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 THE FILED RATE DOCTRINE AND THE INSURANCE ARENA 
 
VONDA MALLICOAT LAUGHLIN* 
 
*** 
 
The article discusses the modern application and jurisprudential 
background of the “filed rate doctrine.” The filed rate doctrine is used by 
courts to uphold the validity of rates approved by regulatory agencies and 
as a bar to claims implicating those rates. The doctrine has enduring 
relevance to the field of insurance litigation and overrides certain common 
legal principles. The article focuses on the broad applicability of the 
doctrine and gives a comprehensive overview of the myriad issues 
impacting its usage. 
The article discusses early cases establishing the doctrine decided  
earlier than the United Supreme Court’s decision in Keogh v. Chicago & 
Northwestern Railway Co., which is often referenced in connection with the 
doctrine’s origination. Based on grounds of legislative intent and the 
perceived unfairness of allowing certain plaintiffs to escape from a 
legislative scheme applicable to others, the article shows how the doctrine 
emerged from judicial deference to federal railroad rate regulations 
enacted by the Interstate Commerce Commission. The filed rate doctrine 
was later expanded to other federally regulated industries including energy 
and telecommunications.  
The applicability of the filed rate doctrine to litigation impacting 
the insurance industry emerged in the mid-1980s. The article highlights a 
number of recent cases showing how various courts have applied the 
doctrine to the insurance industry and how various litigants have attempted 
to avoid the application of it.  
The article delves into a number of issues regarding the filed rate 
doctrine that are specific to the insurance industry and conflicting 
authority regarding application of the doctrine in the insurance arena. The 
                                                                                                                 
* Associate Professor of Business, Carson-Newman College; J.D. University 
of Tennessee College of Law; LL.M. in Insurance Law, University of Connecticut 
School of Law. For invaluable assistance in the development of this article, the 
author thanks Patrick J. Salve, Adjunct Professor, University of Connecticut 
School of Law, former Senior Vice President and Director of Property and 
Casualty Legal Operations, Hartford Fire Insurance Company. The author also 
thanks the members of the Connecticut Insurance Law Journal for assistance in the 
publication of this article. 
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article also discusses the various ways the filed rate doctrine has been 
applied to claims for equitable relief. The article discusses the 
inapplicability of the filed rate doctrine to various claims, including claims 
that an insurer violated insurance regulations. The article also examines 
other typical claims including fraud, charges outside of the basic rate, 
antitrust claims, discrimination claims, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act claims, breach of contract claims, and claims alleging 
the wrongful receipt of kickbacks. The article further discusses the issue of 
administrative review.  
The article concludes by considering the future of the filed rate 
doctrine and predicts its future importance to insurance litigation. 
 
*** 
 
The filed rate doctrine upholds the validity of rates approved by a 
regulatory authority and is often applied to bar claims implicating 
authorized rates. The breadth of the doctrine is in hot dispute, and 
insurance cases address it with increasing frequency.1 Cases interpreting 
the filed rate doctrine confront questions such as the following: 
 
x An insurer refuses to honor a promise to charge a 
policyholder a lower rate than the filed rate charged to 
other policyholders. Will a court enforce the promise?  
x An insurer promises a policyholder additional services 
without an increase in the filed rate? Is that promise 
enforceable? 
x Will a state court consider the filed rate doctrine, or is 
it just a federal issue? Is the McCarran-Ferguson Act 2 
                                                                                                                 
1 See, e.g., Saunders v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 440 F.3d 940, 943-46 (8th Cir. 
2006); Arroyo-Melecio v. P.R. Am. Ins. Co., 398 F.3d 56, 73 (1st Cir. 2005);  
Allen v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 59 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1227-30 (S.D. Ala. 
1999); Schilke v. Wachovia Mortg., No. 09-CV-1363, 2011 WL 4501381, at *8 
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2011); Rios v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 469 F. Supp. 2d 
727, 734-40 (S.D. Iowa 2007); Schermer v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 721 
N.W.2d 307 (Minn. 2006). Compare MacKay v. Superior Court, 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d  
893, 910 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (approving application of the doctrine to property 
and casualty insurance), with Fogel v. Farmers Grp., Inc., 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 61, 74 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (rejecting the doctrine’s application to property and casualty 
insurance). See also Alexander v. Wash. Mut. Inc., No. 07-4425, 2008 WL 
2600323, at *2-3 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 2008).  
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (2006). 
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a consideration in relation to the doctrine? 
x Can injunctive relief regulating future rate charges be 
obtained against an insurer? 
x Will the doctrine be applied to bar enforcement actions 
by the government? 
x Can an insurer take advantage of the filed rate doctrine 
if the regulatory agency is merely a “rubber stamp” 
performing an inadequate review of rates?  
x An insurer wrongfully classifies an insured and 
charges an excessive premium. Is the policyholder 
entitled to a refund? 
x Do policyholders have the right to sue for damages if 
an insurer defrauds a state regulatory agency in order 
to obtain favorable rates?   
x What if the regulatory agency itself is involved in 
accepting bribes from an insurer pertaining to rates? 
Can policyholders go to court, obtain damages from 
the insurer, and have those rates rescinded? 
x What if administrative charges are added in addition to 
a filed rate? Can policyholders use the filed rate 
doctrine to avoid such charges? 
x What if insurers engage in wrongful price fixing? Will 
a court order refunds of illegally charged premiums? 
x Will a court order a refund of excessive premiums 
wrongfully charged to a policyholder who is 
discriminated against on an illegal basis such as race? 
x What about entities other than insurers? Does the 
doctrine, for example, affect suits against mortgage 
lenders who illegally accept kickbacks from property 
insurers? 
 
Understanding the implications of the filed rate doctrine, which is 
also occasionally referenced as the filed tariff doctrine3 or the Keogh 
doctrine,4 is of crucial importance to attorneys confronted with issues such 
                                                                                                                 
3 McCray v. Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 636 F. Supp. 2d 322, 326 (D. Del. 2009). 
4 The Supreme Court first applied the filed rate doctrine to the antitrust area in 
Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co., 260 U.S. 156 (1922), and some 
cases refer to the doctrine by that name. E.g., Blaylock v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 
504 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 1099 n.6 (W.D. Wash. 2007); Amundson & Assoc’s. Art 
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as those set forth above. The doctrine alters the application of many 
commonly accepted legal principles and must be considered in devising 
litigation strategy in any case implicating an insurer’s approved rating 
structure. Establishing that the filed rate doctrine is not an antiquated relic 
living only to a limited extent as some contend,5 this article discusses the 
background of the filed rate doctrine, case law interpreting it, and its 
modern application in the insurance arena.    
Although separation of powers, comity, and legislative intent have 
all been referenced in support of the filed rate doctrine,6 it is most often 
expressed as serving two interests: (1) the prevention of price 
discrimination that is threatened by a judicial determination of rates for 
litigants but not for other policyholders and (2) the preservation of the role 
of agencies in setting rates, often referred to as the “nonjusticiability” 
strand of the doctrine.7 While judicial interest in fairness and 
nondiscrimination in relation to the application of rates is self-evident,8 the 
“nonjusticiability” strand of the doctrine is conceptually more challenging. 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines the term “justiciability” as “[t]he quality or 
state of being appropriate or suitable for adjudication by a court.”9 In 
accord with that definition, courts typically reference the concept in 
connection with avoiding the enmeshment of courts in the rate-making 
process.10 For example, according to the Minnesota Supreme Court in 
Schermer v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company, justiciability concerns 
establish that a court is not well-suited to retroactively reallocate rates and 
                                                                                                                 
Studio, Ltd. v. Nat’l Council on Comp. Ins., Inc., 988 P.2d 1208 (Kan. Ct. App. 
1999). 
5 See, e.g., Amundson, 988 P.2d 1208 at 1213-16 (disagreeing with the 
position that the doctrine is weak and discredited); Richardson v. Standard Guar. 
Ins. Co., 853 A.2d 955, 963 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) (disagreeing with the 
contention that the filed rate doctrine is a bankrupt theory inapplicable to the 
insurance industry). 
6 Schermer, 721 N.W.2d at 307-08. 
7 Wegoland Ltd. v. NYNEX Corp., 27 F.3d 17, 19 (2d Cir. 1994); Schilke v. 
Wachovia Mortg., 705 F. Supp. 2d 932, 942-43 (N.D. Ill. 2010), rev’d on other 
grounds, 758 F. Supp. 2d 542 (N.D. Ill. 2010); Morales v. Attorneys’ Title Ins. 
Fund, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 1418, 1428 (S.D. Fla. 1997).   
8 In Maislin Industries, U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 493 U.S. 116 (1990), 
the U.S. Supreme Court, for example, emphasized  the nondiscriminatory strand of 
the doctrine, rejecting the application of rates obtained by secret negotiation and 
requiring the application of rates duly published and known to all. Id. at 130-31. 
9 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 943 (9th ed. 2009). 
10 E.g., Wegoland Ltd., 27 F.3d at 19; Clark v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 736 
F. Supp. 2d 902, 913 (D.N.J. 2010).   
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determine what rate an agency would find appropriate in place of an 
unlawful rate.11 According to the court in Schermer, rate regulation is an 
“intricate ongoing process,” and judicial interference “may set in motion an 
ever-widening set of consequences and adjustments” that courts are 
powerless to address.12 Similarly, relying on Supreme Court precedent and 
emphasizing the difficulty the judiciary would encounter in attempting to 
determine what reasonable rates in the past should have been, the court in 
Wegoland Ltd. v. NYNEX Corp. stated that “abstract” notions of 
reasonableness are best left for agency determination.13   
The concept of nonjusticiability also encompasses the idea that 
filed rates are available to those affected by them, and that consumers are 
charged with knowledge of those rates. For example, in discussing the 
principle of nonjusticiability, the court in Richardson v. Standard 
Guarantee Insurance Co. stated that the principle “operates on the 
presumption that the plaintiff had knowledge of the filed rates and, thus, 
could not reasonably rely upon the regulated entity's misrepresentations or 
omissions of material facts.”14   
 
I. THE GENESIS OF THE FILED RATE DOCTRINE 
  
Many authorities trace the origination of the filed rate doctrine to 
the United States Supreme Court decision of Keogh v. Chicago & 
Northwestern Railway Co., in which the Supreme Court upheld rates duly 
filed and approved by the now abolished Interstate Commerce Commission 
(the “ICC”)15 against challenges under antitrust laws.16 Case law prior to 
                                                                                                                 
11 Schermer, 721 N.W.2d at 311-12, (citing Keogh v. Chi. & Nw. Ry., 260 
U.S. 156, 164-65 (1922)).   
12 Id. at 315 (quoting Peoples Natural Gas Co. v. Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 
369 N.W.2d 530, 535 (Minn. 1985)). 
13 Wegoland Ltd., 27 F.3d at 19 (quoting Mont.-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Nw. Pub. 
Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 251 (1951)). 
14 Richardson v. Standard Guar. Ins. Co., 853 A.2d 955, 962 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2004) (citing Weinberg v. Sprint Corp., 801 A.2d 281, 287-88 (N.J. 
2002)). 
15 The Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. 
No. 104-88, 109 Stat. 803 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.), 
abolished the ICC and created the Surface Transportation Board to perform many 
of the regulatory functions formerly performed by the ICC. See Friberg v. Kansas 
City S. Ry. Co., 267 F.3d 439, 442 (5th Cir. 2001). 
16 E.g., Knevelbaard Dairies v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 232 F.3d 979, 992 (9th Cir. 
2000); In re N.J. Title Ins. Litig., No. 08-1425, 2009 WL 3233529, at *2 (D.N.J. 
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Keogh, however, establishes that the doctrine had its genesis in much 
earlier cases addressing the role of the ICC following its creation by the 
Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, also referred to as the Act to Regulate 
Commerce.17 For example, the Eleventh Circuit in Taffet v. Southern Co.18 
and the federal district court in McCray v. Fidelity National Title Insurance 
Co.19 trace the doctrine back as far as the 1907 Supreme Court case of 
Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co.,20 in which the 
rating system of the railway involved was challenged as being preferential, 
unjust, and unreasonable.21 The railway in Texas & Pacific Railway Co. 
defended on the basis that the rates at issue had been approved by the ICC. 
In ruling in favor of the railway, although not referencing the filed rate 
doctrine by name, the Court applied its underlying principles noting the 
chaotic effect that would result if both the judiciary and the ICC were 
allowed to address rate disputes.22   
The U.S. Supreme Court in Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall,23 
further referenced the 1913 case Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. 
International Coal Co.,24 as an early filed-rate case. The coal company in 
Pennsylvania Railroad sued the defending railway complaining that it 
wrongfully denied the coal company certain rebates granted to other 
shippers. The Supreme Court agreed that the railroad was bound by the 
filed rate and illegally deviated from it by granting rebates to some.25 
Nevertheless, the plaintiff was unable to adduce proof of damages based on 
the rate differential because, as the Court reasoned, the plaintiff “[h]aving 
paid only the lawful rate . . . was not overcharged, though the favored 
                                                                                                                 
Oct. 5, 2009); Munoz v. PHH Corp., 659 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1099 (E.D. Cal. 2009); 
In re Se. Milk Antitrust Litig., No. 2:08-MD-1000, MDL 1899, 2008 WL 
2368212, at *3-4 (E.D. Tenn. June 06, 2008); Schermer, 721 N.W.2d at 311.   
17 Interstate Commerce Act of Feb. 4, 1887, Ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.). See Kevin M. Decker, The Filed-Rate 
Doctrine: Leaving Regulation to the Regulators, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1351, 
1353-56 (2008) (referencing cases predating Keogh involving the filed rate 
doctrine). 
18 Taffet v. S. Co., 967 F.2d 1483, 1488 (11th Cir. 1992). 
19 McCray v. Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 636 F. Supp. 2d 322, 326 (D. Del. 
2009). 
20 Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 436 (1907). 
21 Id. at 430. 
22 Id. at 441. 
23 Ark. La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 577 (1981). 
24 Penn. R.R. Co. v. Int’l Mining Co., 230 U.S. 184 (1913). 
25 Id. at 197. 
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shipper was illegally undercharged.”26 
Other early Supreme Court decisions, such as Chicago & Alton 
Railroad Co. v. Kirby,27 further laid the groundwork for the modern filed 
rate doctrine.28 Kirby demonstrates that the filed-rate doctrine may apply to 
complaints involving the provision of services, not just to the rates 
themselves.29 Kirby involved a dispute between a shipper and a railroad 
arising after horses failed to arrive as scheduled by expedited delivery via a 
particular train. A railroad representative had promised the shipper a 
deviation from regularly published rates that did not provide for that 
expedited service. Even though upon contracting the shipper did not know 
of the deviation, the Supreme Court refused to enforce the agreement, 
stating that “[t]o guarantee a particular connection and transportation by a 
particular train was to give an advantage or preference not open to all, and 
not provided for in the published tariffs.”30   
 
II. THE CONTINUING VALIDITY OF THE KEOGH DECISION 
 
 Of course, not to be overlooked is the often cited Keogh31 decision, 
which first applied the filed-rate doctrine in the context of antitrust.32 The 
alleged antitrust violation in Keogh was that the defending railways had 
illegally agreed upon shipping rates for excelsior and tow.33 The sole 
                                                                                                                 
26 Id. at 202. 
27 Chi. & Alton R.R. Co. v. Kirby, 225 U.S. 155 (1912). 
28 The U.S. Supreme Court also referenced Louisville & Nashville Railroad 
Co. v. Maxwell, 237 U.S. 94 (1915) as an early case applying the principles later to 
become known as the “filed rate doctrine.” See Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Cent. Office 
Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 222 (1998); Ark. La. Gas Co., 453 U.S. at 582 (1981). The 
term “doctrine” was first used in conjunction with principles construing the effect 
of filed rates in George N. Pierce Co. v. Wells Fargo & Co., 236 U.S. 278, 286 
(1915). 
29 See Kirby, 225 U.S. at 166; see also Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 524 U.S. at 223 
(“Any claim for excessive rates can be couched as a claim for inadequate services 
and vice versa.”).  
30 Kirby, 225 U.S. at 166. 
31 Keogh v. Chicago & Nw. Ry., 260 U.S. 156 (1922).   
32 See Prentice v. Title Ins. Co. of Minn., 500 N.W.2d 658, 661 (Wis. 1993) 
(recognizing that Keogh first applied the filed rate doctrine in the antitrust context). 
33 Keogh, 260 U.S. at 160. In the context of this case, “excelsior” is used to 
mean a “fine curled wood shavings, used esp. for packing fragile items”. 
MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 403 (Merriam 
Webster’s, Inc., 10th ed. 1994). “Tow” is used in this context to mean a “short or 
broken fiber…that is used esp. for yarn, twine, or stuffing.” Id. at 1248.  
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defense was that the rates had been filed with and approved by the 
Interstate Commerce Commission.34 The Supreme Court acknowledged 
that the fact that the rates had been filed would not bar proceedings brought 
by the federal government against the carriers.35 Expressing its concern as 
follows, the Court, however, refused to allow the plaintiff to proceed with 
an antitrust action for price fixing because allowing such actions would 
result in unfairness and discrimination: 
 
If a shipper could recover under section 7 of the Antitrust 
Act for damages resulting from the exaction of a rate 
higher than that which would otherwise have prevailed, the 
amount recovered might, like a rebate, operate to give him 
a preference over his trade competitors. It is no answer to 
say that each of these might bring a similar action under 
section 7. Uniform treatment would not result, even if all 
sued, unless the highly improbable happened, and the 
several juries and courts gave to each the same measure of 
relief.36 
 
Another factor influencing the Court involved the responsibility of 
the ICC to address rates in the first instance. The Court rejected as 
unworkable the suggestion that it suspend proceedings pending a later 
determination of the discrimination issue by the ICC: 
 
The powers conferred upon the Commission are broad. It 
may investigate and decide whether a rate has been, 
whether it is, or whether it would be, discriminatory. But 
by no conceivable proceeding could the question whether a 
hypothetical lower rate would under conceivable 
conditions have been discriminatory, be submitted to the 
Commission for determination. And that hypothetical 
question is one with which plaintiff would necessarily be 
confronted at a trial.37 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
34 Keogh, 260 U.S. at 160. 
35 Id. at 162. 
36 Id. at 163.  
37 Id. at 164. 
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The final factor addressed by the Keogh Court was the likely 
impossibility of computing damages with any amount of accuracy.38 Since 
the carriers were charging the legal rate, damages could not flow from the 
amount the charges exceeded the legal rate.39 Additionally, had charges 
been lowered, all competitors would have been entitled to have been put on 
a parity with Keogh rendering speculative whether Keogh’s business would 
have benefited at all by the lowering of rates.40 
Over the years, acceptance of the Keogh decision diminished.41 
Following the Second Circuit’s criticism of the filed-rate doctrine in 
Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff,42 an opinion authored by Judge 
Henry J. Friendly, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to address 
the doctrine’s continuing validity.43 The petitioners in Square D claimed 
that the defending motor carriers and a rating bureau engaged in illegal 
price fixing and other activities in violation of section one of the Sherman 
Act.44 The Supreme Court addressed the argument that developments in the 
law undermined Keogh, including the rise of class actions, which arguably 
relieved some concern regarding unfair rebates; the emergence of support 
for treble damages; greater sophistication in evaluating damages; and the 
development of procedures to stay judicial proceedings pending regulatory 
action.45 Nevertheless, the Court refused to overrule Keogh finding 
pertinent Congress’ failure to disturb the principles set forth in Keogh 
during the intervening sixty-five years.46 The Court relied heavily upon the 
fact that while Congress was clearly aware of the Keogh rule when it 
passed the Reed-Bulwinkle Act,47 addressing rating systems of rail carriers, 
and enacted the Motor Carrier Act of 1980,48 Congress did not overturn the 
                                                                                                                 
38 Id. at 164-65. 
39 Id. at 165. 
40 Keogh, 260 U.S. at 165. 
41 See generally McCray v. Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 636 F. Supp. 2d 322, 326-
27 (D. Del. 2009) (discussing the history of the doctrine and questions regarding 
its continued validity). 
42 Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 760 F.2d 1347, 1352-
54 (2d Cir. 1985), aff’d, 476 U.S. 409 (1986). 
43 Square D Co., 476 U.S. at 417. 
44 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006)). 
45 Square D Co., 476 U.S. at 423. 
46 Id. 
47 Reed-Bulwinkle Act, Pub. L. No. 80-662, 62 Stat. 472 (1948) (codified as 
amended at 49 U.S.C. § 10706 (2006)). 
48 Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.). 
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principles set forth in Keogh.49 According to the Supreme Court, “[i]f there 
is to be an overruling of the Keogh rule, it must come from Congress, 
rather than from this Court.”50 
 
III. EXTENSION OF THE FILED RATE DOCTRINE TO THE 
ENERGY AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRIES 
 
The principles underlying the filed rate doctrine, first spawned in 
disputes involving the ICC, were well established in other utilities prior to 
general recognition in the insurance industry. Courts addressing the role of 
the filed rate doctrine in insurance disputes often glean guiding principles 
from decisions involving other regulated industries.   
The Supreme Court first applied the filed rate doctrine to the 
electrical industry in Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Northwestern Public 
Service Co.,51 a case in which the plaintiff alleged that the defendant’s 
fraudulent acts let to the imposition of excessive rates in violation of the 
Federal Power Act.52 Although the rates involved had been approved by the 
Federal Power Commission, the plaintiff claimed that through a system of 
an interlocking directorate and joint officers, its predecessor was 
overcharged by the defendant. Refusing to accept that position and 
upholding the authority of the Commission, the Supreme Court stated that 
the complainant could claim “no rate as a legal right that is other than the 
filed rate, whether fixed or merely accepted by the Commission, and not 
even a court can authorize commerce in the commodity on other terms.”53  
In rejection of a gas supplier’s breach of contract claim, the filed 
rate doctrine was first applied by the Supreme Court in the natural gas 
arena in Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall.54 The Supreme Court 
recognized that pursuant to the filed rate doctrine, the supplier was 
                                                                                                                 
49 Square D Co., 476 U.S. at 418-20. 
50 Id. at 424. 
51 Mont.-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Nw. Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246 (1951). 
52 Id. at 250 n.6 (The plaintiff relied on a provision of the act requiring that 
rates be “just and reasonable.”). 
53 Id.  
54 Ark. La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 599 (1981). According to the Justice 
Steven’s dissent, although earlier cases had marked the contours of the doctrine, 
the case marked the first time the term “filed rate doctrine” had been used by the 
Supreme Court.  Id. at 599 (Stevens, J., dissenting). No mention was made of the 
earlier case of  George N. Pierce Co. v. Wells Fargo & Co., 236 U.S. 278 (1915), 
cited in footnote 28,  referencing “the doctrine of the conclusiveness of the filed 
rates.” Id. at 286. 
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forbidden to charge rates for its services other than those properly filed 
with the appropriate regulatory authority and that the judiciary lacked 
authority to impose a different rate.55 According to the Court, “under the 
filed rate doctrine, when there is a conflict between the filed rate and the 
contract rate, the file rate controls.”56   
In American Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Central Office 
Telephone, Inc, a case often cited in disputes involving insurance, the 
Supreme Court applied the filed rate doctrine in the telecommunications 
context.57 The case originated when Central Office Telephone, Inc. 
(“COT”), sued American Telephone and Telegraph Co. (“AT&T”) for 
breach of contract and tortuous interference with contract following 
problems encountered with AT&T’s provision of communication services 
for resale. Among the allegations were that AT&T failed to deliver various 
promised services and billing options in addition to those set forth in its 
filed rates.58 AT&T defended on the basis that it was required by the 
Communications Act to file tariffs containing all charges and 
classifications and that COT’s lawsuit seeking damages based upon unfiled 
criteria was barred by the filed rate doctrine.59 Recognizing the importance 
of preventing unreasonable and discriminatory charges, the Supreme Court 
applied the filed rate doctrine and dismissed the claims.60 The Court 
recognized that discrimination may exist in the form of a lower price for a 
service offered to some but not all, or in the form of enhanced services at a 
price not offered to all.61 Supporting its decision, the Court cited cases 
arising under the Interstate Commerce Act, including Chicago & Alton 
Railroad Co. v. Kirby,62 referenced above, in which the Court refused to 
enforce a shipper’s contract promising a service not contained in the 
railroad’s filed tariffs. 
                                                                                                                 
55 Ark. La. Gas Co., 453 U.S. at 577-78 (majority opinion). 
56 Id. at 582. 
57 Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Cent. Office Tel. Inc., 524 U.S. 214 (1998). This 
case is often cited in disputes involving insurance. See, e.g., In re Title Ins. 
Antitrust Cases, 702 F. Supp. 2d 840 (N.D. Ohio 2010); Rios v. State Farm Fire 
and Cas. Co., 469 F. Supp. 2d 727, 735 (S.D. Iowa 2007); Lumpkin v. Farmers 
Grp., Inc., No. 05-2868 MA/V, 2007 WL 6996584 (W.D. Tenn. Apr 26, 2007); 
Allen v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 59 F. Supp. 2d 1217 (S.D. Ala. 1999). 
58 Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 524 U.S. at 220. 
59 Id. at 221. 
60 Id. at 223. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 224 (citing Chi. & Alton R.R. Co. v. Kirby, 225 U.S. 155, 163, 165 
(1912). 
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IV. EXTENSION OF THE FILED RATE DOCTRINE TO THE 
INSURANCE INDUSTRY 
 
The first insurance cases addressing the application of the filed rate 
doctrine occurred in the latter 1980’s and 1990’s, with the majority decided 
within the last decade. This seems rather late in view of the fact that the 
doctrine had been applied for many years in other regulated areas. The 
1986 decision of the Supreme Court in Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier 
Tariff,63 reaffirming the validity of the doctrine, may have resulted in 
increased attention to its applicability. 
Although not referencing the term “filed rate doctrine,” the 1986 
decision of Anzinger v. Illinois State Medical Inter-Insurance Exchange,64 
was one of the first cases to apply the concepts underlying the filed rate 
doctrine in the context of insurance. The plaintiff physicians in Anzinger 
sought a refund of malpractice premiums collected pursuant to a rate 
schedule approved by the Illinois Director of Insurance but found to be 
excessive and unfairly discriminatory upon later judicial review.65 The 
court refused to order a refund of the premiums believing that recognition 
of a private right of action would interfere with authority granted to the 
state’s department of insurance.66 The court recognized as follows that the 
filed rates were the only rates that could be charged at the time the 
premiums were paid: 
 
[W]hen the agency or body sets the rates, these then are the 
only lawful rates that can be charged and remain such until 
overturned or set aside by a court . . . [T]here is no basis 
                                                                                                                 
63 Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, 476 U.S. 409, 424 (1986). 
64 Anzinger v. Ill. State Med. Inter-Ins. Exch., 494 N.E.2d 655, 657 (Ill. App. 
1986). Interestingly, the decision in Anzinger was issued on May 27, 1986, the 
same day as the decision in Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff. See also 
Prentice v. Title Ins. Co. of Minn., 500 N.W.2d 658, 663 (Wis. 1993) (applying the 
doctrine to state antitrust claims against insurers); In re Empire Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield Customer Litig. v. Weissman, 622 N.Y.S.2d 843 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994), aff’d 
sub nom. Minihane v. Weissman, 226 A.D.2d 152 (N.Y. 1996) (applying the 
doctrine to bar claims of fraud and breach of contract); Calico Trailer Mfg. Co. v. 
Ins. Co. of N. Am., No. LR-C-93-717, 1994 WL 823554, at *3 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 12, 
1994) (applying the doctrine to bar allegations of antitrust violations and other 
state law claims). Courts in these insurance cases relied heavily on cases from 
other industries approving application of the doctrine. 
65 Anzinger, 494 N.E.2d at 656. 
66 Id. at 658. 
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for a refund under such circumstances if a rate was 
subsequently set aside because the government agency had 
determined that the initial rate was reasonable and that 
only this rate could be charged.67 
 
 In attempting to avoid the effects of the filed rate doctrine, 
plaintiffs may attempt to distinguish the insurance industry from other 
regulated industries. For example, the plaintiff in Horwitz ex rel. Gilbert v. 
Bankers Life and Casualty Co. argued against extending the filed rate 
doctrine to insurance disputes claiming that it was only appropriate in areas 
involving highly regulated and monopolistic activities, namely the shipping 
and power industries.68 Recognizing, however, the lack of authority 
supporting the plaintiff’s position, the court proceeded to apply the 
doctrine.69 Similarly, in rejecting the plaintiff’s position that the filed rate 
doctrine should be applied only to areas traditionally thought of as utilities, 
the federal district court in Korte v. Allstate Insurance Co. stated that the 
doctrine was “equally applicable to the insurance industry as to other 
industries where a state agency determines reasonable rates pursuant to a 
statutory scheme.”70   
In applying the doctrine to a controversy involving homeowner’s 
insurance, the court in Rios v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. noted that 
while the doctrine’s roots lie in cases decided under the Interstate 
Commerce Act, it has spread “across the spectrum of regulated utilities.”71 
The following factors were referenced by the court as pertinent in 
determining the filed rate doctrine’s application to a new area: 
 
(1) the impact the court's decision will have on agency 
procedures and rate determinations; (2) whether there is an 
administrative agency to review the claim and provide a 
remedy; (3) whether there is meaningful review of rate 
increases; and (4) whether the damages are based upon the 
difference between the filed rate and the rate that would 
have been charged absent some alleged wrongdoing.72 
                                                                                                                 
67 Id. at 657. 
68  Horwitz v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 745 N.E.2d 591, 601 (Ill. App. 2001). 
69  Id. at 604. 
70 Korte v. Allstate Ins. Co., 48 F. Supp. 2d 647, 651 (E.D. Tex. 1999). 
71 Rios v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 469 F. Supp. 2d 727, 734 (S.D. Iowa 
2007) (quoting Ark. La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 577 (1981)). 
72 Rios, 469 F. Supp. 2d at 736 (citing Allan Kanner, The Filed Rate Doctrine 
and Insurance Fraud Litigation, 76 N.D. L. REV. 1, 3 (2000)). 
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In ruling that the doctrine should be applied in the insurance 
industry, the South Carolina Supreme Court in Edge v. State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Co., further discussed rationale supporting the 
doctrine as follows: 
 
Courts which have adopted the filed rate doctrine have 
given several reasons for doing so, including: (1) 
preserving the agency's authority to determine the 
reasonableness of rates; (2) recognizing the agency's 
expertise with regard to that industry, whereas courts do 
not; (3) allowing an action would undermine the regulatory 
scheme because the statute allows for enforcement by the 
appropriate state officers; and (4) allowing an action may 
result in different prices being paid by victorious plaintiffs 
than non-suing ratepayers, which violates the statutory 
scheme of uniform rates.73 
 
As case law has developed, acceptance of the filed rate doctrine in 
the insurance arena is the norm rather than the exception. For example, 
recognizing the number of cases supporting the doctrine, the court in 
Richardson v. Standard Guaranty Insurance Co., stated that “[w]e, thus, 
align our decision with the considerable weight of authority from other 
jurisdictions that have applied the filed rate doctrine to ratemaking in the 
insurance industry.”74 In support of its decision, the court relied on the 
extensive regulation of the insurance industry and its perception that courts 
are not institutionally suited to regulate insurance premium and benefit 
rates.75 Similarly, in applying the filed rate doctrine in the context of 
property insurance, the court in the recent case of Schilke v. Wachovia 
Mortg. stated that “[n]umerous courts have held, contrary to Plaintiff's 
contention, that the filed rate doctrine applies to the insurance industry.”76 
Nevertheless, controversy regarding the application of the filed rate 
                                                                                                                 
73 Edge v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 623 S.E.2d 387, 391-92 (S.C. 
2005). 
74 Richardson v. Standard Guar. Ins. Co., 853 A.2d 955, 963 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2004). 
75 Id.  
76 Schilke v. Wachovia Mortg., No. 09-CV-1363, 2011 WL 4501381, at *8 
(N.D. Ill. Sep. 28, 2011) (citing Schermer v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 702 
N.W.2d 898, 907 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005); Richardson, 853 A.2d at 964; Horwitz v. 
Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 745 N.E.2d 591 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001); Anzinger v. Ill. 
State Med. Inter–Ins. Exch., 494 N.E.2d 655 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)). 
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doctrine in insurance cases continues. For example, in In re Title Insurance 
Antitrust Cases, when confronted with a lack of case law on the subject in 
that jurisdiction, the federal district court for the Northern District of Ohio 
ruled that the filed rate doctrine should be applied in the insurance context 
to bar claims for damages arising under Ohio state, as well as federal, 
antitrust laws.77 On the other hand, a year later, in Clark v. Prudential 
Insurance Co. of America, a federal district court in New Jersey recently 
disagreed and ruled that Ohio courts would not apply the filed rate doctrine 
to insurance disputes arising under Ohio law.78 Controversy regarding the 
doctrine’s application is further illustrated by the recent conflicting 
decisions of MacKay v. Superior Court79 and Fogel v. Farmers Group, 
Inc.,80 involving application of the doctrine to property and casualty 
insurance in California.   
As discussed further in specific topics in this article, courts 
refusing to apply the doctrine in the insurance context reference reasons 
including concerns with federalism81 and perceived insufficiency of 
administrative review.82 The court in Hanson v. Acceleration Life 
Insurance Co. also raised the lack of opportunity for public input into rate 
determinations in support of its decision rejecting application of the 
doctrine to an insurance dispute.83   
Furthermore, even after the doctrine is accepted in a jurisdiction in 
one area of insurance, opponents may resist its extension into other areas. 
For example, as set forth above, the Anzinger decision, arising in state court 
in Illinois, applied the principles underlying the filed rate doctrine to deny 
recovery to physicians who were overcharged for insurance. Later, in 
Schilke v. Wachovia Mortgage, FSB,84 a case based on diversity 
jurisdiction and construing Illinois law, the plaintiff claimed that the 
doctrine should not be extended to insurance disputes involving property. 
                                                                                                                 
77 In re Title Ins. Antitrust Cases, 702 F. Supp. 2d 840, 861-64 (N.D. Ohio 
2010). 
78 Clark v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., No. Civ. 08-6197 (DRD), 2011 WL 
940729, at *12-14 (D.N.J. Mar. 15, 2011). 
79 MacKay v. Superior Ct., 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 893 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010). 
80 Fogel v. Farmers Grp., Inc., 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 61 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).  
81 See Saunders v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 440 F.3d 940, 945 (8th Cir. 2006). 
82 See, e.g., Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386 (9th Cir. 1992); 
Blaylock v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 504 F. Supp. 2d 1091 (W.D. Wash. 2007). 
83 Hanson v. Acceleration Life Ins. Co., No. CIV A3-97-152, 1999 WL 
33283345, at *4 (D. N.D. Mar. 16, 1999). 
84 Schilke v. Wachovia Mortg., 705 F. Supp. 2d 932 (N.D. Ill. 2010), vacated 
on other grounds, 758 F. Supp. 2d 549 (N.D. Ill. 2010). 
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Citing a number of cases in support, the court recognized, however, that 
application of the doctrine in the context of property insurance was 
consistent with the weight of authority. 85 In support of its decision, the 
court cited the goal of preventing discrimination among policyholders and 
also the nonjusticiability strand of the doctrine placing authority for rates 
with the department of insurance, not the court system.86   
 
V. THE RELATION OF THE FILED RATE DOCTRINE TO THE 
MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT 
 
When considering claims against insurers, examination of the 
interplay between the filed rate doctrine and the McCarran-Ferguson Act87 
may be helpful. The McCarran-Ferguson Act provides in pertinent part that 
“[n]o Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede 
any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of 
insurance…unless the Act specifically relates to the business of 
insurance.”88 Certain exceptions involve the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, 
and the Federal Trade Commission Act to the extent that state law fails to 
regulate the business of insurance.89 
An example of the interplay between the two defenses is illustrated 
in the case of Saunders v. Farmers Insurance Exchange involving alleged 
discrimination in the provision of homeowners’ insurance.90 The court in 
Saunders declined to apply the filed rate doctrine to the claims of 
discrimination at issue but remanded the case for further consideration on 
the basis that it could not be determined on the record presented whether 
application of the federal anti-discrimination laws involved would impair 
the state’s system of insurance rate regulation in violation of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act.91   
The defendants in Sandwich Chef of Texas, Inc. v. Reliance 
                                                                                                                 
85 Id. at 942 (citing Richardson v. Standard Guar. Ins. Co., 853 A.2d 955, 964 
(N.J. Super. App. Div. 2004); Schermer v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 702 
N.W.2d 898, 907 (Minn. App. Ct. 2005); Horwitz v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 745 
N.E.2d 591 (Ill. App. 2001); Anzinger v. Ill. State Med. Inter-Ins. Exch., 494 
N.E.2d 655 (Ill. App. 1986)).  
86 Schilke, 705 F. Supp. 2d at 942-43. 
87 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (2006).  
88 Id. at § 1012(b). 
89 Id. 
90 Saunders v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 440 F.3d 940 (8th Cir. 2006).   
91 Id. at 945-46. The ruling of the court in Saunders on the filed rate doctrine is 
discussed further in Section XVII, B, infra. 
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National Indemnity Insurance Co. also raised both the filed rate doctrine 
and the McCarran-Ferguson Act as defenses.92 On the basis that the 
plaintiffs sought to apply, not avoid, the filed rate, the court refused to find 
that the filed rate doctrine barred the plaintiffs’ RICO claims involving 
alleged overcharges for worker’s compensation insurance.93 In regard to the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act, the defendants claimed that awarding the 
plaintiffs treble damages under RICO for fraudulent departures from the 
filed rates would “frustrate non-discrimination policies declared in state 
insurance laws requiring insurers to collect the full amount of any 
applicable filed rate.”94 The court, however, disagreed ruling that the 
remedies available for fraud under RICO complemented, rather than 
conflicted, with state regulations.95   
Another case highlighting the fact that both the filed rate doctrine 
and the McCarran-Ferguson Act should be considered as defenses in 
insurance cases is In re Title Insurance Antitrust Cases.96 The court in that 
case ruled that the McCarran-Ferguson Act completely barred plaintiff’s 
claims for both damages and injunctive relief although the court believed 
that the filed rate doctrine standing alone would have allowed claims for 
injunctive relief.97   
  Litigants in insurance cases involving interplay between federal 
and state law should consider both the filed rate doctrine and the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act, as either could provide grounds for dismissal. 
Although both may involve the regulatory processes involved in the setting 
of rates, the legal theories underlying the two defenses are distinct and 
separate.   
 
VI. THE RELATION OF THE FILED RATE DOCTRINE TO THE 
STATE ACTION DOCTRINE 
 
A theory referred to as the “state action doctrine” may bar an 
antitrust claim if the defense can establish the state’s intent to replace 
competition with state regulation and the state’s active supervision of the 
                                                                                                                 
92 Sandwich Chef of Tex. v. Reliance Nat’l Indem. Ins. Co., 111 F. Supp. 2d 
867, 874-77 (S.D. Tex. 2000). 
93 Id. at 874-75. 
94 Id. at 872. 
95 Id. at 877. 
96 In re Title Ins. Antitrust Cases, 702 F. Supp. 2d 840 (N.D. Ohio 2010). 
97 Id. at 877-78. 
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conduct at issue.98 As recognized in Arroyo-Melecio v. Puerto Rican 
American Insurance Co.,99 in order to justify state action immunity, “[t]he 
state must manifest intent to intervene in the market, displacing antitrust 
laws and must engage in active supervision of the challenged conduct.”100 
The doctrine requires first that the challenged restraint on trade “be one 
clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy” and second 
that the policy “be actively supervised by the State itself.”101 
 The court in In re Pennsylvania Title Insurance Antitrust 
Litigation recognized that the filed rate doctrine and the state action 
doctrine constitute two independent bases for antitrust immunity.102 A 
significantly lower standard of administrative review, however, is required 
in regard to the filed rate doctrine as compared to the state action 
doctrine.103 Because the standard of administrative supervision required for 
application of the state action doctrine is higher, the filed rate doctrine 
would likely result in a viable defense in a larger number of cases.  
The plaintiffs in N.C. Steel, Inc. v. National Council on 
Compensation Insurance presented a novel theory to the effect that the 
filed rate doctrine was subsumed and made inapplicable by the state action 
doctrine; that the second prong of the state action doctrine requiring active 
state regulation was not met under the circumstances of that case; and that 
their lawsuit was, therefore, viable.104 The court, however, refused to 
follow the plaintiffs’ reasoning and instead applied the filed rate doctrine to 
dismiss the claims.105 No cases were cited in support of the plaintiffs’ 
                                                                                                                 
98 See N.C. Steel, Inc. v. Nat’l Council on Comp. Ins., 496 S.E.2d 369, 374 
(N.C. 1998). 
99 Arroyo-Melecio v. P.R. Am. Ins. Co., 398 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2005). 
100 Id. at 71 (citing I AREEDA AND HOVENKAMP,  ANTITRUST LAW, ¶ 221c (2d 
ed. 2000)). 
101 Id. at 71 (quoting Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, 
Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980)). 
102 In re Pa. Title Ins. Antitrust Litig., 648 F. Supp. 2d 663, 677 n.10 (E.D. Pa. 
2009). 
103 Arroyo-Melecio, 398 F.3d at 71; In re Pa. Title Ins. Antitrust Litig., 648 F. 
Supp. 2d at 677 n.10; In re N.J. Title Ins. Litig., No. CIV.A. 08-1425, 2009 WL 
3233529, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 05, 2009).  
104 N.C. Steel, Inc. v. Nat’l Council on Comp. Ins., 496 S.E.2d 369, 374 (N.C. 
1998). 
105 Id. On the basis that neither prong of the defense was met, another case 
refusing to apply the state action doctrine to bar claims of anti-competitive activity 
is State ex rel. Cooper v. McClure, No. 03-CVS-005617, 2004 WL 2965983, at 
*10-11 (N.C. Super. Dec. 14, 2004), rev’d on other grounds, No. 03-CVS-005617, 
2005 WL 3018635 (N.C. Oct. 28, 2005). 
2012 FILED RATE DOCTRINE 391 
position that the state action subsumed the filed rate doctrine, and other 
cases do not hold as such. 
 
VII. FILED RATES V. FILED FORMS 
 
The filed rate doctrine is more appropriately viewed as applying to 
insurance rates, not insurance forms. For example, in Peachtree Casualty 
Insurance Co., v. Sharpton, the Supreme Court of Alabama rejected the 
insurer’s position that based on regulatory approval of its policy provisions, 
the filed rate doctrine barred claims against it for uninsured motorist 
protection. 106 The insurer had issued a policy excluding uninsured motorist 
coverage for injuries incurred during the use of certain vehicles such as 
motorcycles. The problem for the insurer was that the exclusion conflicted 
with the Alabama statutory requirements for uninsured motorist 
protection.107 Stating that no rate case was involved, the court refused to 
apply the filed rate doctrine to bar the claims for uninsured motorist 
protection.108 Similarly, in rejecting a “filed form doctrine” defense, the 
court in Southern Farm Bureau Life Insurance Co. v. Banko observed that 
no cases were cited indicating that regulatory approval of a form barred a 
lawsuit over policy language.109  
The background and history of the filed rate doctrine uphold the 
position that it fails to bar complaints implicating forms. The justiciability 
strand of the doctrine supports the belief that courts should not become 
enmeshed in the rate-making process through attempting to retroactively 
reallocate rates and determine what rate an agency would find appropriate 
in place of an unlawful rate in relation to all interested parties.110 
Complaints regarding forms are on a different footing and do not implicate 
the same concerns.  
The existence of at least one case supporting a filed form type of 
doctrine, however, should be noted. In AMEX Assurance Co. v. 
Caripides,111 the court upheld policy language contained in an insurance 
                                                                                                                 
106 Peachtree Casualty Ins. Co. v. Sharpton, 768 So. 2d 368, 373 (Ala. 2000).  
107 Id. at 372. 
108 Id. at 373. 
109 S. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co. v. Banko, No. 8:06CV840T27EAJ, 2006 WL 
2935281, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 13, 2006). 
110 See Wegoland Ltd. v. NYNEX Corp., 27 F.3d 17, 19 (2nd Cir. 1994); 
Schermer v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 721 N.W.2d 307, 312 (Minn. 2006) 
(citing Keogh v. Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156, 164-65 (1922)).   
111 AMEX Assur. Co. v. Carpides, 179 F. Supp. 2d 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), 
aff’d, AMEX Assur. Co. v. Carpides, 316 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2003).  
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policy against a claim that the policy violated state statutory requirements. 
In addition to finding no conflict with the statute involved, the court noted 
that “[a] line of cases on the ‘filed rate doctrine’ suggests that the Insurance 
Department's review and approval of a policy is presumptively valid and 
cannot be subsequently judicially challenged as unfair or violative of public 
policy.”112 Both cases cited in support of the court’s statement, City of New 
York v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,113 and Byan v. Prudential Insurance 
Co. of America,114 however, addressed filed rates, not filed forms.115 
 
VIII. THE RELATION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAW 
 
During the evolution of the filed rate doctrine, issues involving the 
interplay between federal and state law have surfaced. One such area 
examined below involves the application of the doctrine to administrative 
review performed by state, as opposed to federal, agencies. This is a 
significant issue in the insurance area since the filing of insurance rates 
with state agencies is the norm. Other issues involve the application of the 
doctrine to claims based solely on state law, and the interplay between state 
and federal law as applied to disputes.   
 
A. APPLICATION OF THE FILED RATE DOCTRINE TO RATES 
REGULATED BY STATE AGENCIES 
 
 There is authority that the filed rate doctrine should only be applied 
when rates are reviewed in conjunction with a federal regulatory system as 
opposed to a state regulatory system. For example, the Montana Supreme 
Court in Williams v. Union Fidelity Life Insurance Co.,116 refused to apply 
the doctrine to an insurance dispute because the rates at issue were not set, 
reviewed, or filed with a federal regulatory authority.117 Similarly, in 
                                                                                                                 
112 Id. at 319 n.5 (citing City of N.Y. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 693 N.Y.S.2d 
139 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999); Byan v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 662 N.Y.S.2d 44, 
45 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)). 
113 City of N.Y. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 693 N.Y.S.2d 139 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1999). 
114 Byan v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 662 N.Y.S.2d 44, 45 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1997). 
115 Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 693 N.Y.S.2d at 140; Byan, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 45.  
116 Williams v. Union Fid. Life Ins. Co., 123 P.3d 213 (Mont. 2005).  
117 Id. at 219. 
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Miletak v. Allstate Insurance Co.,118 a case involving an insurance premium 
dispute, the court stated that “the doctrine does not directly apply to a 
situation, as here, involving potential interference with rates set by a state 
agency rather than a federal agency.”119   
As discussed below, the better and more prevailing view, however, 
is that the doctrine applies to rates reviewed by state insurance 
departments. There seems to be no logical reason to limit application of the 
doctrine to federal agency review only. In applying the filed rate doctrine to 
state agency review, the court in Taffet v. Southern Co.,120 stated that 
“where the legislature has conferred power upon an administrative agency 
to determine the reasonableness of a rate, the rate-payer ‘can claim no rate 
as a legal right that is other than the filed rate’.”121 According to the Taffet 
court, that central principle of the filed rate doctrine “applies with equal 
force” regardless of whether rate setting is done by a state or federal 
authority.122   
Recognizing the weight of authority supporting application of the 
doctrine to rates authorized by state agencies, the court in McCray v. 
Fidelity National Title Insurance Co.,123 stated that “we will preclude the 
recovery of treble damages for a Sherman Act claim predicated on the 
alleged excessiveness or otherwise unreasonableness of a rate filed with a 
state administrative agency.”124 Other insurance cases finding that the filed 
rate doctrine applies to state agency review include In re Title Ins. Antitrust 
Cases,125 In re Pennsylvania Title Insurance Antitrust Litigation,126 Allen v. 
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,127 Schermer v. State Farm Fire & 
                                                                                                                 
118 Miletak v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. C 06-03778 (JW), 2010 WL 809579 (N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 05, 2010).  
119 Id. at *4. 
120 Taffet v. S. Co., 967 F.2d 1483 (11th Cir. 1992). 
121 Id. at 1494 (quoting Mont.-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Nw. Pub. Serv. Co., 341 
U.S. 246, 251 (1951)). 
122 Id. 
123 McCray v. Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 636 F. Supp. 2d 322 (D. Del. 2009).  
124 Id. at 328  
125 In re Title Ins. Antitrust Cases, 702 F. Supp. 2d 840, 861 (N.D. Ohio 
2010).   
126 In re Pa. Title Ins. Antitrust Litig., 648 F. Supp. 2d 663, 672 (E.D. Pa. 
2009). 
127 Allen v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 59 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1228 (S.D. Ala. 
1999).  
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Casualty Co.,128 MacKay v. Superior Court,129 and Commonwealth ex rel. 
Chandler v. Anthem Insurance Co.130   
 
B. APPLICATION OF THE FILED RATE DOCTRINE TO STATE LAW 
CLAIMS 
 
 Assuming that state agency review supports application of the filed 
rate doctrine, a separate issue is whether the doctrine applies to state law 
claims as well as to claims made under federal law. Of course, as 
recognized by the North Carolina Supreme Court in N.C. Steel, Inc. v. 
National Council on Compensation Insurance, federal law applying the 
filed rate doctrine is not controlling in a case involving violation of state 
law.131 The doctrine, however, is often adopted and applied to state law 
claims, as was the case in N.C. Steel, Inc. in response to a challenge to the 
state’s workers’ compensation rating system.132   
 In re Title Insurance Antitrust Cases provides a comprehensive 
discussion of the court’s decision to apply the principles underlying the 
filed rate doctrine to bar state law antitrust claims.133 Ohio courts had not 
specifically ruled on whether the filed rate doctrine barred a suit for 
damages brought by a private plaintiff under state law alleging, for 
example, an antitrust violation.134 The court found persuasive, however, 
Ohio Supreme Court authority barring regulated entities from charging 
rates higher than those properly filed.135 According to the court, case law 
applying that “corollary to the filed rate doctrine,” supported the conclusion 
                                                                                                                 
128 Schermer v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 721 N.W.2d 307, 312 (Minn. 
2006). 
129 MacKay v. Superior Court, 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 893, 899 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2010). 
130 Commonwealth ex rel. Chandler v. Anthem Ins. Co., 8 S.W.3d 48, 52 (Ky. 
Ct. App. 1999). 
131 N.C. Steel, Inc. v. Nat’l Council on Comp. Ins., 496 S.E.2d 369, 374 (N.C. 
1998).  See also In re Pa. Title Ins. Antitrust Litig., 648 F. Supp. 2d 663, 673 n.7 
(E.D. Pa. 2009) (holding state law is the overriding authority in determining if the 
filed rate doctrine applies to state law claims). 
132 N.C. Steel, Inc., 496 S.E.2d at 371. 
133 In re Title Ins. Antitrust Cases 702 F. Supp. 2d 840, 861-65 (N.D. Ohio 
2010). 
134 Id. at 861-65. 
135 Id. at 862 (citing In re Investigation of Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 609 
N.E.2d 156 (Ohio 1993)). 
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that the Ohio Supreme Court would apply the filed rate doctrine to the state 
antitrust claims involved.136 
Another example of the doctrine’s application to state law claims 
occurs in Amundson & Associates Art Studio, Ltd. v. National Council on 
Compensation Insurance, Inc., in which the plaintiff argued that the filed 
rate doctrine was a weak and discredited relic continuing to exist only at 
the federal level.137 The court noted a California case cited by the plaintiff 
as authority for the proposition that the doctrine should not apply at the 
state law level.138 Nevertheless, recognizing the importance of preserving 
the integrity of agency decision making, the court upheld application of the 
doctrine to claims that state antitrust statutes were violated.139  
 
C. APPLICATION OF STATE AND FEDERAL LAW IN CONSTRUCTION OF 
THE FILED RATE DOCTRINE 
 
Although state law is controlling in relation to state law claims,140 
courts addressing the doctrine’s application in such cases typically find 
federal law relevant as well.141 In addressing solely federal antitrust claims, 
the federal district court in In re Pennsylvania Title Insurance Antitrust 
Litigation also expressed the opinion that it could “fill in the interstices of 
the doctrine by drawing on state law.”142 In support of that conclusion, the 
court cited the United States Supreme Court decision of Kamen v. Kemper 
Financial Services, Inc.143 In Kamen, the Court stated that“[t]he 
presumption that state law should be incorporated into federal common law 
is particularly strong in areas in which private parties have entered legal 
relationships with the expectation that their rights and obligations would be 
governed by state-law standards.”144   
                                                                                                                 
136 Id. 
137 Amundson & Assocs. Art Studio, Ltd. v. Nat’l Council on Comp. Ins., Inc., 
988 P.2d 1208, 1213 (Kan. App. Ct. 1999). 
138 Id. at 1214 (citing Cellular Plus, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 308 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1993)). 
139 Id. at 1215-16. 
140 In re Pa. Title Ins. Antitrust Litig., 648 F. Supp. 2d 663, 673 n.7 (E.D. Pa. 
2009). 
141 See Allen v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 59 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1227-30 
(S.D. Ala. 1999); Prentice v. Title Ins. Co. of Minn., 500 N.W.2d 658, 660-62 
(Wis. 1993).   
142 In re Pa. Title Ins. Antitrust Litig., 648 F. Supp. 2d at 673.  
143 Id. (citing Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Serv., Inc., 500 U.S. 90 (1991)). 
144 Kamen, 500 U.S. at 98.   
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Finding pertinent the fact that the federal antitrust claims presented 
involved application of the filed rate doctrine to a Pennsylvania regulatory 
agency, the court in In re Pennsylvania Title Insurance found “especially 
relevant” the treatment of the filed rate doctrine under Pennsylvania state 
law.145 In reliance on Pennsylvania Title Insurance Antitrust Litigation, the 
court in Clark v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America likewise recognized 
that in construing the filed rate doctrine, state law may be used to “fill in 
the interstices” of federal common law.146  
 
IX. THE AVAILABILITY OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF TO PRIVATE 
PLAINTIFFS 
  
The foreclosure of damage claims under federal and state law 
through application of the filed rate doctrine may result in a focus on future 
injunctive relief.  Jurisdictions vary in regard to the application of the filed 
rate doctrine to claims for equitable relief. The Kansas Court of Appeals in 
Amundson & Associates Art Studio, Ltd. v. National Council on 
Compensation Insurance, Inc., a case involving alleged price fixing in 
violation of state antitrust law, ruled that “[a]ny claim for injunctive or 
equitable relief in this area is permissible by the government, not 
individuals.”147 The court in Amundson relied upon a decision of the North 
Carolina Supreme Court, N.C. Steel, Inc. v. National Council on 
Compensation Insurance,148 a case in which the court refused to approve 
injunctive relief for private plaintiffs asserting state law claims stemming 
from charges imposed under the state’s workers’ compensation insurance 
structure.149   
Better reasoned cases, however, indicate that private plaintiffs may 
proceed through injunctive relief in appropriate cases. Injunctive relief not 
implicating agency authority or previously filed rating schedules does not 
interfere with the twin concerns of the filed rate doctrine, justiciability and 
nondiscrimination. Notably, the Supreme Court in Square D Co. v. Niagara 
Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc. affirmed the ruling of the Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals that although the filed rate doctrine barred the private plaintiffs’ 
                                                                                                                 
145 Pa. Title Ins., 648 F. Supp. 2d at 673. 
146 Clark v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 736 F. Supp. 2d 902, 912 (D.N.J. 
2010) (quoting Pa. Title Ins., 648 F. Supp. 2d at 673). 
147 Amundson & Assocs. Art Studio, Ltd. v. Nat’l Council on Comp. Ins., Inc., 
988 P.2d 1208, 1217 (Kan. App. Ct. 1999). 
148 See id. at 1215-16 (citing N.C. Steel, Inc. v. Nat’l Council on Comp. Ins., 
496 S.E.2d 369 (N.C. 1998)). 
149 Id. 
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claims for monetary damages, a remand was appropriate for a 
determination as to whether the plaintiffs were entitled to injunctive 
relief.150 The Supreme Court in Square D recognized the “critical 
distinction” between absolute immunity from all antitrust scrutiny and a 
prohibition against the private treble-damages remedy.151 According to the 
Supreme Court, that distinction was highlighted by the Court of Appeal’s 
remand on the issue of injunctive relief and the consent decree entered into 
between the parties enjoining certain acts. On the issue of the availability of 
injunctive relief, the Second Circuit in Square D further noted that the 
defendants had not moved for dismissal in regards to the claim for an 
injunction “a position well advised in light of Georgia v. Pennsylvania 
Railroad Co.,”152 an earlier Supreme Court case upholding the availability 
of injunctive relief under the filed rate doctrine.153    
Later case law generally acknowledges the availability of 
injunctive relief at least insofar as the filed rate is not affected.154 For 
example, in Saunders v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals disagreed with the district court’s dismissal of the 
plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief stating that “[o]n appeal, defendants 
totally fail to support this seemingly unjustified expansion of the filed rate 
doctrine.”155 Likewise, in Schilke v. Wachovia Mortgage, FSB, a case 
                                                                                                                 
150 Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 414 
(1986). 
151 Id. at 422 n.28. 
152 Square D Co., 760 F.2d at 1364 (citing Ga. v. Pa. R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 
454-55 (1945)). 
153 Although the state of Georgia was involved in Georgia v. Pennsylvania 
Railroad Co., federal antitrust law was involved, and the state was not a federal 
governmental litigant. 324 U.S. 439, 443 (1945). Even if, however, due to the 
involvement of the state of Georgia, Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., loses 
some effect as precedent regarding the availability of injunctive relief to private 
litigants, the plaintiffs in Square D were certainly private litigants. Square D Co., 
760 F.2d at 1349. 
154 See, e.g., Dolan v. Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 365 Fed. App’x 271, 276 (2d 
Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 261 (2010); Saunders v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 440 
F.3d 940, 944 n.1 (8th Cir. 2006); In re Title Ins. Antitrust Cases, 702 F. Supp. 2d 
840, 865 (N.D. Ohio 2010); Schilke v. Wachovia Mortg., FSB, 705 F. Supp. 2d 
932, 944-45 (N.D. Ill. 2010), vacated on other grounds, 758 F. Supp. 2d 549 (N.D. 
Ill. 2010); In re Pa. Title Ins. Antitrust Litig., 648 F. Supp. 2d 663, 686 (E.D. Pa. 
2009); see also Prentice v. Title Ins. Co. of Minn., 500 N.W.2d 658, 663 n.7 (Wis. 
1993) (recognizing that the filed rate doctrine does not protect against private suits 
seeking other than  rate-related damages). 
155 Saunders v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 440 F.3d 940, 944 n.1 (8th Cir. 2006). 
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involving alleged wrongful kickbacks, the court refused to apply the 
doctrine to bar a claim for injunctive relief that sought the public disclosure 
of the portion of insurance premiums constituting commissions and 
brokerage fees.156  
The court in In re Title Insurance Antitrust Cases distinguished 
between allowable types of injunctive relief as opposed to types of 
injunctive relief barred by the doctrine.157 The court acknowledged 
Supreme Court precedent in Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co.158 and 
Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc.159 affirming the 
continued viability of injunctive relief.160 The court found, however, that 
the nonjusticiability strand of the doctrine barred injunctive relief that 
would alter a filed rate or that would “displace the statutory scheme and 
authority of the regulating agency to determine the reasonableness of 
rates.”161 Accordingly, the court found that claims in the case seeking to 
enjoin future collaboration between the defendants were allowed because 
the relief sought could only affect future rates, not any rate already filed.162  
On the other hand, the court ruled that the filed rate doctrine barred claims 
seeking to prohibit the defendants from filing rates containing both 
legitimate premium costs and fees from alleged kickbacks.163 The problem 
in the court’s view was that rather than seek to enjoin the kickbacks 
themselves, the plaintiffs sought an injunction addressing the way in which 
rates were submitted, as a single (or all inclusive) rate.164 According to the 
court, allowing such relief would be substituting the court’s judgment as to 
how rate filings should be made for that of the state’s department of 
insurance, a direct conflict with the nonjusticiability strand of the 
doctrine.165 Likewise, in Dolan v. Fidelity National Title Insurance Co., a 
case in which the plaintiffs requested that the court enjoin price-fixing and 
                                                                                                                 
156 Schilke v. Wachovia Mortg., FSB, 705 F. Supp. 2d 932, 944-45 (N.D. Ill. 
2010) (citing Marcus v. AT&T Corp., 138 F.3d 46, 62 (2d Cir. 1998); Green v. 
Peoples Energy Corp., No. 02C4117, 2003 WL 1712566, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 
2003), vacated on other grounds, 758 F. Supp. 2d 549 (N.D. Ill. 2010)). 
157 In re Title Ins. Antitrust Cases, 702 F. Supp. 2d 840 (N.D. Ohio 2010). 
158 Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439 (1945).  
159 Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409 (1986). 
160 In re Title Ins. Antitrust Cases, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 865. 
161 Id. at 865-66 (citing Town of Norwood v. New Eng. Power Co., 202 F.3d 
408, 420 (1st Cir. 2000)). 
162 Id. at 865. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. at 865-66. 
165 Id. 
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the inclusion in rates of costs for kick-backs and other illegal charges, the 
court stated that “[a]n injunction to remove particular costs from filed rates 
is exactly the sort of relief the doctrine bars.”166 
An apparent conflict in decisional law regarding the type of 
injunctive relief available is illustrated by In re Pennsylvania Title 
Insurance Antitrust Litigation.167 The court in that case expressed approval 
of injunctive relief prohibiting the costs of illegal costs and kickbacks in 
newly filed rates on the basis that the relief sought was exclusively 
prospective and would not interfere with rates already on file.168 The 
court’s decision is contrary, however, to the decisions of In re Title 
Insurance Antitrust Cases and Dolan v. Fidelity National Title Insurance 
Co., discussed above, expressing the opinion that the doctrine bars 
injunctive relief affecting the inclusion of alleged kickbacks in rates. It 
would seem that the better view is expressed in In re Title Insurance 
Antitrust Cases and Dolan based upon justiciability concerns and the 
accepted goal of the filed rate doctrine of avoiding involvement and 
conflict with state regulatory authorities. 
 In any event, as recognized in the recent case of In re New Jersey 
Title Insurance Litigation, an expansive request for injunctive relief could 
present a problem in regard to the filed rate doctrine.169 The court in that 
case refused to grant injunctive relief recognizing that the plaintiffs’ 
“broadly conceived request for injunctive relief” attacked previously filed 
rates in addition to seeking prospective relief.170 Without attempting to 
separate any allowable prospective relief from the perceived overly broad 
request, the court stated that granting the requested injunctive relief would 
interfere with the authority of the state’s insurance department.171   
 
X. THE EFFECT OF THE FILED RATE DOCTRINE ON 
GOVERNMENTAL LITIGANTS 
 
 There is a lack of consensus in regard to the effect of the filed rate 
doctrine on governmental litigants.  The better and more prevalent view is 
that the Supreme Court decisions of Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier 
                                                                                                                 
166 Dolan v. Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 365 F. App’x. 271, 276 (2d Cir. 2010), 
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 261 (2010). 
167 In re Pa. Title Ins. Antitrust Litig., 648 F. Supp. 2d 663 (E.D. Pa. 2009). 
168 Id. at 686. 
169 In re N.J. Title Ins. Litig., Consolidated Civil Action No. 08-1425, 2009 
WL 3233529, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 5, 2009). 
170 Id. 
171 Id. 
400 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL Vol. 18.2 
Tariff Bureau, Inc., and Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co. 
uphold governmental enforcement actions.172 In recognizing rights of the 
government to enforce the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court in Square D 
quoted Keogh for the proposition that “[t]he fact that these rates had been 
approved by the Commission would not, it seems, bar proceedings by the 
Government.”173  
Cases upholding the principle that the filed rate doctrine allows for 
enforcement activity by the government include In re Title Insurance 
Antitrust Cases, recognizing that the doctrine does not “prohibit the 
Government from seeking civil or criminal redress;”174 Prentice v. Title 
Insurance Co. of Minnesota, recognizing that the “filed rate doctrine does 
not protect against suits by the government;”175 and Edge v. State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., recognizing that “[t]he filed rate 
doctrine bars only collateral attacks brought by private parties and not 
direct reviews in ratemaking cases or actions brought by a governmental 
agency.”176  
Nevertheless, decisions are not unanimous regarding application of 
the filed rate doctrine to governmental enforcement efforts. The Kentucky 
Court of Appeals in Commonwealth ex rel. Chandler v. Anthem Insurance 
Companies, Inc. ruled that the filed rate doctrine barred an action brought 
by the Attorney General of Kentucky insofar as it sought damages based on 
alleged wrongdoing in violation of that state’s consumer protection law.177  
The court primarily relied on its interpretation of federal precedent, not on 
any type of more restrictive reading of the filed rate doctrine limited to that 
state.178  
                                                                                                                 
172 Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 419 
(1986); Keogh v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156 (1922).  
173 Square D Co., 476 U.S. at 416 n.17 (quoting Keogh v. Chicago & N. W. 
Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156, 162 (1922)). 
174 In re Title Ins. Antitrust Cases, 702 F. Supp. 2d 840, 849 (N.D. Ohio 
2010). 
175 Prentice v. Title Ins. Co. of Minn., 500 N.W.2d 658, 663 n.7 (Wis. 1993). 
176 Edge v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 623 S.E.2d 387, 391 (S.C. 2005); 
accord Saunders v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 440 F.3d 940, 944 (8th Cir. 2006) 
(approving statements made in Square D that the filed rate doctrine does not affect 
governmental rights). 
177 Commonwealth ex rel. Chandler v. Anthem Ins. Cos., Inc., 8 S.W.3d 48, 53 
(Ky. Ct. App. 1999). The court, however, approved the Attorney General’s action 
for injunctive relief or civil penalties as allowed by statute under the state’s 
consumer protection law. Id. at 53-54. 
178 Id. at 52. 
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Another case implying that the filed rate doctrine may be applied to 
bar actions brought by the government is State ex rel. Cooper v. McClure, a 
case involving an action by the state of North Carolina against one of its 
vendors. Rather than find that the filed rate doctrine was inapplicable to 
actions instituted by the government, the court allowed the case to proceed 
for reasons including its determination that an action against a state vendor 
was not the type of action involving the typical concerns of the filed rate 
doctrine.179 
The majority of cases finding that the filed rate doctrine allows 
governmental enforcement action set forth the better view. The court in In 
re Title Insurance Cases characterized the doctrine as “a judicially created 
restriction on remedies and standing under which private plaintiffs are 
barred from suing for a damage recovery.”180 In rejecting the plaintiff’s 
position that application of the filed rate doctrine would illegally extend 
antitrust immunity, the court relied on its determination that the filed rate 
doctrine allowed for governmental enforcement actions and for injunctive 
relief.181 As the case makes clear, allowing governmental enforcement 
action may prevent violators from escaping consequences of illegal action. 
Additionally, governmental action does not raise the same concerns 
regarding discrimination between similarly situated individuals as would a 
private action by an individual plaintiff benefiting only that plaintiff.   
 
XI. THE EFFECT OF THE FILED RATE DOCTRINE ON 
ENTITIES OTHER THAN INSURERS 
 
 Many cases assume without discussion that the filed rate doctrine 
applies to entities other than insurers when complaints are made involving 
rates filed with a state’s Department of Insurance. This is logical because 
the filed rate doctrine applies to rates set or approved by a regulatory 
agency, and there seems to be no reason to distinguish between insurers 
and other entities. For example, without discussing the status of the 
defendants, the court in Steven v. Union Planters Corp. applied the doctrine 
to bar claims that the bank-affiliated defendants placed required hazard 
insurance on plaintiff’s mortgaged property at an excessive premium 
                                                                                                                 
179 State ex rel. Cooper v. McClure, No. 03-CVS-005617, 2004 WL 296598, at 
*11-12 (N.C. Super. Dec. 14, 2004), rev’d on other grounds, No. 03-CVS-005617, 
2005 WL 3018635 (N.C. Super. Oct. 28, 2005). 
180 In re Title Ins. Antitrust Cases, 702 F. Supp. 2d 840, 849 (N.D. Ohio 
2010). 
181 Id. 
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enabling the defendants to receive wrongful kickbacks from insurers.182 As 
recognized by the court in Steven, “[u]nder the filed rate doctrine, an 
allegation that a forced placed premium is excessive, is barred as a matter 
of law when the rate is declared reasonable by an independent entity.”183  
Without further analysis of the status of the defendants, other courts have 
also assumed the doctrine’s application to defendants other than insurers.184  
A case specifically addressing the application of the doctrine to 
defendants other than insurers is Roussin v. AARP, Inc., in which the 
plaintiff claimed that AARP, a non-profit group targeting retirees, 
improperly received an allowance from an insurer for reasons including its 
sponsorship of the insurer’s policy offerings.185 Noting a lack of contrary 
authority, the court applied the filed rate doctrine to bar the plaintiff’s 
claims stating as follows:   
 
Here, although Defendants did not file the rates, Roussin 
[the plaintiff] indisputably seeks to challenge the 
reasonableness of the rates.  Because she is “seeking relief 
for an injury allegedly caused by the payment of a rate on 
file with a regulatory commission,” albeit indirectly, her 
claims are barred by the filed rate doctrine.186 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
182 Steven v. Union Planters Corp., No. Civ.A. 00-CV-1695, 2000 WL 
33128256, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 2000).   
183 Id. at *2. 
184 See Alston v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 585 F.3d 753, 764 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(applying the doctrine to the defending lender but finding that it did not bar claims 
of illegal kickbacks); Hooks v. Am. Med. Sec. Life Ins. Co., No. CIV. 3:06cv71, 
2008 WL 3911130 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 19, 2008) (applying the doctrine to bar claims 
against a non-profit organization); Harrison v. Commercial Credit Corp., No. 
CIV.A. 4:01CV151LN, 2002 WL 548281, at *6 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 29, 2002) 
(finding that the doctrine barred claims against the defending lender’s employees); 
Gipson v. Fleet Mortg. Grp., Inc., 232 F. Supp. 2d 691 (S.D. Miss. 2002) (applying 
the doctrine to the defending lender but finding that it did not bar claims related to 
a lender’s right to place insurance in such a manner as to cause its borrowers’ 
payment on unnecessary fees). 
185 Roussin v. AARP, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 2d 412, 416-19 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 
2009), aff’d, No. 09-4932-cv, 2010 WL 2101912, at *1 (2d Cir. May 26, 2010) 
(stating that the affirmation was based on the district court’s “well-reasoned 
opinion”). 
186 Id. at 419 (quoting Porr v. NYNEX Corp., 660 N.Y.S.2d 440, 442 (App. 
Div. 1997)). 
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There is authority, however, distinguishing between insurers and 
other entities in the application of the filed rate doctrine.  In Richardson v. 
Standard Guaranty Insurance Co., a case involving alleged fraud 
committed in the sale of credit insurance policies, the court found that the 
claims against the defendant CitiBank, which marketed and sold the 
policies, should be viewed differently in relation to the filed rate doctrine 
because Citibank was not an insurer and did not file rates.187 The court 
found the filed rate doctrine would only apply to bar claims against such a 
defendant if the defendant acted as an agent of the insurer.188   
The better reasoned conclusion is that application of the filed rate 
doctrine is unaffected by the status of the defendant. As recognized in 
Roussin v. AARP, Inc., the pertinent inquiry is whether the claimed injury is 
based on an approved rate, not the nature of the defending entity.189 The 
primary concerns of the filed rate doctrine, nondiscrimination and the 
avoidance of interference with agency rate making is unaffected by the 
identity of the defendant.  
 
XII. APPLICATION OF THE FILED RATE DOCTRINE TO 
CLAIMS INVOLVING THE IMPROPER CALCULATION AND 
APPLICATION OF RATES AND RESERVES, AND OTHER 
ALLEGED FAILURES REGARDING REGULATORY 
REQUIREMENTS 
 
A. CLAIMS THAT RATES VARIED FROM ALLOWABLE RATES 
 
There is authority that the filed rate doctrine is inapplicable to 
claims alleging that the rates charged exceeded filed rates. For example, in 
Birmingham Hockey Club, Inc. v. National Council on Compensation 
Insurance, Inc., the Supreme Court of Alabama found the doctrine 
inapplicable to a claim that rates were assessed in excess of those approved 
by the state’s department of insurance.190 Similarly, the court in Sandwich 
Chef of Texas, Inc. v. Reliance National Indemnity Insurance Co., refused 
to apply the filed rate doctrine to bar a complaint regarding premiums 
                                                                                                                 
187 Richardson v. Standard Guaranty Ins. Co., 853 A.2d 955, 969-70 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004). 
188 Id. at 969 (citing Smith v. SBC Comm. Inc., 839 A.2d 850, 858 (N.J. 
2004)). 
189 See Roussin, 664 F. Supp. 2d at 419. 
190 Birmingham Hockey Club, Inc. v. Nat’l Council on Comp. Ins., Inc., 827 
So.2d 73, 83 (Ala. 2002).   
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charged in excess of filed rates.191 The court reached its conclusion based 
upon the logical principle that the purpose of the filed rate doctrine is to 
prevent challenges to filed rates, not efforts to enforce rates on file.192 
The filed rate doctrine was recently raised in a novel way in 
Blackburn & McCune, PLLC v. Pre-Paid Legal Services, Inc., a case in 
which a law firm hired to provide services to insureds under legal insurance 
plans sued claiming that the fees paid to the firm by the insurer varied from 
the amount the insurer filed as expenses for such costs with the state.193  
The law firm claimed that under the filed rate doctrine it was entitled to 
recover the difference between what it was paid and the amount the insurer 
allegedly represented to the state that it incurred in expenses for the 
services.194 The court, however, determined that the filed rate doctrine is 
intended to protect the relationship between an insurer and consumers, not 
providers.195   
 
B. CLAIMS THAT RATE CATEGORIES WERE IMPROPERLY APPLIED 
 
Generally, courts have refused to apply the filed rate doctrine to 
bar claims that filed rates were applied in an improper manner. For 
example, in White v. Conestoga Title Insurance Co., Pennsylvania’s 
intermediate court refused to apply the doctrine to bar the plaintiff’s claim 
that, although the rate charged was a filed rate, it was the wrong rate.196  
The court relied on the fact that the plaintiff sought to obtain a discounted 
                                                                                                                 
191 Sandwich Chef of Tex., Inc. v. Reliance Nat’l Indem. Ins. Co., 111 F. 
Supp. 2d 867, 874-75 (S.D. Tex. 2000). On appeal, class certification was revoked, 
however, the court recognized that a plaintiff’s knowledge of the imposition of a 
rate other than the filed rate may be used to negate a claim of fraud. See Sandwich 
Chef of Tex., Inc. v. Reliance Nat’l Indem. Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 205, 217 n.10 (5th 
Cir. 2003). 
192 Sandwich Chef of Tex., 111 F. Supp. 2d at 874 (citing Drew v. MCI 
Worldcom Mgmt. Co., Inc., No. Civ. A.3: 99-CV-1355-D, 1999 WL 1087470 
(N.D. Tex. Dec. 1, 1999); Black Radio Network, Inc. v. NYNEX Corp., 44 F. 
Supp. 2d 565, 574 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)). 
193 Blackburn & McCune, PLLC v. Pre-Paid Legal Servs., Inc., No. M2009-
01584-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 2670816, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 30, 2010), 
appeal denied, (Dec. 07, 2010). 
194 Id. at *29. 
195 Id. at *32. 
196 White v. Conestoga Title Ins. Co., 982 A.2d 997, 1009 (Pa. Super. 2009), 
appeal granted, 994 A.2d 1083 (Pa. 2010) (appeal granted on an issue pertaining 
to class certification). 
2012 FILED RATE DOCTRINE 405 
rate to which she claimed entitlement, not challenge the insurance rates 
themselves.197 A number of other insurance cases also recognize that the 
filed rate doctrine is unavailable as a defense to bar claims involving the 
calculation of rates.198   
There is authority, however, supporting the application of the 
doctrine to claims involving the assessment of rates. For example, after 
adopting the filed rate doctrine in the jurisdiction, the South Carolina 
Supreme Court in Edge v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 
ruled that the doctrine barred claims that surcharges were improperly 
imposed based upon wrongful determinations of fault made in regard to 
motor vehicle accidents.199 On the other hand, the dissent in Edge strongly 
and persuasively argued that the doctrine should not have been applied in 
that situation because the case was not a rate case.200   
The dissent recognized that the filed rate doctrine, first outlined in 
Keogh, protects duly authorized and filed rates from collateral attack in 
court.201 That was not the situation in Edge in which the plaintiffs 
complained that they were charged the wrong rate among possible rates.  
The dissent provided the following  persuasive example in clarifying the 
difference between a complaint that a lower rate should have been adopted, 
which the filed rate bars, as opposed a complaint alleging the improper 
assessment of a rate from among other possible rates, which the dissent 
argued was allowable:    
 
To distinguish this case from a “rate case,” it is perhaps 
helpful to use the following illustration: If Plaintiff claims, 
“in the exercise of discretion, the agency should have 
adopted some lower rate instead of a rate of X,” then 
Plaintiff is effectively asking the court to substitute its 
discretion for the administrative agency’s. If instead, a rate 
scheme authorizes a base rate of X, and further provides 
                                                                                                                 
197 Id. at 1007-08 (citing Charles v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., No. CIV.A.06 
2362 JAG, 2007 WL 1959253 (D.N.J. July 3, 2007)). 
198 See Randleman v. Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 2d 812, 823 (N.D. 
Ohio 2006); Robinson v. Fountainhead Title Grp. Corp., 477 F. Supp. 2d 478, 487 
(D. Md. 2006); Richardson v. Standard Guar. Ins. Co., 853 A.2d 955, 967 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004). 
199 Edge v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 623 S.E.2d 387, 392-93 (S.C. 
2005).   
200 Id. at 393 (Toal, C.J., dissenting). 
201 Id. at 393-94 (Toal, C.J., dissenting) (citing Keogh v. Chi. & N.W. Ry. Co., 
260 U.S. 156 (1922)). 
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that, if certain additional conditions exist, then a rate of Y, 
Plaintiff is free to argue that he does not meet the 
requirements for issuance of the higher rate; Plaintiff is 
merely disputing the rate's validity “as applied” to him.202 
  
 It seems that the dissent in Edge had the better argument that the 
filed rate doctrine allowed claims that rates were improperly applied.203  
The rationale behind the filed rate doctrine supports plaintiff rights in 
regard to rate enforcement. For example, recognizing the purposes of the 
filed rate doctrine to prevent price discrimination and to preserve the role 
of agencies in approving reasonable rates, the court in Charles v. Lawyers 
Title Ins. Corp. refused to apply the doctrine to bar enforcement of the 
defendant’s filed rates.204 The plaintiffs claimed that the defending insurer 
charged more than the allowable rating schedule it submitted. According to 
the court in Charles, the defendant attempted “to turn this doctrine on its 
head” by arguing that pursuant to the filed rate doctrine, the plaintiff’s 
constructive knowledge of rates barred claims to enforce filed rates.205  
Enforcement of filed rates does not result in discrimination against 
policyholders nor does it interfere with agency decision making. 
  
C. CLAIMS THAT RESERVES WERE IMPROPERLY SET 
 
 There is disagreement regarding whether the filed rate doctrine 
bars claims regarding the improper setting of insurance reserves retained 
for the payment of future claims. The North Carolina Court of Appeals in 
Lupton v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of North Carolina found that the filed 
rate doctrine barred claims alleging the existence of excessive reserves.206  
By statute a regulated insurer in that state was required to retain a 
percentage of certain gross annual collections from membership dues until 
the reserve retained equaled three times the insurer’s average monthly 
expenditures for claims and other expenses.207 Reserves, however, were 
prohibited by statute from exceeding six times the amount of such average 
                                                                                                                 
202 Id. at 394 n.8 (Toal, C.J., dissenting). 
203 Id. at 394 (Toal, C.J., dissenting).   
204 Charles v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., No. 06-2361 (JAG), 2007 WL 
1959253, at *9 (D.N.J. July 3, 2007). 
205 Id. at *6. 
206 Lupton v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.C., 533 S.E.2d 270, 273 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2000). 
207 Id. at 271 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-65-95(b) (2009)). 
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monthly expenditures.208 In ruling that the filed rate doctrine barred claims 
that the defendant accumulated excessive reserves, the court recognized 
that the state’s Commissioner of Insurance initially approved the 
defendant’s reserve amount and that, thereafter, the retention of reserves 
was governed by statute.209 The court stated that the Commissioner had the 
authority to recalculate approved rates, thereby affecting the amount of the 
reserve and that “[a]ny allegation that Blue Cross accumulated an excessive 
reserve requires the recalculation of approved rates.”210 According to the 
court, “the plaintiffs cannot prove their claim without the rates set by the 
Commissioner being questioned.”211    
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, however, in Ciamaichelo v. 
Independence Blue Cross, refused to apply the filed rate doctrine to dismiss 
a complaint alleging the defendant’s wrongful accumulation of excessive 
reserves.212 The plaintiffs in that case alleged that the defendant violated 
the state’s nonprofit corporation law and breached contractual and fiduciary 
duties through accumulating surplus funds for purposes inconsistent with 
its non-profit status.213 Alleged violations included the use of excess funds 
for possible acquisitions, mergers, conversions, benefits to officers and 
directors, and investments in for-profit subsidiaries.214 The court stated that 
it was unwilling, on preliminary objections, to rule that the complaint 
amounted to only second-guessing an approved rate. Instead, the complaint 
was viewed as raising the issue of whether the defendant “violated the 
Non-Profit Law and committed breaches of contractual and fiduciary duties 
in amassing a fund designated as surplus that was in amount, over and 
                                                                                                                 
208 Id. (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-65-95(c) (2009)). 
209 Id. at 273. 
210 Id. 
211 Lupton v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of North Carolina, 533 S.E.2d 270, 
273 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (quoting N.C. Steel, Inc. v. Nat’l Council on Comp. Ins., 
496 S.E.2d 369, 374 (N.C. 1998)). The court did not address the fact that 
apparently excessive reserves could be computed based on the prohibition that 
reserves not exceed six times the amount of average monthly expenditures.  
Subsection (d) of the statute at issue, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-65-95 (2009), however, 
granted the Commissioner authority to increase reserves under certain 
circumstances to more than six times average monthly expenditures. Although not 
cited by the court, that section could conceivably have provided additional support 
for the application of the nonjusticiability strand of the filed rate doctrine. 
212 Ciamaichelo v. Independence Blue Cross, 909 A.2d 1211, 1217 (2006). 
213 Id. at 1212-13 (citing Nonprofit Corporation Law of 1988, 15 PA. CONS. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 5101-10 (West 1995)). 
214 Id. at 1213. 
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above that necessary for IBC [the defendant] to operate properly, meet its 
legal obligations, or secure its financial solvency . . . .”215 The court 
rejected the reasoning that “allegations in a complaint that could lead to an 
adjustment of an insurer’s approved rate invariably amount to a rate injury 
claim.”216 
While little case law exists on this issue, the goal of the filed rate 
doctrine to avoid enmeshing courts in agency rate-making procedures 
supports the application of the filed rate doctrine to claims regarding 
insurance reserves.217 Typically, state departments of insurance disapprove 
rates that are inadequate, unfairly discriminatory, or excessive, and oversee 
reserves set aside for contingencies.218 The accumulation of excessive 
reserves would necessarily involve rates because the remedy would likely 
be a recalculation of premium from which reserves are obtained.219 
Therefore, rates and reserves are inextricably intertwined. The better view 
is that under the contours of the filed rate doctrine, issues involving 
reserves, as well as rates, are within the province of state departments of 
insurance.   
 
D. CLAIMS OF UNMET REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS 
 
In Richardson v. Standard Guaranty Insurance Co., the court 
addressed the defense that the filed rate doctrine barred the plaintiffs’ 
allegations that benefits and policy terms were inconsistent with governing 
regulations of the state’s department of insurance.220 Specifically, the 
plaintiffs claimed that the defendant violated state regulations by failing to 
include refund provisions in policy terms, by failing to remit premium 
refunds, and through use of a nonconforming form.221 The court determined 
                                                                                                                 
215 Id. at 1217. 
216 Id. at 1218. The court declined to address whether the filed rate doctrine 
would have applied if the complaint had specifically raised a rate injury claim. 
Ciamaichelo v. Independence Blue Cross, 909 A.2d 1211, 1218 n.8 (2006). 
217 See, e.g., Wegoland Ltd. v. NYNEX Corp., 27 F.3d 17, 19 (2d Cir. 1994) 
(expressing the opinion that courts should not become enmeshed in the rate-
making process). 
218 See Rios v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 469 F. Supp. 2d 727, 736 (S.D. 
Iowa 2007); Ciamaichelo, 909 A.2d at 1216; Lupton v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield 
of N.C., 533 S.E.2d 270, 273 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000). 
219 See Lupton, 533 S.E.2d at 273.   
220 Richardson v. Standard Guar. Ins. Co., 853 A.2d 955, 961 (N.J. Super. 
App. Div. 2004).  
221 Id. at 968. 
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that “[r]ather than conflict with the doctrine, these alternative claims 
actually assume the application of the filed rate and filed policy terms.”222 
The court’s ruling is consistent with principles underlying the filed rate 
doctrine and cases refusing to apply the filed rate doctrine as a bar to 
claims seeking to recover charges imposed in excess of allowable filed 
rates.   
 
XIII. THE EFFECT OF NONCOMPLIANT FILING  
 
Litigants opposed to application of the filed rate doctrine may raise 
the failure of insurers to meet administrative rate filing requirements. In 
addressing the issue of improper filing, courts place importance on the 
language of the statutory scheme involved. A crucial issue is whether the 
applicable regulations provide that a rate failing to comply with filing 
requirements is void. Assuming that improperly filed rates are not declared 
void, a practitioner seeking to benefit from the filed rate doctrine would 
likely rely upon the “technical defect” rule.223 As recognized by the court in 
In re Pennsylvania Title Insurance Antitrust Litigation, “the Supreme Court 
has long held that technical or formal errors do not invalidate an otherwise 
properly filed rate that sufficiently notices the rate to be charged.”224 
Additionally, the court in In re Title Insurance Antitrust Cases stated that 
even if the rates in that case were improperly filed, “no statute voids those 
filed and approved rates so as to preclude application of the filed rate 
doctrine . . . .”225 Other cases applying the same reasoning include Dolan v. 
Fidelity National Title Insurance Co. and In re Pennsylvania Title 
Insurance Antitrust Litigation.226 
On the other hand, if an improperly filed rate is declared void, then 
there is no filed rate and no basis to rely upon the filed rate doctrine as a 
shield. The court in In re Pennsylvania Title Insurance Antitrust Litigation 
stated that the U.S. Supreme Court in Security Services, Inc. v. K Mart 
                                                                                                                 
222 Id. 
223 See Sec. Srvs., Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 511 U.S. 431, 442 (1994). 
224 In re Pa. Title Ins. Antitrust Litig., 648 F. Supp. 2d 663, 678-79 (E.D. Pa. 
2009) (citing Berwind-White Coal Mining Co. v. Chi. & Erie R.R. Co., 235 U.S. 
371, 375 (1914)). 
225 In re Title Ins. Antitrust Cases, 702 F. Supp 2d 840, 861 (N.D. Ohio 2010).   
226 Dolan v. Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 365 F. App’x 271, 273 (2d Cir. 2010), 
cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 261 (2010); In re Pa. Title Ins. Antitrust Litig., 648 F. Supp 
2d at 679. 
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Corp “delineated the scope of the properly filed requirement.”227 In that 
case, following its bankruptcy, Security Services, as debtor-in-possession, 
sued KMart for undercharges allegedly owed based on the difference 
between the contract rate KMart paid for shipment and the tariff the carrier, 
Security Services, had on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission.228 
Security Services relied on its filed rate supported by a mileage guide, 
purportedly filed by an agent, as the basis for mileage computation and 
charges. Under applicable regulations, however, the rate filing was void 
because of Security Service’s failure to remit costs for using the mileage 
guide as its filing.229 As recognized by the Court, recovery may not be 
based on “filed, but void, rates.”230 The Court referenced the filing as “an 
incomplete tariff insufficient to support a reliable calculation of 
charges.”231 Consistent with Security Services, the court in In re 
Pennsylvania Title Insurance Antitrust Litigation recognized that the filed 
rate doctrine may be inapplicable in insurance cases if filing deficiencies 
result in an inability to calculate a rate.232    
 
XIV. THE EXTENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW REQUIRED 
 
Courts vary on the type of administrative review required to trigger 
enforcement of the filed rate doctrine. Some courts find the type of review 
process irrelevant, some require an active review process, and some find 
the doctrine applicable so long as a process for administrative review is 
available. Additionally, rebate systems may affect the effectiveness of 
administrative review in regard to the filed rate doctrine.   
The better view is that so long as a state department of insurance 
retains authority to review and disapprove rates, the filed rate doctrine 
should apply. Efforts by the judiciary to determine the extent and 
effectiveness of administrative review would result in the very threat the 
filed rate doctrine is designed to avoid, enmeshment of the courts in the 
rate-making process. Of course, the filed rate doctrine should only have 
application in situations in which administrative review is available. The 
                                                                                                                 
227 In re Pa. Title Ins. Antitrust Litig., 648 F. Supp. 2d at 678 (citing Security 
Serv., Inc. v. KMart Corp., 511 U.S. 431, 440 (1994)).  
228 See Sec. Servs., Inc., 511 U.S. at 434. 
229 Id. at 436. As noted by Justice Ginsburg in dissent, “[t]he fee involved was 
approximately $83.” Id. at 457 n.2 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
230 Id. at 444. 
231 Id. at 443. 
232 See Pa. Title Ins. Antitrust Litig., 648 F. Supp. 2d at 678 (citing In re 
Olympia Holding Corp., 88 F.3d 952, 961-62 (11th Cir. 1996)). 
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court in Clark v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America correctly recognized 
that the filed rate doctrine is inapplicable if a rate is filed with an agency 
with no authority to approve or reject it.233 Further rationale and authority 
regarding these issues and the type of administrative review required is 
discussed below.   
 
A. THE POSITION THAT THE FILED RATE DOCTRINE IS APPLICABLE 
REGARDLESS OF MEANINGFUL ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW   
  
Recognizing that “[d]efining the contours of an agency’s review of 
a filed rate is a task best left to the legislative branch,” the federal district 
court in In re Title Insurance Antitrust Cases, approved the application of 
the filed rate doctrine even under the assumption that insurance filings 
lacked meaningful regulatory oversight.234 In support of its decision, the 
court relied upon Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, a case 
in which the U.S. Supreme Court refused to require a hearing before the 
ICC prior to the institution of rates as a prerequisite for application of the 
doctrine.235 According to the court in In re Title Insurance Antitrust Cases, 
“it is the filing of the rates with the regulating agency that triggers the filed 
rate doctrine not any minimum level of review undertaken by the 
agency.”236 
 Based upon similar reasoning, and in reliance on the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Square D, the court in In re Pennsylvania Title 
Insurance Antitrust Litigation concluded that “as long as the regulatory 
scheme requires the filing of rates with a government agency that has legal 
authority to review those rates, the filed rate doctrine applies regardless of 
the actual degree of agency review of those filed rates.”237 Other cases 
reaching similar results include In re New Jersey Title Insurance Litigation, 
where the court stated that “application of the filed rate doctrine does not 
                                                                                                                 
233 See Clark v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., No. Civ. 08-6197 (DRD), 2011 
WL 940729, at *14-15 (D.N.J. Mar. 15, 2011). 
234 In re Title Ins. Antitrust Cases, 702 F. Supp. 2d 840, 855 (N.D. Ohio 
2010).   
235 See Square D Co v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau,  476 U.S. 409, 417 
(1986). 
236 In re Title Ins. Antitrust Cases, 702 F. Supp. 2d. at 852-53. 
237 In re Pennsylvania Title Ins. Antitrust Litig., 648 F. Supp. 2d 663, 674-75 
(E.D. Pa. 2009). 
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depend upon meaningful agency review of filed rates”238 and Schilke v. 
Wachovia Mortgage, FSB where the court found agency power to 
disapprove rates sufficient for application of the filed rate doctrine.239 
 
B. CASES FINDING ADEQUATE ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW  
 
 Finding the presence of adequate administrative oversight, some 
courts stop short of stating that meaningful review is irrelevant for purposes 
of the filed rate doctrine. For example, in McCray v. Fidelity National Title 
Insurance Co., the court cited authority to the effect that meaningful 
administrative review may be unnecessary for the doctrine’s application240 
but found that the review process of Delaware, the jurisdiction involved, 
was indeed “meaningful and competent.”241   
The administrative scheme at issue in McCray was a “file and use” 
system, whereby rates are filed with the appropriate administrative 
authority and charged after their effective date unless agency objection is 
made.242 Referencing the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Montana-
Dakota Utilities Co. v. Northwestern Public Services Co. that parties “can 
claim no rate as a legal right that is other than the filed rate, whether fixed 
or merely accepted by the [regulatory body],”  the court upheld application 
of the filed rate doctrine to that type of system.243 The court in McCray 
found persuasive the fact that neither the rating system involved in Keogh 
nor the one at issue in Square D required prior regulatory approval before 
going into effect.244 Other cases approving file and use systems to support 
application of the filed rate doctrine include the Minnesota Supreme Court 
decision of Schermer v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., Anzinger v. 
Illinois State Medical Inter-Insurance Exchange, decided by the Illinois 
Court of Appeals, and Horwitz ex rel. Gilbert v. Bankers Life and Casualty 
                                                                                                                 
238 In re N.J. Title Ins. Litig., Consolidated Civil Action No. 08-1425, 2009 
WL 3233529, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 05, 2009) (citing Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier 
Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 417 n.19 (1986)). 
239  See Schilke v. Wachovia Mortgage, FSB, 758 F. Supp. 2d 549, 560-61 
(N.D. Ill. 2010). 
240 McCray v. Fidelity Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 636 F. Supp. 2d 322, 330 (D. Del. 
2009) (citing Wegoland, Ltd. v. NYNEX Corp., 806 F. Supp. 1112, 1120 
(S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff’d, 27 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 1994)). 
241 Id. at 330. 
242 Id. at 325. 
243 McCray, 636 F. Supp. 2d at 329 (quoting Mont.-Dakota Util. Co., 341 U.S. 
at 251) (alteration in original)). 
244 See id. at 329.   
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Co., also decided by the Illinois Court of Appeals but applying Colorado 
law.245 
In an unpublished decision, citing Square D, the Second Circuit in 
Dolan v. Fidelity National Title Insurance Co., stated that “[i]t is well-
established that the doctrine applies to all filed rates, not merely those rates 
investigated before their approval.”246  
 “Use and file” systems under which an insurer begins using rates 
before they are filed for regulatory review have also supported application 
of the filed rate doctrine. For example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in 
Prentice v. Title Insurance Co. of Minnesota applied the filed rate doctrine 
to a use and file system under which insurers were required to file rates 
within thirty days after their effective date.247 Refusing to distinguish 
between the doctrine’s application to use and file systems as opposed to file 
and use systems, the court interpreted Supreme Court precedent as follows: 
“Under Keogh, as interpreted by Square D, the existence of a regulatory 
remedy bars a private rate-related suit for damages under the antitrust laws 
regardless of whether the regulatory body approved the rates before or after 
the rates became effective.”248 Noting that the state’s insurance 
commissioner had authority to disapprove rates, the court recognized that 
additionally granting courts authority over rates “would place insurers in a 
procrustean bed where one rate must conform to the requirements of both 
the Insurance Commissioner and a trier of fact.”249    
 
C. CASES REQUIRING SIGNIFICANT ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW 
 
While some insurance cases indicate that the nature of the review is 
not a critical concern,250 others require meaningful administrative review 
prior to application of the filed rate doctrine. For example, in Rios v. State 
                                                                                                                 
245 See, e.g., Schermer v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 721 N.W.2d 307, 309 
(Minn. 2006); Anzinger v. Illinois State Medical Inter-Ins. Exchange, 494 N.E.2d 
655, 658 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986); Horowitz ex rel. Gilbert v. Bankers Life & Casualty 
Co.,745 N.E.2d 591, 605 (Ill. App. 2001). 
246 Dolan v. Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 365 Fed. App’x. 271, 274 (2d Cir. 2010), 
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 261 (2010) (citing Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff 
Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 417 & n.19 (1986)),. 
247 Prentice v. Title Ins. Co. of Minn., 500 N.W.2d 658, 662 (Wis. 1993). 
248 Id.  
249 Id. at 663. 
250 See McCray v. Fid. Na’l Title Ins. Co., 636 F. Supp. 2d 322, 330 (D. Del. 
2009) (citing Wegoland, Ltd. v. Nynex Corp., 806 F. Supp. 1112, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 
1992)). 
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Farm Fire & Casualty Co. the court recognized the necessity of 
meaningful review as follows:   
 
That is, without the ability to meaningfully regulate the 
rates at issue, the rationale behind applying the filed rate 
doctrine (rates approved by an agency are deemed to be per 
se reasonable and nondiscriminatory) may not be 
appropriate. For example, if a regulatory agency is so 
powerless that it only rubber-stamps the rates filed, then it 
may be inappropriate to apply the filed rate doctrine.251 
 
 Brown v. Ticor Title Insurance Co.,252 addressing title insurance 
rates in Arizona and Wisconsin, is often cited for the view that only 
significant administrative review justifies application of the filed rate 
doctrine.253 In finding that prior administrative approval of rates is 
necessary for application of the filed rate doctrine, the court in Brown 
relied on Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc. v. Giannini, a case addressing 
alleged state law antitrust violations in connection with the sale of fruit.254 
The plaintiffs in Wileman Brothers claimed that the defendants conspired 
to wrongfully enact heightened standards for maturity of fruit before it 
could be marketed.255 The defendants in Wileman Brothers claimed that 
they could not be held liable for the alleged violations because although the 
Secretary of Agriculture did not affirmatively approve the standards at 
issue, the Secretary tacitly approved them by failing to object as allowed by 
regulation.256 Brown quoted with approval Wileman Brothers’ 
disagreement with that proposition as follows: 
 
The mere fact of failure to disapprove, however, does not 
legitimize otherwise anticompetitive conduct. . . . 
[Nondisapproval] does not guarantee any level of review 
                                                                                                                 
251 Rios v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 469 F. Supp. 2d 727, 736 (S.D. Iowa 
2007) (citing Hanson v. Acceleration Life Ins. Co., No. CIV A3-97-152, 1999 WL 
33283345, at *4 (D.N.D. Mar. 16, 1999)). 
252 982 F.2d 386 (9th Cir. 1992).  
253 E.g., In re Title Ins. Antitrust Cases, 702 F. Supp. 2d 840, 854 (N.D. Ohio 
2010); McCray, 636 F. Supp. 2d at 329; Schermer v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 
721 N.W.2d 307, 317-18 (Minn. 2006). 
254 Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc. v. Giannini, 909 F.2d 332, 333-34 (9th Cir. 
1990). 
255 Id. 
256 Id. at 337.   
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whatsoever. . . . [T]here is no affirmative process of non-
disapproval which can be relied upon fairly to evaluate a 
committee’s regulations. Second, non-disapproval is 
equally consistent with lack of knowledge or neglect as it 
is with assent.257 
 
In the Brown court’s view, the absence of meaningful review allowed 
insurers to file any rates they wanted.258 The court in Brown did not address 
Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, in which the U.S. 
Supreme Court approved application of the filed rate doctrine although 
rates were not reviewed by the Interstate Commerce Commission prior to 
their adoption.259 
Other insurance cases have also referenced a concern with 
perceived insufficiency in rate review in relation to application of the filed 
rate doctrine.260 For example, in Richardson v. Standard Guaranty 
Insurance Co., the court recognized that a criticism of the filed rate 
doctrine is its application without the filed rates being rigorously examined 
or challenged.261 Although finding the type of regulatory review at issue in 
the case sufficient, the court stated, “as a general matter, under-
enforcement of ratemaking regulations may constitute a basis for a less 
rigorous application of the filed rate doctrine.”262   
Another case refusing to apply the doctrine to an insurance dispute 
is Blaylock v. First American Title Insurance Co.,263 a federal district court 
case in which the plaintiff homeowners sued providers of title insurance 
complaining of kickbacks in violation of the Washington Consumer 
Protection Act264 and the federal Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act.265 
                                                                                                                 
257 Brown, 982 F.2d at 393 (quoting Wileman Bros., 909 F.2d at 337-38). 
258 Id. at 394. 
259 Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, 476 U.S. 409, 417 (1986). 
260 E.g., Blaylock v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 504 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 1102-03 
(W.D. Wash. 2007); Hanson v. Acceleration Life Ins. Co. No. CIV A3-97-152, 
1999 WL 33283345, at *4 (D.N.D. Mar. 16, 1999); Richardson v. Standard Guar. 
Ins. Co., 853 A.2d 955, 964 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004). 
261 Richardson v. Standard Guar. Ins. Co., 853 A.2d 955, 964 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2004). 
262 Id.  
263 Blaylock, 504 F. Supp. 2d at 1102-03. 
264 WASH. REV. CODE §§ 19.86.010-19.86.920 (1999 & Supp. 2012). 
265 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-17 (2006). 
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In addition to criticizing the filed rate doctrine in general,266 the Blaylock 
court noted that a factor supporting its decision was that title insurance 
rates were subject to less comprehensive regulation than other insurance 
rates in the state.267 According to the court, title insurance rates were 
subjected “only to superficial regulation” with no requirement that they 
receive any review by the insurance commissioner.268 Therefore, the court 
left open an issue regarding the applicability of the doctrine to other forms 
of insurance, such as property and casualty insurance, subjected to more 
comprehensive regulation.   
It is curious that the court in Blaylock did not cite another federal 
district court decision arising in the Western District of Washington 
decided the previous year, albeit an unpublished one, Heaphy v. State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., in which the court recognized 
Washington’s adoption of the filed rate doctrine in the insurance 
industry.269 The plaintiffs in Heaphy alleged that State Farm failed to 
properly pay diminished value property damage claims on uninsured 
motorist policies.270 Citing Hardy v. Claircom Communications Group,271 
distinguished in Blaylock on the basis that it involved a rate set by a federal 
agency in the telecommunications context,272 the court in Heaphy stated 
that “[t]here is ample authority in this and other jurisdictions to the effect 
that the reasonableness of a rate cannot be challenged where that rate was 
required to be (and was) filed with a regulatory agency authorized to 
review it.”273 Finding the doctrine applicable in the insurance arena, the 
court proceeded to rule that while some claims would be allowed to 
proceed, premium-based claims were barred by the filed rate doctrine.274 
 
                                                                                                                 
266 Blaylock, 504 F. Supp. 2d at 1100 (stating that the doctrine has repeatedly 
been called into question since its inception). 
267 Id. at 1102-03.  The more stringent regulatory procedures discussed by the 
court for other types of insurance included property and casualty insurance. See 
WASH. REV. CODE § 48.19.010 (2010); Blaylock, 504 F. Supp. 2d at 1095-96.     
268 Blaylock, 504 F. Supp. 2d at 1102.   
269 Heaphy v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. C05 5404RBL, 2006 WL 
278556, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 2, 2006). 
270 Heaphy v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. C05-5404RBL, 2005 WL 
2573340 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 12, 2005) (setting forth background information on the 
claims).   
271 Hardy v. Claircom Commc’ns, 937 P.2d 1128 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997). 
272 Blaylock, 504 F. Supp. 2d at 1101 n.8. 
273 Heaphy, 2006 WL 278556, at *2 (citing Hardy, 937 P.2d 1128, 1131).  
274 Id. at *3. 
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D. THE EFFECT OF  REBATES  
  
In a dispute involving fees imposed in connection with the 
provision of homeowners, automobile, and umbrella insurance, the 
California Court of Appeals in Fogel v. Farmers Group, Inc. addressed the 
effect of sections of the California Insurance Code allowing insurers to 
rebate excess premiums to policyholders.275 Based on the rebate option, the 
court expressed the opinion that the defending insurers were not required to 
charge any certain rate and that the filed rate doctrine was therefore 
inapplicable.276 According to the court, “even if the filed rate doctrine 
applied in the context of a rate approved by a state regulatory agency 
(defendants have pointed to no cases in which it was), it nevertheless would 
have no application here.”277 The federal district court in the recent 
unreported decision of Miletak v. Allstate Insurance Co. cited with 
approval the reasoning of Fogel regarding the filed rate doctrine.278 
Significantly, in MacKay v. Superior Court, a division of the 
California Court of Appeals other than the division in Fogel disagreed with 
Fogel in regard to the filed rate doctrine.279 Allegations in MacKay that 
illegal criteria were considered in setting automobile insurance rates and 
issues involving the availability of a private right of action implicated the 
same chapter of the state’s insurance code as did the claims in Fogel.280 
                                                                                                                 
275 Fogel v. Farmers Grp., Inc., 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 61, 75 (Ct. App. 2008) 
(construing CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1420, 1860 (West 2005)). 
276 Id. The primary basis of the complaint was that the defending insurers 
charged excessive fees included in premium rates for acting as attorneys-in-fact for 
the plaintiffs in regard to insurance transactions. Id. at 65-66.   
277 Id. at 75. Several cases extending the doctrine to state administrative 
review are cited in Section VIII of this article although a number were issued after 
the 2008 Fogel decision. 
278 Miletak v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. C 06-03778 JW, 2010 WL 809579, at *4 
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2010). 
279 MacKay v. Superior Court, 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 893 (Ct. App. 2010).  Fogel 
was decided by Fourth Division of the Second District of the Court of Appeal 
whereas MacKay was decided by the Third Division of the Second District. 
280 In addition to sections of the state’s insurance code involving rebates, both 
Fogel and MacKay construed sections of Chapter 9, Article 10 of the state’s 
insurance code entitled “Reduction and Control of Insurance Rates” and the effect 
of sections added by Proposition 103 approved by voters in 1988. CAL. INS. CODE 
§§ 1861.01-1861.16 (2005); MacKay, 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 903; Fogel, 74 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d at 66-68. With some exceptions, the statutory scheme involved pertains to 
insurance policies issued in the state including property and casualty policies. CAL. 
INS. CODE § 1851 (2005).       
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The court in MacKay found that the filed rate doctrine supported its 
conclusion that there could be no tort liability for charging a rate approved 
by the state’s department of insurance expressing disagreement with Fogel 
“to the extent that it rejected the application of the filed rate doctrine to 
California insurance rates.”281 The MacKay court did not see the rebate 
system referenced in Fogel as a bar to application of the doctrine stating as 
follows in regard to the rebate system: 
 
We do not see this as a bar to the application of the filed 
rate doctrine. Indeed, as a plan for rebating excess 
premiums to policyholders “shall not be deemed a rating 
plan or system,” the fact that an excess premium may be 
rebated does not in any way impact the controlling fact 
that, once a rating plan has been approved, the insurer may 
charge no other rate.282 
 
Of courts, rates higher than the filed rate would be barred. The 
court in MacKay, however, did not address the effect of the rebate system 
resulting in insureds paying less than the rate initially filed and approved. 
Regulatory authorities are concerned with inadequate as well as excessive 
rates because inadequate rates may lead to insufficient funds with which to 
pay claims.283 An issue exists as to whether a possible lack of 
administrative oversight regarding rebates and reserves reduces concerns 
regarding the justiciability strand of the filed rate doctrine involving the 
preservation of agency authority.284 An interesting note is that the court in 
Fogel cited, but did not analyze, a section of the state’s code providing that 
savings may be returned to subscribers “whenever such returns do not 
constitute an impairment of the assets or reserves required to be 
maintained.”285 Presumably, this section would provide a method by which 
                                                                                                                 
281 MacKay, 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 910. 
282 Id. at 910 n.18 (quoting CAL. INS. CODE § 1860 (West 2005)). Property and 
casualty insurers in California operate under a prior approval system whereby rates 
must be approved by the state’s insurance commissioner prior to use. See Fogel, 74 
Cal. Rptr. 3d at 66 (construing CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.01(c) (2005)). 
283 See In re N.Y. Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Muhl, 684 
N.Y.S.2d 312 (App. Div. 1999). 
284 See Rios v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 469 F. Supp. 2d 727, 738 (S.D. 
Iowa 2007) (recognizing the filed rate doctrine’s application if a court decision 
would impact agency procedures and rate determinations).   
285 Fogel, 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 75 (citing CAL. INS. CODE § 1420 (West 2005)). 
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rebates could be policed, thus providing support for application of the filed 
rate doctrine. 
 
XV. ISSUES OF FRAUD AND INEQUITY 
 
 Should the filed rate doctrine be disregarded when claims are based 
on fraud or inequity directed toward either policyholders or the 
administrative agency involved? The majority of insurance cases hold that 
claims of fraud do not prevent application of the doctrine. For example, the 
court in Richardson v. Standard Guaranty Insurance Co. reasoned that the 
doctrine “precludes fraud claims because it operates on the presumption 
that the plaintiff had knowledge of the filed rates and, thus, could not 
reasonably rely upon the regulated entity's misrepresentations or omissions 
of material facts.”286 Some courts, as discussed below, clarify that the filed 
rate doctrine bars claims of fraud only if rates are specifically implicated.   
 While refusing judicial intervention in the face of fraudulent 
conduct may seem inequitable, application of the doctrine in such cases 
avoids discrimination among policyholders and interference by the 
judiciary in agency affairs. As acknowledged in Rios v State Farm Fire and 
Casualty Co., in regulatory matters of federal law, the Supreme Court 
recognizes that the filed rate doctrine “may seem harsh in some 
circumstances”287 but accepts that result in order to prevent courts from 
upsetting agency authority.288 Consideration should also be given to the fact 
that policyholders subjected to fraud may have redress through the agency 
system in the form of rebates or premium deductions granted to all 
similarly situated policyholders.289  
 
A. CASES FINDING THE DOCTRINE NOT BARRED BY ALLEGATIONS OF 
FRAUD OR INEQUITY 
 
The federal district court for the District of Delaware in McCray v. 
Fidelity National Title Insurance Co. relied on Third Circuit precedent in 
the telecommunications industry in stating “that there is no fraud-in-the-
                                                                                                                 
286 Richardson v. Standard Guar. Ins. Co., 853 A.2d 955, 962 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2004) (citing Weinberg v. Sprint Corp., 801 A.2d 281, 286 (N.J. 2002)). 
287 Rios, 469 F. Supp. 2d at 739 (quoting AT&T Co. v. Cent. Office Tel., Inc., 
524 U.S. 214, 223 (1998)). 
288 Id. at 739-40 (citing H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 954 F.2d 485, 492 (8th 
Cir. 1992)).   
289 See H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 954 F.2d 485, 491 (8th Cir. 1992). 
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rate-setting exception to the filed rate doctrine.”290 Similarly, the federal 
district court in In re Title Insurance Antitrust Cases broadly stated that 
“[e]ven assuming as true that the rates submitted by the Defendant were 
fraudulent or the product of unlawful conduct, the filed rate doctrine still 
applies to bar Plaintiffs' claim for damages.”291  
In refusing to find an exception to the doctrine based upon alleged 
commission of fraud upon the regulating authority, the court in Gipson v. 
Fleet Mortgage Group, Inc. stated that “by far” the majority of courts 
considering the issue have refused to find a fraud exception.292 The court in 
Korte v. Allstate Ins. Co. also recognized that the doctrine applies to claims 
of fraud “with courts rejecting the idea that there is a fraud exception to its 
application.”293 Pointing out that equity does not rule the day when the filed 
rate doctrine is at issue, the court in Dolan v. Fidelity National Title Ins. 
Co. stated that a court should not consider “‘the culpability of the 
defendant’s conduct or the possibility of inequitable results’ when applying 
the doctrine.”294 Several other insurance cases also apply the filed rate 
doctrine to claims involving either allegations of fraud or inequitable 
conduct.295    
                                                                                                                 
290 McCray v. Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 636 F. Supp. 2d 322, 332 (D. Del. 
2009) (citing AT&T Corp. v. JMC Telecom, L.L.C., 470 F.3d 525, 535 (3d Cir. 
2006)). 
291 In re Title Ins. Antitrust Cases, 702 F. Supp. 2d 840, 857 (N.D. Ohio 
2010). 
292 Gipson v. Fleet Mortg. Grp., Inc., 232 F. Supp. 2d 691, 705 (S.D. Miss. 
2002) (citing Wegoland Ltd. v. NYNEX Corp., 27 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir.1994); 
Taffet v. S. Co., 967 F.2d 1483, 1488-90 (11th Cir. 1992); H.J. Inc., 954 F.2d at 
494; Marco Supply Co. v. AT&T Commc’ns, Inc., 875 F.2d 434, 436 (4th Cir. 
1989)). 
293 Korte v. Allstate Ins. Co., 48 F. Supp. 2d 647, 650 (E.D. Tex. 1999) (citing 
Wegoland Ltd. v. NYNEX Corp., 27 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 1994)); see also Transp. 
Data Interchange, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 920 F. Supp. 86, 89-90 (D. Md. 1996). 
294 Dolan v. Fid. Nat’l. Title Ins. Co., No. 08-CV-00466 (TCP)(WDW), 2009 
WL 3934153, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting Marcus v. AT&T Corp., 138 F.3d 
46, 58 (2d Cir. 1998)) aff’d, 365 Fed. App’x 271 (2d Cir. 2010). 
295 E.g., Roussin v. AARP, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 2d 412, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), 
aff’d, No. 09-4932-CV, 2010 WL 2101912 (2d Cir. May 26, 2010); In re N.J. Title 
Ins. Litig., No. 08-1425, 2009 WL 3233529, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 5, 2009); Hooks v. 
Am. Med. Sec. Life Ins. Co., No. 3:06CV71, 2008 WL 3911130, at *5-6 
(W.D.N.C. Aug. 19, 2008); Alexander v. Washington Mut., Inc., No. 07-4426, 
2008 WL 2600323, at *2 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 2008); Anderson v. City Fin. Co., No. 
Civ.A. 3:02CV1074LN, 2003 WL 21788947, at *4 n.9 (S.D. Miss. July 14, 2003); 
Bender v. Friedman's Inc., No. Civ.A. 4:02CV509LN, 2003 WL 21497487, at *2 
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Additionally, although not an insurance case, H.J. Inc. v. 
Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., a RICO case from the 
telecommunications industry, is significant in regard to the relation 
between fraud and the filed rate doctrine.296 In response to allegations that 
agency officials accepted bribes in regard to rate setting, the court in H.J. 
Inc. ruled as follows that even improper activity on the part of agency 
officials did not prevent application of the doctrine: 
 
It is true that the Supreme Court has not considered the 
question of whether the filed rate doctrine applies when 
plaintiffs complain that the regulatory agency itself was 
involved in the alleged fraudulent conduct. We are 
convinced, however, that the underlying conduct does not 
control whether the filed rate doctrine applies. Rather, the 
focus for determining whether the filed rate doctrine 
applies is the impact the court's decision will have on 
agency procedures and rate determinations.297 
 
 In rejecting the position that the filed rate doctrine should be 
disregarded because the court was not asked to engage in ratemaking, the 
court in H.J. Inc. noted that damages could only be determined by 
measuring the difference between approved rates and rates that should have 
been approved absent the alleged wrongful conduct.298 Making such a 
determination would, by definition, involve the court in ratemaking 
procedures. 
 
                                                                                                                 
n.2 (S.D. Miss. May 30, 2003); Strong v. First Family Fin. Servs., Inc., 202 F. 
Supp. 2d 536, 545 (S.D. Miss. 2002); Kirksey v. Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla., 114 
F. Supp. 2d 526, 529 (S.D. Miss. 2000); Uniforce Temp. Pers., Inc. v. Nat’l 
Council on Comp. Ins., Inc., 892 F. Supp. 1503, 1511-12 (S.D. Fla. 1995), aff’d on 
other grounds, 87 F.3d 1296 (11th Cir. 1996); Horowitz ex rel. Gilbert v. Bankers 
Life & Cas. Co., 745 N.E.2d 591, 605 (Ill. App. 2001); Commonwealth ex rel. 
Chandler III v. Anthem Ins. Co’s., Inc., 8 S.W.3d 48, 53 (Ky. App. 1999); Stepan 
v. Edina Realty Title, Inc., No. A07-0578, 2008 WL 2020434, at *2-3 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2008); Byan v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 662 N.Y.S.2d 44, 45 (App. Div. 
1997); In re Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield Customer Litig., 622 N.Y.S.2d 843, 
848 (Sup. Ct. 1994), aff'd sub nom. Minihane v. Weissman, 640 N.Y.S.2d 102 
(App. Div. 1996).   
296 H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 954 F.2d 485 (8th Cir. 1992). 
297 Id. at 489. 
298 Id. at 494. 
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B. CASES CLARIFYING THAT THE DOCTRINE APPLIES TO RATE-
RELATED FRAUD ONLY 
 
 The court in Rios v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. clarified that 
the filed rate doctrine bars only rate-related allegations of fraud.299 The 
court discussed the history of and the reasoning behind the doctrine as well 
as its relationship in regard to challenges to services. The court recognized, 
for example, that the doctrine is implicated when a claim for excessive 
rates is couched as a claim for inadequate services.300 In regard to the 
applicability of the filed rate doctrine, the court further stated that the label 
placed on a claim, such as fraud, is not the appropriate issue and that 
instead the “focus for determining whether the filed rate doctrine applies is 
the impact the court’s decision will have on agency procedures and rate 
determinations.”301 
The dispute in Rios stemmed from State Farm’s policy regarding 
the timing of payments for roof repair. In the states involved, State Farm’s 
initial policy was that it would pay only for a roof overlay when damage 
was initially incurred,302 withholding payment for full replacement cost 
until an entirely new roof was actually in place. If a policyholder did not 
fully replace a damaged roof within a specified time period, the 
policyholder never got full replacement cost reimbursement.303 Later, 
however, for marketing purposes, State Farm decided to pay the full 
replacement cost “upfront” when the damage was incurred and issued 
policies to that effect.304 After incurring significant unexpected losses, State 
Farm attempted to remove the upfront payment provision from policies.305 
Of course, outstanding policies retained the provision, and regulatory 
approval was required before State Farm could legitimately revert to the 
earlier policy provisions.306 The plaintiffs alleged that State Farm continued 
to sell the upfront endorsement policies, although never intending to honor 
them, and that State Farm fraudulently reverted to the two-part payment 
system without obtaining regulatory approval.307   
                                                                                                                 
299 Rios v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 469 F. Supp. 2d 727 (S.D. Iowa 2007). 
300 Id. at 735. 
301 Id. at 737 (quoting H.J. Inc., 954 F.2d at 489). 
302 A roof overlay involves laying new roof shingles on top of existing roof 
shingles. Rios, 469 F. Supp. 2d at 731. 
303 Id. 
304 Id. at 731-32. 
305 Id. at 732. 
306 Id. 
307 Id. 
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Under the theory of fraudulent inducement, damages in the form of 
rescission and disgorgement of premiums for the upfront endorsement were 
sought by the class of plaintiffs who had not actually sustained roof 
damage.308 The court in Rios recognized that the plaintiffs could sue for 
“damages by having been deprived of benefits which were promised, and 
were consistent with the filed rate, but were not delivered.”309 The court 
found, however, that the damages sought, return of the premiums paid for 
the upfront endorsement, would necessarily and plainly “challenge the rates 
previously approved by the Commission[er].”310 In other words, the 
plaintiffs’ problem was that their damages could only be measured by 
comparing the difference between the rates the Commissioner approved 
with the ones that allegedly should have been approved without the upfront 
endorsement.311 The court in Rios further discussed the need for and 
application of the filed rate doctrine in relation to the plaintiffs’ claims as 
follows: 
 
While Plaintiffs argue that the Court would not be involved 
in any rate making or be required to second guess the rate 
making agency because they merely seek the full return of 
all premiums for the Upfront Endorsement, the Court 
disagrees . . . . As stated above, to appropriately measure 
Plaintiff’s and Class I members’ damages, the Court would 
first have to determine the premiums paid for the Upfront 
Endorsement provision (as opposed to the premiums paid 
for the entire homeowner's policy), and then the Court 
would have to “second guess” what rate the Commissioner 
would have charged for each relevant Class Period for the 
homeowners’ policies less the Upfront Endorsement 
provision.312  
 
According to the court, the relief sought by the plaintiffs “falls squarely 
                                                                                                                 
308 Rios, 469 F. Supp. 2d at 733. 
309 Id. at 739 (quoting Richardson v. Standard Guar. Ins. Co., 853 A.2d 955, 
967 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2004)). 
310 Id. at 738 (quoting H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 954 F.2d 485, 493 (8th 
Cir. 1992)). 
311 Id. at 739 (citing Ark. La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 577 (1981); H.J. 
Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 954 F.2d 485, 494 (8th Cir. 1992)). 
312 Rios, 469 F. Supp. 2d at 739 (citations omitted). 
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within the filed rate doctrine.”313 
Another case closely examining the filed rate doctrine in 
connection with allegations of wrongdoing, including fraud, is American 
Bankers’ Insurance Co. of Florida v. Wells, a case in which the Supreme 
Court of Mississippi addressed claims that the defending lender and insurer 
improperly profited from insurance the lender purportedly obtained to 
protect its security interest in automobiles sold to the claimants.314 The 
court in Wells distinguished between allegations of wrongdoing committed 
in connection with performance of a contract as opposed to claims 
challenging policy rates. In finding that the claimants sought some 
premium-related damages barred by the doctrine, the court noted that one 
of the central allegations of the case was that the lender obtained a credit 
protection policy with excessive rates and provisions slanted in favor of the 
lender.315 The court also recognized that the actual damages claimed by the 
plaintiffs closely paralleled the premium charges imposed.316 In remanding 
the case, the court provided the following instructions to the trial judge.   
 
We remand this case to the trial court for a new trial with 
directions that Wells and Oliver [claimants] be limited to 
recovery for damages (if any) resulting from tortious 
conduct in the performance, rather than the rates and terms, 
of the contract in question. The trial judge should also be 
careful, however, to prevent the jury from imposing 
liability based upon the rates of the policies in question 
which are subject to oversight by the Department of 
Insurance in the exercise of its statutory mandate.317 
 
Following are claims in Wells that the court found arguably fell 
outside the ambit of the filed rate doctrine: 
 
x Backdating and charging for insurance coverage that 
was worthless because no damage had occurred during 
the period. 
                                                                                                                 
313 Id. (quoting H.J. Inc., 954 F.2d at 492). The court noted an unresolved 
issue, however, involving the state law to be applied to the proposed nationwide 
class and its effect on the application of the filed rate doctrine. Id. at 740.   
314 Am. Banker’s Ins. Co. of Fla. v. Wells, 819 So. 2d 1196 (Miss. 2001). 
315 Id. at 1204. 
316 Id. 
317 Id. at 1205 (citation omitted) (emphasis omitted). 
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x Requiring and charging for automobile insurance 
based upon an incorrect amount owed. 
x Improperly requiring repossession of damaged 
vehicles. 
x Committing fraud by basing premiums on an 
inaccurate time period and improperly adding 
surcharges to premiums.318 
 
C. THE EFFECT OF A FAILURE TO DISCLOSE   
 
After addressing both the nondiscrimination and the 
nonjusticiability strands of the doctrine, the court in Lentini v. Fidelity 
National Title Insurance Co. of New York found the filed rate doctrine 
inapplicable to claims that the defendant, through its agent, wrongfully 
failed to disclose the availability of discounted rates for insurance to which 
plaintiffs were allegedly entitled.319 Regarding the nonjusticiability strand 
of the doctrine involving the conclusiveness of agency decision making, the 
court recognized that the plaintiff was simply attempting to require that the 
defendant adhere to the approved rates.320 In regard to the 
nondiscrimination strand of the doctrine, the court stated that the plaintiff 
                                                                                                                 
318 Id. at 1204-05.  Interestingly, the court in Wells referenced another 
Mississippi Supreme Court decision decided the same year, Am. Bankers Ins. Co. 
of Fla. v. Alexander, 818 So. 2d 1073 (Miss. 2001), overruled on other grounds by 
Capital City Ins. Co. v. G.B. "Boots" Smith Corp., 889 So. 2d 505 (Miss. 2004), 
which seemed to take a stronger position regarding justification for disregard of the 
filed rate doctrine in the face of allegations of fraud. See Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of 
Fla., 818 So.2d at 1083-85. The Wells court distinguished Alexander on the basis 
that Alexander was reviewed on an interlocutory appeal rather than after a trial on 
the merits. The court in Wells believed the evidence presented at trial established 
that certain claims were based on excessive premiums in violation of the filed rate 
doctrine. Wells, 308 So.2d at 1205 n.2. The dissent in Wells, however, was of the 
opinion that Alexander established that the filed rate doctrine failed to bar the 
claims at issue in the case involving breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the duty of 
good faith and fair dealing, and fraud. Id. at 1211 (McRae, J., dissenting). 
319 Lentini v. Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co. of N.Y., 479 F. Supp. 2d 292 (D. Conn. 
2007).  
320 Id. at 301 (citing Randleman v. Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 2d 
812 (N.D. Ohio 2006)); Zanagara v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Am., 423 F. Supp. 2d 
762, 776 (N.D. Ohio 2006), vacated on other grounds, No. 1:05CV731, 2006 WL 
825231 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 30, 2006) (previous order vacated based on an issue 
involving subject matter jurisdiction)). 
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was seeking to enforce the filed rate, not obtain a lower rate than that 
charged to other consumers.321 Of course, whether the defendant had a duty 
to disclose the information at issue was a question of fact for the jury.322 
The point of the court’s ruling was that the filed rate doctrine did not bar 
the plaintiff from proceeding with proof.     
   Another case finding that allegations of nondisclosure fell outside 
the ambit of the filed rate doctrine is Chambers v. Union National Life 
Insurance Co., an unreported federal district court decision.323 In that case 
the court refused to apply the doctrine to bar claims that the defendants 
wrongfully failed to tell the plaintiff insureds that their policies contained 
waiver of premium provisions for the disabled.324 The result of these cases 
seems correct because the rate enforcement aspect of the doctrine is not 
served by allowing circumvention of rates by defendants. 
 
XVI. CHARGES OUTSIDE THE BASIC RATE – INSTALLMENT 
PAYMENTS,  RENEWALS, AND OTHER FEES AND 
CHARGES 
 
A. INSTALLMENT PAYMENTS  
 
 There is authority to the effect that disputes involving contractual 
provisions by which insureds, for a fee, may pay insurance premiums by 
installment are not affected by the filed rate doctrine. For example, in 
Farmers Texas County Mutual Insurance Co. v. Romo, the plaintiffs 
claimed that by virtue of the filed rate doctrine, the only lawfully 
prescribed charges were those filed with the state’s department of insurance 
and that because the defending insurers did not file installment payment 
plan fees, the fees were illegal.325 The court, however, found in favor of the 
defendants ruling that the statutes at issue did not require the filing of 
installment plan charges rendering moot the argument regarding the filed 
rate doctrine.326 The case raises the issue, however, of whether the filed rate 
doctrine would bar judicial relief in regard to installment fees in a state 
requiring the filing of such fees. 
                                                                                                                 
321 Lentini, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 302.  
322 Id. at 301. 
323 Chambers v. Union Nat’l Life Ins. Co., No. Civ.A. 301CV452WS, 2002 
WL 32397267 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 29, 2002). 
324 Id. at *4. 
325 Farmers Tex. Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Romo, 250 S.W.3d 527, 533 (Tex. 
App. 2008). 
326 Id. at 538. 
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 The court in Lapenna v. Government Employees Insurance Co. an 
unreported federal district court decision, also found that the filed rate 
doctrine failed to bar claims regarding the improper assessment of 
installment payments.327 According to the court, “the filed rate doctrine is 
inapplicable here because this dispute centers on installment fees, which 
are distinct from premium rates.”328 The installment payment charges at 
issue in Lapenna were governed by statute,329 and there was no indication 
that the state required the filing of fees for installment payments with the 
state department of insurance. 
 
B. RENEWALS  
 
In Hooks v. American Medical Security Life Insurance Co., the 
court refused to accept the plaintiffs’ position that the filed rate doctrine 
was inapplicable to claims of excessive premium charges for policy 
renewals.330 The court recognized that, by statute, readjustment of the 
premium rate was allowed based on an insurer’s “experience thereunder,” 
and that the phrase “experience thereunder” referred back to initial rate 
filings.331 The court, therefore, reasoned that any decision regarding 
renewal rates would have to refer back to the initial rates; and that the filed 
rate doctrine applied as a bar because “[t]he plaintiffs cannot prove their 
claim without the rates set by the Commissioner being questioned.”332 
The plaintiffs in Hooks also claimed that the defendants wrongfully 
increased premiums by retaining portions of membership fees.333 The 
plaintiffs thought the membership fees at issue were to be paid to another 
organization they believed they had joined in order to obtain group rates.334 
The court, however, determined that the claim was barred by the filed rate 
doctrine because the doctrine prohibits the recovery of damages measured 
by comparing the approved rate and the rate that would have been charged 
                                                                                                                 
327  Lapenna v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., No. 8:05-cv-904-T-24MSS, 2007 WL 
4199580 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 26, 2007), aff’d, 316 F. App’x 894 (11th Cir. 2009). 
328 Id. at *2 n.3. 
329 Id. at *3-4. 
330 Hooks v. Am. Med. Sec. Life Ins. Co., No. 3:06cv71, 2008 WL 3911130 
(W.D.N.C. Aug. 19, 2008). 
331 Id. (construing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-51-80(g) (2009)). 
332 Id. at *5 (citing Lupton v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.C., 533 S.E.2d 
270, 273 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000)). 
333 Id. 
334 Id. at *6. 
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absent the alleged improper conduct.335  
The Hooks court referenced Euclid Insurance Agencies, Inc. v. 
American Association of Orthodontists,336 cited by the plaintiffs, 
recognizing that the court in that case “found that a claim for breach of 
contract for failing to adjust rates pursuant to the contract was not 
precluded by the filed rate doctrine.”337 The court, however, did not discuss 
that theory further on the basis that the plaintiffs in Hooks had not raised a 
breach of contract claim.338 Hooks raises the issue of whether in some cases 
by artful pleading, a litigant may be able to avoid the effects of the filed 
rate doctrine.   
 
C. OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE FEES 
 
The Supreme Court of Texas in Mid-Century Insurance Co. of 
Texas v. Ademaj approved the assessment of a fee outside the insurer’s 
filed rates imposed to cover the costs of a state anti-theft program.339 The 
state’s insurance commissioner had specifically authorized the imposition 
of the charge340 and had promulgated a rule under which insurers were not 
required to include the fee in rate filings.341 The plaintiffs claimed that the 
fee was wrongfully imposed because it was not included in premium rates 
filed with the state.342 Although acknowledging that the filed rate doctrine 
was applied in the state,343 the court recognized the absence of authority 
that charges validly approved by the commissioner would be barred by the 
doctrine and upheld the imposition of the fee.344 The plaintiffs in Ademaj 
did not assert the filed rate doctrine as it is generally understood—as a bar 
to challenges of approved rates. The case illustrates, however, the various 
ways in which the doctrine may be asserted.  
 
 
                                                                                                                 
335 Id. 
336 Euclid Ins. Agencies, Inc. v. Am. Assoc. of Orthodontists, No. 95 C 3308, 
1997 WL 548069 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 1997). 
337 Hooks, 2008 WL 3911130, at *5 n.6. 
338 Id. 
339 Mid-Century Ins. Co. of Tex. v. Ademaj, 243 S.W.3d 618 (Tex. 2007). 
340 Id. at 620. 
341 Id. at 624 (citing 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 5.205(b) (1992)). 
342 Id. at 625. 
343 Id. (citing Sw. Elec. Power Co. v. Grant, 73 S.W.3d 211, 216-17 (Tex. 
2002)). 
344 Id. 
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XVII. APPLICATION OF THE FILED RATE DOCTRINE IN 
SPECIFIC AREAS 
 
While the filed rate doctrine is not limited to specific realms, it 
does seem to appear more frequently in relation to certain types of claims. 
Following is a discussion of the doctrine as applied to antitrust claims, 
discrimination claims, alleged violations of the Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations Act,345 breach of contract claims, and to allegations 
regarding the wrongful receipt of kickbacks or unearned premiums—all 
areas in which the doctrine is commonly raised. 
  
A. RESTRAINT OF TRADE AND ANTITRUST CLAIMS 
 
The filed rate doctrine arises frequently in conjunction with claims 
of antitrust and restraint of trade violations in the insurance industry. For 
example, in Allen v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. the court recognized 
that the gravamen of the plaintiffs’ claims was that the defending insurers 
concertedly and in restraint of trade agreed not to offer homeowners’ 
insurance coverage in coastal areas unless a percentage-based hurricane 
deductible was allowed.346 In ruling that the claims were barred for reasons 
including the filed rate doctrine, the court recognized that the doctrine 
“prohibits a party from recovering damages measured by comparing the 
filed rate and the rate that might have been approved absent the conduct in 
issue.”347 The court further set forth its reasoning as follows: 
 
Allowing the plaintiffs to circumvent the established 
statutory process for approval of insurance rates by 
allowing the Court to become enmeshed in the rate-making 
process would undermine Alabama's current regulatory 
regime, which, through its statutory administrative 
remedies, is designed to be self-policing. If this Court 
strikes the hurricane deductible, thereby increasing 
coverage under the policies, that necessarily affects a 
decrease in the defendants' effective rates and disturbs the 
commissioner's rate-making authority. Therefore, pursuant 
                                                                                                                 
345 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (2006 & Supp. III 2009). 
346 Allen v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 59 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1230 (S.D. Ala. 
1999). 
347 Id. at 1227 (quoting Calico Trailer Mfg. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 155 
F.3d 976, 977 (8th Cir. 1998)). 
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to the filed-rate doctrine, this Court concludes that 
plaintiffs' claims challenging the unlawfulness of the 
defendants' rate filing, which include the hurricane 
deductible, are due to be dismissed.348 
 
Many other cases have also relied on the filed rate doctrine in dismissing 
claims of antitrust violations arising under federal and state law,349 although 
there is contrary authority.350  
The following sections address exceptions in the insurance field 
that have been claimed in relation to application of the doctrine in antitrust 
cases. Of course, as discussed in Section V of this article, litigants in 
insurance cases involving interplay between state and federal law should 
consider the impact of the McCarran-Ferguson Act351 as well as the filed 
rate doctrine.   
 
1. Issues Involving Alleged Non-Rate Anticompetitive Activity  
 
 Citing In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litigation,352 the 
court in the insurance case of In re Pennsylvania Title Insurance Antitrust 
                                                                                                                 
348 Id. at 1229. 
349 E.g., Winn v. Alamo Title Ins. Co., 372 F. App’x 461, 462-63 (5th Cir. 
2010); Dolan v. Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 365 F. App’x 271, 272-73 (2d Cir. 2010); 
In re Title Ins. Antitrust Cases, 702 F. Supp. 2d 840, 890 (N.D. Ohio 2010); In re 
N.J. Title Ins. Litig., No. 08-1425, 2009 WL 3233529, at *2-4 (D.N.J. Oct. 5, 
2009); Uniforce Temp. Pers., Inc. v. Nat’l Council on Comp. Ins., Inc., 892 F. 
Supp. 1503, 1511-12 (S.D. Fla. 1995), aff’d on other grounds, 87 F.3d 1296, 1301 
(11th Cir. 1996); Calico Trailer Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., LR-C-93-717, 
1994 WL 823554, at *1-2, *8 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 12, 1994); Amundson & Assocs. Art 
Studio, Ltd. v. Nat’l Council on Comp. Ins., Inc., 988 P.2d 1208, 1213, 1216-17 
(Kan. Ct. App. 1999) (applying the doctrine to claims arising under state antitrust 
claims); N.C. Steel, Inc. v. Nat’l Council on Comp. Ins., 496 S.E.2d 369, 372 
(N.C. 1998) (applying the doctrine to state antitrust claims); Prentice v. Title Ins. 
Co. of Minn., 500 N.W.2d 658, 659, 663-64 (Wis. 1993) (applying the filed rate 
doctrine to antitrust action arising under state law).  
350 See Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386, 393-94 (9th Cir. 1992).  
Brown is discussed in detail in Section XIV C. of this article, addressing the type 
of administrative review required for imposition of the doctrine. See supra pp. 42-
48. 
35115 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (2006). 
352 In re Pa. Title Ins. Antitrust Litig., 648 F. Supp. 2d 663, 680 (E.D. Pa. 
2009) (citing In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litig., 998 F.2d 1144, 
1159-61 (3d Cir. 1993)). 
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Litigation recognized that the Third Circuit has “carved out a non-rate 
anticompetitive activity exception” to the filed rate doctrine's preclusive 
effect in antitrust actions. Under that exception, the filed rate doctrine does 
not apply to situations, such as that occurring in Lower Lake Erie, in which 
it was found that the defendants acted to inhibit lower cost competitors 
from entering the shipping market following technological advances 
enabling shipment of iron ore by means other than rail.353 Specifically, the 
railroads illegally conspired and acted to prevent the movement of iron ore 
by trucking through, for example, restricting the lease and sale of railroad-
owned dock property.354 The plaintiffs contended that absent the 
conspiracy, they would have paid lower costs for the transportation of iron 
ore.355 Addressing the fact that rates were filed with the ICC, the court in 
Lower Lake Erie explained the non-rate activity exception to the filed rate 
doctrine as follows: 
 
We recognize that the success of anticompetitive non-rate 
activity would coincidentally implicate rates promulgated 
under the jurisdiction of the ICC. It is fully consistent with 
Keogh [v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co], however, 
to accept these rates as lawful and nonetheless to conclude 
that through non-rate activities, particularly the restriction 
on the sale or lease of dock space and the refusal to deal 
with potential competitors, the railroads effectively 
retarded entry of lower cost competitors to the market. The 
instrument of damage to the steel companies was the 
absence of the lower-cost combination. In contrast, the 
Supreme Court in Keogh made it clear that “the instrument 
by which Keogh is alleged to have been damaged is rates 
approved by the Commission.”356  
 
The court in Lower Lake Erie recognized that “[i]t was the railroads’ 
hindering the development of the market which defines this antitrust 
litigation.”357 
                                                                                                                 
353 See Lower Lake Erie, 998 F.2d at 1159-61; In re Pa. Title Ins. Antitrust 
Litig., 648 F. Supp. 2d at 680 (citing Bar Techs., Inc. v. Conemaugh & Black Lick 
R.R. Co., 73 F. Supp. 2d 512, 518 (W.D. Pa. 1999)). 
354 Lower Lake Erie, 998 F.2d at 1152-53. 
355 Id. at 1154. 
356 Id. at 1159 (quoting Keogh v. Chicago & Nw. Ry., 260 U.S. 156, 161 
(1922)).   
357 Id. at 1160. 
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On the other hand, the court in In re Pennsylvania Title Insurance 
Antitrust Litigation cited Utilimax.com, Inc. v. PPL Energy Plus, LLC358 as 
an example of the type of situation to which the non-rate anticompetitive 
activity exception is inapplicable.359 In Utilimax the plaintiff, a retail 
supplier of electricity, claimed that the defendant, through its monopolistic 
position, exerted undue market influence over the wholesale electricity 
market enabling it to charge excessive rates.360 The court in Utilimax 
distinguished Lower Lake Erie on the basis that the dispute in Lower Lake 
Erie dealt with activities wholly separate from rates.361 The Ultimax court 
was of the opinion that the plaintiff, in simply claiming that the defendant 
“exploited its market position by raising its rates,” failed to allege non-rate 
anticompetitive activity and, therefore, the filed rate doctrine barred the 
claims.362   
The court in In re Pennsylvania Title found that the alleged 
wrongdoing in that case fell closer to market exploitation, which the 
Ultimax court considered rate-related, than market exclusion, which the 
Lake Erie court considered non-rate related. The determining factor in the 
court’s opinion was that the plaintiffs challenged the rates themselves, not 
activity separate from the rates.363 This exception to the filed rate doctrine 
is not frequently referenced in insurance cases. As the doctrine continues to 
develop, it would not be unexpected for plaintiffs to focus on non-rate 
activities in an effort to avoid the effects of the doctrine.     
 
2. The Impact of “Price Squeeze” Cases 
 
The plaintiffs in McCray v. Fidelity National Title Insurance Co. 
claimed that the filed rate doctrine was inapplicable to claims of price 
fixing in relation to insurance rates because the insurance regulatory regime 
involved was insufficiently comprehensive.364 Specifically, the plaintiffs 
                                                                                                                 
358 378 F.3d 303 (3d Cir. 2004).  
359 In re Pa. Title Ins. Antitrust Litig., 648 F. Supp. 2d 663, 680 (E.D. Pa. 
2009) (citing Utilimax, 378 F.3d at 308). 
360 Utilimax, 378 F.3d at 306. 
361 Id. at 308. 
362 Id. Although finding it inapplicable, the court in Ultimax also referenced a 
competitor exception to the filed rate doctrine. The reasoning for such a rule is that 
competitors are not the intended beneficiaries of rate regulation. Id. at 307. That 
exception has not been analyzed in insurance cases. 
363 In re Pa. Title Ins. Antitrust Litig., 648 F. Supp. 2d at 680. 
364 McCray v. Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 636 F. Supp. 2d 322, 330 (D. Del. 
2009). 
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complained that the regulations failed to provide claimants with monetary 
relief for rates initially accepted by the state’s department of insurance but 
later found to be unreasonable or fraudulent.365 According to the plaintiffs, 
their claims fell into a type of “regulatory lacuna” counseling against the 
application of the filed rate doctrine.366 The court noted that the plaintiffs 
primarily relied on “price squeeze” cases in support of their argument.367   
The court in Borough of Lansdale v. PP & L, Inc., a case arising in 
the electric industry cited by the McCray court,368 explained that a price 
squeeze case generally involves a defending monopolist who supplies the 
plaintiff at one level, such as at the wholesale level; competes with the 
plaintiff on another level, such as at retail; and then seeks to destroy the 
plaintiff by charging the plaintiff a higher wholesale price than other retail 
customers.369 The court in Borough of Lansdale recognized that when no 
one regulatory agency has complete jurisdiction over the rating system at 
issue in a price squeeze claim, the filed rate doctrine is inapplicable.370 On 
the basis that two agencies were involved in the rating system at issue, the 
court refused to apply the filed rate doctrine to bar the plaintiff’s price 
squeeze claims stating that application of the doctrine would result in “no 
mechanism to reiew overall ratemaking and its potential anticompetitive 
effects.”371   
The court in McCray correctly reasoned that the situation presented 
in that case did not qualify for any such exception stating: “The plaintiffs’ 
claim falls into no regulatory lacuna. There is but one regulatory authority 
here . . . and it is fully empowered to regulate the one rate at issue here that 
involves title insurance premiums.”372 The court, however, stopped short of 
ruling that a price squeeze situation involving, for example, competing 
regulatory authority would fail to qualify as an exception to the filed rate 
                                                                                                                 
365 Id. 
366 Id.  
367 Id. (citing Kirkwood v. Union Elec. Co., 671 F.2d 1173, 1176 (8th Cir. 
1982); City of Mishawaka v. Ind. & Mich. Elec. Co., 560 F.2d 1314, 1321 (7th Cir. 
1977)). 
368 McCray, 636 F. Supp. 2d at 330-31 (citing Borough of Lansdale v. PP & L, 
Inc., 503 F. Supp. 2d 730, 736 (E.D. Pa. 2007)). 
369 Borough of Lansdale v. PP & L, Inc., 503 F. Supp. 2d 730, 735 (E.D. Pa. 
2007). 
370  Id. at 742.  The court, however, recognized the existence of contrary 
authority on the issue of whether the filed rate doctrine bars price squeeze claims 
implicating the jurisdiction of more than one set of rate regulations.  Id. at 736. 
371 Id. at 742. 
372 McCray, 636 F. Supp. 2d at 331. 
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doctrine.  
 
3. Allegations of Illegal Boycotts 
 
Claims of boycott are typical in the antitrust arena although there is 
little case law addressing the relationship between boycotts and the filed 
rate doctrine. The court in Arroyo-Melecio v. Puerto Rican American 
Insurance Co. refused to apply the filed rate doctrine to bar allegations that 
private insurers, who allegedly benefited from the placement of 
compulsory insurance with a state-created agency, engaged in a boycott to 
punish an insurance broker for aiding in the private placement of 
compulsory insurance.373 Quoting the First Circuit decision of Town of 
Norwood v. New England Power Co. for the proposition that “[t]he law on 
the filed rate doctrine is extremely creaky,”374 the court stated that “[w]e 
think that boycott has little to do with the filed rate doctrine, a famously 
complex and sometimes criticized set of rules.”375 In reaching its 
conclusion, the court focused on aspects of the filed rate doctrine 
prohibiting contractual agreements or other claims seeking rates different 
from those reflected in agency filings, not activity associated with 
boycotts.376 Arguably, however, because agency procedures and rate 
determinations would be affected, if the gravamen of a claim is that 
excessive rates were charged due to a boycott, the filed rate should be 
applicable in jurisdictions recognizing its application in the insurance 
arena.377   
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
373 Arroyo-Melecio v. P.R. Am. Ins. Co., 398 F.3d 56, 69, 73 (1st Cir. 2005). 
374 Id. at 73 (quoting Town of Norwood v. New England Power Co., 202 F.3d 
408, 420 (1st Cir. 2000)). 
375 Arroyo-Melecio, 398 F.3d at 73. See also In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore 
Antitrust Litig., 998 F.2d 1144, 1159 (3d Cir. 1993). 
376 Arroyo-Melecio, 398 F.3d at 73 (citing Town of Norwood v. Fed. Energy 
Regulatory Comm’n, 217 F.3d 24, 28 (1st Cir. 2000)). 
377 See, e.g., Roussin v. AARP, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 2d 412, 416-17 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009) (recognizing that because the plaintiff was actually complaining of rates, the 
filed rate doctrine applied to claims styled as breach of fiduciary duties and gross 
negligence), aff’d, 379 F.App’x 30, 31 (2d Cir. 2010); Rios v. State Farm Fire & 
Cas. Co., 469 F. Supp. 2d 727, 735 (S.D. Iowa 2007) (refusing to countenance 
avoidance of the doctrine through styling a claim for excessive rates as a claim for 
inadequate service). 
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B. DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PROTECTED CATEGORIES 
 
Cases of unlawful discrimination in the area of insurance may 
involve claims of “redlining” involving allegations that a defendant refused 
to insure properties located in districts with a high population of 
minorities.378 Plaintiffs have also alleged the subjection of minorities to 
illegal discrimination through the use of credit scores to set insurance 
rates.379 Plaintiffs in cases alleging discrimination have had varying degrees 
of success when confronted with the filed rate doctrine defense. Based on 
the following case law, depending on the jurisdiction involved, it seems 
that plaintiffs may fare better in regard to avoiding the effects of the filed 
rate doctrine when proceeding under federal law and also when proceeding 
under broad based anti-discrimination laws as compared to anti-
discrimination regulations specifically impacting insurance.380   
 
1. Authority that the Filed Rate Doctrine Bars Discrimination 
Claims  
 
Schermer v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., decided by the 
Minnesota Supreme Court, involved a class action alleging that a surcharge 
imposed on older homes was racially discriminatory and a form of 
redlining.381 The plaintiffs sued on the basis of a Minnesota statute 
prohibiting the charge of differential rates for homeowner’s insurance 
solely because of the age of the structure but allowing rating standards 
based on the age of components of the residence, such as the electrical 
system, affecting the risk of loss.382 The plaintiffs alleged that the rate 
differential was illegally based on home age rather than electrical system 
age, as claimed by the defending insurer.383 Upholding the filed rate 
                                                                                                                 
378 See, e.g., Schermer v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 721 N.W.2d 307 (Minn. 
2006). 
379 See, e.g., Lumpkin v. Farmers Grp., Inc., No. 05-2868 Ma/V, 2007 WL 
6996584 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 26, 2007). 
380 Compare Schermer, 721 N.W.2d 307 (Minn. 2006) (applying the doctrine 
to bar claims under state laws specifically prohibiting discrimination in the 
provision of home owner’s insurance), with Saunders v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 440 
F.3d 940 (8th Cir. 2006) (refusing to apply the doctrine to bar claims under federal 
anti-discrimination laws). 
381 Schermer, 721 N.W.2d 307 (Minn. 2006). 
382 The court referred to the statute involved, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 72A.20 
(West 2011), as the “anti-redlining” statute.  Schermer, 721 N.W.2d at 309. 
383 Schermer, 721 N.W.2d at 309. 
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doctrine, the court ruled that the claims were barred even assuming the 
truth of the plaintiffs’ allegations.384 
In discussing exceptions to the filed rate doctrine, the court in 
Schermer referenced Saunders v. Farmers Insurance Exchange,385 an 
Eighth Circuit decision discussed further below, for the proposition that 
“where a rate filed with a state regulatory agency violates a federal 
antidiscrimination statute, the federal statute predominates under the 
Supremacy Clause and the filed rate doctrine is inapplicable.”386 The 
Schermer court did not specifically express agreement or disagreement 
with the holding in Saunders. An issue exists, however, as to whether the 
court in Shermer would have ruled differently had a claim under federal 
anti-discrimination law been raised as opposed to a claim under state law 
specifically addressing insurance rates. Additionally, the court in Schermer 
recognized that the plaintiffs in that case had not filed a claim under the 
Minnesota Human Rights Act387 thereby leaving open the issue of whether 
the filed rate doctrine would have applied in that instance.388   
 
2. Authority that the Filed Rate Doctrine is Inapplicable to 
Discrimination Claims 
 
In Saunders v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, plaintiffs sued 
numerous insurers under the federal Fair Housing Act389 and under 
Sections 1981390 and 1982391 of the Civil Rights Acts, alleging race 
discrimination in connection with the provision of homeowners’ insurance 
coverage.392 The court stated that on the record involved, state regulation of 
insurance rates did not support applying the filed rate doctrine to bar 
damage claims arising under federal civil rights statutes.393 In reliance on 
the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution,394 the court 
                                                                                                                 
384 Id. at 319. 
385 Saunders v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 440 F.3d 940 (8th Cir. 2006). 
386 Schermer, 721 N.W.2d at 317 (citing Saunders v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 440 
F.3d at 944-45). 
387 MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 363A.01-41 (2011). 
388 Schermer, 721 N.W.2d at 317 n.6. 
389 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (2000). 
390 Id. § 1981 (2012). 
391 Id. § 1982. 
392 Saunders v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 440 F.3d 940 (8th Cir. 2006). 
393 Saunders, 440 F.3d at 943. 
394 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
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distinguished Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co.395 and 
Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc.,396 stating that in 
those cases the Supreme Court “harmonized two federal statutes with 
competing purposes, the Sherman Act and the Interstate Commerce Act, 
whereas here the Supremacy Clause tips any legislative competition in 
favor of the federal anti-discrimination statutes.”397 
A perplexing issue acknowledged by the court in Saunders 
involves the effect of the number of decisions applying the filed rate 
doctrine based on rates filed with state regulatory agencies to bar, for 
example, federal RICO and antitrust claims.398 The court distinguished 
those cases as follows based on an issue of standing:  
 
But RICO and the Sherman Act require a plaintiff to prove 
injury to “his business or property.” 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). 
Thus, the no-injury principle of Keogh applies to deprive a 
RICO or antitrust plaintiff of standing under federal law to 
challenge a filed rate that must be charged under state law. 
But standing to sue under federal anti-discrimination 
statutes such as the Fair Housing Act is far broader. See 
Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 93 
S.Ct. 364, 34 L.Ed.2d 415 (1972).399 
 
No other cases have been located adopting the court’s reasoning 
regarding standing.400   
A case in which the filed rate doctrine was raised in an unusual 
context in regard to a discrimination claim is Lyons v. First American Title 
Insurance Co.401 The plaintiffs in Lyons claimed that the defendant 
                                                                                                                 
395 Keogh v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156 (1922).   
396 Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409 (1986). 
397 Saunders, 440 F.3d at 944. 
398 See id. at 944 (citing Texas Commercial Energy v. TXU Energy, Inc., 413 
F.3d 503 (5th Cir. 2005); Wegoland Ltd. v. NYNEX Corp., 27 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 
1994); H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 954 F.2d 485 (8th Cir. 1992); Taffet v. S. 
Co., 967 F.2d 1483 (11th Cir. 1992)). 
399 Saunders, 440 F.3d at 944. 
400 Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972), quoted by 
Saunders, involved the standing of tenants who were not themselves denied 
housing to enforce rights under federal law prohibiting housing discrimination. Id. 
at 211. The filed rate doctrine was not at issue. 
401 Lyons v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., No. C09-4156(PJH), 2009 WL 5195866 
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2009). 
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discriminated against minority homeowners in the provision of 
insurance.402 The defendant relied on a section of the state’s code providing 
that acts taken pursuant to authority conferred by the rate regulation section 
of the state’s code failed to provide grounds for civil proceedings.403 The 
plaintiffs countered with the claim that the defendants actually relied on the 
filed rate doctrine, a theory that had been discredited.404 The court found 
the plaintiffs’ argument unpersuasive, stating that the filed rate doctrine is 
“traditionally employed as a bar to actions in the antitrust context, not the 
discrimination context.”405 
 In a case involving allegations of race discrimination in connection 
with the use of credit scoring information to set rates, the Fifth Circuit in 
Dehoyos v. Allstate Corp. addressed the effect of the filed rate doctrine in 
dicta in an interlocutory appeal primarily involving the application of the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act406 to federal anti-discrimination statutes.407 
Although noting that it was not required to address the issue because it was 
initially raised during the appeal, the court found the defendant’s filed rate 
argument unpersuasive, expressing the opinion that application of anti-
discrimination laws would not supplant the state rate controls at issue.408  
Likewise, in  Lumpkin v. Farmers Group, Inc.,409 the court refused to find 
the plaintiff’s claims of racial discrimination based on the use of credit 
scores in pricing homeowners’ insurance barred by the doctrine, stating that 
“[w]here consumers do not challenge the reasonableness of the insurance 
rates…the filed rate doctrine does not apply.”410   
 
 
 
C. CLAIMS UNDER THE RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT 
ORGANIZATIONS ACT 
 
The filed rate doctrine may provide a basis upon which to oppose 
claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
                                                                                                                 
402 Id. at *2. 
403 Id. at *5 (citing Cal. Ins. Code 12414.26 (West 2005)). 
404 Id. at *5. 
405 Id. at *7. 
406 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1994). 
407 Dehoyos v. Allstate Corp., 345 F.3d 290 (5th Cir. 2003). 
408 Id. 
409 No. 05-2868(Ma/V), 2007 WL 6996584 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 26, 2007). 
410 Lumpkin, 2007 WL 6996584 at *8 (citing Zangara v. Travelers Indem. Co. 
of Am., 423 F. Supp. 2d 762, 775 (N.D. Ohio 2006)). 
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(“RICO”)411 allegedly impacting a state’s insurance rating system. 
Prevailing on the doctrine as a defense to a RICO claim, however, is not a 
certainty. For example, in addressing defenses under the McCarran-
Ferguson Act and the filed rate doctrine to RICO claims, the federal district 
court in the recent case of In re American Investors Life Insurance Co. 
Annuity Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation, stated that “[t]hese 
arguments raise difficult issues, the outcome of which is uncertain.”412 The 
logical conclusion is that RICO claims in the insurance industry would be 
analyzed in the same manner as other theories with the filed rate doctrine 
applying in situations in which the insurance rating system is implicated. 
 
1. Authority Applying the Doctrine to RICO Claims 
 
 Two unpublished federal court decisions from the Southern District 
of New York applied the filed rate doctrine to bar RICO claims in the 
insurance industry. In In re EVIC Class Action Litigation, the plaintiffs 
sued on various theories complaining about insurance charges imposed by 
United Parcel Service, Inc.413 Based on the filed rate doctrine, the court 
dismissed a number of counts, including RICO claims, alleging damages 
during the time period that the defendant was required to file tariffs with 
the ICC.414 Similarly, the court in Fersco v. Empire Blue Cross/Blue Shield 
of New York found that the filed rate doctrine barred plaintiffs’ RICO 
allegations that the defendant obtained approval of its rates through the use 
of fraud.415 The court relied heavily upon Wegoland Ltd. v. NYNEX 
Corp.,416 involving RICO claims in the telecommunications industry, for 
the proposition that there is no fraud exception to the filed rate doctrine.417 
In rejecting the argument that consideration of the rate-making process was 
                                                                                                                 
411 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (2006 & Supp. III 2009). 
412 In re Am. Inv. Life Ins. Co. Annuity Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 263 
F.R.D. 226, 242 (E.D. Pa. 2009), enforced in part, 695 F. Supp. 2d 157 (E.D. Pa. 
2010). The court made the quoted statement in connection with the approval of a 
proposed class action settlement without further analysis of the filed rate doctrine. 
Id. 
413 In re Evic Class Action Litig. v. United Parcel Serv., Nos. 00-CIV-
3811(RMB), 02-CIV-2703(RMB), M-21-84(RMB), MDL-1339, 2002 WL 
1766554, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2002). 
414 In re EVIC Class Action Litig., 2002 WL 1766554 at *5-7.   
415 Fersco v. Empire Blue Cross/Blue Shield of N.Y., No. 93 Civ. 4226 (JFK), 
1994 WL 445730, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 1994). 
416 Wegoland Ltd. v. NYNEX Corp., 27 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 1994). 
417 Fersco, 1994 WL 445730, at *2 (citing Wegoland, 27 F.3d at 21). 
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not needed in order to determine if fraud was the basis for the challenged 
rate increase, the court stated that ascertaining damages and determining a 
reasonable rate “are hopelessly intertwined.”418 
 A number of insurance cases indicate in dicta that the filed rate 
doctrine applies to RICO claims.419 For example, although not a RICO 
case, the court in Allen v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. cited with 
approval Taffet v. Southern Co.,420 a RICO case arising in the electric 
industry, for the proposition that the filed rate doctrine applies even if the 
regulated entity defrauded the regulatory agency to obtain a filed rate.421 
Additionally, although disapproving the application of the filed rate 
doctrine to claims of discrimination, the Eighth Circuit in Saunders v. 
Farmers Insurance Exchange referenced with approval cases from other 
industries applying the doctrine to alleged RICO violations.422   
 
2. Authority Refusing to Apply the Doctrine to RICO Claims 
 
 The federal district court for the Southern District of Florida in In 
re Managed Care Litigation addressed claims asserted under RICO that 
through misrepresentations and omissions contained in advertising, 
marketing, and membership materials, managed care insurers manipulated 
the meaning of the term “medical necessity” when encouraging plaintiffs to 
enroll in managed care organizations (MCO’s).423 The defendants asserted 
that the plaintiffs’ use of wire and mail fraud as a predicate act was 
foreclosed by the filed rate doctrine. The court, however, refused to apply 
                                                                                                                 
418 Id. (quoting Wegoland, 27 F.3d at 21). 
419 See, e.g., Saunders v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 440 F.3d 940, 944 (8th Cir. 
2006); Jader v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 975 F.2d 525, 527 (8th Cir. 1992); 
Gipson v. Fleet Mortg. Grp., Inc., 232 F. Supp. 2d 691, 705 (S.D. Miss. 2002); 
Allen v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 59 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1228 (S.D. Ala. 1999); 
Morales v. Attorneys’ Title Ins. Fund, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 1418 (S.D. Fla. 1997); 
Amundson & Ass’n Art Studio, Ltd. v. Nat’l Council on Comp. Ins., Inc., 988 P.2d 
1208, 1213 (Kan. App. 1999); Kentucky ex rel. Chandler v. Anthem Ins. Cos., 8 
S.W.3d 48, 53-54 (Ky. App. 1999). 
420 Taffet v. Southern Co, 967 F.2d 1483 (11th Cir. 1992).  
421 Allen v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 59 F. Supp. 2d at 1228 (citing Taffet, 
967 F.2d at 1494-95). 
422 Saunders, 440 F.3d. at 944 (citing Wegoland Ltd. v. NYNEX Corp., 27 
F.3d 17 (2d Cir.1994); H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 954 F.2d 485 (8th Cir. 1992); 
Taffet v. S. Co., 967 F.2d 1483 (11th Cir. 1992)). 
423 In re Managed Care Litigation, 150 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1334-35. (S.D. Fla. 
2001). 
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the doctrine stating as follows:   
 
The filed rate doctrine does not apply to the present case 
because these states do not appear to conduct 
administrative oversight in the extensive manner typical of 
situations implicating the doctrine. For example, unlike 
utility customers, MCO subscribers (or their employers) 
presumably have some flexibility to search for varying 
amounts of coverage at various rates other than a flat rate 
set by a regulatory regime.424  
 
The court also noted that even if the doctrine applied, the plaintiffs did not 
challenge the rate structure itself.425 Notably, the court did not entirely 
foreclose application of the filed rate doctrine in all RICO cases.   
 
D. BREACH OF CONTRACT  
 
 Courts adopting the filed rate doctrine in the insurance area seem in 
agreement that it is applicable to breach of contract actions implicating the 
filed rate.426 For example, the plaintiff in Kirksey v. American Bankers 
Insurance Co. of Florida, claimed that he was charged more than the 
amount to which he contractually agreed to pay for personal property 
insurance.427 The court, however, found the claim barred stating that 
“[p]laintiff's argument that the contract . . . should control is of no 
consequence since the filed rate controls.”428 The court recognized that 
while it “might disagree with the amount that is allowed for this type of 
insurance, it has no power or authority to set legislative policy of the State 
of Mississippi, to usurp the duties and responsibilities of the Mississippi 
Department of Insurance.”429 Similarly, the court in Rios v. State Farm Fire 
                                                                                                                 
424 Id. at 1344.   
425 Id. 
426 See, e.g., Rios v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 469 F. Supp. 2d 727 (S.D. 
Iowa 2007); Allen v. State Farm Fire & Cas.Co., 59 F. Supp. 2d 1217 (S.D. Ala. 
1999); Korte v. Allstate Ins. Co., 48 F. Supp. 2d 647, 652 (E.D. Tex. 1999); In re 
Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield Customer Litig., 622 N.Y.S.2d 843 (App. Div. 
1994), aff’d sub nom. Minihane v. Weissman, 640 N.Y.S.2d 102 (App. Div. 1996); 
Stutts v. Travelers Indem. Co., 682 S.E.2d 769 (N.C. App. 2009). 
427 Kirksey v. Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla., 114 F. Supp. 2d 526 (S.D. Miss. 
2000). 
428 Id. at 530. 
429 Id. 
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& Casualty Co. recognized that “[o]nce the rates are filed and approved, 
the ‘rights as defined by the [rate] cannot be varied or enlarged either by 
contract or tort of the [regulated entity]’.”430 
There is case law to the effect, however, that the filed rate doctrine 
does not bar claims regarding either interpretation of or enforcement of a 
contract of insurance consistent with the filed rate. For example, although 
finding some of the plaintiff’s claims barred by the filed rate doctrine, the 
court in Horwitz ex rel. Gilbert v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co. 
disregarded the doctrine in relation to a breach of contract claim involving 
the interpretation of ambiguous language.431 The language at issue involved 
the number of times the plaintiff’s premium could be increased yearly.432   
 Similarly, although finding some of the plaintiff’s claims barred by 
the filed rate doctrine, the court in Richardson v. Standard Guaranty 
Insurance Co. allowed others to proceed.433 The court found that the 
doctrine barred claims that the defendants misrepresented the costs and 
benefits to be received from the purchase of the policies at issue. The 
court’s reasoning was that under the filed rate doctrine, the plaintiff was 
presumed to have knowledge of the filed rates and also that the doctrine 
required the conclusion that the plaintiff had suffered no ascertainable 
loss.434 The court recognized, however, that the plaintiff could proceed on 
claims that the defending credit card issuers breached the terms of credit 
insurance policies. Allowable claims included that the defendants 
misconstrued contractual provisions in order to minimize benefits, failed to 
make timely payments, miscalculated premiums, and ignored cancellation 
notices.435 The court explained its ruling as follows:  
 
There is nothing about the filed rate doctrine which would 
preclude a consumer from suing for damages on a claim 
that the insurer breached the policy as written. While the 
doctrine precludes a claim for damages which would 
indirectly cause the application of rates different from the 
                                                                                                                 
430 Rios v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 469 F. Supp. 2d 727, 735 (quoting 
Keogh v. Chicago & Nw. Ry, 260 U.S. 156, 160 (1922)). 
431 Horwitz v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 745 N.E.2d 591, 606 (Ill. App. 2001) 
(defendant conceded that the filed rate doctrine did not apply to the claim focusing 
on ambiguities in the insurance contract itself). 
432 Id. 
433 Richardson v. Standard Guar. Ins. Co., 853 A.2d 955 (N.J. Super. App. 
Div. 2004). 
434 Id. at 967. 
435 Id. 
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filed rates, and would also preclude plaintiff from seeking 
relief, whether equitable or legal, for having been misled 
by unconscionable sales practices which caused plaintiff to 
enter into a contract consistent with the filed rate, the filed 
rate doctrine does not preclude a consumer from suing for 
damages by having been deprived of benefits which were 
promised, and were consistent with the filed rate, but were 
not delivered.436   
 
 Other insurance cases also express the opinion that the doctrine 
allows actions to enforce contractual provisions not conflicting with filed 
rates.437 A case reaching an interesting result on a motion for partial 
summary judgment involving a contractual dispute is Euclid Insurance 
Agencies, Inc. v. American Ass'n of Orthodontists.438 The insurer in that 
case raised the filed rate doctrine as a defense to the claim that it had failed 
to honor a contractual agreement to make “adjustments…over time based 
on experience and actuarial calculations.”439 The court, however, stated that 
although the reasonableness of the rates and the fact that they were 
governed by regulatory agencies “may be factors in deciding this issue, 
they are not dispositive.”440 Noting that no statute or case had been cited 
prohibiting the insurer’s ability to fulfill its commitment, the court ruled 
that the issue of whether the insurer complied with the agreement by 
appropriately adjusting rates was one for the jury.441 The court did not 
expand upon how it believed rates should be used as factors in deciding 
such a dispute.   
 
 
E. Claims Involving Kickbacks or Unearned Premiums 
 
 Plaintiffs complaining of kickbacks paid by insurers to lenders for 
the placement of insurance on mortgaged properties have sued under 
                                                                                                                 
436 Id.  
437 See, e.g., U.S. Steel Corp. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., No. CIV.A. 02-
2108, 2005 WL 2106580, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2005); Randleman v. Fid. Nat’l 
Title Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 2d 812, 823 (N.D. Ohio 2006); Beller v. William Penn 
Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 778 N.Y.S.2d 82, 84-85 (App. Div. 2004). 
438 Euclid Insurance Agencies, Inc. v. American Ass'n of Orthodontists, No. 95 
C 3308, 1998 WL 60775, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 5, 1998). 
439 Id.  
440 Id. 
441 Id. 
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various legal theories. As set forth below, cases conflict on whether the 
filed rate doctrine bars such claims. Perhaps the better view is that while 
the filed rate doctrine bars claims for damages based on filed rates that are 
purportedly excessive, it would not prevent injunctive relief prohibiting the 
payment of future kickbacks not affecting current rates. Such action would 
not unreasonably interfere with the nonjusticiabilitystrand of the doctrine or 
result in discrimination among policyholders. It should also be noted that, 
depending on the jurisdiction involved, plaintiffs may fare better if relief is 
sought under the federal Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (hereinafter 
“RESPA”).442 
 
1. The Filed Rate Doctrine Applied to Bar Claims 
 
In Schilke v. Wachovia Mortgage, FSB, the plaintiff filed various 
state law claims, including fraud, against the defending insurer.443 The 
plaintiff complained of undisclosed fees in the form of kickbacks paid by 
the insurer to plaintiff’s bank in connection with the forced placement by 
the bank of hazard insurance on mortgaged property.444 Referencing its 
concern with preserving agency authority, the court found plaintiff’s claims 
for money damages barred by the filed rate doctrine.445 The court noted that 
plaintiff’s allegations of illegality in relation to the kickbacks did not 
interfere with application of the doctrine.446 
Similarly, the court applied the filed rate doctrine in Roussin v. 
AARP, Inc., to bar claims that AARP improperly received an allowance for 
its sponsorship of insurance plans.447 The plaintiffs claimed that the filed 
rate doctrine was inapplicable because the complaint involved gross 
negligence and a breach of fiduciary duties, not the filed rate.448 The court 
disagreed, however, stating that “[i]t has repeatedly been held that a 
consumer's claim, however disguised, seeking relief for an injury allegedly 
caused by the payment of a rate on file with a regulatory commission, is 
viewed as an attack upon the rate approved by the regulatory 
                                                                                                                 
442 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-17 (2006). 
443 Schilke v. Wachovia Mortg., FSB, 758 F. Supp. 2d 549 (N.D. Ill. 2010). 
444 Id. at 561. The bank was contractually entitled to purchase insurance at the 
plaintiff’s expense because the plaintiff failed to maintain insurance on the 
property. Id. 
445 Id.  
446 Id. at 561-62. 
447 Roussin v. AARP, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 2d 412 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2009), 
aff’d, 379 Fed. App’x 30 (2d Cir. 2010). 
448 Id. at 414. 
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commission.”449 The court was persuaded that the plaintiff was seeking 
recovery based on the difference between what she paid in premiums and 
what she contended she should have paid – the type of accounting barred 
by the filed rate doctrine.450   
In Morales v. Attorneys’ Title Insurance Fund, Inc., the federal 
district court applied the filed rate doctrine to bar class action claims that 
the defending insurers violated RESPA451 through the use of kickbacks and 
fee splitting with mortgage brokers, lenders, and other agents. The court 
found the doctrine applicable even assuming the correctness of the 
plaintiffs’ position that the proper measure of damages was the return of all 
premiums paid, not damages measured by the difference between the actual 
rate and the rate charged.452 Stating that “the class action nature of the 
proceeding in no way affects the important concerns of agency authority, 
justiciability, and institutional competence,” the court in Morales dispensed 
with the plaintiffs’ position that class actions reduce concerns of 
discrimination thereby negating the need for the filed rate doctrine.453 
According to the court, the plaintiffs had no legal right to pay anything but 
the promulgated rates; they had no injury; and, therefore, they lacked 
standing to complain.454 As set forth below, not all courts agree with the 
Morales decision. 
 
2. The Filed Rate Doctrine Found Inapplicable 
 
 Noting disagreement with Morales v. Attorneys’ Title Insurance 
Fund, Inc., discussed above, the Third Circuit in Alston v. Countrywide 
Financial Corp.,455 declined to apply the doctrine to bar claims of illegal 
                                                                                                                 
449 Id. at 416 (quoting Porr v. NYNEX Corp., 230 A.D.2d 564, 660 (App. Div. 
1997)). 
450 Id. at 416-17. 
451 Morales v. Att’ys Title Ins. Fund, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 1418 (S.D. Fla. 1997); 
12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-17 (2006). 
452 Morales, 983 F. Supp. at 1428. 
453 Id. (quoting Wegoland, 27 F.3d at 22). 
454 Id. at 1429. Although the plaintiff did not name lenders as defendants, the 
court in Steven v. Union Planters Corp., No. 00-cv-1695, 2000 WL 33128256 
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 2000) likewise applied the filed rate doctrine to bar claims 
under RESPA that the defending bank-related defendants improperly received 
kickbacks from the plaintiff’s property insurer. 
455 585 F.3d 753 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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kickbacks under RESPA.456 The court in Alston was of the opinion that the 
plaintiffs challenged illegal kickbacks or fee splitting, not the fairness of 
rates.457 In support of its decision, the court quoted Kay v. Wells Fargo & 
Co.458 as follows:  
 
Statutes like RESPA are enacted to protect consumers from 
unfair business practices by giving consumers a private 
right of action against service providers. Plaintiffs may not 
sue under the veil of RESPA if they simply think that the 
price they paid for their settlement services was unfair. 
Alternatively, plaintiffs bringing a suit under RESPA may 
allege a violation of fair business practices through the use 
of illegal kickback payments. The filed-rate doctrine bars 
suit from the former class of plaintiffs and not the latter.459 
 
The court in Alston further cited the following four factors in 
support of its decision: (1) The measure of damages was set by RESPA, so 
there was no need to second guess rates; (2) All consumers affected were to 
be protected by RESPA, not just those bringing suit; (3) Congress intended 
that RESPA apply to mortgage insurance; and (4) RESPA, as a remedial 
statute, should be construed broadly.460 The court concluded by stating that 
it was clear that the plaintiffs challenged defendant Countrywide’s 
allegedly wrongful conduct, “not the reasonableness or propriety of the rate 
that triggered that conduct.”461   
Another case leaving open the possibility that claims brought under 
RESPA may survive application of the filed rate doctrine is Schilke v. 
Wachovia Mortgage, FSB.462 The court in Schilke relied on the filed rate 
doctrine in dismissing state law claims for damages made against the 
defending insurer in relation to alleged wrongful kickbacks. The court, 
however, distinguished Alston on the basis that the plaintiff was not “suing 
                                                                                                                 
45612 U.S.C. §§ 2601-17 (2006); Alston, 585 F.3d at 764 (expressing 
disagreement with Morales). 
457 Alston, 585 F.3d at 764 (citing Alexander v. Wash. Mut., Inc., No. 08-8043, 
2008 WL 2600323, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 2008); Kay v. Wells Fargo & Co., 247 
F.R.D. 572 (N.D. Cal.  2007)). 
458 Kay v. Wells Fargo & Co., 247 F.R.D. 572, 576 (N.D. Cal.2007). 
459 Alston, 585 F.3d at 764 (quoting Kay, 247 F.R.D. at 576). 
460 Id.  
461 Id. at 765. 
462 Schilke v. Wachovia Mortg., FSB, 758 F. Supp. 2d 549, 562 (N.D. Ill. 
2010). 
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under RESPA or any other federal law stemming from Congressional intent 
to circumvent the filed rate doctrine.”463 
Additionally, the court in Gipson v. Fleet Mortgage Group, Inc. 
refused to apply the file rate doctrine to bar a complaint that the defending 
lender wrongfully entered into an arrangement with an insurer by which the 
lender received fees and commissions recouped from borrowers through 
the payment of higher insurance premiums.464 The plaintiff claimed that by 
doing so, the lender breached its contract and also violated its duty of good 
faith and fair dealing.  In refusing to apply the filed rate doctrine, the court 
stated that the challenge was “not so much a challenge to the rate itself as it 
is to the lender’s right under the lending contract to place insurance in such 
a manner as to cause its borrowers’ payment of unnecessary fees.”465   
 
XVIII. THE FUTURE OF THE FILED RATE DOCTRINE 
 
What about the future of the filed rate doctrine? At the federal 
level, Congress has taken no action to abrogate the doctrine. Additionally, 
the U.S. Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in a case involving the 
filed rate doctrine, Dolan v. Fidelity National Title Insurance Co.,466 which 
is not surprising in view of the Court’s pronouncement in Square D Co. v. 
Niagara Frontier Tariff  that “[i]f there is to be an overruling of the Keogh 
rule, it must come from Congress, rather than from this Court.”467   
As previously mentioned, ongoing disagreement regarding the 
doctrine’s application in the insurance arena is illustrated by the recent 
cases of In re Title Insurance Antitrust Cases468 and Clark v. Prudential 
Insurance Co. of America469 reaching conflicting decisions regarding 
application of the doctrine to claims arising under Ohio state law.470 
                                                                                                                 
463 Id. at 560. 
464 Gipson v. Fleet Mortg. Grp., Inc., 232 F. Supp. 2d 691 (S.D. Miss. 2002). 
465 Id. at 707. The court in Gipson did, however, apply the doctrine to bar a 
claim that the defending insurer illegally obtained rates through committing fraud 
on the state’s department of insurance.  Id. at 703. 
466 365 Fed. App’x 271 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 261 (2010). 
467 Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 408, 424 
(1986). 
468 702 F. Supp. 2d 840 (N.D. Ohio 2010).   
469 Clark v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., No. Civ. 08-6197 DRD, 2011 WL 
940729 (D.N.J. Mar. 15, 2011). 
470 Compare In re Title Ins. Antitrust Cases, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 861-65 
(adopting the filed rate doctrine in regard to claims under Ohio state law), with 
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Disagreement regarding the doctrine is further illustrated by the conflicting 
decisions of MacKay v. Superior Court471 and Fogel v. Farmers Group, 
Inc.,472 involving the application of the filed rate doctrine to property and 
casualty insurance in California.   
An issue, however, on which consensus could likely be reached is 
the importance of the doctrine in the area of insurance law. For example, 
although the parties had provided notification of a tentative settlement, the 
MacKay court exercised its discretion to issue an opinion stating that one 
reason for doing so was that the issues “are of major importance to both 
insurers and policy holders in California and are clearly of continuing 
public interest and are likely to recur.”473 Although the filed rate doctrine 
was not the only issue considered by the court, it was a significant matter 
addressed in depth.474 
 A review of cases cited in this article illustrates the large number 
decided in the last few years as well as the fact that many courts have 
struggled with the interpretation and the application of the doctrine. A 
primary difference in rationale seems to occur between courts expressing 
the opinion that the doctrine applies to bar claims whenever a rate must be 
consulted in order to determine damages versus courts that allow claims to 
continue so long as the claims themselves do not implicate the filed rate.475 
                                                                                                                 
Clark, 2011 WL 940729 at *12-14 (rejecting application of the filed rate doctrine 
to claims arising under Ohio state law). 
471 MacKay v. Superior Court, 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 893 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010). 
472 Fogel v. Farmers Group, Inc., 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 61 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).  
473 MacKay, 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 912 n.21. 
474 Id. at 910-11. 
475 Compare H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 954 F.2d 485, 489 (8th Cir. 1992) 
(stating that the underlying conduct does not control whether the doctrine applies 
and that the appropriate focus is the impact the court’s decision would have on 
agency procedures and rate determinations), In re Pa. Title Ins. Antitrust Litig., 
648 F. Supp. 2d 663, 680 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (finding that plaintiffs complaint of 
kickbacks actually went to rates), Rios v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 469 F. Supp. 
2d 727, 735 (S.D. Iowa 2007) (recognizing that the filed rate doctrine extends to 
complaints about services as well as to complaints about rates), Morales v. 
Attorneys’ Title Ins. Fund, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 1418, 1429 (S.D. Fla. 1997) 
(recognizing that complaints regarding kickbacks and fee splitting actually went to 
the state’s rate structure), and Uniforce Temp. Pers., Inc. v. Nat’l Council on 
Comp. Ins., Inc., 892 F. Supp. 1503, 1511-12 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (recognizing that the 
filed rate doctrine barred claims that the defendants forced the plaintiff into the 
assigned risk market), aff’d on other grounds, 87 F.3d 1296 (11th Cir. 1996), with 
Arroyo-Melecio v. Puerto Rico Am. Ins. Co., 398 F.3d 56, 73 (1st Cir. 2005) 
(expressing the opinion that the doctrine fails to bar any action which might 
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Another basic difference in outlook is expressed in cases construing the 
doctrine as applied to claims of illegal discrimination in violation of federal 
law based on criteria such as race.476   
The issue of administrative review and action may be another 
fertile ground for litigation. As discussed in Section XIV of this article, 
many courts have discussed the type of administrative review required for 
application of the doctrine. Interestingly, however, in determining whether 
the doctrine should be applied, neither litigants nor the courts have delved 
into the enthusiasm with which state agencies have taken action against 
alleged wrongdoing. Of course, that would involve quite an undertaking 
and large amounts of discovery. Additionally, obtaining such proof in and 
of itself may impact the nonjusticiability strand of the doctrine involving 
the principle that courts should refrain from interfering with the affairs of 
agencies entrusted by the legislative branch with authority over rate 
issues.477   
 Considering the number of cases construing the filed rate doctrine 
in the insurance arena in the last few years coupled with the significant 
disagreement in existence regarding the specific contours of the doctrine, it 
appears that the filed rate doctrine will be a significant source of future 
litigation. Issues impacted by the doctrine are far reaching with puzzling 
and complex disputes involving the role of state departments of insurance, 
the interests of insurers, and the rights of consumers.  
                                                                                                                 
“arguably and coincidentally implicate rates”), Alston v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 
585 F.3d 753, 764 (3d Cir. 2009) (recognizing that the plaintiffs did not directly 
challenge any rate and refusing to apply the doctrine); In re Managed Care Litig., 
150 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1334 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (refusing to apply the doctrine as a 
bar and recognizing that the plaintiffs did not challenge the rate structure per se), 
and Ciamaichelo v. Independence Blue Cross, 909 A.2d 1211, 1218 (Pa. 2006) 
(rejecting the position that allegations that could lead to an adjustment of an 
insurer’s rate “invariably amount to a rate injury claim”). 
476 Compare Schermer, 721 N.W.2d at 307  (applying the doctrine to claims of 
race discrimination), with Saunders, 440 F.3d at 940  (refusing to apply the 
doctrine to claims of race discrimination). 
477 See, e.g., Wegoland Ltd., 27 F.3d at 19 (asserting that courts should not 
become enmeshed in the rate-making process). 
  
A JURISPRUDENTIAL SURVEY OF BAD FAITH  
CLAIMS IN THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION  
CONTEXT AND A CALL FOR A UNIFIED  
STATUTORY REMEDY  
 
STEVEN PLITT* 
  
*** 
 
The article advocates for an exclusive unified remedial approach 
to insurer bad faith claims in the worker’s compensation context as 
opposed to a mixed statutory and common law approach.  The article 
considers the various jurisprudential positions on common law bad faith 
causes of action. The article then details the legislative response to the 
bad-faith cause of action, with a focus on legislation designed to make the 
Worker’s Compensation Act the exclusive remedy for bad faith misconduct 
by insurers. The judicial response to this legislation is also highlighted. 
The article then focuses on legislative attempts to impose penalties on 
insurers as a deterrent to insurer misconduct. Lastly, the article proposes 
in detail a unified approach utilizing an administrative adjudicatory system 
that benefits from knowledgeable and experience triers of fact.  The article 
proposes keeping the current statutory framework in place but with an 
escalating scale of penalties for insurer misconduct that would be coupled 
with a requirement that insurers keep records of complaints filed against 
them, as well as penalties assessed against them, for improper claims 
handling. The penalties would then be escalated according to an insurer’s 
penalty experience rating.  
 
*** 
 
 The issue of whether a specific Workers’ Compensation Act 
precludes common-law tort actions for an insurer’s bad faith conduct in 
mishandling a claim for benefits has arisen in many American 
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jurisdictions.1 The issue has been resolved in different ways; the results 
depend upon the particular facts alleged, the elements of the tort of 
common-law bad faith within the jurisdiction, and the exclusivity and 
penalty provisions of the relevant Workers’ Compensation Act. The courts 
are almost equally divided on this issue. There has been minimal scholarly 
commentary analyzing the competing legal viewpoints which populate the 
debate regarding the proper forum for resolving unfair claim handling 
committed in the workers’ compensation context. 
 A large number of courts have held that common-law bad faith 
actions are barred by the exclusivity provisions2 of a particular Workers’ 
Compensation Act.3 Still other courts have recognized actions for conduct 
                                                                                                        
1 One court has observed that the tort of workers’ compensation bad faith 
arises when an insurance company or a self-insured employer intentionally fails to 
process or pay a claim without a reasonable basis for such action and the carrier 
either knows or it is being unreasonable or fails to conduct an investigation 
adequate to determine whether its conduct was reasonable. See Rowland v. Great 
States Ins. Co., 20 P.3d 1158, 1166 n.5 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001). 
2 The exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Acts are 
designed to balance the interests of both employers and employees. On the one 
hand the employer assumes liability for “accidental” injuries to employees 
regardless of fault and, on the other hand, the employer is relieved of the 
possibility of large damage verdicts which may jeopardize the future of the 
employer’s business. See Gunter v. Mersereau, 491 P.2d 1205, 1206-07 (Or. Ct. 
App. 1971) (motivating philosophy behind workmen's compensation acts is that 
loss arising from accidents in industry should be distributed between employer and 
consumer as cost of production); Woolsey v. Panhandle Refinery Co., 116 S.W.2d 
675, 676 (Tex. 1938) (workers’ compensation objective is to do away with issues 
of negligence, unavoidable accident, and contributory negligence, and to fix 
amount recoverable free from uncertainty). Generally, under the exclusivity 
provisions of the Act employees are not barred from bringing actions for 
intentional torts against their employer, but if the employee elects to pursue a claim 
under the Act the employee may waive his cause of action for the intentional tort. 
See, e.g., Reed Tool Co. v. Copelin, 610 S.W.2d 736, 739 (Tex. 1980) (intentional 
tort action waived by proceeding under Act from injuries derived in course of 
employment); H.L. Hutton & Co. v. District Court of Kay County, 398 P.2d 530, 
534 (Okla. 1965) (election of remedy waives other claims). 
3 See, e.g., Garvin v. Shewbart, 442 So. 2d 80 (Ala. 1983) (provision for 
circuit court action provides remedy for negligent or bad faith failure to pay 
medical expenses); Stafford v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. of New York, Inc., 526 
P.2d 37 (Alaska 1974), overruled by Cooper v. Argonaut Ins. Cos., 556 P.2d 525 
(Alaska 1976) (20 percent penalty for late payment of benefit installments provides 
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constituting bad faith although the tort was not characterized as such.4 As 
an example, a plurality of jurisdictions that have precluded a bad faith 
cause of action have nevertheless recognized that certain other common-
law tort actions, particularly actions for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress,5 can be maintained against a workers’ compensation insurer.6   
                                                                                                        
remedy for negligent or bad faith delay); Sandoval v. Salt River Project Agric. 
Impr. & Power Dist., 571 P.2d 706 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977) (Act provides procedures 
in event of failure to provide benefits); Cervantes v. Great American Ins. Co., 140 
Cal. App. 3d 763, 189 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1983) (10 percent penalty for unreasonable 
delay in payment is exclusive remedy for willful and intentional, as well as 
negligent delay); Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Whitworth, 442 So. 2d 1078 (Fla. Ct. 
App. 1983) (penalty and attorney fee provisions are exclusive remedies for bad 
faith); Robertson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 448 N.E.2d 866 (Ill. 1983) (50 percent 
penalty for unreasonable or vexatious delay remedies insurer’s malicious deception 
or outrageous conduct); Harned v. Farmland Foods, Inc., 331 N.W.2d 98 (Iowa 
1983) (statutory procedure for resolving dispute over treatment constitutes 
exclusive remedy); Hormann v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 689 P.2d 837 (Kan. 
1984) (8 percent interest when carrier refuses to pay without just cause or excuse is 
remedy for intentional refusals); Paradissis v. Royal Indem. Co., 507 S.W.2d 526 
(Tex. 1974) (self-help and administrative procedures provide sole relief for 
insurer's negligence).  
4 See, e.g., Martin v. Travelers Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 329 (1st Cir. 1974); Gibson 
v. Nat’l Ben Franklin Ins. Co., 387 A.2d 220 (Me. 1978); Broaddus v. Ferndale 
Fastener Division, 269 N.W.2d 689 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978). 
5 The standard of proof for an intentional tort in the workers’ compensation 
context can be very difficult to satisfy. As an example, a tort claim against a 
workers’ compensation insurer alleging a bad faith failure to pay an insurance 
claim is barred by the exclusivity provisions of Alabama’s Workers’ 
Compensation Act. Stewart v. Matthews Indus., Inc., 644 So. 2d 915 (Ala. 1994) 
(citing ALA. CODE §§ 25-5-11, -52, -53 (1975); Farley v. CNA Ins. Co., 576 So. 2d 
158 (Ala. 1991); Garvin, 442 So. 2d at 80; Oliver v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 548 So. 
2d 1025 (Ala. 1989); Nabors v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 489 So. 2d 573 (Ala. 1986); 
Moore v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 468 So. 2d 122 (Ala. 1985); Waldon v. Hartford 
Ins. Group, 435 So. 2d 1271 (Ala. 1983). Although the Alabama Supreme Court 
has held that a claim alleging bad faith failure to pay an insurance claim –in the 
context of a workers’ compensation claim –is barred by the exclusivity provisions 
of the Act, the court has also recognized that the tort of outrageous conduct or 
intentional infliction of emotional distress can occur in a workers’ compensation 
setting. See, e.g., Farley, 576 So. 2d at 158; Garvin, 442 So. 2d at 80. The Court in 
Garvin v. Shewbart observed:   
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The [Workers’ Compensation] Act is designed to 
compensate those who are injured on the job and provides 
immunity from common law suits for those employers and 
carriers who come within the Act.  A suit seeking recovery under 
the tort of outrageous conduct does not seek compensation [or] 
medical benefits for the original on-the-job injury. The 
connection with the physical injury that gave rise to the original 
workmen’s compensation claim is tenuous. The conduct giving 
rise to the tort of outrageous conduct in the context of this kind 
of case can be more accurately characterized as mental assault 
than as failure to pay compensation or medical benefits even 
though it may arise in a failure to pay context. Conduct 
constituting the tort of outrageous conduct cannot reasonably be 
considered to be within the scope of the Act. When the employer 
or carrier’s conduct crosses the line between mere failure to pay 
and intent to cause severe emotional distress, the cloak of 
immunity is removed.   
Garvin, 442 So. 2d at 83 (emphasis added). 
 
Under Alabama law, the tort of outrageous conduct or intentional infliction of 
emotional distress involves “extreme and outrageous conduct” by one who 
“intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another.” American 
Road Service Co. v. Inmon, 394 So. 2d 361, 365 (Ala. 1980). In order to present a 
case of outrageous conduct, the plaintiff must show that the conduct was “so 
outrageous in character and so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible 
bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a 
civilized society.” Id.; see also Bearden v. Equifax Services, 455 So. 2d 836 (Ala. 
1984); Strickland v. Birmingham Bldg. & Remodeling, 449 So. 2d 1242 (Ala. 
1984); Cates v. Taylor, 428 So. 2d 637 (Ala. 1983). 
The severe emotional distress required for the tort of outrage requires 
the following: 
 
The emotional distress . . . must be so severe that no 
reasonable person could be expected to endure it.  Any recovery 
must be reasonable and justified under the circumstances, 
liability ensuing only when the conduct is extreme.  By extreme 
we refer to conduct so outrageous in character and so extreme in 
degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be 
regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized 
society.   
Am. Road Serv. Co., 394 So. 2d at 365 (citations omitted).  
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 Some courts recognize tort actions for bad faith outside of the 
relevant Workers Compensation Act.7 Other jurisdictions have held that 
statutory penalty provisions, although available, do not constitute exclusive 
remedies for insurer bad faith.8   
 This article will explore the utility of a modified statutory approach 
to unfair claim handling practices in the workers’ compensation context. 
Part I of the article surveys the competing jurisprudential viewpoints on 
whether to allow a common-law bad faith cause of action. The debate 
among these courts center upon the legislative intent regarding the scope of 
a particular Workers’ Compensation Act exclusivity provision. A small 
number of courts have straddled the issue and determined that their state’s 
Workers’ Compensation Act provided only partial immunity through 
exclusivity for most routine delays in payment of compensation benefits 
alleged to have been withheld in bad faith while permitting a common law 
bad faith tort action where egregious and willful misconduct is involved. A 
few courts have adopted a breach of contract theory regarding bad faith 
misconduct in the workers’ compensation context. Each of these competing 
theories is surveyed in Part I.   
 Part II of the article briefly discusses legislative intervention 
following judicial recognition of a common-law bad faith tort action. 
Legislative intervention, overturning the judicial recognition of the tort, has 
met with mixed success.   
Part III of the article discusses statutory penalties and deterrents. 
There is wide variation of severity and scope in state workers’ 
                                                                                                        
The outrageous conduct must be established by clear and convincing evidence. 
Farley, 576 So. 2d 158. 
6 See Garvin, 442 So. 2d at 80; Stafford, 526 P.2d at 37; Sandoval, 571 P.2d at 
706 (tortious conduct as breaking and entering not immunized); Unruh v. Truck 
Ins. Exch., 498 P.2d 1063 (Cal. 1972); Sullivan v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 So. 
2d 658 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (statute provides exceptions for intentional 
assault and automobile accidents); Robertson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 448 N.E.2d 866 
(Ill. 1983) (penalty might not be exclusive remedy in Unruh-like facts); Paradissis 
v. Royal Indem. Co., 507 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. 1974) (willful torts such as fraud or 
outrageous conduct not within exclusivity bar of Texas Act).  
7 See, e.g., Hollman v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 712 F.2d 1259 (8th Cir. 1983) 
(under South Dakota law); Hayes v. Aetna Fire Underwriters, 609 P.2d 257 (Mont. 
1980); Coleman v. Am. Universal Ins. Co., 273 N.W.2d 220 (Wis. 1979).  
8 See, e.g., Martin v. Travelers Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 329 (1st Cir. 1974) (20 
percent penalty for late payment not exclusive remedy); Gibson v. Nat’l Ben 
Franklin Ins. Co., 387 A.2d 220 (Me. 1978) (similar ruling). 
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compensation penalty statutory remedies. Courts have reached mixed 
conclusions on whether a particular state’s penalty provision provides 
adequate deterrence to prevent insurer misconduct.   
Part IV of the article analyzes the statutory unification of bad faith 
remedies through increased penalties and the maintenance of exclusivity. It 
is the thesis of this article that an exclusive unified remedial approach to 
insurer bad faith is preferable to a combination of statutory and common-
law remedies. An effective unified remedial approach would utilize the 
administrative apparatus in current use which benefits from a 
knowledgeable trier of fact. The current statutory approach would be 
supplemented with a significant penalty system coupled with measures to 
require the annual record-keeping of penalty experience rating. Statistics 
regarding findings of misconduct could be used to assess greater penalties 
and would permit insurance company executives to understand the true cost 
of improper claim handling practices. 
 
I. JURISDICTIONAL SURVEY ON WHETHER TO ALLOW OR 
REJECT COMMON-LAW BAD FAITH IN THE WORKERS’ 
COMPENSATION CONTEXT.  
 
Courts are almost evenly divided over the issue of whether a 
workers’ compensation insurer may invoke the employer’s immunity from 
suit in the workers’ compensation context against charges that the insurer 
committed bad faith in its handling of an employee’s compensation claim.9 
Set forth below are the four principle viewpoints on this issue. 
                                                                                                        
9 The following courts held that the workers’ compensation insurer is entitled 
to immunity: Alabama (Stewart, 644 So. 2d at 915; Oliver v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 
548 So. 2d 1025 (Ala. 1989)); Arkansas (Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 852 
S.W.2d 816 (Ark. 1993); Johnson v. Houston Gen. Ins. Co., 536 S.W.2d 121 (Ark. 
1976)); California (Goetz v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 710 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1983) 
(interpreting California law); Stoddard v. Western Employer’s Ins. Co.,  245 Cal. 
Rptr. 820 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988)); Connecticut (DeOliveira v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,  
870 A.2d 1066 (Conn. 2005)); District of Columbia (Hall v. C&P Telephone Co., 
793 F.2d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1986), reh’g denied, 809 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir. 1987)); 
Georgia (Bright v. Nimmo, 320 S.E.2d 365 (Ga. 1984); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. 
Davis, 320 S.E.2d 368, 370 (Ga. 1984)); Idaho (Van Tine v. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 
889 P.2d 717 (Idaho 1994)); Illinois (Robertson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 448 N.E.2d 
866 (Ill. 1983); Perfection Carpet, Inc. v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 630 N.E.2d 
1152 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)); Indiana (Stump v. Commercial Union, 601 N.E.2d 327 
(Ind. 1992); Borgman v. State Farm Ins. Co., 713 N.E.2d 851 (Ind. Ct. App. 
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1999)); Kentucky (Coker v. Daniel Const. Co., 664 F. Supp. 1079 (W.D. Ky. 
1987), aff’d, 848 F.2d 189 (6th Cir. 1988); Zurich Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 712 S.W.2d 
340 (Ky. 1986); General Acc. Ins. Co. v. Blank, 873 S.W.2d 580 (Ky. Ct. App. 
1993)); Louisiana (Bergeron v. North American Underwriters, Inc., 549 So. 2d 315 
(La. 1989); Banes v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 544 So. 2d 700 (La. Ct. App. 
1989)); Massachusetts (Kelly v. Raytheon, Inc., 563 N.E.2d 1372 (Mass.  App. Ct. 
1990); Boduch v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 528 N.E.2d 1182 (Mass.  App. Ct. 
1988)); Minnesota (Denisen v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 360 N.W.2d 448 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1985)); Missouri (Young v. U. S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 588 S.W.2d 46 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1979)); Nebraska (Ihm v. Crawford & Co., 580 N.W.2d 115 (Neb. 
1998)); New Mexico (Chavez v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 547 F.2d 541 (10th Cir. 
1977); Cruz v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 889 P.2d 1223 (N.M. 1995)); New York 
(Burlew v. Am. Mut. Ins. Co., 472 N.E.2d 682 (N.Y. 1984)); Pennsylvania 
(Winterberg v. Transp. Ins. Co., 72 F.3d 318 (3rd Cir. 1995); Fry v. Atl. States Ins. 
Co., 700 A.2d 974 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997)); Rhode Island (Cianci v. Nationwide Ins. 
Co., 659 A.2d 662 (R.I. 1995)); South Carolina (Cook v. Mack’s Transfer & 
Storage, 352 S.E.2d 296 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986)); Utah (Savage v. Educators Ins. 
Co., 908 P.2d 862 (Utah 1995); Gunderson v. May Dept. Stores Co., 955 P.2d 346 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998)); Washington (Wolf v. Scott Wetzel Services, Inc., 782 P.2d 
203 (Wash. 1989)). 
The following courts allowed common-law bad faith claims against workers’ 
compensation insurers: Arizona (Hayes v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 872 P.2d 668 (Ariz. 
1994); Franks v. U. S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 718 P.2d 193 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985)); 
Colorado (Travelers Ins. Co. v. Savio, 706 P.2d 1258 (Colo. 1985)); Connecticut 
(Carpentino v. Transport Ins. Co., 609 F. Supp. 556 (D. Conn. 1985), but see 
DeOliveira, 870 A.2d 1066 (where the court held that bad faith actions are not 
available, except under the intentional act exception to exclusivity)); Delaware 
(Correa v. Pa. Mfrs. Ass’n Ins. Co., 618 F. Supp. 915 (D. Del. 1985); Pierce v. 
Int’l Ins. Co. of Ill., 671 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1996)); Hawaii (Hough v. Pacific Ins. 
Co., Ltd., 927 P.2d 858 (Haw. 1996)); Iowa (Reedy v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 
503 N.W.2d 601 (Iowa 1993); Boylan v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 489 N.W.2d 
742 (Iowa 1992), reh’g denied, (Oct. 23, 1992)); Minnesota (Kaluza v. Home Ins. 
Co., 403 N.W.2d 230 (Minn. 1987), but see Hastings v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Cos., 
404 N.W.2d 374 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)); Mississippi (S. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. 
Co. v. Holland, 469 So. 2d 55 (Miss. 1984)); Montana (Brewington v. Employers 
Fire Ins. Co., 992 P.2d 237 (Mont. 1999); Spadaro v. Midland Claims Service, 
Inc., 740 P.2d 1105 (Mont. 1987); Birkenbuel v. Montana State Comp. Ins. Fund, 
687 P.2d 700 (Mont. 1984)); Nevada (Falline v. GNLV Corp., 823 P.2d 888 (Nev. 
1991)); North Carolina (Johnson v. First Union Corp., 496 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. Ct. App. 
1998), on reh’g, 505 S.E.2d 808 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998)); Ohio (Balyint v. Ark. Best 
Freight System, Inc., 480 N.E.2d 417 (Ohio 1985)); Oklahoma (Sizemore v. Cont’l 
Cas. Co., 142 P.3d 47 (Okla. 2006)); South Dakota (Hollman, 712 F.2d 1259, 
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 The following principles regarding liability for delayed payment 
can be gleaned from the decisions in those jurisdictions which have 
rejected a common-law tort of bad faith. First, without significant analysis, 
courts have found that their state’s exclusive remedy statute forecloses a 
common-law bad faith tort. Second, a cause of action generally will not 
arise from delayed payment of a workers’ compensation claim unless the 
insurer or self-insured employer has committed offenses greater than mere 
delay of payment. Third, the existence of a penalty for late payment of 
claims generally indicates that the legislature intended to expand a statute’s 
exclusive remedy provision to bar bad faith claims arising from delayed 
payment.10 Fourth, even where the statutory penalties do not adequately 
                                                                                                        
aff’d, 752 F.2d 311 (8th Cir. 1985)); Texas (Aranda v. Ins. Co. of North America, 
748 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. 1988), aff’d, 833 S.W.2d 209 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992), reh’g 
denied, (June 18, 1992); Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co. v. Marshall, 724 S.W.2d 770 
(Tex. 1987); Escajeda v. Cigna Ins. Co. of Texas, 934 S.W.2d 402 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1996)); Wisconsin (Coleman, 273 N.W.2d 220; Messner v. Briggs & Stratton 
Corp., 353 N.W.2d 363 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984)). 
10 Some courts have concluded that the exclusivity principle is manifest 
through the penalty award provisions in the Workers’ Compensation Act. See, e.g., 
Cain v. Nat’l Union Life Ins. Co., 718 S.W.2d 444, 444 (Ark. 1986) (rejecting 
workers’ compensation claim for late payment because statutes provide remedies 
for late payment); Hormann v. N. H. Ins. Co., 689 P.2d 837, 840 (Kan. 1984) 
(denying independent claim for tortious behavior because statute providing 
penalties provided exclusive remedy); Kelly, 563 N.E.2d at 1374-75 (dismissing 
claim for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress for failure to 
compensate because workers' compensation laws provided exclusive remedy of 
statutory penalties); Wood v. Union Elec. Co., 786 S.W.2d 613, 614 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1990) (denying claim for recovery of work-related medical expenses because 
penalty provision provided exclusive remedy); Dunlevy v. Kemper Ins. Grp., 532 
A.2d 754, 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (holding that penalty in statute for 
failure to pay compensation benefits provided sole remedy); Messner, 353 N.W.2d 
at 368 (dismissing claim for bad faith denial of workers’ compensation because 
penalty provision provided exclusive remedy). See also Michael A. Rosenhouse, 
Annotation, Tort Liability of Worker’s Compensation Insurer for Wrongful Delay 
or Refusal to Make Payments Due, 8 A.L.R. 4th 902 (1981). 
In Dunlevy, the Court held that New Jersey’s Workers’ Compensation Act 
provided the exclusive remedy for an insurance company’s intentional conduct in 
failing to provide benefits. The Court observed that the New Jersey Legislature 
recognized the need to impose sanctions when the party responsible for providing 
benefits unreasonably or negligently failed to do so. It provided the specific 
remedy of penalties in N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-28.1. Had the New Jersey 
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compensate the employee for damages caused by late payments, the 
imposition of a penalty reveals a legislative intent to preempt common-law 
causes of action.11 
 One commentator has observed: “[w]hether one views the workers’ 
compensation system as a well-oiled, humming engine of adequate 
                                                                                                        
lawmakers intended common-law redress also to be available for intentional 
conduct in failing to provide benefits, the Court found that the Legislature could 
have readily done so in the manner of N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 34:15-8. In essence, the 
Court found the specific nature of New Jersey’s remedial legislation for failure of 
an employer to pay required benefits as its rationale for sustaining the exclusivity 
in face of common-law actions for redress.   
In Flick v. PMA Ins. Co., 928 A.2d 54 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2007), the Court 
reaffirmed its prior ruling that New Jersey’s Workers’ Compensation Act’s 
exclusive remedy provisions foreclosed a common-law tort action for bad faith.  
The Court observed that the New Jersey Legislature specifically envisioned that 
there would be situations in which an employer or its insurance carrier would 
“unreasonably or negligently delay” providing compensation to an injured worker 
entitled to compensation benefits. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-28.1 imposes a 25% 
penalty on amounts due plus any reasonable legal fees incurred as a result of such 
delays or refusals.  
11 A few jurisdictions have allowed bad faith claims despite the existence of 
statutory penalties.  In general, these jurisdictions have based their conclusions on 
two factors:  the failure of the relevant statutes to identify specific penalties for bad 
faith or injurious delay of payment, and a failure to provide penalties to adequately 
compensate employees for the real harm suffered as a result of delayed payments.  
See, e.g., Gibson, 387 A.2d at 220; Aranda, 748 S.W.2d at 210; Coleman, 273 
N.W.2d at 220. 
In Travelers Ins. Co. v. Savio, 706 P.2d 1258 (Colo. 1985), Travelers argued 
that the penalty provisions in the Workers’ Compensation Act provided claimants 
with a remedy for an insurer’s misconduct.  See 3 COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-44-106 
(1973). The Act provides that “[i]f any insurance carrier intentionally, knowingly, 
or willfully violates any of the provisions of articles 40 to 54 of this title, the 
commissioner of insurance, on the request of the director, shall suspend or revoke 
the license or authority of such carrier to do a compensation business in this state.” 
Id. The Court noted that while such conduct on the part of the insurer was risky for 
any insurer to engage in, the statute did not provide any remedy for the individual 
injured thereby. Savio, 706 P.2d at 1266. Citing other penalty provisions, (see 3 
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 8-53-124, 8-53-126, 8-53-127, 8-53-129 (1973) (repealed by 
Laws 1990, H.B.90-1160, § 77, eff. July 1, 1990)), while they serve to deter 
conduct which violates the Workers’ Compensation Act, the penalty statutes did 
not provide any direct remedy to employees who may claim injuries from the same 
conduct which is proscribed by the penalty provisions.   
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compensation, or a conglomerate of discordant parts meting out rough 
justice, the exclusivity principle, which mandates workers' compensation as 
the virtual sole means of compensation for work-related injuries, serves as 
the system’s cornerstone.”12 
 
A. THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY BAR  
 
 Some commentators have adopted an inflexible view of the 
exclusive remedy principle. These commentators hold that “the exclusive 
remedy principle mandates, which the compensation system holds, sway 
over all workers’ compensation-related causes of action, whether they 
relate to the injury, or sound in tort or contract law.”13 This is reflected in 
Professor Larson's rejection of a bad faith tort in his renowned treatise:   
 
It seems clear that a compensation claimant cannot 
transform a simple delay in payments into an actionable 
tort by merely invoking the magic words “fraudulent, 
deceitful and intentional” or “intentional infliction of 
emotional distress” or “outrageous conduct.” [sic] in his 
complaint. The temptation to shatter the exclusiveness 
principle by reaching for the tort weapon whenever there is 
a delay in payments or a termination of treatment is all too 
obvious, and awareness of this possibility has undoubtedly 
been one reason for the reluctance of courts to recognize 
this tort except in cases of egregious cruelty or venality.14 
 
 “The exclusivity principle is the great fence that seeks to enclose 
all work-related tort-like injuries. The overriding fear is that the exclusivity 
principle will begin to disintegrate, with each new application of judicial 
gloss forcing the law to ‘become honeycombed with independent and 
conflicting rulings of the courts.’”15 Were this to occur, the objective of the 
                                                                                                        
12 Joel E. Fenton, The Tort of Bad Faith in Iowa Workers’ Compensation Law, 
45 DRAKE L. REV. 839, 847 (1997). 
13 Id. at 848. 
14 Id. at 848 (citing 6 ARTHUR LARSON, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 
68.34(c), at 13-229 to 13-230 (1997)). 
15 Fenton, supra note 12, at 848 (citing Noe v. Travelers Ins. Co., 342 P.2d 
976, 979 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959). 
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Legislature in enacting Workers’ Compensation Acts and the whole pattern 
of workers’ compensation could thereby be partially nullified.16 
 One California court has observed:  
 
In these days of ever shrinking judicial resources, the 
plaintiff’s bar would be well advised to heed these rules [re 
exclusive jurisdiction of the WCAB] and to concentrate its 
energy on securing swift and simple compensation for the 
injured employee in the forum which has exclusive 
jurisdiction over the claims.  Its continual efforts to make 
end-runs around the exclusivity provisions of the workers’ 
compensation system would be more appropriately 
addressed to the Legislature . . . .17 
 
The jurisprudence of Kentucky, Connecticut, Rhode Island, 
Louisiana, Pennsylvania and Massachusetts provide good examples of state 
jurisdictions where the courts have held that the exclusivity provisions of 
the state’s Workers’ Compensation Act bar a common-law tort of bad faith 
because the insurer is immunized.   
Kentucky’s exclusive remedy statute in the Workers’ 
Compensation Act is set forth in KY. REV. STAT. § 342.690(1). The 
Kentucky exclusive remedy statute grants immunity for liability arising 
from common-law and statutory claims, meaning those claims which could 
not be pursued in the courts of the Kentucky Commonwealth.18 The 
Kentucky Supreme Court has observed that the grant of exclusive 
immunity was part of the bargain provided by the Act whereby employers 
are made strictly liable to their employees for compensation for work-
related injuries. The Kentucky Supreme Court has held that the statute 
continues by specifically extending the immunity to the employer’s 
workers’ compensation insurance carrier: 
 
The exemption from liability given an employer by this 
section shall also extend to such employer’s carrier and to 
all employees, officers or directors of such employer or 
                                                                                                        
16 Noe v. Travelers Ins. Co., 342 P.2d 976, 980 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959). 
17 Caplan v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 220 Cal. Rptr. 549, 550 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1985) (citing United States Borax & Chem. Corp. v. Superior Court, 213 Cal. Rptr. 
155, 158 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985)). 
18 Ky. Emp’rs Mut. Ins. v. Coleman, 236 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Ky. 2007). 
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carrier, provided that the exemption from liability given an 
employee, officer or director or an employer or carrier 
shall not apply in any case where the injury or death is 
proximately caused by the willful and unprovoked physical 
aggression of such employee, officer or director.19 
 
The effect of KY. REV. STAT. § 342.690(1) is to shield a covered 
employer and its insurer from any other liability to a covered employee for 
damages arising out of a work-related injury.20 The Kentucky courts have 
found that the immunity granted by the statute is “[e]xtensive, ranging from 
disputes over the payment of injuries of the employee to allegations of 
tortious conduct related to dealing with the workers’ compensation claim 
itself.”21   
 In DeOliveira v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., the Connecticut Supreme 
Court held that Connecticut would not recognize a common-law cause of 
                                                                                                        
19 Coleman, 236 S.W.3d at 13. 
20Coleman, 236 S.W.3d at 13 (emphasis added); Travelers Indem. Co. v. 
Reker, 100 S.W.3d 756, 760 (Ky. 2003). See also Zurich Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 712 
S.W.2d 340, 341 (Ky. 1986) (“[T]he Workers’ Compensation Act provides an 
exclusive remedy and consequently bars an employee’s tort action for separate 
damages due to the untimely payment of benefits.”); Reker, S.W.3d at 759 
(reaffirming this principle rejecting a civil lawsuit alleging bad faith in the 
workers’ compensation context for a violation of Kentucky’s Unfair Claims 
Settlement Practices Act, KY. REV. STAT. § 304.12-230, as being barred by the 
exclusive remedy provision of the workers’ compensation statute); Reker, S.W.3d 
at 762 (reasoning that the Workers’ Compensation Act provided administrative 
remedies for a delay in payment or failure to pay: “[T]he the statutory scheme of 
the Workers’ Compensation Act . . . provides[s] civil remedies for an employee 
who is injured by an employer’s ‘bad faith’ refusal to settle or to make payments 
when due.”) (alteration in the original); KY. REV. STAT. § 342.040(1) (West 2008) 
(allowing for the imposition of interest at the rate of 18% upon an ALJ finding that 
a “[D]enial, delay, or termination in payment of income benefit was without 
reasonable foundation.”). 
21 Coleman, 236 S.W.3d at 14; Gen. Acc. Ins. Co. v. Blank, 873 S.W.2d 580, 
582-83 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that the Act precludes suit against the carrier 
for alleged violation of the Consumer Protection Act and the UCSPA); Zurich Ins. 
Co. v. Mitchell, 712 S.W.2d 340, 341 (Ky. 1986) (holding that the Act precludes a 
civil action against the insurance carrier for failure to pay medical expenses under 
either a common law “bad faith” theory or under the tort of outrage theory); Brown 
Badgett, Inc. v. Calloway, 675 S.W.2d 389 (Ky. 1984). 
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action for bad faith handling of a workers’ compensation claim.22 Central to 
the Court’s ruling was the conclusion that the statutory penalties within 
Connecticut’s Workers’ Compensation Act demonstrated a legislative 
intent to confine the available remedies to those provided by the relevant 
penalty statutes.   
 The Court began its analysis of the issue by addressing the 
exclusivity provision in Connecticut’s Workers’ Compensation Act.23 
Connecticut’s Act provided a number of statutory penalties against insurers 
for improper delay in providing benefits.24 The Legislature had vested in 
the Commission the jurisdiction to hear employee complaints and award 
interest, attorney’s fees, and penalties for improper claim handling.25 A 
$500 penalty for “undue” delay in adjusting a claim is provided for within 
the Connecticut Act, together with provisions for the awarding of 
attorney’s fees and interest to the claimant if it was determined that the 
insurer unreasonably contested liability or delayed payment.26 The Act also 
provided a 20% penalty when an insurer failed to make timely payments 
pursuant to an award or voluntary agreement.27 The Court in DeOliveira 
found that the existence of the statutory penalty provisions revealed both a 
legislative awareness of the serious problems injured workers faced when 
insurers acted in bad faith, and a legislative solution to those problems “In 
other words, by providing remedies for such conduct, the legislature 
evinced its intention to bar a tort action for the same conduct proscribed 
and penalized under the act.”28 The Court found that a recognition of a bad 
faith cause of action would “usurp” the legislative function.29 The Court 
noted that Connecticut’s Workers’ Compensation Act, which was carefully 
balanced between rights and remedies, limited but also guaranteed that 
benefits would be timely paid without regard to fault.   
The Court in DeOliveira bolstered its legislative intent analysis by 
examining the Workers’ Compensation Act’s legislative history. The Court 
focused on legislative testimony between 1979 through 1993 (when the Act 
                                                                                                        
22 DeOliveira v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 870 A.2d 1066, 1070-71 (Conn. 2005). 
23 Id. at 1071 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-284(a) (West 1961)). 
24 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-288(b), 31-295 (West 1961). 
25 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-300 (West 1961). 
26 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-288(b), 31-295(c), 31-300 (West 1961). 
27 DeOliveira, 870 A.2d at 1072 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-303 
(West 1961)). 
28 Id. at 1073. 
29 Id. at 1074. 
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underwent major revisions) which described the “horrific circumstances” 
that resulted from bad faith claims handling as evidence that the legislature 
was fully aware of those type of problems and that the solution they 
fashioned through the adoption of various statutory penalty provisions was 
the legislature’s response to the problem. The Court concluded that “[t]he 
legislature clearly was aware of the scope and nature of this problem and 
presumably crafted the remedies that it deemed fit.”30 Based upon this 
legislative history, the Court in DeOliveira found that bad faith claims 
handling was clearly a “[r]isk contemplated by the compensation bargain” 
and therefore fell within the Act’s exclusive remedy provisions.31 The 
Court also found that the various statutory penalties for undue or 
unreasonable delay were “[b]road enough to encompass the bad faith 
processing of a workers’ compensation claim,32 thus preempting a 
judicially created common-law cause of action.33 
In Cianci v. Nationwide Ins. Co.,34 the Supreme Court of Rhode 
Island held that the exclusivity provisions of Rhode Island’s Worker’s 
Compensation Act applied to any suit against an employer’s workers’ 
compensation insurer.35 The Court held that the Worker’s Compensation 
Act provided an efficient mechanism permitting employees and the insurer 
to resolve disputes relating to work-related injuries and medical payments 
in a timely manner.36 An employee covered under the Act has no common-
law right of action against the insurer because the Act expressly addressed 
such claims and thus immunized the insurer from liability.   
 Under Louisiana law, no civil common-law cause of action for an 
insurer’s arbitrary refusal to pay medical expenses in an accident covered 
                                                                                                        
30 Id. at 1073-74. 
31 Id. at 1076. 
32 Id. at 1077. 
33 Contra Boylan v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 489 N.W.2d 742, 744 (Iowa 
1992) (“We conclude that it is unlikely that the legislature intended the penalty 
provision in section 86.13 to be the sole remedy for all types of wrongful conduct 
by carriers . . . .). See also id. at 744 (referencing other Iowa Supreme Court 
decisions holding that statutory penalties did not exclude independent bad faith 
actions); Gibson v. ITT Hartford Ins. Co., 621 N.W.2d 388, 396-97 (Iowa 2001). 
34 Cianci v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 659 A.2d 662, 688 (R.I. 1995). 
35 Contra Lopes v. G.T.E. Products Corp., 560 A.2d 949, 951 (R.I. 1989) 
(holding that there was no intentional tort exception to the exclusivity provisions of 
the Act); Coakley v. Aetna Bridge Co., 572 A.2d 295, 296 (R.I. 1990) (holding the 
same). 
36 Cianci, 659 A.2d at 669. 
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by workers’ compensation is allowed.37 The sole remedy for arbitrary 
failure to pay workers’ compensation benefits is the recovery of penalties 
and attorney’s fees under LSA-R.S. § 23:1201.2.38 The crucial inquiry is 
whether the insurer had an articulable and objective reason to deny benefits 
at the time it took action.39 In order to reasonably controvert a claim, the 
insurer must have some valid reason or evidence upon which to base the 
denial of benefits.40   
 Under LSA-R.S. § 23:1032, an employee’s exclusive remedy 
against his employer for injuries suffered in the course and scope of his 
employment lies within the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act. The 
Louisiana courts have held that the exclusivity statute manifested the 
following legislative intent: “The rights and remedies herein granted . . . 
shall be exclusive of all other rights and remedies of such employee . . . 
against his employer[.]”41 The statute provides an exception for employees 
injured as a result of an “intentional act” on the part of their employers.42  
In order to constitute an intentional act within the meaning of LSA-R.S. § 
23:1032, the employer must have consciously desired the physical result of 
                                                                                                        
37 Bergeron v. North Am. Underwriters, Inc., 549 So. 2d 315 (La. 1989). 
38 Id. at 315; see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1201(F) (1989) (stating that 
under Louisiana’s workers’ compensation statutes, penalties and attorney’s fees are 
recoverable if the employer or insurer fails to commence payments of benefits 
timely or to pay continued installments or medical benefits timely, unless the claim 
is reasonably controverted); Jackson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 868 So. 2d 813, 820 
(La. Ct. App. 2004) (holding Louisiana’s penalty and attorney’s fees statute is 
designed to discourage indifference and undesirable conduct by insurers and are 
essentially penal in nature); Cooper v. St. Tammany Parish School Bd., 862 So. 2d 
1001, 1008-10 (La. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that although the Worker’s 
Compensation Act is to be liberally construed under Louisiana law in regards to 
benefits, penal statutes generally are to be strictly construed in Louisiana). 
39 McLin v. Indus. Specialty Contractors, Inc., 851 So. 2d 1135, 1144 (La. 
2003). 
40 Brown v. Texas-LA Cartage, 721 So. 2d 885, 890 (La. 1998). 
41 Banes v. Am. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 544 So. 2d 700, 704 (La. Ct. App. 1989). 
42 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1032.A.(1)(a) (1995) (Louisiana’s exclusivity 
statute). But see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1032.B (1995) (“Nothing in this 
Chapter shall affect the liability of the employer, or any officer, director, 
stockholder, partner, or employee of such employer or principal to a fine or penalty 
under any other statue or the liability, civil or criminal, resulting from an 
intentional act.” (emphasis added)). 
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his act or have known that that result was substantially certain to follow 
from his conduct.43   
                                                                                                        
43 Yousufali v. Southland Corp., 467 So. 2d 191, 193 (La. Ct. App. 1985); 
Courtney v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 385 So. 2d 391, 392-93 (La. Ct. App. 1980) 
(stating under Louisiana law, “intentional acts” is to be interpreted as the 
equivalent of intentional torts. Thus the only statutory exception to worker’s 
compensation as a remedy is for intentional torts); Banes, 544 So. 2d at 705 
(stating Louisiana courts have held that the Legislature has expressly concerned 
itself not only with assuring compensation to the injured workers, but with policing 
the procedures under which the claims are made and paid); id. at 705 (holding 
LSA-R.S. §§ 23:1201(E) and 23:1201.2 [now codified in LSA-R.S. § 23:1201 (F), 
(I), (J)] provide that penalties and attorney’s fees are awarded to a claimant who is 
denied worker’s compensation coverage when such denial is arbitrary, capricious 
and without probable cause) (alteration in the original); Mott v. River Parish 
Maint., Inc., 432 So. 2d 827, 832 (La. 1983) (holding a violation of the statutes 
alone are not per se an intentional act that would result in the employers tort 
liability even if injuries sustained by the employee because of the violation); 
Physicians and Surgeons Hosp. v. Leone, 399 So. 2d 806, 807-08 (La. Ct. App. 
1981) (holding damages for emotional and mental anguish arising from an 
insurer’s failure to pay an employee’s medical benefits is covered by the 
exclusivity remedy of the Workers’ Compensation Act penalties. Thus, a worker’s 
compensation insurer of the employer is immune from a tort proceeding). See also 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1032.B (1995) (Louisiana’s exclusivity statute 
permitting a civil cause of action for civil or criminal intentional acts). In Boudoin 
v. Bradley, 549 So. 2d 1265 (La. Ct. App. 1989), the Court considered whether an 
employee could maintain an action in tort for intentional infliction of emotion 
distress against the employer’s workers’ compensation insurer. It was alleged that 
the employee’s benefits were termination by the insurer in order to place the 
employee in a position of having to financially accept the insurer’s settlement offer 
even though the offer was unreasonably low. The Court found that to recover 
damages for the intentional infliction of mental distress, the employee was required 
to prove that the insurer damages for the intentional infliction of mental distress, 
the employer was required to prove that the insurer either actively desired to bring 
about mental anguish or realized to a virtual certainty that it would occur. The 
Court noted that recovery in such cases had generally been limited to instances of 
outrageous conduct. Steadman v. South Central Bell Tel. Co., 362 So. 2d 1144, 
1145-46 (La. Ct. App. 1978). By “outrageous” it is meant conduct “so extreme in 
degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as 
atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Having recognized 
this standard, the Court in Boudoin noted that the Workers’ Compensation Act 
provisions for penalties and attorney’s fees were part of the legislative compromise 
which governed the rights of employees and employers in work-related accidents.  
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In Kuney v. PMA Ins. Co., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
addressed a claim for damages arising from an insurer’s bad faith failure to 
pay workers’ compensation benefits.44 The Court utilized the following 
rationale to hold that Pennsylvania’s Workers’ Compensation Act provided 
the claimant’s sole remedy: 
 
Reduced to its essence, the appellee’s claim is that the 
insurance company wrongfully delayed his receipt of 
compensation benefits.  This is clearly a matter pertaining 
to a workers’ compensation claim and must therefore be 
adjudicated within the framework of the statute, which, as 
                                                                                                        
To allow recovery in tort against a compensation insurer under a standard less than 
that articulated by the Louisiana Court in Steadman would upset the balance struck 
by this compromise by permitting tort damages where the legislature has 
determined that an administrative penalty is the plaintiff’s appropriate remedy.  
Boudoin, 549 So. 2d at 1267. The Court in Boudoin cited with approval Professor 
Larson’s treatise on workers’ compensation law:   
 
It seems clear that a compensation claimant cannot transform a 
simple delay in payments into an actionable tort by merely 
invoking the magical words “‘fraudulent, deceitful and 
intentional” or “intentional infliction of emotional distress” or 
“outrageous” conduct in his complaint.  The temptation to shatter 
the exclusiveness principle by reaching for the tort weapon 
whenever there is a delay in payments or a termination of 
treatment is all too obvious, and awareness of this possibility has 
undoubtedly been one reason for the reluctance of courts to 
recognize this tort except in cases of egregious cruelty or 
venality. 
 
One final factor may be noted that has figured in many of these 
cases:  the presence in the statute of an administrative penalty 
for the very conduct on which the tort suit is based.  A majority 
of the courts have taken the view that this evidences a legislative 
intent that the remedy for delay in payments, even vexatious 
delay, shall remain in the system in the form of some kind of 
penalty.  
 
Id. at 1268 (emphasis added) (citing 2A LARSON, WORKMEN'S 
COMPENSATION LAW § 68.34(c) (1987), at 13-145). 
44 Kuney v. PMA Ins. Co., 578 A.2d 1285, 1286-87 (Pa. 1990). 
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stated above, has specific remedies for such a grievance. . . 
. It is fruitless to argue that the appellee has nevertheless 
failed to receive full indemnification for the injury he 
suffered through the insurance company’s allegedly 
fraudulent handling of his claim. Benefits payable under 
the Workmen’s Compensation Act are normally the limit 
of a worker’s recovery even though compensatory 
damages in a tort action might be much higher. . . . We 
have long recognized that the adequacy of [workers’] 
compensation [awards] is solely a matter for the 
legislature.45 
 
 Similarly, in Kelly v. Raytheon, Inc., the insurer refused to pay a 
workers’ compensation award until the trial court issued a contempt 
order.46 The Massachusetts Court of Appeals held that, however egregious 
the insurer’s delay of payment, its obvious bad faith “adds nothing of 
substance to the claim that the delay was not justified.”47 Thus, the Court 
reasoned that: “the exclusivity provisions of [the Massachusetts workers’ 
compensation statute], in conjunction with the . . . penalties for delayed 
payments, reveal a legislative intent that the remedies [for delayed 
payment] should remain within the system and should be exclusive of all 
other common law and statutory remedies. . . . [T]he touchstone of [this] 
claim is the delay in the payment of benefits, and . . . [even] the 
extraordinary duration and intensity of the dispute between the parties is 
inadequate to overcome the plain legislative scheme.”48 
 
                                                                                                        
45 Id. at 1287.  In Cook v. Mack’s Transfer & Storage, 352 S.E.2d 296, 299 
(S.C. Ct. App. 1986), the Court observed: “The Act itself provides for speedy 
adjudication of all controversies over the processing of an injured worker’s claim 
for benefits. If the dispute concerns an alleged wrongful denial of statutory 
benefits, the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate the controversy. 
Whether the denial is willful, in bad faith, negligent, or the result of a good faith 
difference is immaterial to the question of the Commission’s exclusive 
jurisdiction.” The Court in Cook held that because a remedy existed under South 
Carolina statute, the injured worker had no right to bring a common-law action in 
the courts.   
46 563 N.E.2d 1372, 1373 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990). 
47 Id. at 1374. 
48 Id. at 1374-75. 
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B. COMMON-LAW BAD FAITH ALLOWED 
 
 A central viewpoint of those courts which have allowed a 
common-law tort of bad faith in the workers’ compensation context is that 
a cause of action that reaches the status of an intentional tort is not within 
the purview of the exclusive remedy provisions of their state’s Act because 
the exclusive remedy provisions are only designed to insulate the employer 
against common-law liability for the ordinary hazards of employment. A 
“bad faith” workers’ compensation claim requires the insurer to indulge in 
intentional misconduct which places it outside the framework of a state’s 
workers’ compensation system. Thus, the insurance company, by its own 
conduct, abandons the defense that a claimant’s exclusive remedies arise 
under the workers’ compensation framework when the insurer commits bad 
faith.   
A bad faith cause of action is a fault-based tort and does not arise 
under workers’ compensation laws even when the state’s workers’ 
compensation framework provides the basic relationship between the 
parties for the action.49 These courts have concluded that a bad faith claim 
does not arise under their state’s workers’ compensation law merely 
because an independent fault-based tort occurs in that context. The courts 
of Iowa, Hawaii and South Dakota provide examples of this approach. 
In Boylan v. American Motorists Ins. Co., the Iowa Supreme Court 
recognized a bad faith cause of action by an employee against the insurance 
carrier in delaying or failing to pay compensation benefits.50 The lawsuit 
brought by the employee alleged that American Motorists Insurance 
Company delayed and then terminated weekly wage and medical benefits 
in bad faith causing an aggravation of the employee’s work-related 
injuries.51 The trial court analogized the claim brought by the employee to 
third-party bad faith suits which Iowa courts did not recognize and, 
therefore, dismissed the claim.52 However, the Iowa Supreme Court 
reversed. Referring to Iowa’s Workers’ Compensation Act, where penalties 
may be assessed when benefits are unreasonably delayed or denied, the 
Iowa Supreme Court declared that the Act mandated an obligation to 
furnish medical and hospital supplies to an injured employee as well as to 
                                                                                                        
49 Spearman v. Exxon Coal USA, Inc., 16 F.3d 722, 725 (7th Cir. 1994). 
50 489 N.W.2d 742, 742 (Iowa 1992). 
51 Id. 
52 Id.  
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provide temporary disability or healing period benefits.53 The Court found 
that these statutory obligations ran from the insurance company to the 
employee directly making the employee’s claim analogous to a first party 
bad faith lawsuit, which Iowa did recognize.54 In so holding, the Boylan 
Court recognized that an implied contract existed between the workers’ 
compensation insurer and the injured employee.55   
 The Court in Boylan disregarded the penalty provision under Iowa 
statute for the insurer’s wrongful conduct in the administration of 
benefits.56 The Court in Boylan concluded that it was “unlikely that the 
legislature intended the penalty provision in [IOWA CODE] section 86.13 to 
be the sole remedy for all types of wrongful conduct by carriers with 
respect to administration of workers’ compensation benefits.”57 The Court 
reached this conclusion for the following reasons: (1) looking at the terms 
of the penalty provision, “it provides applies only to delay in 
commencement or termination of benefits;”58 (2) the penalty provision did 
not contemplate the “willful or reckless acts” necessary for a bad faith 
cause of action, but only negligent conduct;59 (3) the penalty provision did 
not provide a remedy “for delay or failure to pay medical benefits;”60 and 
(4) other jurisdictions had held that a common-law bad faith action was not 
                                                                                                        
53 Id. at 743. 
54 Iowa first recognized first party bad faith in Dolan v. AID Ins. Co., 431 
N.W.2d 790, 790 (Iowa 1988). However, in Long v. McAllister, 319 N.W.2d 256, 
262 (Iowa 1982), the Iowa Supreme Court refused to recognize a bad faith cause of 
action permitting a third-party to recover against the tortfeasor’s liability insurer 
for failing to settle a liability claim against the insured. 
55 489 N.W.2d at 743. The Dolan Court also emphasized that a contractual 
relationship existed between the insurer and insured. 431 N.W.2d at 794. The 
insurer in Dolan was found to have a duty to act in the best interest of the insured 
because of its insurance contract with the insured. Id. Applying this duty to the 
facts of Boylan, the Supreme Court found that American Motorists Ins. Co., whose 
contract was with the employer, had a duty to act in good faith to the employee 
who was not a party to the insurance contract. 489 N.W.2d at 744.   
56 See IOWA CODE § 86.13 (1991); Boylan, 489 N.W.2d at 744. 
57 Boylan, 489 N.W.2d at 744. 
58 Id.  
59 Id.  
60 Id.  
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precluded by “[p]enalty provisions for mere delay in payment or improper 
termination of benefits.”61  
 The Hawaii courts permit a cause of action for insurer bad faith in 
the workers’ compensation context.62 In Hough v. Pacific Ins. Co., Ltd., the 
Court held “[b]y its plain language, HRS § 386-5, and indeed, the entire 
workers’ compensation scheme, applies only to ‘work injuries.’”63 In 
Hough the plaintiff filed a claim for, inter alia, bad faith and intentional 
and negligent infliction of emotional distress against his previous 
employer’s workers’ compensation insurer for injuries allegedly incurred in 
the handling of his claim for benefits. The Court ruled that “[b]ecause 
Hough's common-law tort claims do not ‘arise under’ HRS Chapter 386, 
the director of labor and industrial relations does not have original 
jurisdiction under HRS § 386-73.” 64 Additionally, the Court found that the 
relevant statutory language under Hawaii’s Workers’ Compensation Act 
did not reasonably envision emotional and physical suffering allegedly 
                                                                                                        
61 Id. The Boylan Court’s interpretation of legislative intent is questionable.  
The Court’s reasoning that IOWA CODE § 86.13 applied only to delay in 
commencement or termination of benefits and not to delays at other times would 
appear to frustrate the purpose of § 86.13. Just as the Court concluded that “it 
[was] unlikely that the Legislature intended the penalty provision . . . to be the sole 
remedy” for delays in payment,  it is equally unlikely that the Iowa Legislature 
intended to award penalties only for damages in commencement or termination of 
benefits. Id. There is no rational basis to make the distinction between the two 
types of payments and the court did not attempt to make such a distinction. The 
Court’s conclusion that the penalty provision did not provide a remedy “for delay 
or failure to pay medical benefits” is also flawed because section 86.13 does apply 
to delay or termination of benefits inasmuch as it does not list specific benefits. See 
IOWA CODE § 86.13 (1991); Boylan, 489 N.W.2d at 744. Section 86.13 is broad 
enough to provide a penalty for all types of benefits allowable under the Workers’ 
Compensation Act. Finally, the Court’s reasoning that the penalty provision 
“contemplates negligent conduct rather than the willful or reckless acts” required 
for a bad faith action can be questioned. Boylan, 489 N.W.2d at 744. Certainly the 
fact that the Iowa Legislature adopted a penalty of “fifty percent of the amount of 
benefits that were unreasonably delayed or denied” was a substantial penalty to 
deter wrongful conduct. IOWA CODE § 86.13 (1991). Moreover, if the Iowa 
Legislature had intended to allow a common-law cause of action, the Legislature 
could have statutorily provided for a bad faith cause of action.   
62 Hough v. Pac. Ins. Co., Ltd., 927 P.2d 858, 869-70 (1996). Hawaii’s 
exclusivity statute is HAW. REV. STAT. § 386-5 (1993).   
63 Hough, 927 P.2d at 865.  
64 Id. at 867. 
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caused by an insurer’s outrageous and intentional denial of medical 
benefits and disability payments as an injury arising out of and in the 
course of employment.65   
 The South Dakota courts have recognized a cause of action for bad 
faith in the workers’ compensation context. The South Dakota courts 
follow a two-prong test in cases of alleged bad faith failure to pay by a 
workers’ compensation carrier:   
 
[F]or proof of bad faith, there must be an absence of a 
reasonable basis for denial of policy benefits and the 
knowledge or reckless disregard [of the lack] of a 
reasonable basis for denial, implicit in that test is our 
conclusion that the knowledge of the lack of a reasonable 
basis may be inferred and imputed to an insurance 
company where there is a reckless disregard of a lack of a 
reasonable basis for denial or a reckless indifference to 
facts or to proofs submitted by the insured. 
 
Under these tests of the tort of bad faith, an insurance 
company, however, may challenge claims which are fairly 
debatable and will be found liable only where it has 
intentionally denied (or failed to process or pay) a claim 
without a reasonable basis.66 
 
 In Hein v. Acuity, the South Dakota Supreme Court discussed the 
unique contours of a bad faith cause of action in the workers’ compensation 
context:  
                                                                                                        
65 Id. at 866. See also Catron v. Tokio Marine Mgmt., Inc., 978 P.2d 845, 849-
50 (1999). Under Hawaii law, a bad faith cause of action against a workers’ 
compensation insurer is originally cognizable in court and does not fall within the 
original jurisdiction of the director under HAW. REV. STAT. §386. Jou v. Nat’l 
Interstate Ins. Co. of Hawaii, 157 P.3d 561, 567 (Haw. Ct. App. 2007). A workers’ 
compensation insurance carrier has a duty to act in good faith in dealing with 
workers’ compensation claimants, and a breach of this duty gives rise to a cause of 
action in tort for insurer bad faith. Wittig v. Allianz, 145 P.3d 738, 743 (Haw. Ct. 
App. 2006); See also Hough, 927 P.2d at 869-70. A reasonableness standard 
governs bad faith claims in Hawaii. Best Place, Inc. v. Penn Am. Ins. Co., 920 P.2d 
334, 347 (Haw. 1996). 
66 Walz v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 556 N.W.2d 68, 70 (S.D. 1996) (citing 
Champion v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 399 N.W.2d 320, 324 (S.D. 1987)). 
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Customarily, bad faith litigation can be classified as either 
first- or third-party bad faith. Third-party bad faith is 
traditionally based on principles of negligence and arises 
when an insurer wrongfully refuses to settle a case brought 
against its insured by a third-party. Third-party bad faith 
exists when an insurer breaches its duty to give equal 
consideration to the interests of its insured when making a 
decision to settle a case. 
 
First-party bad faith, on the other hand, is an intentional 
tort and typically occurs when an insurance company 
consciously engages in wrongdoing during its processing 
or paying of policy benefits to its insured. In these cases, 
the parties are adversaries, and therefore, an insurer is 
permitted to challenge claims that are fairly debatable.  
However, a frivolous or unfounded refusal to comply with 
a duty under an insurance contract constitutes bad faith.  
 
Wrongful conduct toward an employee claimant by the 
employer’s insurer in a workers’ compensation case does 
not fit the traditional definition of either first- or third-party 
bad faith. A bad faith claim related to workers’ 
compensation is not based on an insurer’s refusal to settle 
its own insured’s suit as in third-party cases, but exists 
when an insurer breaches its duty to deal in good faith and 
fairly when processing a workers’ compensation claim.  
And, unlike first-party bad faith, the claimant, not the 
insured employer, brings the action against the insurer.  
Nonetheless, it is within the first-party bad faith context 
that multiple jurisdictions, including South Dakota, 
recognize a bad faith cause of action based on an insurer’s 
conduct in a workers’ compensation case. . . .  
 
[T]here exists a key difference between bad faith in a 
workers’ compensation action and bad faith in a traditional 
first-party insured-insurer relationship.  In workers’ 
compensation cases, the claimant is not the insured.  In true 
first-party claims, there exists a contractual relationship, 
whereby the insurer has accepted a premium from its 
insured to provide coverage.  Under those circumstances, 
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we recognized . . . that bad faith can extend to situations 
beyond mere denial of policy benefits. 
 
Nonetheless, in a dispute between a workers' compensation 
claimant and the employer's insurer, no contractual 
relationship exists. . . . Bad faith arising out of workers’ 
compensation proceedings does not have the necessary 
attribute of a traditional first-party bad faith claim, i.e., a 
contractual relationship.67   
 
 A bad faith action cannot proceed once the South Dakota 
Department of Labor has determined that the plaintiff was not entitled to 
benefits.68 Thus, claimants must exhaust administrative remedies. 
 
C. PARTIAL IMMUNITY 
 
A few courts have found that their state’s workers’ compensation 
statutes grant immunity to insurers for routine bad faith delay claims but 
allow a common-law tort action where extreme misconduct is involved.69  
This approach has been utilized by the courts in Alaska70 and Florida.71 As 
an example, in Stafford v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. of New York, Inc., the 
Alaska Supreme Court held that ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.155 was enacted 
                                                                                                        
67 Hein v. Acuity, 731 N.W.2d 231, 235-36 (S.D. 2007) (internal citations 
omitted).  
68 Zuke v. Presentation Sisters, Inc., 589 N.W.2d 925, 930 (S.D. 1999) (citing 
Jordan v. Union Ins. Co., 771 F. Supp. 1031 (D. S.D. 1991)). 
69 See, e.g., McCutchen v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 699 F. Supp. 701, 711 (N.D. 
Ind. 1988) (holding insurer’s mockery of claimant while repeatedly refusing to pay 
psychiatric treatment claims rose to the level of a separate tort committed during 
claim settlement and was not barred by workers’ compensation statute); Cont’l 
Cas. Ins. Co. v. McDonald, 567 So. 2d 1208, 1219 (Ala. 1990) (stating delay of 
payment cannot give rise to tort actions unless delay is “so outrageous in character 
and so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be 
regarded as utterly intolerable in a civilized society”); Young v. Hartford Accident 
& Indem. Co., 492 A.2d 1270, 1279 (Md. 1985) (holding claimant’s stated cause 
of action when she alleged insurance carrier forced her to submit to psychiatric 
exam for sole purpose of making her abandon her claim or commit suicide). 
70 Stafford v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. of N.Y., 526 P.2d 37, 43-44 (Alaska 
1974). 
71 Aguilera v. Inservices, Inc., 905 So. 2d 84, 95 (Fla. 2005). 
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by Alaska’s Legislature to cover situations where the employer or insurer 
negligently, or willfully, failed to make timely compensation payments to 
claimants.72 However, the Court held that ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.155, 
Alaska’s penalty statute, was not intended to operate as the exclusive 
remedy for all intentional wrongdoings.73 In those circumstances where 
there has been tortious conduct that goes beyond the bounds of untimely 
payments, the Court in Stafford held that exclusive immunity from suit 
provided by the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act is lost.74   
The Court in Stafford observed that normally an insurer must 
investigate claims in order that the compensation scheme of payments for 
actual injuries will be properly administered. However, intentional torts 
committed in connection with the investigation of claims and payments 
thereof are not protected.75 In Stafford, the claimant alleged that 
Westchester did more than delay in making benefit payments; claimant 
asserted that Westchester intentionally and maliciously misled him about 
his right to compensation and discouraged him from exercising his rights, 
resulting in emotional injury. The Court in Stafford held that these types of 
allegations, if proven, could form the basis of an independent bad faith tort 
action. 
 The Court in Stafford adopted the rationale of the California 
Supreme Court in Unruh v. Truck Ins. Exch.76 The Alaska Supreme Court’s 
observation of the Unruh decision was that the Unruh Court had reasoned 
that the insurer obtained immunity by being the alter ego of the employer, 
and that exclusive immunity was lost when the insurer exceeded its proper 
role in the process. The Unruh Court had concluded that the insurer’s 
committing of intentional torts, placed the insurer outside the role of being 
the alter ego of the employer, and became a “person other than the 
                                                                                                        
72 Stafford, 526 P.2d at 43. 
73 Id. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.155(e) (1962) is one of several provisions in the 
Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act that directly penalizes employers for failure to 
comply with the Act’s requirements. The statute provides for a civil penalty up to 
$1,000 for failure to file reports. ALASKA STAT. § 23.50.155(e) (1962). Under 
ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.155(f) (1962), a 25% penalty on unpaid awards payable 
under the terms of an award. The Commission can also award attorney’s fees to 
claimants. See ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.145 (1962). The employer faces felony 
liability for failure to pay compensation due. See ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.255 
(1962). 
74 Stafford, 526 P.2d at 43.  
75 Id. at 43-44. 
76 Id. at 43 (adopting Unruh v. Truck Ins. Exch., 498 P.2d 1063 (Cal. 1972)). 
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employer” against whom the employee is entitled to bring a civil action for 
damages. The Unruh Court refused to allow tort recovery for negligent acts 
by the insurer reasoning that the system of workers’ compensation would 
be subjected to a process of partial disintegration as a result. However, the 
Unruh Court found that permitting suits for intentional torts would 
subserve the laudable objectives of the compensation scheme, while 
encouraging the insurer to fulfill its proper role in that scheme.77 
 In Aguilera v. Inservices, Inc., the Florida Court recognized that 
minor delays in payment, and conduct amounting to simple bad faith in 
claim handling procedures of the employee’s compensation claim are 
protected by immunity.78 The Court stated that mere delay of payments or 
simple bad faith in handling workers’ compensation claims are not 
actionable torts, and that employees are not permitted to transform such 
simple delays into actionable torts cognizable by the courts.79 However, 
where the conduct of the insurer goes beyond a simple claim of delay or 
termination of benefits and alleges harm caused subsequent to and distinct 
from the original workplace injury, the Court found that Florida’s Workers’ 
Compensation Act did not permit compensation insurance carriers to cloak 
themselves with blanket immunity in circumstances where the carrier has 
not merely breached the duty to timely pay benefits, or acted negligently, 
but has actually committed an intentional tort upon an employee. The Court 
stated:   
 
                                                                                                        
77 Id. at 42-43 (citing Unruh v. Truck Ins. Exch., 498 P.2d 1063, 1073) (Cal. 
1972)). 
78 Aguilera v. Inservices, Inc., 905 So. 2d 84, 91 (Fla. 2005). 
79 Id. See also Sheraton Key Largo v. Roca, 710 So. 2d 1016, 1017 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1998) (stating an employee cannot avoid the exclusivity of the workers’ 
compensation law and transform a mere delay in payments into an actionable tort 
simply by calling that delay outrageous, fraudulent, deceitful, or an intentional 
infliction of emotional distress); Assoc. Indus. of Fla. Prop. & Cas. Trust v. Smith, 
633 So. 2d 543, 544 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (“Because Florida’s compensation 
law contains mechanisms to insure timely payment and provides an array of 
sanctions which may be imposed when a carrier wrongfully withholds payment, 
the remedy under the act is exclusive.”); Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Whitworth, 442 
So. 2d 1078, 1079 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (determining that while the employee 
alleged a bad faith refusal to timely compensate him for his disabilities, the 
complaint did not allege that the insurance carrier intentionally harmed the 
employee). 
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The workers’ compensation system was never designed or 
structured to be used by employers or insurance carriers as 
a sword to strike out and cause harm to individual 
employees during the claim process and then provide a 
shield from responsibility for an employee’s valid 
intentional tort claim for that conduct through immunity 
flowing under the law. Most certainly, the workers’ 
compensation system was never intended to function as a 
substitute for an employee’s right to seek relief in a 
common law intentional tort action against an employer or 
insurance carrier, but was only intended to provide 
employers and insurance carriers with immunity for 
negligent workplace conduct which produced workplace 
injury. Minor delays in payments, and conduct amounting 
to simple bad faith in claim handling procedures of the 
employee’s compensation claim have been captured within 
the immunity.80 
 
The Court in Aguilera held that an insurance carrier that utilizes the process 
of administering benefits to intentionally injure a worker is not afforded 
immunity.81   
 
D. BREACH OF CONTRACT THEORY 
 
 The courts in Delaware82 and Utah83 have found that their state’s 
Workers’ Compensation Act did not bar a cause of action brought in 
contract against the claimant’s workers’ compensation insurer. As an 
example, in Pierce v. Int’l Ins. Co. of Illinois, the Delaware Supreme Court 
ruled that Delaware’s Workers’ Compensation Act did not bar a cause of 
action in contract brought by claimants against a workers’ compensation 
insurance carrier alleging bad faith delay in payment of claims.84  
According to the Court in Pierce, the claimant is limited to contract 
remedies which include breach, consequential and punitive damages.85  
                                                                                                        
80 Aguilera, 905 So. 2d at 91. 
81 Id. at 98. 
82 Pierce v. Int’l Ins. Co. of Ill., 671 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1996). 
83 Savage v. Educators Ins. Co., 908 P.2d 862 (Utah 1995). 
84 Pierce, 671 A.2d at 1362. 
85 Id. at 1367. 
478 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL Vol. 18.2 
 
However, damages for emotional distress do not arise from the breach of 
the duty of good faith and fair dealing when the insurer allegedly acts in 
bad faith by delaying payment of claims.86   
The Utah Supreme Court in Savage v. Educators Ins. Co. 
concluded that injured workers cannot pursue a tort action for bad faith.87  
This was predicated upon the jurisprudence of Utah which had previously 
held that a breach of the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing did not give rise to a tort claim because the claim was actionable 
only as a contractual breach.88 Because injured claimants do not have a 
contractual relationship with the workers’ compensation insurer, the Court 
in Savage held that no cause of action exists between the injured employee 
claimant and the workers’ compensation insurer for breach of the covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing.89 To support this conclusion, the Court in 
Savage recognized that a cause of action in favor of employees against an 
insurer for the manner in which it adjusted a workers’ compensation claim 
was inconsistent with the workers’ compensation scheme and, in fact, 
                                                                                                        
86 Id. 
87 Savage, 908 P.2d 862, 866. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. The relationship between a workers’ compensation insurer and an 
injured employee is different from the relationship between an insurance company 
and a normal third-party. However, some courts examining the relationship have 
concluded that it involves the same level of intimacy as does the relationship 
between an insurer and a first-party insured. See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Savio, 
706 P.2d 1258, 1272 (Colo. 1985) (holding that covered employee stands in the 
same position as an insured in a private insurance contract). The roots of this 
relationship are grounded in the purpose of workers’ compensation statutes, which 
is to provide speedy, equitable relief to injured employees. See State Tax Comm’n 
v. Indus. Comm’n, 685 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah 1984). Under worker’s 
compensation statutes, employees relinquish their common-law claims against 
their employers in return for the promise that employers and their workers’ 
compensation insurers will fairly compensate them for injuries sustained in the 
course of employment. From the time of injury, employees in most areas rely on 
workers’ compensation insurers for protection from the severe financial adversity 
associated with disabling injuries. This reliance, combined with the exclusive 
control workers’ compensation insurers exercise over the processing of claims 
creates a considerable disparity in bargaining power. Thus, injured employees are 
particularly vulnerable to delaying tactics and other bad faith acts by workers’ 
compensation insurers. See Scott Wetzel Servs., Inc. v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 804, 810 
(Colo. 1991). 
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could do substantial harm to the workers’ compensation system as a whole.  
The Court observed:  
 
[B]eyond the legalistic objection to appellant’s position, 
we must point out that if delay in medical service 
attributable to a carrier could give rise to independent third 
party court actions, the system of workmen’s 
compensation could be subjected to a process of partial 
disintegration. In the practical operation of the plan, minor 
delays in getting medical service, such as for a few days or 
even a few hours, caused by a carrier, could become the 
bases of independent suits, and these could be many and 
manifold indeed. The uniform and exclusive application of 
the law would become honeycombed with independent and 
conflicting rulings of the courts. The objective of the 
Legislature and the whole pattern of workmen’s 
compensation could thereby be partially nullified.90 
 
 The Court in Savage observed that Utah’s workers’ compensation 
system contemplated situations where a claim for medical benefits was 
denied by a workers’ compensation insurer.91 Under the Workers’ 
Compensation Act, an employee who disagreed with the denial of benefits 
could apply for a hearing with the Industrial Commission.92 Therefore, the 
Court found that the workers’ compensation system provided an efficient 
and definite remedy to employees who disagreed with the decision of a 
workers’ compensation insurer.93 The Court observed that both the 
Legislature and the Commission provided penalties to be imposed where an 
insurer or employer delayed payment without good cause.94   
 
                                                                                                        
90 Savage, 908 P.2d at 867 (citing with approval the Florida Court of Appeals 
in Sullivan v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 So. 2d 658, 660-61 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1979)); see also Noe v. Travelers Ins. Co., 342 P.2d 976, 979-80 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1959). 
91 Savage, 908 P.2d at 867. 
92  Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
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II. LEGISLATIVE INTERVENTION AFTER JUDICIAL 
RECOGNITION OF A COMMON-LAW BAD FAITH TORT. 
 
In a few instances, the state legislatures have reacted to their state’s 
judicial adoption of a common-law bad faith tort in the workers’ 
compensation context by passing legislation to strengthen the exclusivity 
provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act to include bad faith 
misconduct. These corrective legislative attempts have experienced mixed 
success.   
The seminal case for extending bad faith tort responsibility to 
workers’ compensation claimants is the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s 
decision in Coleman v. American Universal Ins. Co.95 The Wisconsin 
Supreme Court in Coleman reasoned that a bad faith action predicated upon 
the settlement practices of the workers’ compensation insurer was an 
“independent” claim for injuries that was not covered by the Wisconsin 
Workers’ Compensation Act.96 The Court rejected the insurer’s contention 
that the Workers’ Compensation Act provided the claimant’s sole remedy 
reasoning that the available compensation remedy is exclusive, “only if the 
injury falls within the coverage of the Act.”97 The injury asserted by 
Coleman, according to the Court, was “distinct in time and place” from the 
original industrial injury and, as such, it did not fall within the purview of 
Wisconsin’s Workers’ Compensation Act.98 Therefore, the Court 
concluded, the exclusivity provision of the Act was not a bar to a claim 
grounded on tort principles. In finding that Coleman’s injury was separate 
and distinct from the original injury suffered in the course of employment, 
and not merely an aggravation or extension of the original injury, the Court 
in Coleman quoted Professor Larson to illustrate its finding:   
 
It is true that but for the original injury the investigation 
would never have been undertaken and the second injury 
would not have occurred. But must we go on to say that the 
carrier acquires complete tort immunity ever after for 
anything its agents do to carry out their investigation?  
Suppose the agent had decided to burglarize the claimant's 
house to get needed evidence. Suppose claimant died of 
                                                                                                        
95 Coleman v. Am. Universal Ins. Co., 273 N.W.2d 220, 221 (Wis. 1979). 
96 Id.  
97 Id. at 222.   
98 Id. at 223. 
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fright on seeing the burglar. Is the compensation act the 
exclusive remedy, merely because the activity involved, 
which was the collecting of evidence, was in the 
mainstream of the agent's duties? 
 
Again, suppose a claimant has a compensable broken toe, 
and is being tailed by a photographer. Claimant sees him in 
the bushes, a scuffle ensues, and claimant receives a skull 
fracture as a result of a blow from the camera. Is this skull 
fracture nothing but an aggravation of the broken toe?99   
 
 The Court in Coleman focused upon the Compensation Act’s 
penalty provision, finding that it did not foreclose an action for the tort of 
bad faith. The Court found that the penalty provision was designed to avoid 
litigation by promoting the automatic payment of benefits where there was 
no justification for delay.100 In instances where the insurer inexcusably 
delayed payment due to its own mismanagement or deficient 
administration, the penalty provision was applicable.101 However, the Court 
based its decision, allowing for a bad faith cause of action, on the public 
policy consideration of providing a remedy in instances where the penalty 
provision may be wholly inadequate.102 “The inexcusable-delay provision . 
. . does not contemplate that the intentional tort of bad faith can be expiated 
merely by payments augmented in the amount of 10 percent.”103 Where 
insureds have been harmed to the extent that the remedies available in the 
penalty provision are inadequate, the insured can bring an action for the tort 
of bad faith.104   
                                                                                                        
99 Id. at 223-24 (quoting 2A ARTHUR LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 
LAW, § 65.00, at 13-36 to 13-37 (1978)). 
100 Coleman, 273 N.W.2d at 224 (interpreting WIS. STAT. ANN. § 102.22(1) 
(West 1977) allowing for increase of compensation award of 10% as penalty for 
inexcusable delay of payments).   
101 Id.  
102 Id.  
103 Id.  
104 Id. (citing Martin v. Travelers Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 329, 331 (1st Cir. 1974) 
(federal Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act does not 
prohibit separate tort action for insurer’s bad faith conduct outside bounds of Act); 
Stafford v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. of N.Y., 526 P.2d 37, 43 (Alaska 1974) 
(penalty provision of Alaska’s Workers’ Compensation Act no bar to recovery of 
intentional bad faith torts of insurer committed in processing worker’s claim)).   
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 The Wisconsin Legislature successfully overturned the Coleman 
decision in 1981 when it replaced the old penalty provision of the Workers’ 
Compensation Act with a new penalty provision giving an exclusive 
remedy for an insurer’s bad faith conduct.105   
 In Stump v. Commercial Union, 601 N.E.2d 327 (Ind. 1992), the 
Indiana Supreme Court permitted workers to sue workers’ compensation 
insurers for bad faith.106 The Court observed that Indiana’s statutes granted 
a right to injured employees to assert actions for damages against persons 
other than the employer or a fellow employee.107 The Indiana courts had 
consistently held the exclusive remedy provisions do not apply to bar the 
right of an employee to assert actions against third-parties.108 Under Indiana 
law, the exclusive remedy provisions precluded separate actions for 
employee injuries only when the injury or death (a) occurred by accident, 
(b) arose out of employment, and (c) arose in the course of employment.109  
Actions for employee injuries or death not meeting each of these 
prerequisites were not excluded and could be pursued in the courts.110 The 
Indiana courts observed:   
 
The relationship of the compensation insurance carrier to 
the employer should not afford it special immunity.  
Various entities may also be involved in assisting 
employers in fulfilling their obligations under the worker's 
compensation laws. Ambulance services, physicians, 
hospitals, pharmacies, medical device manufacturers, and 
others may participate in providing medical and 
rehabilitative care covered by worker’s compensation. We 
find no adequate justification to absolve worker's 
compensation insurance carriers and other such third 
parties of their responsibilities in the event of additional 
                                                                                                        
105 See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 102.18(3)(bp) (West Supp. 1984) (providing 
exclusive remedy for employers or insurers’ bad faith conduct through lesser of 
200% of compensation due or $15,000). 
106 Stump v. Commercial Union, 601 N.E.2d 327 (Ind. 1992). 
107 Id. at 330 (citing IND. CODE § 22-3-2-13 (1992)). 
108 Stump v. Commercial Union, 601 N.E.2d 327, 330 (Ind. 1992); Rosander 
v. Copco Steel & Eng’g Co., 429 N.E.2d 990, 991 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982). 
109 Evans v. Yankeetown Dock Corp., 491 N.E.2d 969, 973 (Ind. 1986). 
110 Id.  
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injuries or harm proximately caused by their actionable 
conduct.111 
 
 After the Stump decision, the Indiana Legislature enacted IND. 
CODE § 22-3-4-12.1(a), the so-called bad faith statute, which became 
effective in July 1997. The statute provides as follows: 
 
The worker’s compensation board, upon hearing a claim 
for benefits, has the exclusive jurisdiction to determine 
whether the employer, the employer’s worker’s 
compensation administrator, or the worker’s compensation 
insurance carrier has acted with a lack of diligence, in bad 
faith, or has committed an independent tort in adjusting or 
settling the claim for compensation.112 
 
Based upon the statutory language, the Compensation Board has exclusive 
jurisdiction in bad faith situations.113 
 In Borgman v. State Farm Ins. Co., the constitutionality of 
Indiana’s workers’ compensation bad faith statute was challenged.114 It was 
argued that the statute violated the “open courts” provision of the Indiana 
Constitution115 because the statute improperly granted the Board authority 
to consider claims beyond work-related incidents.116 The Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the statute finding that the Indiana Legislature, in 
enacting the bad faith statute, had merely acted to restrict the remedy 
available for a breach of duty imposed upon the worker’s compensation 
insurance carrier.117 Additionally, the Court in Borgman noted that the 
statute did nothing more than designate the proper forum for bringing the 
enumerated claims against the worker’s compensation insurance carrier and 
did not operate to strip the Borgmans of an established right of recourse.   
While the Wisconsin and Indiana Legislatures were successful in 
re-establishing exclusivity after their courts had permitted a common-law 
bad faith tort, the Arizona Legislature was unsuccessful. In two opinions 
                                                                                                        
111 Stump, 601 N.E.2d at 331. 
112 IND. CODE ANN. §22-3-4-12.1(a) (West 2011). 
113 Borgman v. State Farm Ins. Co., 713 N.E.2d 851, 855 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 855. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 856. 
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the Arizona Court of Appeals held that the exclusivity doctrine of 
Arizona’s Workers’ Compensation Act did not bar common-law actions for 
bad faith against workers’ compensation carriers.118 In response to these 
cases, the Arizona Legislature enacted ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 23-930 which 
provides in relevant part:   
 
A. The Commission has exclusive jurisdiction as 
prescribed in this section over complaints involving 
alleged unfair claim processing practices or bad faith 
by an employer, self-insured employer, insurance 
carrier or claims processing representative relating to 
any aspect of this chapter. The commission shall 
investigate allegations of unfair claim processing or 
bad faith either on receiving a complaint or on its own 
motion. 
 
B. If the Commission finds that unfair claim processing or 
bad faith has occurred in the handling of a particular 
claim, it shall award the claimant, in addition to any 
benefits it finds are due and owing, a benefit penalty of 
twenty-five per cent of the benefit amount ordered to 
be paid or five hundred dollars, whichever is more. 
 
C.  If the Commission finds that an employer, self-insured 
employer, insurance carrier or claim processing 
representative has a history or pattern of repeated 
unfair claim processing practices or bad faith, it may 
impose a civil penalty of up to one thousand dollars for 
each violation found. The civil penalty shall be 
deposited in the state general fund. 
 
Under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 23-930(E), the Commission was charged with 
adopting rules to define unfair claim processing practices and bad faith. In 
formulating those rules and definitions, the Commission was statutorily 
required to consider “among other factors, recognized and approved claim 
processing practices within the insurance industry, the Commission’s own 
                                                                                                        
118 Boy v. Fremont Indem. Co., 742 P.2d 835 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987); Franks 
v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 718 P.2d 193 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985).  
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experience in processing workers’ compensation claims and the workers’ 
compensation and insurance laws of [Arizona].”  
 In Hayes v. Continental Ins. Co., the Arizona Supreme Court 
considered the Legislature’s adoption of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 23-930. The 
issue before the Court was whether the statute deprived the courts of 
jurisdiction over plaintiff’s common-law action for bad faith. The Court in 
Hayes questioned whether the timing of the statute’s adoption expressed a 
legislative intent to overrule the prior case law establishing a common-law 
tort of bad faith.119 The Court noted that the penalties imposed by ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. § 23-930 were relatively modest. Although the penalty amount 
was not dispositive in itself to the Court’s ruling, the Court observed that it 
could not say that the penalties were so flexible, and the administrative 
remedies so comprehensive, that the Legislature must have intended for 
them to provide the sole remedy for, or deterrent to, the serious abuses that 
the common-law addresses.120 At the conclusion of its statutory analysis, 
the Court in Hayes concluded that ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 23-930 did not 
divest Arizona courts of jurisdiction over the common-law causes of action 
previously recognized by the courts.121 
 
III. STATUTORY PENALTIES AND DETERRENCE. 
 
Workers’ compensation statutes often contemplate questionable 
denials of benefits and provide remedies to the injured employee by 
providing a forum for the resolution of those types of disputes and, in many 
                                                                                                        
119 Hayes v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 872 P.2d 668, 672 (Ariz. 1994). 
120 Hayes, 872 P.2d at 675 (citing Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 
200, 216 (1994) (statutory scheme so comprehensive that it, along with statute’s 
history, demonstrated legislative intent to preclude district court review of 
administrative orders); CETA Workers’ Org. Comm. v. City of N.Y., 617 F.2d 
926, 930-31 (2d Cir. 1980) (the statutes comprising the Comprehensive 
Employment and Training Act cannot be construed to authorize a private right of 
action for breach because “the totality of these provisions, comprehensive and 
well-crafted to the Act’s administrative, institutional, and political exigencies, 
affirms the primacy and suggests the exclusivity of the [administrative] procedures 
. . . .”). See also Carpentino v. Transport Ins. Co., 609 F. Supp. 556, 561 (D. Conn. 
1985) (relatively low penalties are an important factor in determining whether to 
allow common-law tort actions); Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Holland, 
469 So. 2d 55, 58 (Miss. 1985) (penalty provisions for workers’ compensation bad 
faith inadequate to deter intentional carrier wrongdoing). 
121 Hayes, 872 P.2d at 678. 
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cases, contain penalty provisions designed to provide a remedy for 
unreasonable conduct on the part of the insurance company.122 As an 
example, in Texas an insurer is subject to a 15% penalty if the insurer fails 
to pay benefits or file a notice of controversion within 20 days of receiving 
notice of the claim.123 Additionally, a 12% penalty plus “reasonable 
attorney’s fees for the prosecution and collection of the claim” may be 
imposed as a sanction against an insurer who fails to promptly pay the 
proceeds of a settlement.124 In Alaska, an employer can be subjected to a 
civil penalty up to $1,000 for the failure to file reports125 and can face a 
20% penalty on unpaid awards payable under the terms of an award. The 
Workers’ Compensation Commission can also award attorney’s fees to 
claimants.126 Significantly, an employer can face felony liability for failure 
to pay compensation due.127   
 In Robertson v. Travelers Ins. Co.128 the Illinois Supreme Court 
held that the common-law tort of bad faith was barred by the exclusivity 
provisions of Illinois’ Workers’ Compensation Act. Central to the Court’s 
finding was the observation that Section 19(k) of the Illinois Workers’ 
Compensation Act provided for the payment of penalties of 50% of the 
amount of compensation payable whenever “there has been any 
unreasonable or vexatious delay of payment or intentional underpayment of 
compensation, or proceedings have been instituted or carried on by the one 
liable to pay the compensation, which . . . are merely frivolous or for 
delay.”129 The Court found that the statute was applicable not only to cases 
involving ordinary delay without justification, but also where the delay was 
malicious.130 The Court held that a common-law action should not, without 
other evidence of legislative intent, be held to survive the Act’s exclusivity 
                                                                                                        
122 See, e.g., Robertson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 448 N.E.2d 866, 870-72 (Ill. 
1983) (claim for vexatious delay and alleged outrageous conduct held to be within 
the penalty provision of the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act and such remedy 
was exclusive). 
123 TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 18(a) (repealed by Acts 1989, 71st 
Leg., 2nd C.S., ch. 1, § 16.01(7) to (9), eff. Jan. 1, 1991). 
124 TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 410.208(d) (West 2005). 
125 ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.155(c). 
126 See ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.145. 
127 See ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.255. 
128 Robertson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 448 N.E.2d 866, 867 (Ill. 1983). 
129 ILL. REV. STAT.1973, ch. 48, par. 138.19(k). 
130 Robertson, 448 N.E.2d at 869. 
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provisions merely because the remedy provided in the Act for the injury 
alleged applies to other kinds of injuries as well.131 
However, some jurisdictions have allowed bad faith claims despite 
the existence of statutory penalties. In general, these jurisdictions have 
based their conclusions on two factors: (1) the failure of the relevant 
statutes to identify specific penalties for bad faith or injurious delay of 
payment; and (2) a failure to provide penalties to adequately compensate 
employees for the real harm suffered as a result of delayed payments.132  
Examples of the former reasoning can be found in Iowa and Colorado. An 
example of the latter reasoning can be found in Arizona.     
 The Iowa and Colorado courts have permitted bad faith lawsuits 
because their state WCA statutes did not have penalty provisions 
specifically addressing bad faith. The Court in Boylan v. American 
Motorists Ins. Co. concluded that it was “unlikely that the legislature 
intended the penalty provision in [Iowa’s WCA] to be the sole remedy for 
all types of wrongful conduct by carriers with respect to the administration 
of workers’ compensation benefits.”133 The Court in Boylan observed that 
Iowa’s penalty provisions only applied to delays in the commencement or 
termination of workers’ compensation benefits134 but did not address issues 
                                                                                                        
131 Id. In Perfection Carpet, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 630 N.E.2d 
1152, 1156 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994), the Court observed that the purpose of the 
Workers’ Compensation Act was to provide financial protection to workers for 
accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of employment. Under Section 
5(a) of Illinois’ Workers’ Compensation Act, workers do not have a common law 
or statutory right to recover damages from their employer for an injury sustained 
while in the line of duty other than the compensation provided in the Act. Illinois’ 
Workers’ Compensation Act also recognized that under certain circumstances 
additional compensation or penalties should be assessed against the insurance 
carrier. Section 19(k) provided penalties in the amount of 50% of the amount of 
compensation payable where “there has been any unreasonable or vexatious delay 
of payment or intentional underpayment of compensation.” The Court noted that 
Section 19(l) provided additional compensation where “the employer or his 
insurance carrier shall without good and just cause fail, neglect, refuse or 
unreasonably delay the payment of weekly compensation benefits due to an injured 
employee during the period of temporary total disability.” The Court reaffirmed 
the Robertson decision. 
132 See, e.g., Gibson v. Nat’l Ben Franklin Ins. Co., 387 A.2d 220, 220 (Me. 
1978); Aranda v. Ins. Co. of North Am., 748 S.W.2d 210, 210 (Tex. 1988); 
Coleman v. Am. Universal Ins. Co., 273 N.W.2d 220, 220 (Wis. 1979). 
133 Boylan v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 489 N.W.2d 742, 744 (Iowa 1992). 
134 Id.  
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regarding compensation benefits themselves because there was no 
provision within the Iowa statute for penalty benefits for failing to provide 
appropriate medical care.135 The Court in Boylan implicitly suggested that 
the penalty provisions were nothing more than some sort of administrative 
prod to dissuade insurance carriers from negligence in claims handling, but 
that the penalty statutes did not specifically contemplate willful, reckless, 
or otherwise egregious acts that the recognition of a tort of bad faith would 
be presumed to cover.136 The Colorado Supreme Court in Travelers Ins. 
Co. v. Savio, observed that while the penalty provisions in Colorado’s 
Workers’ Compensation Act applied to conduct which violated the Act, the 
penalty statutes137 did not provide any direct remedy to employees who 
may claim injuries from the same conduct which is proscribed by the 
penalty provisions. 138 
There is wide variation regarding the nature and extent of penalties 
provided by the various state Workers’ Compensation Acts. Courts have 
reached differing conclusions as to whether penalty provisions provide 
adequate deterrence for insurer misconduct in the workers’ compensation 
context. As an example, in Arizona, the courts have determined that the 
penalty statutes in Arizona’s Workers’ Compensation Act do not provide 
significant deterrence. In Hayes v. Continental Ins. Co., the Arizona 
Supreme Court noted that the penalties imposed by the Workers’ 
Compensation Act139 were relatively modest.140 In assessing the strength of 
                                                                                                        
135 Id. (citing Klein v. Furnas Elec. Co., 384 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Iowa 1986)). 
136 See Michelle M. Lasswell, Workers’ Compensation – Employee’s 
Allegations that Workers’ Compensation Insurer Terminated His Benefits in Bad 
Faith Stated Bad Faith Tort Claim Against the Insurer – Boylan v. American 
Motorists Ins. Co., 489 N.W.2d 742 (Iowa 1992), 43 DRAKE L. REV. 477, 478 
(1994); Fenton, supra note 12, at 850-51. 
137 See 3 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 8-43-304, 8-43-305, 8-43-306, 8-43-401, 8-43-
401.5 (2010). 
138 Travelers Ins. Co. v. Savio, 706 P.2d 1258, 1276 (Colo. 1985). 
139 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 23-930 (1987). 
140 Hayes v. Continental Ins. Co,, 178 Ariz. 872 P.2d 668, 675 (citing Thunder 
Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 216 (1994) (statutory scheme so 
comprehensive that it, along with statute’s history, demonstrated legislative intent 
to preclude district court review of administrative orders)); CETA Workers’ Org. 
Comm. v. City of N.Y., 617 F.2d 926, 930-31 (2d Cir. 1980) (the statutes 
comprising the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act cannot be construed 
to authorize a private right of action for breach because “the totality of these 
provisions, comprehensive and well-crafted to the Act’s administrative, 
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the penalty provisions set forth in ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 23-930(B), the Court 
in Hayes noted:   
 
A.R.S. § 23-930(B) authorizes a penalty, payable to the 
claimant, of 25% of the amount wrongfully withheld or 
$500, whichever is greater. In addition, under section (C), 
if the Commission finds a pattern of abuse, it may impose 
a civil penalty of up to $1,000 for each violation, payable 
to a special fund rather than to the claimant. This penalty 
structure seems to discourage claimants from bringing bad 
faith claims if the amount in controversy is small because 
there is little chance of recovering enough money to pay an 
attorney. It is an equally weak deterrent to bad faith 
practices in larger cases because a 25% penalty can easily 
be absorbed by an insurer who selectively targets abusive 
practices to those cases likely to succeed. Moreover, even 
if an insurer faces the added penalty for a pattern of abuse, 
the penalty is only $1,000, regardless of the amount the 
insurer wrongfully withholds. Thus, in cases in which a 
$1,000 fine is small compared to the amount the insurer 
would stand to gain, the fixed fine provides little deterrent 
to unfair practices if the insurer selects only those cases in 
which the practices are most likely to succeed in 
preventing workers from pressing genuine claims. It is 
therefore questionable whether these penalties are adequate 
to discourage bad faith practices. This, of course, is not to 
say that the legislature could not have meant a relatively 
weak set of remedies to be the sole remedy for bad faith 
practices, but it more logically indicates the opposite 
intent.141 
 
                                                                                                        
institutional, and political exigencies, affirms the primacy and suggests the 
exclusivity of the [administrative] procedures . . . .”). See also Carpentino v. 
Transport Ins. Co., 609 F. Supp. 556, 561 (D. Conn. 1985) (relatively low penalties 
are an important factor in determining whether to allow common-law tort actions); 
Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Holland, 469 So. 2d 55, 58 (Miss. 1985) 
(penalty provisions for workers’ compensation bad faith inadequate to deter 
intentional carrier wrongdoing). 
141 Hayes, 872 P.2d at 676 n.14.  
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 However, the New Mexico Supreme Court observed that New 
Mexico’s Workers’ Compensation Act penalty provisions provided 
sufficient deterrence to prevent an insurer from denying benefits in bad 
faith while enforcing the public policy against the bad faith handling of 
workers’ compensation claims. In Cruz v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., the New 
Mexico Supreme Court interpreted Section 52-1-28.1 and considered its 
effect on bad faith claims.142 Specifically, the New Mexico Supreme Court 
considered the size of the award available to the worker. The Court stated:   
 
Further, Section 52-1-28.1 provides an adequate remedy.  
The purpose of the bad-faith action in the Act is to secure 
benefits for the employee and penalize the employer or 
insurer. Under Section 52-1-28.1, the employee receives all 
compensation for benefits due and owing and “shall 
receive” an extra “benefit penalty” of up to twenty-five 
percent of the claim.  Section 52-1-28.1(B). Although this 
penalty may not be a great amount when the amount of the 
claim is small, it provides sufficient deterrence to prevent 
an insurer from denying benefits in bad faith and enforces 
the public policy against the bad-faith handling of workers’ 
compensation claims. In addition, although this Section 
may not provide a recovery for emotional distress or an 
award of punitive damages, we previously have held that 
“the employer or insurer’s liability is limited to that set 
forth in the Act.”143   
 
IV. UNIFYING REMEDIES FOR BAD FAITH THROUGH 
EXCLUSIVITY AND INCREASED PENALTIES. 
 
 Cogent legal analysis supports the competing views adopted by 
various courts in deciding whether to permit or disallow a common-law 
cause of action for insurance company bad faith in the workers’ 
compensation context. Judicial reluctance to permit a common-law bad 
faith remedy as an exception to the exclusive remedy rule stems from a 
judicial unwillingness to tamper with what courts see as the fixed terms of 
the carefully designed legislative bargain underlying workers’ 
                                                                                                        
142 Cruz v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 889 P.2d 1223, 1226 (N.M. 1995). 
143 Id. 
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compensation.144 Courts taking this view regard the exclusive remedy rule 
as a reluctantly conceded bargaining chip essential to the original deal and, 
in turn, to the preservation of the compensation system.145 Some of these 
courts perceive that their authority to modify the bargain is constrained and 
therefore they defer to legislatures for the enactment of any needed 
reforms.146 Indeed there are sound policy reasons for denying such claims.  
As an example, the Court in Noe v. Traveler’s Ins. Co. recognized that “if 
delay in medical service attributable to a carrier would give rise to 
independent third-party court actions, the system of workmen’s 
compensation could be subjected to a process of partial disintegration.” 147 
The Court observed “the uniform and exclusive application of the law 
would become honeycombed with independent and conflicting rulings of 
the courts. The objective of the Legislature and the whole pattern of 
workmen’s compensation could thereby be partially nullified.”148   
                                                                                                        
144 The Workers’ Compensation Acts shift from the employee to the employer 
the risk of work-related injuries incident to modern industrial activity. In return, 
they require the worker, as a condition for receiving the benefits of the Acts, to 
surrender his or her right to sue a common law. This balancing of advantages is 
embodied in the exclusive rights and remedies provision of the respective Act.  
The exclusive remedy provision typically bars all actions against an employer 
where a personal injury to an employee comes within the Act. The exclusive 
remedy provision makes the Act the exclusive means of settling all such claims.  
However, the amount of compensation available under the Act may be 
substantially less than could be recovered in a successful common-law action; but 
in other cases, the employee will receive benefits he would not otherwise have 
enjoyed because of his inability to establish the employer’s common-law liability.  
This is the balance that was struck by the state legislatures in order to afford the 
widest practical coverage for work-related injuries.   
 The Workers’ Compensation Act provides an exclusive remedy of 
compensation and derogation of common-law rights and is not cumulative or 
supplemental thereto but wholly substitutional. The compensation afforded by the 
Act is statutory in character, and the right of any claimant thereto is dependent 
upon the terms and conditions of the statute. These include the procedures for 
adjudicating a compensation claim as well as the terms and conditions of 
substantive entitlement.   
145 See Note, Exceptions to the Exclusive Remedy Requirements of Workers’ 
Compensation Statutes, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1654 (1983). 
146 Id. 
147 Noe v. Travelers Ins. Co., 342 P.2d 976, 979 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959). 
148 Id. at 979-80. 
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 One commentator has correctly observed that a bad faith cause of 
action “stems” from the same source as the original action – a compensable 
workers’ compensation injury.149 Certainly, a cause of action for bad faith 
arises out of the originating statutory proceedings. “[T]he fact that a 
claimant makes application for workers’ compensation benefits under the 
policy and under the Act is tied to the fact that there was a compensable 
injury in the first place.”150   
It is hard to argue, conceptually, with the notion that insurer bad 
faith is “inextricably interwoven” with the insurer’s status in the workers’ 
compensation process. Reasoning that investigation by an insurer 
“constitutes a service ‘inextricably interwoven’ with the insurer’s status,” 
the Court in Unruh v. Truck Ins. Exch. concluded that as long as the insurer 
acts within the role contemplated by the Act, liability should not be 
imposed beyond the provisions within the Act.151 However, the tortious 
conduct constituting bad faith occurs “after the injury, outside the 
workplace, and away from the employer. It occurs in the context of 
administration and investigation of the claim under the insurance policy . . . 
.”152   
Courts have circumvented the exclusivity provisions of workers’ 
compensation statutes by allowing an independent action against an insurer 
for intentional infliction of emotional distress.153 As an example, in Unruh 
v. Truck Ins. Exch., the Court allowed the claimant to recover for the 
intentional torts committed by the insurer under the dual capacity doctrine. 
                                                                                                        
149 Lasswell, supra note 136. 
150 Fenton, supra note 12, at 851. 
151 Unruh v. Truck Ins. Exch., 498 P.2d 1063, 1071 (Cal. 1972). The Court 
reinstated the counts alleging assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, and punitive damages for the reason that such insurer conduct removed 
the insurer from its normal role. Id. at 1073.   
152 Fenton, supra note 12, at 851.  
153 See Martin v. Travelers Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 329, 331 (1st Cir. 1974) 
(intentional infliction of mental and emotional suffering under Maine law); 
Stafford v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. of New York, 526 P.2d 37, 39, 42 (Alaska 
1974) (conscious infliction of mental distress); Unruh v. Truck Ins. Exch., 498 
P.2d 1063, 1073 (Cal. 1972) (intentional infliction of emotional distress); see also 
Robertson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 427 N.E.2d 302, 307 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) 
(intentional infliction of emotional distress); Gibson v. Nat’l Ben Franklin Ins. Co., 
387 A.2d 220, 222 (Me. 1978) (intentional infliction of physical and emotional 
distress); Hayes v. Aetna Fire Underwriters, 609 P.2d 257, 261-62 (Mont. 1980) 
(intentional infliction of emotional distress). 
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154 The dual capacity doctrine allows an injured employee a separate tort 
against his employer who has dual legal personalities; one as an employer 
and another in a secondary non-employer capacity.155 The Court in Unruh 
found that the insurer had stepped out of its proper role of “insurer”156 by 
embarking upon a detestable course of conduct and, therefore, as one acting 
under a different capacity, should not be afforded protection under the 
workers compensation exclusivity provision.157   
As this case law developed, courts appeared to act upon a concern 
that there would be a wave of tort actions based on intentional delays and 
                                                                                                        
154 Unruh, 498 P.2d at 1063 (Cal. 1972). 
155 See Duprey v. Shane, 249 P.2d 8, 13-15 (Cal. 1952). 
156 Some employers do not purchase workers’ compensation insurance at all.  
They are authorized to act as self-insurers under the state’s Workers’ 
Compensation Act. Some courts have held that self-insureds may be held directly 
liable for bad faith in the handling of a worker’s compensation claim. See, e.g., 
Falline v. GNLV Corp., 823 P.2d 888, 893 (Nev. 1991); Sizemore v. Cont’l. Cas. 
Co., 142 P.3d 47, 54 (Okla. 2006). The Court in Reedy v. White Consol. Indus., 
Inc., 503 N.W.2d 601, 603 (Iowa 1993), observed: “[We] see no distinction 
between a workers’ compensation insurance carrier for an employer and an 
employer who voluntarily assumes self-insured status under the act.”   
 Some states levy fines against self-insureds who delay payments but it has 
been observed that “although administrative fines may have some deterrent effect 
on self-insured employers, they do not purport to address the plight of the injured 
worker who may suffer great deprivation as a result of the tortuous denial or delay 
of his or her benefits.” Falline, 823 P.2d at 894; see also Hough v. Pac. Ins. Co., 
927 P.2d 858, 868 (Haw. 1996). At least one court has found that a self-insured’s 
bad faith exposure cannot be avoided by contracting out its claim handling 
functions to a third-party administrator (TPA). See, e.g., Scott Wetzel Servs., Inc. 
v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 804 (Colo. 1991) (en banc). 
A question arises as to whether a TPA can be held directly liable for bad faith.  
The few courts that have considered this issue are split on the issue. As an 
example, some jurisdictions have held that because the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing imposes obligations of a non-delegable nature and because there is a 
lack of privity between the TPA and the insured employee, the TPA cannot be held 
directly liable. See, e.g., Simmons v. Congress Life Ins. Co., 791 So. 2d 360, 365 
(Ala. Civ. App. 1998) rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Ex parte Simmons, 791 So. 
2d 371 (Ala. 2000). See also Walter v. Simmons, 818 P.2d 214 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1991). However, other courts have found that TPAs may be directly liable “even in 
the absence of contractual privity with the employee.” E.g., Scott Wetzel Services, 
Inc., 821 P.2d at 813; see also Dellaira v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 102 P.3d 111, 115 
(N.M. Ct. App. 2004). 
157 Unruh, 498 P.2d at 1077. 
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terminations of payments. Some courts began to demand that the insurer’s 
conduct be “conspicuously contemptible.”158 Under this rationale, an 
insurer’s mere delay in making compensation payments would not be a 
sufficient basis on which to ground an action in tort.159   
Generally, outrageous or deceitful conduct was needed to maintain 
a tort action outside the exclusive remedy provision.160 Mere delay in 
making compensation payments would not be a sufficient basis to ground 
an action in tort while only extreme and outrageous conduct would be 
actionable at common law.161 Clearly, the conduct which gives rise to the 
                                                                                                        
158 See Martin v. Travelers Ins. Co., 497 F.3d 329, 330 (1st Cir. 1974) (insurer 
stopped payment on valid compensation payments only after claimant had 
deposited and made withdrawals against them, resulting in severe embarrassment 
and emotional distress); Coleman v. Am. Universal Ins. Co., 273 N.W.2d 220, 221 
(Wis. 1979) (action for tort of bad faith and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress after insurer stopped payments three times, causing plaintiff to be evicted). 
159 See Martin, 497 F.2d at 331 (mere late payment not sufficient basis for tort 
action); Stafford v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. of N.Y. Inc., 526 P.2d 37 (1974) 
(tortuous conduct must go beyond untimely payments to pierce exclusivity 
defense); Unruh, 498 P.2d at 1071-72 (mere negligence of compensation carrier 
will not give rise to tort liability); Coleman, 273 N.W.2d at 224 (mere delay is 
adequately compensated by 10% penalty award). 
160 Ricard v. Pac. Indem. Co., 183 Cal. Rptr. 502, 506 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) 
(outrageous and deceitful conduct needed to maintain tort action outside exclusive 
remedy provision); Robertson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 427 N.E.2d 302, 307 (Ill. Ct. 
App. 1981) (outrageous conduct required to state action in tort). 
161 The state of Alabama has attempted to reconcile the concept of exclusive 
remedy with the provision of the limited intentional torts of “outrageous conduct” 
or “intentional infliction of emotional distress.” This approach addresses standard 
or simple bad faith under the Workers’ Compensation Act while extreme bad faith 
is handled outside the Act. This leaves a gap where moderate bad faith is not 
adequately addressed by the Act and not allowed as an independent tort.   
 A tort claim against a workers’ compensation insurer alleging a bad faith 
failure to pay an insurance claim is barred by the exclusivity provisions of 
Alabama’s Workers’ Compensation Act. Stewart v. Matthews Indus., Inc., 644 So. 
2d 915, 918 (Ala. 1994) (citing ALA. CODE §§ 25-5-11, -52, -53 (1975); Farley v. 
CNA Ins. Co., 576 So. 2d 158 (Ala. 1991); Garvin v. Shewbart, 442 So. 2d 80 
(Ala. 1983)); Oliver v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 548 So. 2d 1025, 1026 (Ala. 1989); 
Nabors v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 489 So. 2d 573 (Ala. 1986); Moore v. Liberty Mut. Ins. 
Co., 468 So. 2d 122 (Ala. 1985); Waldon v. Hartford Ins. Grp., 435 So. 2d 1271 
(Ala. 1983). Although the Alabama Supreme Court has held that a claim alleging 
bad faith failure to pay an insurance claim, in the context of a workers’ 
compensation claim, is barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Act, the court 
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has also recognized that the tort of outrageous conduct or intentional infliction of 
emotional distress can occur in a workers’ compensation setting. See, e.g., Farley, 
576 So. 2d at 158 and Garvin, 442 So. 2d at 80. The Court in Stewart observed:   
 
The [Workers’ Compensation] Act is designed to compensate 
those who are injured on the job and provides immunity from 
common law suits for those employers and carriers who come 
within the Act. A suit seeking recovery under the tort of 
outrageous conduct does not seek compensation [or] medical 
benefits for the original on-the-job injury. The connection with 
the physical injury that gave rise to the original workmen’s 
compensation claim is tenuous. The conduct giving rise to the 
tort of outrageous conduct in the context of this kind of case can 
be more accurately characterized as mental assault than as 
failure to pay compensation or medical benefits even though it 
may arise in a failure to pay context. Conduct constituting the 
tort of outrageous conduct cannot reasonably be considered to be 
within the scope of the Act. When the employer or carrier’s 
conduct crosses the line between mere failure to pay and intent 
to cause severe emotional distress, the cloak of immunity is 
removed.  
 
Stewart, 644 So. 2d at 918 (emphasis added) (citing Garvin, 442 
So. 2d at 83). 
 Under Alabama law, the tort of outrageous conduct or intentional 
infliction of emotional distress involves “extreme and outrageous conduct” by one 
who “intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another.” Am.  
Road Serv. Co. v. Inmon, 394 So. 2d 361, 365 (Ala. 1980). In order to present a 
case of outrageous conduct, the plaintiff must show that the conduct was “so 
outrageous in character and so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible 
bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a 
civilized society.” Am. Road Serv. Co., 394 So. 2d at 365. See also Cates v. Taylor, 
428 So. 2d 637 (Ala. 1983); Bearden v. Equifax Services, 455 So. 2d 836 (Ala. 
1984); Strickland v. Birmingham Bldg. & Remodeling, 449 So. 2d 1242 (Ala. 
1984). 
 The severe emotional distress required for the tort of outrage requires the 
following: 
 “The emotional distress … must be so severe that no reasonable person 
could be expected to endure it.  Any recovery must be reasonable and justified 
under the circumstances, liability ensuing only when the conduct is extreme.” Am. 
Road Serv. Co., 394 So. 2d at 365.   
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tort of bad faith can be independent enough from the workplace injury to be 
considered as not being truly under the umbrella of the workers’ 
compensation system.162 The problem lies in finding the separation point 
where the exclusive remedy principle becomes a tangential issue to the 
recognition of a tort remedy for bad faith rather than a sticking point which 
calls into question the entire cause of action. Some bad faith conduct is 
extreme in nature which separates the tortious bad faith conduct by the 
insurer or its agent from the original workplace injury, which was 
otherwise meant to be compensated by the no-fault workers’ compensation 
system.  
Statutory remedies may provide a reasonable method to resolve 
common cases of payment delay or refusal, however some remedy 
provisions do not contemplate the harm which may arise from an insurer’s 
intentional bad faith conduct.163 Compensation laws should be exclusive 
only when they provide an adequate remedy.164 Are the penalties adequate?   
 Virtually all states have enacted statutory penalty provisions to 
provide a remedy for an insurer’s inexcusable or unreasonable withholding 
of benefits.165 The penalties are added to the amount of unpaid 
compensation166 and range from 10%167 to 200%.168 In some states 
                                                                                                        
The outrageous conduct must be established by clear and convincing evidence.  
Farley, 576 So. 2d at 158. 
162 Boylan v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 489 N.W.2d 742, 743-44 (Iowa 1992).   
163 Gibson v. Nat’l Ben Franklin Ins. Co., 387 A.2d 220, 223 (Me. 1978) 
(penalty provision of Workers’ Compensation Act not sufficient to redress 
claimant since fines assessed to insurer paid to state rather than claimant); 
Coleman, 273 N.W.2d at 224 (10% remedy provision does not adequately 
compensate worker for detriment occasioned by intentional tort). 
164 Stafford, 526 P.2d at 43. 
165 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-221(e) (2011) (providing 15% penalty for 
insurer’s inexcusable delay of compensation benefits); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
39, § 104-A(2) (1984) (forfeiture of $25 per day for insurer’s failure to pay 
compensation); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 18a(a) (West 1985) 
(providing for 15% penalty of all past due compensation).   
166 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:658 (West 1978) (12% of difference 
between amount tendered or paid and amount found due); 820 ILCS 305/19(k) 
(percentage award of compensation “additional to that otherwise payable”); 
W.S.A. § 102.18(1)(bp) (percentage of “total compensation due”). 
167 See CAL. LAB. CODE § 5814(b) (West 2004) (10% for delay); FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 440.20(7) (West 2011) (punitive penalty of 20% of unpaid installment). 
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attorney’s fees may be awarded.169 Oftentimes the penalty provisions are 
fixed to a specific percentage of the compensation award irrespective of the 
quality of the insurer’s misconduct.170 Some states have adopted penalty 
provisions which take into consideration instances where an insurer acts 
intentionally or unreasonably in denying benefits by increasing the 
percentage awarded to the claimant.171   
The penalties can be significant. As an example, the Illinois statute 
increases the penalty to 50% of the benefits due where the insurer has 
unreasonably or vexatiously delayed payments, intentionally underpaid 
compensation, or instituted frivolous proceedings for the purpose of delay 
where no real controversy ever existed as to the insurer’s liability for 
paying the compensation.172 Under Wisconsin’s penalty provision, a 
claimant may have his or her unpaid compensation benefits increased by 
25% where the insurer has not acted in “good faith” in processing a 
claim.173 The Wisconsin penalty statute also provides for those instances 
when a carrier engages in “malicious or bad faith” conduct by awarding a 
claimant “the lesser of 200% of total compensation due or $15,000.”174  
Under the Wisconsin statute, the Department of Labor defines what 
conduct demonstrates malice or bad faith in assessing a penalty. Under 
                                                                                                        
168 See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 102.18(1)(bp) (West 2011) (up to 200% or $30,000 
penalty may be assessed against insurer for malicious or bad faith failure to pay 
compensation benefits). 
169 See ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 48/138.16 (West 2011) (reasonable attorney’s 
fees are recoverable where insurer’s delay is unreasonable); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 22:658 (punitive penalty of 12% and “all reasonable attorney’s fees for the 
prosecution and collection of such amount”). 
170 See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 5814(b) (West 2004) (penalty fixed at 10% of 
compensation award); GA. CODE ANN. § 114-705(e) (2011) (penalty designated at 
set rate of 15% after 14 days); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. Ann. art. 806, § 18a (West 
2011) (penalty not to exceed 15% of unpaid compensation). 
171 See 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/155 (2004) (penalty imposed against insurer 
whose actions are “unreasonable,” “vexatious,” or “intentional”); LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 23:1201 (percentage penalty plus attorney’s fees where insurer’s conduct 
“arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 
176.225(1) (penalty assessed against insurer who acts “unreasonably or 
vexatiously”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 102.18(1)(bp) (penalty imposed where insurer’s 
conduct malicious or in bad faith). 
172 See 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 305/19 (k) (West 2011).  
173 See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 102.18(1)(b) (West 2010). 
174 See id. § 102.18(1)(bp). 
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Wisconsin common law, however, in order to show an insurer’s “bad faith” 
the plaintiff must show “[t]he absence of a reasonable basis for denying 
benefits of the policy and the defendant’s knowledge or reckless disregard 
of the lack of a reasonable basis for denying the claim.”175 
 Penalty statutes can hold an insurer accountable for its actions by 
imposing fair and adequate penalties where the circumstances dictate.  
Penalty statutes can also provide the claimant with an adequate remedy for 
any detriment he or she may have suffered and create an incentive for the 
insurer to act reasonably in settling an employee’s claim. Additionally, by 
barring common-law recoveries, exclusive remedy penalty provisions can 
foreclose the possibility of high damage verdicts being assessed against an 
insurer and the possible disintegration of the workers’ compensation 
scheme. Certainly the adoption of a bad faith tort action can assist in 
equalizing the bargaining power between the worker and insurer during 
claim processing by prompting the insurer to act reasonably and in good 
faith in processing claims.176 Significant penalties can also achieve this 
goal.   
                                                                                                        
175 See Anderson v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368, 376 (Wis. 1978). 
176 See Kranzush v. Badger State Mut. Cas. Co., 307 N.W.2d 256, 261 (Wis. 
1981) (bad faith action good policy since promotes assurance workers “exclusive 
remedy will not be denied through the intentional wrongdoings of the insurer”); 
accord Eckenrode v. Life of Am. Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1, 5 (7th Cir. 1972) (insureds 
forced to take insurance contracts “as is,” leaving little or no remedy); Christian v. 
Am. Home Assur. Co., 577 P.2d 899, 902 (Okla. 1977) (insured has essentially no 
bargaining power in insurance contract; relegated to terms of contract as basis of 
decision to extend insured’s bad faith tort action). But see Hayes v. Aetna Fire 
Underwriters, 609 P.2d 257, 262-63 (Mont. 1980) (Harrison, J., specially 
concurring) (recognition of independent action may place insurers at disadvantage 
in settle claims).   
 In Izaguirre v. Texas Employers’ Ins. Ass’n, 749 S.W.2d 550 (Tex. App. 
1988), the court found that the penalties provided by Texas’ Workers’ 
Compensation Act were not exclusive remedies for any wrongful denials or delays 
of payments stating “a special relationship arises out of the parties’ unequal 
bargaining power and the nature of insurance contracts which would allow 
unscrupulous insurers to take advantage of their insured’s misfortunes in 
bargaining for settlement or resolution of claims.” Id. at 554. The court in 
Izaguirre went on to state that the statutory regulation and existing statutory 
penalties were not adequate to equalize the bargaining power between workers and 
insurers in settling claims. Id. at 554-55. But see Bowen v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 
512 So. 2d 248, 250 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); Robertson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 
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 One commentator has observed that through the promulgation of 
statutory penalties and guidelines, a state legislature can fashion a “bad 
faith” remedy to compensate employees for the detriment they may suffer 
as a result of insurer “bad faith” while the insurer is protected by limiting 
the amount which may be recovered.177 The commentator’s legislative 
proposal was modeled after the statutes which had been enacted in Illinois, 
Minnesota and Wisconsin.178 The proposal, which includes statutorily 
regulated penalties for an insurer’s bad faith conduct, is aimed at balancing 
the bargaining powers between the parties by creating an incentive for the 
insurer to deal fairly and in good faith when processing a claim.”179 The 
following is the proposed amendment to state Workers’ Compensation 
Acts: 
 
Additional Award as Penalty for Bad Faith Conduct of 
Insurance Carriers or Employers in the Processing or 
Settlement of Employee Claims 
 
(a)  After notice and a hearing or upon the opportunity to 
be heard,180 the [insert name of jurisdictional body, i.e., 
Industrial Commission], or upon appeal, a court of 
competent jurisdiction, may in its discretion award 
additional compensation which it considers just, up to, 
but not exceeding, the lesser of 200% of the 
compensation then past due or $70,000181 in any case 
where an insurance carrier or employer has: 
                                                                                                        
448 N.E.2d 866 (Ill. 1983); Gonzales v. U. S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 659 P.2d 318, 320 
(N.M. Ct. App. 1983). 
177 Frederick L. Streck, III, Bad Faith Claims Practices in Texas – Do They 
Exist?: Extending a Bad Faith Cause of Action to Texas Workers’ Compensation 
Insurance Claimants, 16 ST. MARY’S L.J. 679, 703 (1985). 
178 Id. at 704 (citing 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 305/19(k) (West 2011); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.225(1) (West 1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 102.18(1)(bp) 
(West 2010)). 
179  Streck, supra note 178, at 704. 
180 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.225(1) (West 1985) (providing party against 
whom proceeding brought opportunity to be heard so as to refute charges against 
him and provide due process under law) cited in Streck, supra note 178, at 704 
n.137. 
181 See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 102.18(1)(bp) (West 2010) (where the 
compensation commission was empowered to award just compensation “not to 
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(1)  instituted proceedings and/or interposed a 
defense where no real or present controversy 
exists as to the carrier's liability to pay the 
compensation, but which are only frivolous or 
are for delay;182 or 
 
(2)  unreasonably, vexatiously, or in bad faith 
delayed or refused compensation payments;183 
or 
 
(3)  intentionally underpaid compensation.184 
 
(b)  The penalty award as provided in this section is to be 
the employee's exclusive remedy against an insurance 
carrier or employer for engaging in conduct described 
in subsection (a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(3). 
 
(c)  Actions or conduct rising to the level described in 
subsections (a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(3) are to be defined by 
                                                                                                        
exceed the lesser of 200% of total compensation due or $15,000”) cited in Streck, 
supra note 178 at 704 n.139. 
182 See 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 305/19(k) (West 2011) (penalty available 
where “proceedings have been instituted or carried by one liable to pay the 
compensation, which do not present a real controversy, but are merely frivolous or 
for delay”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.225(1)(a) (West 1985) (“instituted a 
proceeding or interposed a defense which does not present a real controversy but 
which is frivolous or for the purpose of delay”) cited in Streck, supra note 178 at 
704-05 n.140.  
183 See 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 305/19 (k) (West 2011) (penalty imposed 
where insurer’s conduct unreasonable or vexatious in delaying payments); WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 102.18(1)(bp) (West. 2010) (statute sets applicable standard of 
recovery for bad faith action) cited in Streck, supra note 178, at 705 n.141. 
184 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.225(1)(d) (West 1984) (penalty may be 
imposed where employer or insurer has “intentionally underpaid compensation”') 
cited in Streck, supra note 178, at 705 n.142. 
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rule of the [insert name of jurisdictional body, i.e., 
Industrial Commission].185  
 
The commentator contemplates that the penalty provision will be 
discretionary with the governing Industrial Commission or the courts.186   
 The proposed amended statutory penalty provision addresses the 
social cost associated with permitting tort liability in the workers’ 
compensation context.187 The author of the amendment provides the 
following support for the amendment’s adoption:   
 
The exclusive remedy proviso of the legislative enactment 
has the distinct advantage of guaranteeing greater 
protection for the employee and, at the same time, the 
proposal adequately insulates the insurer from liability in 
tort and its resultant high damages. The insulation of the 
insurer from excessive liability in tort will also ultimately 
protect the consumer by indirectly maintaining the price of 
goods. In a workers’ compensation situation, the employer 
pays the premium to the insurer with the employee being 
named as a third-party beneficiary. When the insurer is 
burdened with a tort verdict, the penalty passed on to the 
employer in the form of increased premiums are thereafter 
transferred to the consumer through an increase in the cost 
of the employer’s goods and services. This ‘passing the 
buck’ situation would be almost nonexistent under the 
proposed legislation due to the reduced likelihood of 
insurer tort liability.188 
 
                                                                                                        
185 See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 102.18(1)(bp) (West 2010) (“department may, by 
rule, define actions which demonstrate malice or bad faith”) cited in Streck, supra 
note 178, at 705 n.144. 
186 See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 102.18(1)(b) (West 2010) (imposition of 
penalty left to discretion of department of labor); see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 
176.225(1) (West 1985) (assessment of penalty award discretionary with 
compensation judge or court) cited in Streck, supra note 178, at 705 n.145. 
187 See Glenn L. Allen, Insurance Bad Faith Law: The Need for Legislative 
Intervention, 13 PAC. L.J. 833, 857 (1982) (society as the consumer ultimately 
bears the risk of loss in the form of higher premiums for policies sold occasioned 
by unlimited tort verdicts rendered against insurers).   
188 Streck, supra note 178, at 706. 
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 The proposed amended statutory penalty provision is triggered by a 
single act of bad faith and the available penalty compensation is based 
upon a specific delayed payment. An alternative approach would be to 
establish a two tier monetary penalty provision. Instructive is the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners’ (“NAIC”) Model Unfair Claims 
Settlement Practices Act which utilizes a two tier penalty structure.   
The first tier of monetary penalties under the NAIC Model Unfair 
Claims Settlement Practices Act has a per-violation cap of $1,000 and an 
aggregate cap for all violations of $100,000.189 Second tier penalties are 
applicable where the violation was committed “flagrantly and in conscious 
disregard of [the] Act.”190 Many jurisdictions trigger tier two penalties 
where the insurance company knew or should have known that its conduct 
violated their respective Acts.191 Second tier penalties are capped at 
$25,000 for each violation with an aggregate cap of $250,000.192   
                                                                                                        
189 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 21.36.125(a)(13) (2000); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 20-461(A)(12) (2002); IOWA CODE ANN. § 507B.4(9)(l) (West 1988); KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 304.12-230(12) (West 2004). 
190 See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-1542(1) (2004); N.Y. INS. LAW § 2601 
(McKinney 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-63-15(11) (2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 
26.1-04-03 (2000). 
191 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1108(a) (2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 38a-817(b) (West 2000); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 18 § 2308(a)(1) (2005); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 33-6-8(a)(1) (2000); HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:12-201(a)(1) (1993). 
The Alaska Legislature provided its Commissioner with the elements to be 
considered and weighed in assessing the amount of a monetary penalty.  The 
Alaska Commissioner is to consider: (1) the amount of loss or harm caused by the 
violation; (2) the amount of benefit derived by the insurance company by reason of 
the violation; (3) the seriousness of the violation; (4) the promptness and 
completeness of the insurance companies remedial action; (5) whether a single act 
or a pattern of practice was involved; and (6) deterrence. ALASKA STAT. § 
21.36.320 (2004).  
 The South Dakota Legislature provided similar guidance to its 
Commissioner.  In determining an appropriate penalty, the Division of Insurance 
will balance four specific factors of the insurance company and the insured: (1) the 
magnitude of the harm to the insured or claimant; (2) the actions taken by the 
insurance company, insured and/or claimant that either lessen or worsen the result 
of the violation; (3) any impediments that the insured or the claimant caused to the 
insurance company in either the process or the settling of the claim; and (4) the 
actions of the insurance company, specifically those that worsen the harm to the 
claimant or the insured from the violation. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-33-68 
(2000).   
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 In order to use a two tier penalty system where the most severe 
penalties are based upon both flagrant and conscious disregard of the 
Workers’ Compensation Act, there would need to be built into the 
Workers’ Compensation Act a provision for monitoring insurance company 
misconduct across various claims. 
 In the context of the NAIC Model Unfair Claims Settlement 
Practices Act, seventeen states have adopted provisions in their Act which 
require insurance companies to maintain records regarding complaints of 
                                                                                                        
Vexatious conduct has been elaborately addressed by the Missouri 
Legislature in the context of third party claim settlement practices. MO. ANN. 
STAT. § 375.420 (West 2002). There are seven elements that the Missouri courts 
look to in conducting an analysis of vexatiousness under the Unfair Claims Act.  
First, the insured’s claim must be assessed and determined as it was presented to 
the insurance company at the time it was presented. Hopkins v. Am. Econ. Ins. 
Co., 896 S.W.2d 933, 939 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995). Second, the insured must show 
that the refusal to pay by the insurance company “was willful and without 
reasonable cause of excuse, as facts would have appeared to a reasonable person 
before trial.” Id.; accord State ex. rel. Pemiscot County, Missouri v. Western 
Surety Co., 51 F.3d 170, 174 (8th Cir. 1995); Nelson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 359 F. 
Supp. 271, 298 (W.D. Mo. 1973); Bickerton, Inc. v. Am. States Ins. Co., 898 
S.W.2d 595, 602 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995). Third, the “existence of a litigable issue, 
either factual or legal, does not preclude the statutory penalty where there is 
evidence that the insurer’s attitude was vexatious and recalcitrant.” Liberty Life 
Ins. Co. v. Schaffer, 853 F.2d 591, 592 (8th Cir. 1988). Fourth, a holding that 
coverage is adverse to the insurance company in and of itself does not mandate 
damages be assessed to the insurer’s vexatious delay in paying. Id. at 593; see also 
Morris v. J.C. Penney Life Ins. Co., 895 S.W.2d 73, 76 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).  
Fifth, the insurance company is liable for vexatious delay in paying when it 
continues to refuse to pay even after it becomes aware that its defense is without 
merit. Kostelec v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 64 F.3d 1220, 1227-28 (8th Cir. 
1995); Allen v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 753 S.W.2d 616, 620-21 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1988). Sixth, despite the fact that the insurance company may have had a 
valid dispute on a question of law or fact up through trial, does not prevent a 
statutory penalty for unfairly treating the insured. DeWitt v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. 
Co., 667 S.W.2d 700, 710 (Mo. 1984) (en banc). Seventh, a jury may consider all 
of the evidence and surrounding circumstances of the case and even without any 
direct evidence, find the insurance company guilty of a vexatious delay. Laster v. 
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 693 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). 
192 ALASKA STAT. § 21.36.125(a)(11) (2004); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-
461(A)(10) (2002); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-816(6)(j) (2000). 
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improper claim handling.193 Typically these states require insurance 
companies to keep a “complete record of all complaints of its insureds.”  
Most states that impose this requirement specify that the records must 
indicate the total number of complaints, their classification by type of 
insurance, the nature of each complaint, the disposition of the complaint, 
and the time it took to process each complaint.194 While most states require 
information regarding “complaints,” four states (Vermont,195 Florida,196 
Kansas197 and Massachusetts198) also require recordation of any 
“grievance” in addition to “complaints.” Only New Hampshire requires an 
annual report to the insurance department regarding complaints.199  
Moreover, New Hampshire permits claimants to use this information in 
administrative and judicial proceedings.200 
 
Evidence as to the numbers and types of complaints to the 
insurance department against an insurer, and said 
department’s complaint experience with other insurers 
writing similar lines of insurance, shall be admissible in 
evidence in an administrative or judicial proceeding 
brought under this title, provided that no insurer shall be 
                                                                                                        
193 ARK. CODE. ANN. § 23-66-206 (4)(A) (West 2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 
38a-816(7) (West 2004); DEL. CODE. ANN., tit. 18 § 2304(17); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
626.9541 (1)(i)(3)(j); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-2404(10) (West 2000); LA. REV. 
STAT. § 22:1214(17) (2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS Ch. 176D § 3(a)(10) (West 2007); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 500.2026(2) (LexisNexis 2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 
33-21-105(i) (2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 417:4(XV)(a)(13) (209); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. 17:29B-4(10) (West 2007); N.Y. INS. LAW § 2601(b) (McKinney 2009); 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. Tit. 36 § 1250.5(14) (West 2011); 40 PA. STAT. ANN. 
§1171.5(a)(11) (West 1999); TEX INS. CODE ANN. § 21.21-3(b)(6) (repealed 2005); 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8 § 4 724(10) (2005); W. VA. CODE § 33-11-4(10) 
(LexisNexis 2011). 
194 Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont, and West 
Virginia.   
195 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8 § 4724(10) (2005). 
196 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 626.9541 (1)(i)(3)(j) (West 2004). 
197 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-2404(10) (West 2000). 
198 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 176D § 3(a)(10) (West 2007). 
199 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 417:4(XV)(a)(13) (2009). 
200 Id. § 417:4(XV)(b). 
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deemed in violation of this section solely by reason of the 
numbers and types of such complaints.201 
 
 The standard time frame for keeping this complaint information is 
from the date of the last insurance department examination. However, 
Massachusetts only requires the information to be kept for two years;202 
Oklahoma requires information to be kept for three years or since the date 
of its last financial examination, whichever is longer;203 Texas requires the 
information be kept for three years or since the date of its last examination, 
whichever time is shorter;204 and Pennsylvania requires the information to 
be kept for a four year period.205 
To effectively work within the workers’ compensation context, 
insurers would be required to keep statistics on each penalty imposed, 
including the nature of the misconduct and the penalty award amount, 
during the processing of a claim. The insurer would also need to maintain 
statistics which allow aggregate calculations to be generated. To some 
extent, misconduct would need to be aggregated into categories and each 
award would have to identify the specific misconduct category(ies) found 
as the basis of the award. Categorization would permit necessary 
standardization to permit the statistical analysis. Penalties could also be 
categorized to correspond to the misconduct type. Statistics would be state 
specific. 
 Abandoning a common-law tort of bad faith in favor of an 
exclusive penalty regulatory approach has three distinct advantages: (1) 
uniformity in the standard of conduct; (2) an efficient administrative 
hearing process; and (3) accurate record keeping.  
 
A. UNIFORMITY IN THE STANDARD OF CONDUCT. 
 
 A regulatory approach would bring certainty regarding appropriate 
and inappropriate conduct. Currently, the common-law tort of bad faith is 
defined by vague legal constructs like “good faith and fair dealing” or “fair 
debatability.” The creation of a specific inventory of regulated improper 
claim handling practices would provide greater certainty to the insurance 
                                                                                                        
201 Id. See also N.Y. INS. LAW § 2601(b) (McKinney 2009). 
202 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 176D § 3(a)(10) (West 2007). 
203 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36 § 1250.5(14) (West 2011). 
204 TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 542.005 (West 2005). 
205 40 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1171.5(a)(11) (West 1999). 
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industry regarding what conduct is forbidden in the workers’ compensation 
context and, conversely, what specific conduct should be engaged in. As an 
example, the NAIC Model Act proscribes fourteen unfair claims practices.  
The Model Act contains a general requirement that insurance companies 
“adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt investigation 
and settlement of claims arising under its policies.”206 The various 
Industrial Commissions could do the same. 
 
B. AN EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING PROCESS 
 
 A regulatory administrative adjudicatory process would have the 
benefit of a knowledgeable trier of fact. The administrative adjudicatory 
process, utilizing administrative hearing officers or administrative law 
judges, brings to the hearing process a knowledgeable trier of fact who 
understands the purpose of the WCA as well as the focused workers’ 
compensation segment of the insurance industry and its standards, customs 
and practices. Because the trier of fact will have a significant understanding 
of the insurance industry, the workers’ compensation penalty hearing 
process can be abbreviated and become more focused upon creating a 
record regarding each individual claim which can then be aggregated into 
an annual report for oversight purposes. 
 Utilization of a regulatory administrative hearing process can lead 
to speedy resolution of disputed claims through an abbreviated 
administrative hearing process that limits discovery. By limiting discovery 
and abbreviating the overall process, lower costs in presenting the claim 
should be realized. 
 
C. ACCURATE RECORD KEEPING 
 
 A regulatory administrative approach would permit a better record 
to track improper claim handling practices within an insurance company so 
that when penalties are assessed there is an adequate record, especially for 
tier two penalties, to prove a pattern or frequency in improper claim 
handling. Although the aggregate of penalties in a given year may 
approximate a large monetary loss, insurance company executives will not 
                                                                                                        
206 See, e.g., 2 Nat’l Ass’n Ins. Commissioners Proc. 367-70 (1976). The Act 
and regulations are also set out at II National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners Official NAIC Model Insurance Laws, Regulations and 
Guidelines, 890-1 to 890-4, 900-1 to 900-10 (2011). 
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be able to be dismissive about what produced the financial loss, i.e., a 
rogue jury. 
 The availability of accurate information regarding the failure of a 
particular insurance company’s claim handling guidelines within its field 
offices is essential to positive change. Presently, only 13 states require 
insurance companies to keep records regarding all complaints and/or 
grievances made as the result of perceived claim mishandling under the 
NAIC Model Act.207 A uniform adoption of mandatory record keeping in 
the workers’ compensation context must be a focus of any regulatory 
approach to claim handling practices. Requiring insurance companies to 
provide detailed annual reports to the insurance department and industrial 
commission in the states in which they underwrite business regarding the 
number of complaints and grievances classified by type of violation and 
information regarding the nature of each complaint, together with the 
complaint’s disposition would assist not only insurance departments in 
regulating the industry, and assist administrative law judges in assessing 
penalties but would also assist insurance company executives. Information 
regarding fines/penalties imposed which can be allocated by classification, 
together with a report of attorney’s fees expended would bring to the 
forefront the true cost of claim mishandling.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
 Courts are equally divided on whether a common-law tort of bad 
faith should be permitted in the workers’ compensation context. The legal 
analysis used by courts for these competing viewpoints on this issue are 
cogent and cannot be dismissed easily.   
 The respective state Workers’ Compensation Acts provide an 
efficient mechanism for employees and insurers to resolve disputes relating 
to work-related injuries in a timely and expeditious manner. The system 
provides a knowledgeable trier of fact through experienced hearing officers 
and administrative law judges. Utilizing the existing workers’ 
compensation system to resolve issues involving alleged insurer 
misconduct and bad faith would permit a timely resolution of any 
impediments to the disposition of an employee’s compensation for work-
related injuries. However, in order to provide sufficient deterrence, 
                                                                                                        
207 Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont and West 
Virginia.   
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substantial penalties for insurer misconduct and bad faith must be provided 
to the trier of fact.   
 Any regulatory penalty framework must include a requirement that 
insurers track penalties that have been awarded with sufficient specificity 
to create a positive informational feedback to insurance company executes 
regarding the actual and cumulative cost of inappropriate claim processing. 
THE SPANISH PROPERTY INSURANCE CARTEL 
 
FRANCISCO MARCOS* 
 
*** 
 
Inherent Defects Insurance (“IDI”) for new housing buildings has 
been mandatory in Spain since 2000. The institution of this requirement 
prompted an upsurge in the IDI market in following years. Having been 
confronted with competition, major insurance carriers active in the 
property insurance market formed a cartel, which involved IDI reinsurers. 
This article examines the features of the Spanish IDI cartel, as uncovered 
by the National Competition Commission (“NCC”) in 2009. The 
companies involved in the cartel were punished with a fine of over €120 
million, the largest fine ever imposed by competition authorities in Spain. 
This article describes how the cartel was organized and operated, and 
emphasizes the reinsurers’ key role in assuring and propagating the 
effectiveness of the minimum price agreement throughout the property 
insurance market. It also critically analyzes the Spanish NCC’s assessment 
of the cartel, and how it dealt with the arguments submitted by the 
reinsurers to defend their behavior. 
 
*** 
 
Keywords: property insurance, reinsurance, cartel, inherent defects 
insurance (IDI). 
JEL Codes: G22, K12, K14, K21, L41 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

* Professor of Law, Fellow-Center for European Studies, IE Law School, C/ 
Serrano 118, E-28006, Madrid, Spain, Tel. 34-917820040, 
francisco.marcos@ie.edu. Comments by Albert Sánchez-Graells and by two 
anonymous reviewers are gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimer applies. 
Part of this work was presented at the International Conference on the Private 
Enforcement of Competition Law, University of Valladolid School of Law, Spain 
(Oct. 15, 2010) and at the Competition Law Scholars Forum (CLaSF), London 
(Sept. 22, 2011). 
510 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL Vol. 18.2 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
II. SPANISH DECENNIAL INSURANCE FOR NEW HOUSING 
III. THE MECHANICS OF THE SPANISH INHERENT DEFECTS 
INSURANCE (IDI) CARTEL 
A. CARTEL ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION 
B. MONITORING AND POLICING COMPLIANCE WITH CARTEL 
C. CARTEL EFFECTS: ECONOMIC RELEVANCE 
IV. LEGAL ASSESSMENT BY THE NATIONAL COMPETITION 
COMMISSION (NCC) 
A. APPLICABLE LAW AND POSSIBLE EXEMPTIONS 
B. DIRECT EVIDENCE OF THE CARTEL 
C. LACK OF ALTERNATIVE COMPETITIVE EXPLANATION 
D. FINES AND DAMAGE CLAIMS 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This article describes how the Spanish property insurance cartel 
was organized and operated, beginning with the introduction of legally 
required Inherent Defects Insurance (“IDI”) for new housing in May 2000. 
Direct insurers took initial steps in the formation of the cartel, and 
reinsurance companies were crucial in spreading its anticompetitive effects 
throughout the IDI market.  
The Spanish National Competition Commission (“NCC”) 
discovered the cartel in early 2009. By the end of the year, the three major 
companies selling property insurance (Asefa, MAPFRE Empresas and 
Caser) as well as the majority of the reinsurers for property insurance 
(Suiza/Swiss Re, SCOR and MÜNCHENER) were fined a total of 
€120,728,000.1 The companies were condemned for infringing Article 

1 See Comisión Nacional de la Competencia (Spanish National Competition 
Commission), Compañías de Seguro Decenal Resolución, S/0037/08 (Nov. 12, 
2009) [hereinafter NCC Decennial IDI Resolution]. However, the NCC resolution 
has been appealed in court and a decision is pending on several grounds (mainly 
concerning the existence of a violation and the amount of the fines). See Brief, La 
Comisión Nacional de la Competencia (CNC) Imposes €120.728.000 in Fines on 
Insurance Companies Cartel, EUR. COMPETITION NETWORK (Jan. 2010), 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/brief/01_2010/brief_01_2010_short.pdf; 
Michael Bradford, Spain Charges Big Insurers Developed Construction Coverage 
Cartel, BUS. INS. (Nov. 23, 2009), 
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101.1 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) 
and Section 1 of the Spanish Competition Act (“SCA”) by organizing and 
taking part in a conspiracy to raise the prices of mandatory property 
insurance for new buildings.2  
 
II. SPANISH DECENNIAL INSURANCE FOR NEW HOUSING 
 
The Spanish building industry sprawl of the 1980s and 1990s was 
followed by complaints regarding the quality of buildings and protection of 
buyers. For that reason, new legislation was enacted in the late 1990s to 
strengthen and clarify liability rules in this area.  
The Spanish Act 38/1999 on building regulations was put into 
effect on May 6, 2000.3 The Act introduced a complete and modern legal 
framework for the building industry in Spain. It clarified the duties and 
liabilities of all the agents involved in the building process, with the aim of 
assuring better quality of new buildings (including functionality, security 
and occupancy), as well as better conditions and guarantees for purchasers 
of the new buildings. 
Among other relevant provisions, the 38/1999 Act requires 
property promoters or developers to subscribe to a ten-year IDI policy for 
newly constructed housing.4 Building developers are legally responsible for 

http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20091122/ISSUE01/311229973?tags=|7
6|80. 
2 See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union art 101.1, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 88 [hereinafter TFEU], available 
at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/index.htm; Defensa de la Competencia art. 1 
(B.O.E. 2007, 159) (Spain) [hereinafter SCA] (unofficial translation available at 
http://www.cncompetencia.es/Inicio/Gestion 
Documental/tabid/76/Default.aspx?EntryId=18425&Command=Core_Download&
Method=attachment). 
3 Ordenación de la Edificación (B.O.E 1999, 266) (Spain). 
4 Articles 9.2.d and 19.1.c, and Additional Disposition 2.1 of the Spanish 
Building Regulations Act gives the builder the option of buying the insurance on 
behalf of the developer, who initially has the legal obligation to purchase insurance 
[Section 19.2.d]. Before 2000, liability insurance for architects and builders was 
available and regularly purchased in accordance with Section 1591 of Spanish 
Civil Code, which makes architects and builders liable for building defects over a 
period of 10 years beginning with the end of the construction work (if the defects 
had to do with vices on ground, construction, or direction of building work). Based 
on general insurance contract law, prior to the 1999 Act there were different 
insurance products available to those involved in building work, including 
professional liability insurance, liability insurance, all-risks building insurance, and 
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any harm resulting from the building’s foundation and other structural 
elements for 10 years after the completion of the building’s construction. 
The extent of decennial liability includes material damages to the building 
arising from inherent vices or defects in the masonry, supports, beams, 
framework, load-bearing walls or any other structural elements that 
threaten the building’s solidity, mechanical resistance and stability. The 
Act makes the purchase of insurance for such liabilities compulsory, and 
makes the buyer of the home the beneficiary to the policy.5 IDI provides a 
mechanism for reducing or avoiding construction defects litigation.  
The mandatory nature of decennial IDI, including an obligatory 
100% coverage of construction management expenses, such as paying 
professional fees and permits (deductibles could not exceed 1% of the total 
sum insured), had the effect of providing a background in which an 
anticompetitive agreement by insurance and reinsurance companies could 
easily flourish. Neither policyholders (namely, housing developers) nor 
insurers have much choice regarding certain features of the policy, 
including whether to contract and the extent of coverage to insure.6 
Obviously, in this sense, demand for decennial IDI is highly inelastic 
(must-contract service). 

decennial liability insurance. See Josefa Brenes, GARANTÍAS POR DEFECTOS EN LA 
CONSTRUCCIÓN EN LA LEY DE ORDENACIÓN DE LA EDIFICACIÓN 51-71 (Apr. 
2005); Ángel Carrasco Perera, Comentario al artículo 19, in COMENTARIOS A LA 
LEY DE ORDENACIÓN DE LA EDIFICACIÓN 351, 358-66 (Ángel Carrasco Perera, 
Encarna Cordero Lobato, Mª del Carmen González Carrasco eds., 3d ed. 2005). 
5 According to Section 20.1 of the Spanish Building Regulations Act, the 
insurance policy details must be presented to the Notary and must be included in 
the public deed of the building to be registered in the Real Estate Registry. Without 
this, registration is not possible, and any further sale transactions would not be 
notarized. See Brenes, supra note 4, at 357-79; Antonio J. Jiménez Clar, El Sistema 
de Seguros en la Ley de Ordenación de la Edificación, 6 REVISTA DE DERECHO 
PATRIMONIAL 19, at 43-45, 61-64 (2001); JESÚS ESTRUCH ESTRUCH, LAS 
RESPONSABILIDADES EN LA CONSTRUCCIÓN 855-59 (2d ed. 2005). 
6 Contractual freedom and choice is severely limited, if not abolished, 
although some authors assert that there still remains the possibility for both 
potential policyholders and insurers to choose their contractual parties and alert 
them to possible distortions provoked by the mandatory nature of IDI, ranging 
from insurance companies’ inclusion of abusive contract terms against the insured 
to excessive judicialization or an increase in housing prices. See Eduardo Pavelek 
Zamora, Seguros Obligatorios y Obligación de Asegurarse, 106 REVISTA 
ESPAÑOLA DE SEGUROS 235, 240 (2001); FEDERICO ARNAU MOYA, LOS VICIOS DE 
LA CONSTRUCCIÓN: SU RÉGIMEN EN EL CÓDIGO CIVIL Y EN LA LEY DE 
ORDENACIÓN DE LA EDIFICACIÓN 295-96 (July 2004).  
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Aside from mandatory ten-year insurance coverage for building 
developers, optional supplementary coverage is available in three-year 
increments in accordance with the 38/1999 Act decrees on water tightness 
of roofs and walls, as well as other elements that affect the stability and 
habitability of a building. The Act also prescribes a one-year liability 
period for the builder regarding the condition of finishing elements 
(“snagging list”). Supplementary coverage for this liability is also 
available. In these last two instances, insurance is not required.  However, 
insurance companies frequently offer voluntary, supplementary coverage to 
housing promoters who purchase the mandatory decennial insurance for 
new residential developments.7
The requirement of mandatory insurance was also the starting point 
of a new market for decennial insurance in Spain that grew hand-in-hand 
with the growth of the construction industry until 2007, but which 
decreased dramatically thereafter (see Table 1).  
 
TABLE 1. THE DECENNIAL IDI MARKET IN SPAIN (2000-2008) 
 
Year Number of 
contracts 
Coverage 
Amount (€) 
Total Price 
(€) 
2000 2,042 2,193,975,000 15,056,000 
2001 14,948 10,471,910,000 65,486,000 
2002 26,143 21,922,843,000 145,258,000 
2003 26,302 31,062,129,000 225,002,000 
2004 32,559 41,865,225,000 312,895,000 
2005 35,157 46,650,215,000 355,069,000 
2006 38,111 52,080,802,000 386,404,000 
2007 36,508 50,505,917,000 355,557,000 
2008 17,515 25,632,962,000 174,116,000 
Source: NCC Resolution of 12 November 2009, S/0037/08, Finding of 
Fact 2.4. 
 
On the other hand, the origins and evolution of the decennial IDI 
market in Spain were characterized by the substantial concentration of the 
offering of this type of insurance by three companies. From the beginning, 
insurers Asefa, MAPFRE and Caser together held 60% of the market.8 The 

7 For more information on the additional coverage normally included in IDI 
policies in excess of the mandatory coverage, see Brenes, supra note 4, at 180-86. 
8 Asefa is co-owned by the French insurance company Société Mutuelle 
d´Assurance du Bâtiment et des Travaux Publics (SMABTP) and the French 
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rest of the market was fragmented in smaller shares held by about fifteen 
other insurance companies. 
On the other hand, from its inception, the decennial IDI market was 
deeply affected by reinsurance contracts between the four primary 
reinsurers active in this market: Suiza, MÜNCHENER, SCOR and 
MAPFRE RE.9 In general, the influence of reinsurers on contractual and 
underwriting conditions of any direct insurance contract is well known.10 
Firstly, two of the four reinsurance companies were affiliates of 
two of the main IDI insurers (SCOR and MAPFRE RE). Secondly, when 
mandatory IDI was established in May 2000, reinsurance contracts for 
decennial IDI were structured as proportional quota share schemes, shifting 

reinsurer SCOR. See NCC Decennial IDI Resolution, supra note 1, Finding of Fact 
1.1, at 7. Apparently, Asefa is heavily dependent on its insurance activities in the 
construction market, in which it is strongly specialized. 
9 MAPFRE RE mainly reinsured the decennial IDI contracted with MAPFRE 
Empresas, and later on retroceded it to the other three main IDI reinsurers. See 
NCC Decennial IDI Resolution, supra note 1, Finding of Fact 2.7, at 20. Despite 
being two independent legal entities, both companies belonged to the same 
corporate group, and the NCC took that into consideration when assessing their 
behavior, deciding they did not deserve separate fines. See id., Legal Ground 9th, 
at 68-69. 
10 Underwriting philosophy and underwriting success by direct insurers are 
conditions considered by reinsurers before signing a reinsurance contract with 
them. See Aviva Abramovsky, Reinsurance: The Silent Regulator?, 15 CONN. INS. 
L.J. 345, 375 (2009) (“Just as with primary insurance, the existence of a 
reinsurance agreement limits the options of insurer action if they wish to benefit 
from the reinsuring agreement.”); see also id. at 377 (“Rather it is the identification 
that terms and standards common to the reinsurance relationship have the potential 
to affect insurance company action as regards their primary policyholder in areas 
that come within the bounds of current insurance regulatory interests. Specifically, 
insurer practices in underwriting and claims handling.”).. In the Decision of Dec. 
20 1989, relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty, the EU 
Commission showed how a collaborative agreement among reinsurers restricted 
competition both in German reinsurance and in direct insurance markets for 
machinery loss-of-profits insurance and space insurance. See Commission 
Decision IV/32.408-TEKO of 20 Dec. 1989, 1990 O.J. (L 13) 34. Indeed, 
regarding the limits reinsurers face in exercising their influence on insurance 
carriers, the EU Commission held that “TEKO's coordination activity goes well 
beyond the influence of reinsurers that is otherwise customary on the market, since 
reinsurers generally confine themselves to checking the premiums and the terms 
and conditions worked out by direct insurers and neither calculate the direct 
insurers' offers for them at the outset nor serve as a permanent joint information 
and advisory body for a specific group of undertakings.” Id. at 36. 
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a higher share of risk exposure to the reinsurers, who correspondingly 
shared an even proportion of the premium.11 Premiums and losses were 
shared on the same pro-rata basis (for more on this, see infra § 2.1). 
Because of the agreement amongst the four reinsurers active in the IDI 
market, no alternative type of reinsurance contracts were available for 
purchase. This severely constrained potential competition in the market by 
both direct insurers and reinsurers willing to follow other contractual 
schemes.12 Only in 2007, when the cartel was brought to light by the NCC, 
did facultative reinsurance contracts and non-proportional reinsurance 
agreements come into use.13 Such agreements came into use in the form of 
stop-loss or excess-loss, in which the basis is the loss incurred and not the 
risk ceded, with the reinsurer covering a set amount of the loss exceeding 
the amount retained by the insurance carrier.14 
 
III. THE MECHANICS OF THE SPANISH PROPERTY 
INSURANCE CARTEL 
 
According to the evidence discovered by the NCC, the year after 
the 38/1999 Act became effective (i.e., when mandatory decennial IDI was 
established), there were contacts amongst IDI carriers and IDI reinsurers 
concerning excessive competition in this new market. Apparently, 
competition led to a dramatic decrease in IDI premiums, and some of the 
companies active in that market decided something needed to be done to 
stop that trend. It is unclear how many meetings took place and who was 
part of those meetings, but it is well settled that there was a common 
understanding between Asefa and MAPFRE (the IDI carriers) and Suiza, 
MÜNCHENER and SCOR (the reinsurers) that premiums had to be 
increased and that uniform contracting conditions should be followed 
throughout the decennial insurance market.15  

11 See Patrick L. Brockett, Robert C. Witt & Paul R. Aird, An Overview of 
Reinsurance and the Reinsurance Markets, 9 J. INS. REG. 432, 435-37 (1991). 
12 It does not seem that the proportional quota share reinsurance and the 
refusal to write any other type of reinsurance contract was aimed at protecting 
reinsurers’ financial health, but only to ensure that no primary insurer would be 
able to sell IDI contracts that did not follow the premiums fixed by the cartel. See 
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 792 (1993). 
13 Indeed, no more proportional quota share treatises were written after that 
time. 
14 See NCC Decennial IDI Resolution, supra note 1, Findings of Fact 2.6-2.7, 
at 17-20. 
15 See id., Findings of Fact 3-6, at 22-23. 
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The main outcome of this understanding was a draft prepared by 
Asefa at the end of August 2001, entitled “Corrective Measures Decennial 
Damage Insurance”, which set market-wide standards for technical and 
commercial features of decennial insurance. The Asefa draft contained 
some technical requirements for IDI contracting and quality control, as well 
as several measures that involved a minimum price-fixing agreement. In 
December 2001, after discussions with MAPFRE and the IDI reinsurers, a 
new version of the document was finally agreed upon by Asefa, MAPFRE 
Empresas, MÜNCHENER, Suiza and SCOR, entitled “Corrective 
Measures Decennial Damage Insurance-2002”.16 
 
A. CARTEL ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION 
 
Several other meetings between IDI insurers, reinsurers and third-
party IDI providers (including savings and bank associations) took place in 
2002 to fine-tune the pricing conditions agreed upon for IDI contracts, but 
according to the NCC, the effects of the cartel commenced in January 
2002.17 Starting at that point, IDI reinsurance contracts included the agreed 
upon corrective measures; indeed, minimum pricing and underwriting 
conditions for direct IDI established by the cartel were annexed to 
reinsurance contracts between 2002 and 2007.18 
Reinsurance was key in the organization of the cartel.19 The 
generalization of proportional quota share reinsurance treatises as the only 

16 See id., Findings of Fact 7-11, at 23-24. 
17 See id., Findings of Fact 13-19, at 26-28. Some cartel members raised 
doubts regarding the compliance of all reinsurers with the agreed-upon corrective 
measures. See id., Finding of Fact 15, at 26-27. Apparently, the most important 
moment took place on May 7, 2002, when Asefa and all the reinsurers agreed to 
new minimum price conditions and monthly monitoring meetings to examine 
defections. See id., Finding of Fact 18, at 27-28. 
18 See id., Findings of Fact 12, 20-24, at 24-26, 28. The NCC assumes a year 
(from January to December) as the minimum duration of a cartel, because that is 
the typical duration of reinsurance contracts. Id. 
19 In other competition cases in the insurance market, authorities have found 
reinsurance crucial to structuring anticompetitive behavior. See EU Commission 
Decision of 30 March 1984, relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC 
Treaty, ¶¶ 10, 16, 23 (IV/30.804- Nuovo CEGAM, OJ L99, of April 11, 1984, 29-
37) (regarding engineering insurance in Italy). In one famous U.S. case, reinsurers 
were key in a conspiracy by direct insurers to change certain policy terms on 
commercial liability insurance and property insurance policies (reducing risk 
exposure to insurance carriers). Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 
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type of reinsurance available in the IDI market gave way to a situation in 
which reinsurers depended greatly on the ceding insurer. Proportional 
quota share reinsurance “involves the cession by reinsured of a fixed 
proportion of business within the scope of the reinsurance contract to the 
reinsurer.”20 Reinsurance companies did not offer alternative contractual 
schemes in which the reinsured had a choice as to what risks he would 
cede. Indeed, in that situation, IDI insurers could easily be considered mere 
agents of the reinsurers.21 Proportional quota share treatises strengthened 
the influence of the reinsurers on the IDI market.22 As the most profitable 

775-77, 792 (1993); see also Edward Correia, How to Reform the McCarran-
Ferguson Act, 22 MEMPHIS STATE U. L. REV. 43, 62-65 (1991); Charles R. 
McGuire, Regulation of the Insurance Industry After Hartford Fire Insurance v. 
California: The McCarran-Ferguson Act and Antitrust Policies, 25 LOY. U. CHI. 
L.J. 303, 334-35 (1994); James P. Rhatican, Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. 
California: A Mixed Blessing for Insurance Antitrust Defendants, 47 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 905, 907-09 (1995). The involvement of reinsurers was also critical in some 
conspiracies detected within the U.S. fire insurance market. See St. Paul Fire & 
Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 560-61 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting); 
U.S. v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 535-36 (1944). 
20 See Nicholas Legh-Jones (ed.), MACGILLIVRAY ON INSURANCE LAW, ¶ 33-
13 (2003); see also EU Commission, BUSINESS INSURANCE SECTOR INQUIRY, 
INQUIRY INTO THE EUROPEAN BUSINESS INSURANCE SECTOR PURSUANT TO 
ARTICLE 17 OF REGULATION 1/2003, INTERIM REPORT, Jan. 2007, 24-25, available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/financial_ 
services/inquiries/interim_report_24012007.pdf; Gary Patrik, Reinsurance, in 
FOUNDATIONS OF CASUALTY ACTUARIAL SCIENCE, 342-43, 348-49 (2001, 4th ed.). 
21 See OECD, COMPETITION AND RELATED REGULATION ISSUES IN THE 
INSURANCE INDUSTRY, 1998, DAFFE/CPL(98), 27, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/34/25/1920099.pdf (“However, as in other 
industries, the vertical relationships that arise through reinsurance may act to 
facilitate collusion. In particular, a situation might arise where the upstream 
reinsurance market is relatively concentrated. In this circumstance the downstream 
insurers may be able to utilize the reinsurer as a tool for enforcing collusive 
arrangements. For example, the insurers (via the reinsurer) argue that ‘uniformity 
of premiums and policy conditions is required to make the calculation of the tariffs 
for reinsurance possible’. The reinsurer, by enforcing tariff uniformity (at the cartel 
price) becomes the mechanism by which collusion is enforced.”). 
22 Apart from the specific type of reinsurance used in the decennial IDI 
market, there has allegedly been an overall shift in the relationships among 
insurance carriers and reinsurers. See PEDRO PORTELLANO DÍEZ, EL REASEGURO: 
NUEVOS PACTOS 26-27 (2007). Reinsurers are increasingly vertically integrated 
with insurers, through “captive insurance firms,” and there is an increasing 
reciprocal influence or intervention in direct insurance, not only informally, but 
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type of reinsurance for reinsurers, proportional quota share treatises are 
normally used for homogeneous risks and when there is difficulty 
foreseeing the accident or loss rate. Such treatises provide reinsurers with a 
balanced, continuous business flux, in which a proportionate quota share of 
all IDI premiums is ceded independent of its amount. Of course, a similar 
proportion of risk exposure is also transferred to the reinsurer. 
The automatic cession framework pushed reinsurers and reinsureds 
into a community of interest, in which the direct IDI contracts written by 
insurance companies have a straightforward and immediate impact on 
reinsurers. As the reinsurers’ stake in the functioning of decennial IDI grew 
larger, the reinsurers sought to control different features of premiums and 
risk exposure by imposing conditions and requirements in underwriting 
direct insurance contracts, specifically, a minimum premium.  
Compared to other insurance products, setting premiums for 
decennial IDI contracts requires accounting for different elements related to 
the characteristics and location of the building, and although some 
sophistication by the housing developers purchasing this type of insurance 
can be assumed, the process is not a straightforward exercise. The NCC 
found a good deal of evidence illustrating how reinsurers fixed minimum 
premiums for direct IDI insurance throughout the market by requiring 
uniform minimum pricing conditions to be followed by direct insurers if 
they wanted their IDI contracts to be subject of cession to IDI reinsurers.  
Indeed, pricing conditions for IDI contracts were agreed upon by 
cartel members, including: (1) the minimum percentage of decennial IDI 
coverage for apartments and houses, (2) the minimum flat amount per IDI 
contract and per housing unit, (3) identical percentages of supplementary 
coverage outside of mandatory IDI (such as coverage for water tightness of 
roofs and walls and stability of non load-bearing walls), (4) extra 
percentages charged for resignations to claims against other agents in the 
building process and IDI price references per square meter of building area 
to correct for low-value declarations that could imply lower premiums.23 
The conditions agreed to by cartel members were exact and precise, and 

also through contractual means. Id. at 45-51. See also EU Commission, supra note 
21, at 26-27. 
23 See NCC Decennial IDI Resolution, supra note 1, Finding of Fact 25, at 29. 
According to the NCC, these conditions were the same “corrective measures” for 
decennial damage insurance contract agreed to by the cartel members in 2001. 
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were to be applied to the coverage amount in the calculation of the 
commercial premiums.24 
In sum, the reinsurance side of the cartel heavily influenced direct 
IDI contracts written from 2002 onward, imposing minimum premiums and 
even correcting for possible value changes in housing that could lead to 
underinsurance.25 The NCC sampled twenty different direct IDI contracts 
underwritten by Asefa, MAPFRE and Caser, and found that minimum price 
conditions set by the cartel were strictly followed.26 
 
B. MONITORING AND POLICING COMPLIANCE WITH CARTEL 
 
Operating at two different levels, insurance and reinsurance, the 
property insurance cartel faced difficulties in monitoring compliance with 
the established minimum price conditions. The NCC provides several 
examples of how reinsurance and insurance carriers, whether they were 
part on the cartel or not, acted as the primary agents in monitoring IDI 
offerings below the price set by the cartel, while the reinsurers were also 
the judges and executioners acting against any potential defections (see 

24 In setting the premium to be paid, insurers start from a technical calculation 
of the risk covered (probability of accident), taking into account the sum insured 
and the contract duration (this is called the gross premium or the premium at risk), 
but the final premium charged (i.e., the commercial premium or the net premium) 
is the result of adding certain other expenses (administrative and other charges, 
including the profit to be earned by the insurer) to the gross premium. According to 
the NCC, the cartel went into the details of fixing the final premiums to be charged 
by IDI carriers. 
25 See NCC Decennial IDI Resolution, supra note 1, Finding of Fact 26, at 31. 
A similar device was found to be essential in the operation of the fire insurance 
cartel in Germany. See Case 45/85, Verband der Sachversicherer e.V. v Comm’n 
of the European Cmty., 1987 E.C.R. 405, 455 (“German re-insurance companies 
decided to include in their contracts of re-insurance concerning the same risks a 
special ‘premium calculation clause’ according to which premium rates which fail 
to conform to the recommendation are to be treated in the event of a claim as 
under-insurance.”). 
26 See NCC Decennial IDI Resolution, supra note 1, Finding of Fact 28 and 
Legal Ground 3rd, at 31, 53-54. The NCC reckoned that technical features of some 
buildings may introduce additional risks that require additional surcharges, and 
some other circumstances that may give way to further discounts and surcharges 
(type of soil, slope, phreatic stratum, foundations and type of structure) that were 
out of the minimum pricing conditions set by the cartel. 
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Figure 1 for a graphical representation of the cartel structure and 
organization).27  
 
 
In practice, every time a potential defection by direct insurers was 
detected, the action moved upstream to the reinsurance level of cartel 
members. Upstream reinsurance cartel members were in charge of adopting 
measures to prevent IDI offerings that did not comply with the cartel terms 
from being underwritten in the market. Reinsurers refused to allow the 
cession of any IDI contracts that did not comply with the pricing conditions 
set by the cartel, and even cancelled those that were agreed to below cartel 
prices. 
The biggest challenge to the cartel took place at the end of 2006, 
when the insurer Mutua de Seguros a Prima Fija (MUSAAT) negotiated a 
non-proportional excess-loss reinsurance contract with the reinsurer 
Hannover Re, which would have altered the standard contractual provisions 
employed by IDI reinsurers and would have led to a violation of the cartel’s 
minimum prices. However, the original cartel members, along with Caser, 
persuaded Hannover Re to withdraw the reinsurance contract it had offered 
to MUSAAT.28 

27 See id., Findings of Fact 29-34, at 31-32. The NCC considered claims not 
only by cartel members but also by the insurers Vitalicio and Allianz. See id., 
Findings of Fact 36, 39, at 33. 
28 See id., Findings of Fact 40-44, at 33-35. Caser was not considered to be an 
original member of the cartel and, initially, it only followed the conditions set by 
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Nevertheless, the initiative of MUSAAT destabilized the cartel and 
led to its breakdown in 2007. MUSAAT eventually managed to get 
reinsured under conditions different than those imposed by the cartel. 
Although several meetings by cartel members took place during 2007 in 
order to reinforce the cartel’s strength,29 the initiation of investigations by 
NCC ultimately put an end to the cartel. 
 
C. CARTEL EFFECTS: ECONOMIC RELEVANCE 
 
In order to estimate the economic significance of the cartel and its 
impact on the pricing of decennial IDI, the Spanish NCC utilized statistics 
on the evolution of the decennial insurance market from 2001 to 2007. 
Although both direct insurers and reinsurers were members of the cartel, 
the NCC determined that only the direct IDI market was affected by the 
cartel. Using the available data, the NCC calculated the average premium 
rate per sum insured for the period 2002-2007. This calculation permitted 
the NCC to observe an increase in average premiums while the cartel was 
in place (see Table 2). According to NCC calculations, the total excess in 
decennial IDI premiums paid by residential building developers from 2002 
to 2007 amounted to around 17% of the premiums paid over the duration of 
the cartel (about €242,436,072).30 
  

reinsurers. However, the NCC considered its role changed in 2006, when it started 
playing a relevant function in monitoring defections from the minimum pricing 
agreement. See id., Legal Ground 6, ¶ 4, at 60-63. 
29 See id., Findings of Fact 45-58, at 35-37. 
30 See NCC Decennial IDI Resolution, supra note 1, Finding of Fact 59, at 31. 
The reinsurers and insurance carriers involved in the cartel acknowledged an 
increase in average premiums for IDI after 2002, but they denied that it had 
anything to do with a cartel. For them, it was the result of normal market 
operations. Instead, the NCC attributed the entire increase in average premiums to 
the effect of the cartel. According to the NCC, it amounted to around 17% of the 
premium paid over the duration of the cartel. 
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TABLE 2. CALCULATION OF CARTEL IMPACT ON IDI PRICES (2002-
2007) 
 
Year 
Sum 
Insured 
€ (A) 
Total 
Premiu
ms € (B)
B/A 
in % 
B/A 
abse
nt 
cartel
I in 
% 
(C) 
CxA Total 
Premium 
absent 
cartel € 
(D) 
B-D 
Premium 
excess due 
to cartel € 
2002 21.9228 145.258 0.66 0.63 138.1139 7.1440 
2003 31.0621 225.002 0.72 0.63 195.6914 29.3105 
2004 41.8652 312.895 0.75 0.63 263.7509 49.1440 
2005 46.6502 355.069 0.76 0.63 293.8963 61.1726 
2006 52.0808 386.404 0.74 0.63 328.1090 58.2949 
2007 50.5059 355.557 0.70 0.63 318.1872 37.3697 
 (I) Total percentage of premiums per sum insured in the year prior to 
the existence of cartel (in millions), year 2001 (Source: NCC 
Resolution of 12 November 2009, S/0037/08, findings of fact 2.4 and 
59). 
 
In the words of the NCC, the minimum price agreement 
“eliminated all competition in prices in all the decennial IDI market, all 
policyholders had to pay, at least, the minimum prices set.”31 Surely, 
reinsurers competed amongst themselves in the commissions charged and 
could compete in setting different proportions of risk exposure taken, but it 
is clear that they all took part in an anticompetitive agreement that froze 
competition in both the IDI reinsurance market and the direct IDI market. 
Competition amongst reinsurers was severely restrained by the condition 
that only proportional pro quota share treatises were available and, 
consequently, by the identical underwriting and pricing conditions IDI 
reinsurers set for the direct IDI market. Concerning the latter, it is true that 
there were variations in the commercial conditions offered by insurance 
carriers over the minimum prices set by the cartel, which might be 
explained by the complex criteria used to set final prices as well as the 
existence of some competition by direct insurers above the cartel minimum 
prices. 

31 Id., Legal Ground 10, at 73-81. 
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Another consequence of the cartel was that while it was in effect, 
cartel members at both primary insurance and reinsurance levels 
maintained and even increased their market shares. Only the breakdown of 
cartel in 2007 allowed other insurance companies (for example, MUSAAT) 
to gain a substantial market share, as the minimum pricing agreement 
ceased to be in effect and alternative reinsurance contracts started to 
become available.32 
 
IV. LEGAL ASSESSMENT BY NCC 
 
The evidence above led the Spanish National Competition 
Commission to determine that insurers Asefa and MAPFRE and reinsurers 
SCOR, Suiza and MÜNCHENER had violated Article 101.1 of the TFEU 
and Section 1.1.a of the SCA. As described above, the cartel operated at 
two levels (direct IDI and IDI reinsurance), limiting the types of 
reinsurance contracts available for IDI carriers and setting a minimum 
premium for decennial property insurance in Spain from 2002 to 2007. The 
two-level structure of the cartel was crucial for its effectiveness. The cartel 
was deeply rooted on the relationships among IDI carriers and IDI 
reinsurers (and vice versa). However, the NCC considered the horizontal 
dimension of the agreement at both levels -either among direct insurers or 
among IDI reinsurers - to be prevalent to the vertical dimension.33 
Moreover (as mentioned earlier, supra § III.C), the NCC focused its 
attention on the cartel’s impact on competition within the direct IDI 
market, although it is clear that competition was also restrained in the IDI 
reinsurance market. 
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32 See id., Legal Ground 10, ¶ 6, at 70. There is some controversy regarding 
the data used by the NCC to make these calculations. The NCC used the data 
available from the Investigación Cooperativa entre Entidades Aseguradoras y 
Fondos de Pensiones (ICEA). This was the first Spanish association of insurance 
companies founded in 1963 (see more information at http://www.icea.es). Its 
reports and statistics are constructed with data provided by member insurance and 
reinsurance companies. Cartel members complained about the inaccuracy and 
variability of ICEA’s data and statistics. However, the NCC considered that despite 
possible defects and variations in the statistics used, there was enough evidence of 
the violation committed which, moreover, the SCA and the TFEU prohibited 
because of its object, no matter the effect it might have had in the market. See also 
id. ¶¶ 5, 7-11, at 70-72. 
33 See NCC Decennial IDI Resolution, supra note 1, Legal Ground 6, at 60-63. 
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A. APPLICABLE LAW AND POSSIBLE EXEMPTIONS 
 
Regarding EU competition law, the cartel created a minimum 
pricing agreement in violation of Article 101.1.a of the TFEU that affected 
member state trade, as it covered the entire Spanish market and prevented 
reinsurance companies offering no proportional treatises, facultative 
reinsurance contracts, and other pricing conditions different from those set 
by the cartel from entering the Spanish market.34 In making this 
determination, the NCC ascertained that the cartel had fragmented the 
Spanish decennial IDI market. 
Regarding domestic competition law, although the cartel operated 
when the 1989 SCA was in force, the NCC investigation and proceedings 
did not take place until after the 2007 SCA had been adopted.35 In any case, 
an agreement fixing minimum prices, such as the one that occurred in the 
decennial IDI cartel, was a violation of both versions of the SCA, as no 
relevant change was introduced on this prohibition in the new Act. In fact, 
the language in the newly adopted SCA is identical to the language of the 
previous SCA. 
However, both EU law and Spanish domestic law contemplate that, 
due to the specific nature and regulated character of the insurance industry, 
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34 See Joined Cases C-295/04 to C-298/04, Manfredi v. Lloyd Adriatico 
Assicurazioni SpA, Cannito v. Fondiaria Sai SpA, Tricarico v. Assitalia SpA, 2006 
E.C.R. § 52; Case C-309/99, Wouters v. Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde 
van Advocaten, 2002 ECR I-1653, § 95 (“As regards the question whether intra-
Community trade is affected, it is sufficient to observe that an agreement, decision 
or concerted practice extending over the whole of the territory of a Member State 
has, by its very nature, the effect of reinforcing the partitioning of markets on a 
national basis, thereby holding up the economic interpenetration which the Treaty 
is designed to bring about.”) (citing Case 8/72 Bereeniging van Cementhandelaren 
v. Comm’n [1972] ECR 977, ¶ 29; Case 42/84 Remia & Others v Comm’n [1985] 
ECR 2545, ¶ 22; and CNSD, ¶ 48). See also Commission Notice - Guidelines on 
the effect on trade concept contained in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 2004 O.J. 
(C 101) § 78 (“Horizontal cartels covering the whole of a Member State are 
normally capable of affecting trade between Member States. The Community 
Courts have held in a number of cases that agreements extending over the whole 
territory of a Member State by their very nature have the effect of reinforcing the 
partitioning of markets on a national basis by hindering the economic penetration 
which the Treaty is designed to bring about.”). 
35 Moreover, the NCC determined that the cartel existed and continued 
producing effects several months after the 2007 SCA was in force (Sept. 1, 2007), 
so even the latter would be applicable. NCC Decennial IDI Resolution, supra note 
1, Legal Ground 1, at 40-42. 
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some business practices in insurance markets are exempted from 
prohibitions on competition.36 Therefore, one could foresee that the 
companies accused of organizing the IDI cartel would raise the defense that 
their actions were covered by the insurance exemption. Firstly, cartel 
members argued that per EC Regulation 358/2003, decennial liability 
constituted a “new risk” that should be covered by the special regime set by 
the Block Exemption Regulation (“BER”).37 According to cartel members, 
mandatory decennial IDI for housing as required by the 28/1999 Act gave 
way to a new class of insurance, and all of the arrangements made by 
insurers and reinsurers concerning decennial IDI were justified due to the 
lack of information on the risk and adequate coverage.38 In the same vein, it 
was argued that the proportional treatise by reinsurers were promulgated as 
a natural consequence of such a situation and, moreover, that it allowed 
reinsurers to substantially limit the risk assumed by controlling direct 
insurance conditions.39 The NCC dismissed each of these arguments by 
examining the evidence of how the price fixing agreement was conceived 
as the anticompetitive solution that Asefa, MAPFRE and the reinsurers 
designed to correct what they understood to be excessive market 
competition. According to the documentary proof obtained by the NCC in 
the form of minutes from the cartel members’ meeting, the first year the 
38/1999 Act was in force, the cartel members considered decennial IDI 
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36 See FRANCISCO MARCOS & ALBERT SÁNCHEZ-GRAELLS, ACTIVIDAD 
ASEGURADORA Y DEFENSA DE LA COMPETENCIA: LA EXENCIÓN ANTITRUST DEL 
SECTOR ASEGURADOR, Instituto del Ciencias del Seguro, 
http://www.mapfre.com/ccm/content/documentos/fundacion/cs-
seguro/libros/Actividad-aseguradora-y-defensa-de-la-competencia-la-exencion-
antitrust-del-sector-asegurador.pdf (for an explanation of the insurance sector 
exemption both in EU Law and Spanish Law). In this article, references are made 
to Commission Regulation (EC) No. 358/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 53/8), but the 
exemption has been significantly rewritten by Commission Regulation (EU) No. 
267/2010, 2010 O.J. (L 83/1). 
37 Commission Regulation (EC) No. 358/2003, supra note 37, at 8-16 (on the 
application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of agreements, 
decisions and concerted practices in the insurance sector). 
38 Brenes, supra note 4, at 242 (When discussing premium calculation in her 
study of decennial IDI, Brenes mentions the lack of experience in the Spanish 
insurance market on the risks covered by this type of insurance that greatly 
encumber the pricing process). 
39 NCC Decennial IDI Resolution, supra note 1, Legal Ground 3rd, ¶¶ 3-4, at 
49-55. 
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premiums to be too low and agreed that something needed to be done to 
substantially increase them.40 
Moreover, Spanish general insurance legislation includes an 
obligation for each insurance company to avoid underinsurance by setting 
minimum premium schedules with adequate technical provisions, and by 
requiring that the measures adopted to comply with these requirements do 
not restrict competition (Section 25.3 of the 2004 Spanish Insurance 
Regulation).41 The agreements entered into by the direct IDI insurers and 
reinsurers did not comply with that provision, as they agreed to and 
imposed minimum commercial premium rates throughout the Spanish IDI 
market.42 Therefore, a legal exemption could not exist that would be 
applicable to the behavior of companies in the IDI market in accordance 
with Section 2.1 of the 1989 SCA (currently, Section 4.1 of 2007 SCA). 
Furthermore, such an exemption would not be available and operative 
against an application of Article 101.1 of TFEU.43 
Finally, the NCC brushed aside any possible exemption for the 
cartel agreement that could have been given due to beneficial market 
effects or the efficiencies arising from it (in accordance with Article 101.3 
of TFEU and Section 1.3 of 2007 SCA). It also disregarded arguments that 
the Spanish Ministry of Development’s enactment of the LOE justified the 
cooperation amongst cartel members.44 
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40 Id., Legal Ground 3rd, ¶¶ 7-9, at 50-51. 
41 Royal Legislative Decree 6/2004 (R.C.L. 2004, OSJ 267) (Spain). (“The 
premium rates shall be sufficient, on reasonable actuarial assumptions, to enable 
the insurer to meet all the obligations arising from insurance contracts and, in 
particular, to establish adequate technical provisions…They also shall respect free 
competition in the insurance market without, for this purpose, being considered a 
restraint of competition the use of risk premium rates based on common 
statistics.”) (approving the revised text of the Law on regulation and supervision of 
private insurance). 
42 NCC Decennial IDI Resolution, supra note 1, Legal Ground 3rd, ¶ 4, at 50 
(The dissenting opinion considers this legal provision as grounds for awarding a 
legal exemption to IDI insurers and reinsurers in accordance with Section 2.1 of 
the 1989 Spanish Competition Act 16/1989, of July 17). 
43 See Francisco Marcos, Comentario Artículo 4, in COMENTARIO A LA LEY DE 
DEFENSA DE LA COMPETENCIA 239, 274-79 (Jose Manuel Sala Arquer ed., 2d ed. 
2010). 
44 NCC Decennial IDI Resolution, supra note 1, Legal Ground 4th, ¶¶ 6-8, at 
57-58. 
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B. DIRECT EVIDENCE OF THE CARTEL 
 
Although the NCC established strong evidence regarding the 
minimum price fixing agreement and its operation, cartel members denied 
its existence. They acknowledged their reciprocal contacts and participation 
in meetings as proven by the NCC, but asserted that these meetings were 
aimed only at sharing information and experiences of purely technical 
character regarding decennial IDI coverage.45 
According to the cartel members’ defense, their contacts and 
meetings contemplated sharing technical information and cooperatively 
calculating coverage costs that were intercommunicated amongst 
companies within the exemption provided by the 2003 BER. The NCC 
responded that the cartel members’ behavior exceeded the strict scope and 
conditions imposed by Article 3 of 2003 BER. This provision requires that 
information and data shared by insurance companies be of a purely 
technical nature (that is, actuarial data) and not contain any indication of 
the level of commercial premiums.46 Article 4 excluded from the 
exemption those agreements that oblige companies to use the information 
and data shared when conducting their insurance business.47 The NCC 
showed that both final commercial premiums and mandatory premiums 
were established and imposed throughout the IDI market by the cartel. 
According to the evidence put forward by the NCC, Asefa, 
MAPFRE Empresas, Caser, MÜNCHENER, Suiza and SCOR were part of 
a price fixing scheme; the commercial premiums were agreed upon and 
compliance was mandatorily imposed on insurance carriers that were part 
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45 See id., Legal Ground 3rd, ¶¶ 1-2, at 49. 
46 See Commission Regulation 267/2010, 2010 O.J. (L 83) 1, 2 (EU) (“It is 
therefore appropriate to stipulate in particular that agreements on commercial 
premiums are not exempted. Indeed, commercial premiums may be lower than the 
amounts indicated by the compilations, tables or study results in question, since 
insurers can use the revenues from their investments in order to reduce their 
premiums. Moreover, the calculations, tables or Studies in question should be non-
binding and serve only for reference purposes.”) (emphasis added). See also 
Alessandro De Nicola & Donatella Porrini, Scambio di Informazioni e Mercato 
Assicurativo: Analisi Economica del Diritto Antitrust en Italia e USA, in 
CARTELLLO A PERDERE. ASSICURAZIONI, ANTITRUST, E SCAMBIO 
D’IINFORMAZIONI, 131, 153-55 (Rubbettino ed., 2008); MARCOS & SÁNCHEZ-
GRAELLS, supra note 37, at § 4.1. 
47 See id. 
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of the cartel and indirectly imposed on the rest of the market through the 
influence of reinsurers (see supra §§ III.B, C).48 
 
C. LACK OF AN ALTERNATIVE COMPETITIVE EXPLANATION 
 
If the direct evidence of the existence of the cartel was not enough, 
the NCC also rejected alternative explanations of their agreements that 
were put forward by cartel members.49 In providing a more solid ground for 
its conclusions, the NCC set aside all of the arguments advanced by the 
conspiring insurers and reinsurers on plausible lawful and competitive 
reasons that could justify their behavior.  
Of course, the NCC did not determine that the proportional share 
treatises agreed to by conspiring reinsurers and direct IDI insurers, in 
which reinsurers fixed some minimum direct insurance pricing terms, were 
anticompetitive per se. Nevertheless, it was suspicious that no other type of 
reinsurance was available, and that the reinsurance members of the cartel 
acted against any attempt for any other type of reinsurance contracts to be 
written.  
However, the NCC determined that it was more than suspicious 
that there was no competition below certain threshold premiums in IDI 
insurance (following the pricing conditions set by IDI reinsurers which 
were identical throughout the market, see supra § III.A). There is no 
plausible explanation for the uniform premiums in the IDI market other 
than the minimum price fixing agreement by reinsurers (and the three 
larger IDI carriers), in violation of Article 101.1 of TFEU and Section 1 of 
SCA. 
 
D. FINES AND DAMAGE CLAIMS 
 
The NCC deemed Asefa, MAPFRE Empresas, Caser, 
MÜNCHENER, Suiza and SCOR to be part of a cartel that fixed minimum 
prices in the IDI market from 2002 to 2007. Operating at two levels, 
reinsurance and insurance, the cartel had an atypical and complex structure 
that included horizontal agreements at each of the two levels coupled with 
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48 See NCC Decennial IDI Resolution, supra note 1, Legal Ground 3rd, ¶¶ 10-
16, at 53-57. The NCC even found evidence indicating that cartel members knew 
about the unlawful nature of their behavior, with several references made by them 
as to how important it was to keep all their contacts and agreements secret and 
away from competition authorities. See id., Legal Ground 4th, ¶¶ 3-5, at 54. 
49 See id., Legal Ground 5th, at 58-60. 
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vertical agreements among the three IDI carriers and all of the reinsurers 
that were active in the IDI market (see supra Figure 1).50 
The agreement amongst cartel members was a single and complex 
agreement, which included fixing minimum prices for decennial IDI 
insurance, monitoring compliance by direct insurers, and detecting and 
prosecuting defections from cartel prices. There was a concerted action by 
some insurance carriers and all the IDI reinsurers to fix and control 
premiums on the decennial IDI market, boycotting and retorting against 
those direct insurers that did not comply with cartel conditions, and the 
NCC considered this a single and continuous infringement of Article 101.1 
of TFEU and Section 1.1 of SCA.51 
In setting the amount of the fine, the NCC applied Section 10 of the 
1989 SCA.52 This Section gives discretion to set the level of the fines, with 

50 See id., Legal Ground 7th, at 63-66. 
51 Following EU case law, the NCC does not apportion the responsibility of 
cartel members in the conspiracy, nor does it deconstruct the different parts of the 
complex violation. See Joined Cases T-101/05 and T-111/05, BASF AG & UCB v. 
Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-4959, ¶¶ 159-61; Joined Cases T-305/94 to T-307/94, T-
313/94 to T-316/94, T-318/94, T-325/94, T-328/94, T-329/94 and T-335/94, 
Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij & Others v. Comm’n, 1999 E.C.R. II-945, ¶696. 
But see NCC Decennial IDI Resolution, supra note 1, Legal Ground 2nd, at 42-49 
(The dissenting opinion criticized the NCC’s refusal to apportion responsibility in 
a conspiracy). 
52 See The Competition Act § 10 (B.O.E. 1989, 170) (Spain) (“1. The Court 
may impose on the economic agents, undertakings, associations, unions or groups 
that have either deliberately or through negligence breached the terms of Sections 
1, 6 and 7, or failed to comply with a condition or obligation foreseen in Article 
4.2, fines of up to 150.000.000 pesetas (901.518,16 euros), amount which may be 
increased up to 10 percent of the turnover corresponding to the financial year 
immediately prior to the Court resolution. 2. The amount of the sanction shall be 
determined according to the importance of the breach, for which purpose the 
following factors shall be taken into consideration: a) The type and scope of the 
restriction upon competition. b) The dimension of the market affected. c) The 
market share of the corresponding undertaking. d) The effect of the restriction 
upon competition had on the actual or potential competitors, the other parties in the 
economic process and the consumers and users. e) The duration of the restriction 
upon competition. f) The reiteration of the prohibited conduct.”). But see NCC 
Decennial IDI Resolution, supra note 1, Legal Ground 7th, at 63-66 (The 
dissenting opinion suggested that the cap set by § 10 of 1989 SCA was 
inappropriately exceeded by the majority opinion because the aggravating 
circumstance considered was indeed part of the cartel itself, which should have 
meant that a cap of 901,518.16 euro per firm was applicable. However, that 
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the only condition being that the NCC must assess all concurring 
circumstances proportionally. First, the NCC considered the cartel duration 
of January 1, 2002 to December 31, 2007.53 Second, being a long-term 
violation, the NCC also took into account the severe nature of the violation, 
the relevant position in the market of the insurance carriers and reinsurers 
involved with the cartel, the mandatory nature of decennial IDI insurance 
(which made demand inelastic), the possibility for housing developers to 
transfer the cost of insurance to final clients (i.e., consumers were the final 
victims of the cartel), and the deliberate nature of the violation.  
To calculate the fine within the framework of Section 10 of 1989 
SCA,54 the NCC surreptitiously used its 2009 Communication on the 
Quantification of Sanctions.55 First, to estimate the base amount of the fine, 
the sales volume affected by the violation was calculated (taking into 
account the duration of the violation).56 The base amount is the percentage 
of the sales volume affected, ranging from 10% to 30% (varying with the 
severity of the infringement and its capacity for producing cascade effects 
in other markets).57  
Subsequently, the NCC adjusted the base amount applicable to 
each firm. In the case of Asefa, the NCC considered its behavior as the 
frontrunner in organizing the cartel and policing and controlling defections 
to be an aggravating factor. Concerning Caser, although it was a late 
member of cartel, its role in monitoring cartel defections was similarly 
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assessment is mistaken, as the cap applies only to business firms and agents 
lacking a business turnover.). 
53 See NCC Decennial IDI Resolution, supra note 1, Finding of Fact 12, at 20-
24. 
54 Most of the information on the quantification of the fine has been purged 
from the public text of NCC resolution (due to confidentiality issues), which 
greatly hinders the analysis that can be done here. 
55 See The Competition Act art. 1-3 (B.O.E. 2007, 159) (Spain); Consolidated 
Version of the Treaty on European Union, art. 81-82, Dec. 29, 2006 O.J. (C 321) 1, 
73-75; see also Andrew Ward & Carmen Hernández, Clemencia y Sanciones, in 
LA LEY DE DEFENSA DE LA COMPETENCIA: BALANCE DE SU APLICACIÓN 251, 252 
(Sergio Baches ed., 2010). But see Begoña Barrantes, Dos Años de Aplicación del 
Artículo 1 de la Ley 15/2007, de 3 de Julio, de Defensa de la Competencia: 
Balance y Asuntos Más Destacados, in LA LEY DE DEFENSA DE LA COMPETENCIA: 
BALANCE DE SU APLICACIÓN 127, 157-59 (Sergio Baches ed., 2010) (criticizing the 
application of the NCC Communication in this case). 
56 See NCC Decennial IDI Resolution, supra note 1, at 4-5. 
57 See id. at 5. 
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considered an aggravating factor.58 Similarly, aggravating circumstances 
were considered in the case of the reinsurer SCOR due its boycott of 
MUSAAT, as well as in the cases of Suiza59 and MÜNCHENER. Only 
MAPFRE was not considered to have been involved in any aggravating 
circumstances.60 No attenuating circumstances were considered for any of 
the cartel participants. Table 3 details the final amount of fines imposed to 
each company. For now, it suffices to say that, if NCC estimations are 
correct, the total amount of fines imposed (€120,728,000) is only half the 
amount of the harm inflicted to the victims (which, according to the data 
provided by the NCC, would amount to €242,436,072, see supra Table 2). 
If the data used by the NCC is accurate, the fines are far below both the 
illegal profits and the consumer harm. 
 
TABLE 3. FINE CALCULATION  
 
Companies Basis (€) Amount of fine 
(€) 
Asefa 25,235,000 27,759,000 
MAPFRE Empresas/ 
MAPFRE RE 
21,632,000 21,632,000 
Caser 12,947,000 14,241,000 
SCOR 16,908,000 18,599,000 
MÜNCHENER 15,101,000 15,856,000 
Suiza /Swiss Re 21,563,000 22,641,000 
       Source: NCC Decennial IDI Resolution  
 
The companies considered the fines to be disproportionately large, 
and have rushed to appeal the fines imposed to the competent judicial court 
(Audiencia Nacional) on several grounds. The fate that awaits the NCC 
resolution is still unknown. Recently, several fines imposed by the NCC 

58 See supra note 25. The implication of Caser in the cartel may be one of the 
weakest points of the NCC Resolution. Proportionally, it got a larger fine than its 
fellow cartel members, specially bearing in mind it only took part in the last two 
years of the cartel. 
59 See NCC Decennial IDI Resolution, supra note 1, Legal Ground 8th, at 66-
68 (justifying why Suiza, being a wholly owned subsidiary of Swiss Re, should be 
considered responsible together and inseparably with the latter, and only one fine 
was imposed to them). 
60 See NCC Decennial IDI Resolution, supra note 1, Legal Ground 9th, at 68-
69. 
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have been repealed and lowered by the National Court and/or the Supreme 
Court.  
On the other hand, and somewhat unexpectedly, the NCC 
resolution did not fuel any damage claims in court against cartel members. 
This dearth of private claims for damages is puzzling and revealing, not 
only due to the weak competition culture and the difficulties still faced for 
private enforcement of competition law in Spain, but also because of the 
specific features and intricacies of the decennial insurance cartel that may 
well hamper judicial claims for damage compensation against conspiring 
insurers and reinsurers.61 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
This article has analyzed the property insurance cartel that operated 
in Spain from 2002 to 2007. Insurance and reinsurance firms active in the 
Spanish property insurance market promoted it as a reaction to increased 
competition in the market after IDI was required by law in 2000. 
Understanding the cartel organization, as well as its dynamics and 
effectiveness, underlines the role of reinsurance companies as the monitors 
and enforcers of the minimum pricing agreement. By restricting 
reinsurance contracts available to proportional share treatises, reinsurers 
(SCOR, MÜNCHENER and Suiza/Swiss Re) exerted total control over the 
IDI direct insurance market, contributing greatly to the minimum pricing 
conditions agreed to by some insurers (Asefa, MAPFRE and Caser). The 
Spanish NCC uncovered the cartel in 2007 and imposed fines totaling more 
than €120 million to the companies.   
The cartel owed its origin to the imposition of mandatory decennial 
insurance in 2000, but the characteristics of the close relationship among 
insurance companies and reinsurers in this context and sectorial regulation 
in the matter favored the creation and development of a perfect conspiracy 
to restrain competition in the Spanish market for property insurance. 
 
 
  

61 See Francisco Marcos, Why There Might Not Be Many Damage Claims 
Arising From the Spanish Property Insurance Cartel?, in PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT 
OF COMPETITION LAW, 303, 319-30 (Velasco San Pedro et al. eds., 2011). 
NOT IN THE FINE PRINT: RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO 
LIFE INSURANCE POLICY DISCLOSURES REGARDING 
RETAINED ASSET ACCOUNTS 
 
     MICHAEL A. BARRESE* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Tom is the primary breadwinner of his family. In order to protect 
his wife and children financially in the event that he passes away, he goes 
online and researches life insurance policies. After becoming familiar with 
the different forms of life insurance, Tom purchases a $250,000 life 
insurance policy from a large insurance company. When he purchases the 
policy, he makes his wife, Melissa, the primary beneficiary. Under the 
policy, in the event that Tom dies, Melissa is entitled to a lump-sum 
$250,000 payment.  
Six months after purchasing the policy Tom dies in a car accident. 
Melissa, as beneficiary, is entitled to a lump sum $250,000 payment per the 
terms of the policy. In the past, this would have been no problem, the 
insurance company would merely write the $250,000 check to Melissa. 
However, in 1984, something changed.1 Some large insurance companies 
rolled out a new form of payment, the Retained Asset Account.  
Retained Asset Accounts (“RAAs”) are created when life insurance 
carriers provide the beneficiary of a life insurance policy with a pseudo-
checkbook instead of a single lump sum check.2 Instead of being paid out 
with a check for the entire amount of the life insurance policy, the proceeds 
are placed into the insurer’s general corporate account from which the 
beneficiary can draft funds with the use of the pseudo-checkbook.3  
                                                                                                                                      
*B.S. in Finance and Marketing from Lehigh University in 2008; University 
of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate Class of 2012. I would like to thank 
my uncle, James Barrese, for all of his help and advice while writing and redrafting 
this note.  I would also like to thank my parents and siblings for their support and 
guidance throughout my time at the University of Connecticut School of Law. 
 
1 ADVOCATE LAW GROUP P.C., RETAINED ASSET ACCOUNTS, 
http://www.retainedassetaccounts.com/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2012). 
2 Id. 
3 David Evans, Fallen Soldiers' Families Denied Cash as Insurers Profit, 
BLOOMBERG, (July 28, 2010, 10:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-
07-28/fallen-soldiers-families-denied-cash-payout-as-life-insurers-boost-
profit.html (“The ‘checks’ that Cindy Lohman wrote, the ones rejected by retailers, 
were actually drafts, or IOUs, issued by Prudential. Even though the ‘checks’ had 
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Because of this change, Melissa does not receive a lump-sum 
payment; rather she receives a pseudo-checkbook from the insurance 
company that appears to be drawn from Bank A. Confused by this, Melissa 
reads the policy disclosure and learns that this pseudo-checkbook entitles 
her to write checks against the Retained Asset Account up to the value of 
the insurance policy. With this knowledge, Melissa realizes that she has 
some options. She can write a pseudo-check for the full amount of the 
policy and deposit it into her own bank account or she can leave the funds, 
in whole or in part, in the Retained Asset Account until she has an 
immediate need for them.  
As it turns out, the insurance company has not deposited any of 
Melissa’s funds into an account at Bank A. Instead, the funds were 
deposited in the insurance company’s corporate account at Bank C. When 
Melissa attempts to deposit a pseudo-check at her bank, Bank B, there is a 
delay. The delay is caused by the clearing process that the pseudo-check 
has to go through in order to be deposited. Instead of Bank B drawing the 
funds directly from Bank A, Bank B must go to the insurance company 
who then requests the release of funds from Bank C to Bank B. At the end 
of the day, Melissa still gets the money she is owed, it just takes longer 
than it would have if she had received an ordinary check for the full 
amount of the policy from the start.  
The practice of providing Retained Asset Accounts in lieu of a 
lump-sum check was critically described in the article “Fallen Soldiers’ 
Families Denied Cash as Insurers Profit,” by Bloomberg journalist, David 
Evans.4 The issue made its way into other media outlets and eventually 
lawsuits were filed in Federal District Court regarding the policy 
disclosures and administration of the Retained Asset Accounts. 
This note expands upon the discussion in the mainstream media by 
presenting a description of both benefits and criticisms of Retained Asset 
Accounts as well as recommendations for changes to policy disclosures 
that would improve the image of this type of account. In Section II, the 
paper discusses the benefits and criticisms of Retained Asset Accounts. In 
Section III, disclosure issues are identified and solutions are presented. The 
note concludes that there are benefits to both the beneficiaries and to the 
insurance companies but there are also components of Retained Asset 
Accounts that are questionable and need to change. Because of these 
                                                                                                                                      
the name of JPMorgan Chase & Co. on them, Lohman’s funds weren’t in that 
bank; they were held by Prudential. Before a check could clear, Prudential would 
have to send money to JPMorgan, bank spokesman John Murray says.”). 
4 Id. 
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questionable components of Retained Asset Accounts, it would be wise for 
insurance companies to improve their disclosure statements regarding 
Retained Asset Accounts in order to avoid both bad publicity and potential 
litigation.  
 
II. RETAINED ASSET ACCOUNTS 
 
 In 2010, insurance companies had over $28 billion invested in 
Retained Asset Accounts.5 Metropolitan Life Insurance Company 
(“MetLife”) alone had 36 percent of that total and makes an estimated $100 
to $300 million a year on Retained Asset Accounts.6  
Retained Asset Accounts are created when an insurance company 
“pays the proceeds from a life insurance policy or annuity contract to a 
beneficiary by sending the beneficiary ‘a checkbook instead of a check.’”7 
For example, if a life insurance policy is supposed to be paid in a lump-
sum, instead of sending a check for the full amount of the policy, the 
insurance company will send a pseudo-checkbook that permits the 
beneficiary to write pseudo-checks (drafts) against the Retained Asset 
Account.  
 
A. BENEFITS 
 
While the mainstream media has provided several articles 
criticizing Retained Asset Accounts, there are some benefits to using them 
to pay life insurance benefits to beneficiaries.  
First, the intention behind RAAs was to give beneficiaries 
immediate access to the proceeds from insurance policies.8 Traditionally, 
lump sum checks issued by insurance companies took two weeks to clear 
once deposited in the beneficiary’s bank account.9 By providing the 
pseudo-checks attached to a Retained Asset Account insurance companies 
were, in effect, providing easier access to funds at the time families needed 
                                                                                                                                      
5 Id. 
6 Id. (“Gerry Goldsholle, the man who invented retained-asset accounts, says 
MetLife makes $100 million to $300 million a year from investment returns on the 
death benefits it holds. A former president of MetLife Marketing Corp., 
Goldsholle, 69, devised the accounts in 1984.”). 
7 ADVOCATE LAW GROUP P.C., RETAINED ASSET ACCOUNTS, supra note 1. 
8 ADVOCATE LAW GROUP P.C., Benefits of Retained Asset Accounts, 
RETAINED ASSET ACCOUNTS, http://www.retainedassetaccounts.com/benefits-of-
retained-asset-accounts.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2012). 
9 Id. 
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it most. The immediate use of funds is not possible under the traditional 
single lump-sum check payment method.10 
Second, RAAs provide continuous interest payments to 
beneficiaries as soon as the claim is approved and until the beneficiary 
withdraws all of the money they are entitled to.11 As previously stated, it 
takes several weeks for a bank to clear a single lump-sum check, the 
clearing time effectively reduces the interest that can be earned on the lump 
sum payment. Combine this delay with the mailing delay of the check and 
RAAs pay interest on the funds for a longer period than a single lump-sum 
check. RAAs also allow the beneficiary to move the funds into higher yield 
accounts more quickly than they could with a single lump-sum check. 
As originally designed, insurance companies guaranteed that RAAs 
would pay beneficiaries and interest rate that was equal to or greater than 
the average rate paid “banks and money market mutual funds on similar 
accounts.”12 In addition to guaranteeing a level of payment equal to or 
greater than bank rates, the insurance company also provided a floor, below 
which interest rates on RAAs would not fall.13 In the current economic 
climate, this floor provides significant upside for RAAs due to extremely 
low interest rates on regular bank accounts. 
In addition, RAAs were designed with consumer protection in 
mind. Instead of relying solely on the insurance company to back the 
accounts, they were designed to also be insured by State Sponsored 
Guarantee Associations (“SSGA”).14 While it is not FDIC insurance, State 
Sponsored Guaranty Associations do provide some protection against 
insurance company insolvency. 
Finally, RAAs were designed in the mold of a standard bank 
account. They would pay interest, provide monthly statements and also 
provide mutual benefit to the beneficiary and insurance company that 
maintained the account.15 In order to provide a return to beneficiaries, the 
insurance company has to use their funds to make money, similar to how a 
bank lends out money from a savings account at an interest rate higher than 
it pays to account holders.  
                                                                                                                                      
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id.; AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURERS, About Retained Asset Accounts, 
(July 29, 2010), available at http://www.acli.com/Newsroom/Documents/ 
80af916fc317435cb9340a17bdbaf052AboutRetainedAssetAccounts.pdf. 
13 AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURERS, supra note 12. 
14 ADVOCATE LAW GROUP P.C., Benefits of Retained Asset Accounts, supra 
note 8. 
15 Id. 
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B. CRITICISMS 
 
Journalistic criticisms present several important questions about 
RAAs, these include: whether RAAs are a permitted distribution method 
per the initial contract with the policyholder; do beneficiaries understand 
how RAAs operate as a payment option; is interest paid on the funds in the 
RAA and, if so, is the rate competitive with financial alternatives; and are 
they as safe as depositing the funds into an FDIC insured bank account, a 
common alternative available to beneficiaries.  
One problem highlighted in the journalistic efforts is the claim that 
insurance companies provide beneficiaries with pseudo-checks that the 
beneficiary believes to be the same as a check from their bank. What the 
insurance companies actually provide are drafts. Several beneficiaries have 
encountered difficulties when trying to use these drafts as several retailers 
have rejected the beneficiary’s draft even though the Retained Asset 
Account had more than enough money in it to cover the transaction.16 It has 
been suggested that beneficiaries do not generally understand that the funds 
in RAAs are not readily available for payment in the bank against which 
the pseudo-checks are drawn. This is based on the perception that insurance 
companies have intentionally refrained from disclosing important facts 
regarding Retained Asset Accounts.  
 Instead of paying the entire policy benefit in one lump sum 
payment, the RAA scheme permits life insurance companies to retain the 
funds in their general account and provide beneficiaries with a book of 
drafts.17 The drafts are issued against the insurance company’s general 
corporate account rather than an individual beneficiary account.18 This 
scheme permits the life insurance company to retain substantial funds in 
their general corporate account, an account that earned over 4% interest in 
2010.19 While all of the insurance providers pay interest on the accounts, 
and several pay more than the average Money Market Account,20 
                                                                                                                                      
16 Evans, supra note 3. 
17 Id.  
18 Id.  
19 Id.  
20 Money Market Definition, INVESTOPEDIA.COM, http://www.investopedia.co 
m/terms/m/moneymarket.asp, (last visited Mar. 18, 2012) (“The money market is 
used by a wide array of participants, from a company raising money by selling 
commercial paper into the market to an investor purchasing CDs as a safe place to 
park money in the short term. The money market is typically seen as a safe place 
to put money due the highly liquid nature of the securities and short maturities, but 
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journalists have called attention to the spread between the return the 
insurance provider receives on its investment and the amount of interest it 
pays beneficiaries. 21 “Prudential’s general account earned 4.4 percent in 
2009, mostly from bond investments, according to SEC filings. The 
company has paid survivors 0.5 percent in 2010.” Met Life also paid 
approximately 0.5 percent to beneficiaries with Retained Asset Accounts, a 
rate that was less than half the rate paid in some banks. The fact that there 
is a spread between the interest paid to beneficiaries and the earnings from 
retained funds by the life insurer is no different from the fact that any firm 
in the financial sector holding funds for an investor attempts to earn more 
on the retained funds than they pay to the investor. In order to be a valid 
criticism, it would have to be based on evidence that the risk-adjusted 
return to the RAA beneficiary is not sufficient and disclosed. The evidence 
suggests that some of the largest life insurance companies paid between 
0.5% and 1.5% interest to beneficiaries on the retained RAA funds during 
between 2008 and 2010.22 In addition to paying lower interest rates, if the 
money were put in a bank, it would be insured by the FDIC up to two 
hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000).23 
By comparison, banks paid between 0.1% and 4.0% on their FDIC 
insured money market accounts during this same period.24 RAA funds are 
offered some protection against insolvency by industry solvency protection 
plans but few non-governmental insurance plans match the risk protection 
provided in the government’s FDIC plan. The level of protection against 
the insolvency of the insurer is another question that leads to criticism of 
industry disclosure practices.  
While not relevant to the purpose of this paper, two similar classes 
of Retained Asset Accounts have been identified by the mainstream media; 
beneficiaries of military policies and beneficiaries of non-military policies. 
The main difference lies in the fact that military personnel have to use 
Prudential for their life insurance needs while non-military policyholders 
can get insurance from any insurance company that is legally able to offer 
life insurance in the state. Again, while not important for the purposes of 
                                                                                                                                      
there are risks in the market that any investor needs to be aware of including the 
risk of default on securities such as commercial paper.”). 
21 Evans, supra note 3. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Online Savings Account Interest Rates History, 
THESUNSFINANCIALDIARY.COM (Jan. 21, 2009), http://www.thesunsfinancialdiary 
.com/personal-finance/online-savings-account-interest-rates-history. 
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this paper, the journalistic attention to RAAs appears to be stimulated by 
attention to the effect on the families of military personnel.25  
 Retained Asset Accounts are seen by the providers as a useful to 
beneficiaries, giving them time to think about what they want to do with 
the money they have received instead of having a single check which they 
“could lose” weighing heavily on them.26 Insurance companies have been 
quick to point out that a beneficiary can withdraw all of the money in the 
account whenever they want, even on the day they receive the pseudo-
checkbook.  However, the insurance company has not adequately disclosed 
important information including the potential delay for each pseudo-check 
to clear, that the checks may not be widely accepted by retailers, and that 
holding funds in Retained Asset Accounts benefits the insurance company 
itself.27  
Through proper disclosure, the insurance companies offering 
RAAs can reduce the misperception that beneficiaries think they are 
receiving their own personal account similar to that which they can obtain 
from their local bank. Insurers need to make a better effort to ensure that 
beneficiaries understand that instead of a single “lump sum” payment 
drawn on funds deposited in a bank account they receive a right to make a 
request for funds held in the insurance company’s general corporate 
account without the security of FDIC insurance and used by the insurer for 
their corporate purposes until the beneficiary has closed the account by 
withdrawing all of the remaining funds due.  
While there is likely no quantifiable harm done by lack of 
disclosure regarding Retained Asset Accounts and thus there will be no 
ability for beneficiaries to recover damages in court from this failure to 
disclose pertinent information to policy holders and beneficiaries until there 
is a failure of the insurance provider, regulatory agencies should still 
require clear and concise disclosure of the actual nature and extent of 
insurance backing of Retained Asset Accounts for the benefit of the 
reputation of the industry generally. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                      
25 Evans, supra note 3. 
26 Bloomberg News, V.A. Agreed to Withholding of Benefits, Documents Say, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/14/ 
business/14insure.html?_r=1&src=twr.  
27 Id. 
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1. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
 
 The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) is an 
independent corporation that insures deposits in banks and thrift institutions 
against failure.28 The FDIC was created as part of the Glass-Steagall Act of 
1933 in response to the over nine thousand bank failures during the Great 
Depression.29 The FDIC insures deposit accounts for up to two hundred 
fifty thousand dollars ($250,000) per individual, per bank.30 An individual 
could put $1 million in a single FDIC insured bank and be covered for only 
$250,000 of that sum or that same individual could spread that $1 million 
into 4 or more FDIC insured banks and be insured for the entire $1 million. 
The FDIC does have ways to receive more than $250,000 worth of 
coverage at one bank provided certain criteria are met, such as having 
accounts in different asset categories.31  
 
Example 1: Single Account (owned by one person): $250,000 per owner.32 
 
Example of Insurance Coverage for Single Accounts33 
 
Depositor Type of Deposit
Amount 
Deposited
Jane Smith Savings account $25,000 
Jane Smith Certificate of Deposit $250,000 
Jane Smith NOW account $50,000 
Jane Smith's sole 
proprietorship 
Checking 
account $50,000 
Total Deposited $375,000
                                                                                                                                      
28 Who is the FDIC?, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://www.fdic.gov/about/ 
learn/symbol/index (last updated Aug. 11, 2011). 
29 Robert Stammers, The History of the FDIC, INVESTOPEDIA.COM (Jan. 6, 
2009), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/economics/09/fdic-history.asp. 
30 Who is the FDIC?, supra note 28. 
31 Deposit Insurance FAQ, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., https://www.fdic.gov/ 
edie/fdic_info.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2011). 
32 Id.  
33 Id.  
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Insurance Available $250,000
Uninsured Amount $125,000
 
 
The FDIC is funded through premiums paid by banks and thrifts 
and from earnings on U.S. Treasury Securities.34 These premiums are paid 
regularly and go into what is described by some as a “war chest”.35 “To 
provide an effective banking safety net, it is necessary for the FDIC to 
replace cash (of the failed bank) with cash from the FDIC at the moment 
the bank fails.”36 The FDIC insures traditional bank accounts, savings, 
checking, trust, certificates of deposit (“CDs”), money market savings 
accounts and IRA accounts.37 Since its creation in 1934, no depositor 
insured by the FDIC has lost a single penny of insured funds as a result of a 
bank failure.38 It is because of this success that the FDIC has gained such 
prominence and respect from individuals and businesses alike. A further 
discussion of more complex formations for FDIC coverage is discussed in 
the Appendix. 
 
2. State Sponsored Guaranty Associations 
 
 The Metropolitan Life Insurance Company observed that the 
financial integrity of Retained Asset Accounts is provided primarily by the 
company’s own financial strength but also through state insurance guaranty 
associations.39 Like the banking industry, the insurance industry offers 
protection against the insolvency of an insurer. The insurance industry 
protection, however, is not a nationally uniform system like the FDIC is. 
This section describes some pertinent issues of the so-called State 
Sponsored Guaranty Associations. This issue important because Retained 
                                                                                                                                      
34 Id.  
35 Peter G. Gallanis, President, Nat’l Org. of Life and Health Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 
Address at the American Bar Association’s Insurer Relationship and Run-off: The 
Next Level, Tort Trial & Insurance Practice Session: NOLHGA, the Life and 
Health Insurance Guaranty System and the Financial Crisis of 2008-2009, at 9 
(June 5, 2009), available at http://www.nolhga.com/resource/file/NOLHGA 
andFinancial Crisis.pdf. 
36 Id. at 10. 
37 Insured or Not Insured?, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://www.fdic.gov/ 
consumers/consumer/information/fdiciorn.html (last updated Apr. 11, 2011). 
38 Who is the FDIC?, supra note 28. 
39 Evans, supra note 3. 
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Asset Accounts are not insured by the FDIC and there is an open question 
about whether they are insured by SSGAs. 
  In a letter written by FDIC Chairman Sheila C. Bair to the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (“NAIC”), Ms. Bair 
expressly denied the fact that Retained Asset Accounts were insured by the 
FDIC.40 The letter indicated that the only way Retained Asset Accounts 
could be insured by the FDIC is if the insurance company is holding the 
funds as a Fiduciary to the policyholders and beneficiaries.41 In Clark v. 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., the plaintiff filed a claim against Met Life for 
breach of fiduciary duty.42 The claim was summarily dismissed when Met 
Life submitted a motion to dismiss on the issue indicating that the 
insurance company is not acting as a fiduciary in maintaining RAAs for 
beneficiaries.43  
The National Organization of Life & Health Insurance Guaranty 
Associations (“NOLHGA”) and State Sponsored Guaranty Associations, 
on the other hand, have been providing “security” for RAAs since 1983.44 
NOLHGA is “a voluntary association made up of the life and health 
insurance guaranty associations of all 50 states, the District of Colombia 
and Puerto Rico.”45 
 State Sponsored Guaranty Associations “were created to protect 
state residents who are policyholders and beneficiaries of policies issued by 
a life or health insurance company that has gone out of business.”46 Most 
insurance companies licensed to write life and health insurance or annuities 
in a given state are required to be members of the state’s SSGA.47 Should 
one of these companies fail, the SSGA issues an assessment for funds to 
continue the coverage promised by the failing insurance company subject 
                                                                                                                                      
40 Retained Asset Accounts and FDIC Deposit Insurance Coverage, FED. 
DESPOSIT INS. CORP. http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2010/fil10048.html 
(last updated Aug. 11, 2010). 
41 Id. 
42 Clark v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. 3:08-cv-00158-LRH-VPC, 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 95097, at *19 (D. Nev. Sept. 10, 2010).  
43 Id. 
44 Facts & Figures, NAT’L ORG. OF LIFE AND HEALTH INS. GUAR. ASS’NS, 
http://www.nolhga.com/factsandfigures/main.cfm (last visited Jan. 21, 2011).  
45 Id. 
46 Policy Holder Information: Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L ORG. OF 
LIFE AND HEALTH INS. GUAR. ASS’NS, http://www.nolhga.com/policyholderinfo/ 
main.cfm/location/questions (last visited Jan. 21, 2011). 
47 Gallanis, supra note 35, at 3. 
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to the limits of the SSGA.48 Unlike the FDIC, State Sponsored Guaranty 
Associations do not collect funds on the national level; instead they are 
collected only in the state of the failing insurance company and collections 
are based upon the market share of insurance companies from the previous 
year.49 This has led some commentators to raise concerns about the 
sufficiency of the funds if some of the larger suppliers of life insurance 
were to fail.50 
 Each SSGA “is authorized by its enabling statute to assess and 
collect, from insurance companies writing covered lines of business in the 
state (the Guarantee Association’s ‘member insurers’), the amount needed 
to satisfy the Guaranty Association’s obligations to policyholders.”51 Due 
to funding constraints, the limits of the SSGA may be lower than the limits 
of the failed insurer’s contract.52 The fact that the SSGA limits to the 
amount of coverage they will continue is not unlike the fact that the FDIC 
limits the return to a failed bank depositor. However, unlike the coverage 
provided by the FDIC, there is no national standard for SSGA coverage. 
SSGA coverage limits are established by state law and vary from state to 
state.53 In the area of life-health insurance, most states provide at least the 
following coverage:  
 
$300,000 in life insurance death benefits  
$100,000 in cash surrender or withdrawal values for life 
insurance  
$100,000 in withdrawal and cash values for annuities  
$100,000 in health insurance policy benefits54 
                                                                                                                                      
48 Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, STATE SOLVENCY 
REGULATION OF PROPERTY-CASUALTY AND LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES 68 (Dec. 
1992). 
49 National Organization of Life and Health Insurance Guaranty Associations, 
INVESTOPEDIA.COM, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/nolhga.asp (last visited 
Jan. 21, 2011).  
50 Id. 
51  Gallanis, supra note 35, at 9. 
52 Id.  
53 The National Organization of Life and Health Insurance Guaranty 
Associations and The National Conference of Insurance Guaranty Funds, Joint 
Comments of NOLHGA and NCIGF in Response to FIO’s Request for Public 
Input, http://www.nolhga.com/pressroom/articles/NOLHGA-NCIGF%20FIO%20 
SUBMISSION.PDF. 
54 Policy Holder Information, supra note 46; AMERICAN COUNSEL OF LIFE 
INSURERS, supra note 12. 
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In the event that an insurer is judged by regulators to be insolvent, 
the legal process of liquidation begins. The liquidation process allows the 
sale of the firms’ assets and the use of the funds raised to pay liabilities. If 
and when the funds are not sufficient to pay liabilities, the SSGA supplies 
necessary funds from assessments on in-state insurers.55 The SSGA 
member companies are obligated to pay the assessments, however the 
assessments, which are generally allocated based on the firm’s market 
share from the previous year within the state and are generally limited to a 
maximum of 2% of collected premiums in the prior year.56 With the 
exception of New York State, SSGAs do not have an FDIC style “war 
chest” available ready to pay claims before a company fails.57 The SSGA’s 
funding comes from assessments that are collected only when are needed. 
In other words funds are only collected after a failure occurs and income 
from the sale of firm assets is depleted.58 The FDIC needs the war chest 
because bank accounts and checking accounts are “demand obligations” 
whereas life insurance and annuity products are generally promises to pay 
in the future.59 Given that RAAs are modeled after standard bank accounts, 
it stands to reason that SSGAs should have a war chest to cover on demand 
obligations from holders of RAAs. 
Like bank depositors, in order to recover the difference in coverage 
limits and contractual benefits, the policyholder would have to file suit 
against the estate of the failed insurance company and get in line behind all 
other creditors to receive a potential payout when the failed company’s 
                                                                                                                                      
55 State Laws and Provisions Report, NAT’L ORG. OF LIFE AND HEALTH INS. 
GUAR. ASS’NS, http://www.nolhga.com/policyholderinfo/main.cfm/location/ 
questions (last updated Dec. 31, 2011). 
56 Id. (Rhode Island maxes out at 3% and North and South Carolina max out at 
4%); Joint Comments of NOLHGA and NCIGF in Response to FIO’s Request for 
Public Input, NAT’L ORG. OF LIFE AND HEALTH INS. GUAR. ASS’NS, 
http://www.nolhga.com/pressroom/articles/NOLHGA-
NCIGF%20FIO%20SUBMISSION.PDF. 
57  Gallanis, supra note 35, at 9. 
58 Id. 
59 Id.; see also Evans, supra note 3 (If one insurer is unable to meet its 
obligations, people could lose faith and demand payment from other companies 
triggering a panic similar to a bank run. The purpose of the FDIC was to put an end 
to bank runs, allowing insurance companies to act like this with Retained Asset 
Accounts could set the economy up for another failure due to an inability of 
insurance companies to meet their payment obligations should people lose faith in 
the system and demand immediate payment on their “accounts.”). 
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assets are liquidated.60 The likelihood of any significant recovery by a 
policyholder or beneficiary in this situation is very small.  
 
3. The Financial Strength of the Insurance Company 
 
As previously discussed, Retained Asset Accounts are not FDIC 
insured. Instead, the primary “insurance” for RAAs is the financial strength 
of the insurance company.61 In light of recent economic events, including 
the scandals involving Enron, WorldCom, AIG, and Lehman Brothers 
among others, corporate assurances of financial might does little to instill 
confidence in beneficiaries.62  
 Perhaps the most well known example of why CEOs and corporate 
executives are not trusted by investors and the general public is the failure 
of Enron. Once a tremendous economic success, Enron’s misrepresentation 
of its finances almost singlehandedly led to a nationwide recession. 
Between 1997 and 2001 Enron claimed substantial growth in annual 
profits.63 Media outlets and financial analysts applauded Enron for its 
success only to learn later that it was all a sham.64 In the end, even Enron 
had to admit that “[f]inancial statements for [1997 through the first two 
quarters of 2001] and the audit reports relating to the year-end financial 
statements for 1997 through 2000 should not be relied upon.”65  
Unfortunately analysts and investors did not hesitate to consider 
the complexity of Enron’s financial statements before investing and they 
paid dearly for the trust they put in the public statements of Enron’s Chief 
Officers.66  
After Enron collapsed, WorldCom pushed the economy down 
further with its own series of questionable accounting decisions. Between 
1999 and 2002 WorldCom used “shady accounting methods” to make its 
                                                                                                                                      
60 Gallanis, supra note 35, at 2. 
61 Id. 
62 See Penelope Patsuris, The Corporate Scandal Sheet, FORBES (Aug. 26, 
2002), http://www.forbes.com/2002/07/25/accountingtracker.html (for an in-depth 
look at the corporate scandals of the late 1990s and early 2000s). 
63 Dan Ackman, Enron Says, ‘Oops’, FORBES (Nov. 9, 2001), 
http://www.forbes.com/2001/11/09/1109topnews.html. 
64 Howard Kurtz, The Enron Story That Waited to be Told, WASH. POST (Jan. 
18, 2002), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A64769-2002Ja 
n17.html. 
65 Ackman, supra note 63. 
66 Kurtz, supra note 64. 
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books look better than they were.67 WorldCom accomplished this fraud in 
two ways. First, their accounting department “underreported ‘line costs’ 
(interconnection expenses with other telecommunication companies) by 
capitalizing these costs on the balance sheet rather than properly expensing 
them.”68 Second, WorldCom would inflate their revenues by using falsified 
accounting entries “from ‘corporate unallocated revenue accounts.’”69 On 
July 21, 2002, WorldCom filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in what would 
be the largest such bankruptcy filing in the history of the United States.70 In 
2003, it was “estimated that the company’s assets had been overstated by 
$11 billion.”71  
The failure of Enron, WorldCom and many others are examples of 
why Met Life’s assurances that their policies are insured by the financial 
strength of the company are not going to reassure investors and 
beneficiaries.72 While these assurances may have meant something to 
investors in the early 1990s, because of the misstatements by others, these 
statements no longer hold water with investors and beneficiaries. This may 
be unfair, but it is true none-the-less. Because of this, insurance companies 
need to do more to inform beneficiaries about their products, specifically 
about RAAs. 
In 1990, the House Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations 
and the House Committee on Energy & Commerce investigated and 
reported on the current status of the regulation of insurance companies and 
on the financial condition of the insurance industry.73 The report is known 
as the Dingell Report: Failed Promises. The House Committee indicated in 
this report that financial failures in insurance companies come with 
                                                                                                                                      
67 WorldCom Scandal: A Look Back at One of the Biggest Corporate Scandals 
in U.S. History, YAHOO ASSOCIATED CONTENT, 
http://www.associatedcontent.com/ 
article/162656/worldcom_scandal_a_look_back_at_one.html (last visited Jan. 21, 
2011). 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id.; Luisa Beltran, WorldCom Files Largest Bankruptcy Ever: Nation’s No. 
2 Long-Distance Company in Chapter 11 – Largest with $107 Billion in Assets, 
CNN MONEY (July 22, 2002), http://money.cnn.com/2002/07/19/news/ 
worldcom_bankruptcy/. 
71  WorldCom Scandal: A Look Back at One of the Biggest Corporate 
Scandals, supra at note 67. 
72 Evans, supra note 3. 
73 Id.  
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consistent elements.74 These elements are: “rapid expansion, over-reliance 
on managing general agents, extensive and complex reinsurance 
arrangements, excessive under-pricing, reserve problems, false reports, 
reckless management, gross incompetence, fraudulent activity, greed, and 
self dealing.”75 According to the report, the following list contains the 
primary causes of insurer insolvencies: 
 
1. Inefficient, reckless, and deplorable middle and upper 
management, including personnel deficiencies; 
2. Gross incompetence/bad business judgment; 
3. Rapid and/or over expansion and diversification; 
4. Over-reliance upon and a failure to monitor and 
supervise Managing General Agents (MGAs), 
including the improper delegation of responsibilities; 
5. Expensive and complex reinsurance arrangements, 
including the problem of uncollectible reinsurance; 
6. Excessive underpricing and inadequate pricing 
schemes; 
7. Poor investment policies; 
8. Inadequate reserve problems; 
9. False financial reporting and fraudulent activity; 
10. Greed and self-dealing; 
11. Under-capitalization; and 
12. Inadequate regulation by state regulators and/or 
independent public accounting firms, including the 
failure to identify and correct the insurer's problems.76 
 
These issues consistently resulted in over-leveraged insurance companies 
that filed unclear or misleading statements of financial condition.77 The 
                                                                                                                                      
74 Steven W. Schwabb et al., Caught Between Rocks and Hard Places: The 
Plight of Reinsurance Intermediaries Under U.S. and English Law, 16 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 485, 489 (1995); STAFF OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT & 
INVESTIGATIONS, HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 101st Cong., 2d 
Sess., FAILED PROMISES: INSURANCE COMPANY INSOLVENCIES 2 (Comm. Print 
1990) [hereinafter COMMITTEE REPORT]. 
75 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 74, at 2. 
76 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 74, at Opening remarks of Chairman Rep. 
John D. Dingell (D. MI.); David W. Evans & Paul S. Cohen, Professional Liability 
Targets in Cases of Insolvency: Directors and Officers, and Accountants, 580 
PLI/Comm 157, 161-65 (1991). 
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Dingell Report also “cited the states' failure to regulate the reinsurance 
market as another significant cause of insolvencies.”78 Specifically, the 
Dingell Report suggested that due to an absence of adequate supervision by 
state regulators, insurance companies maintained very low capital levels 
that could be manipulated as needed to continue operations.79   
In addition to the Dingell Report, the Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Affairs investigated the regulation of life insurance 
companies in 1992 and similarly found that capital reserves held by life 
insurance companies were not adequate given the level of business they 
were conducting during the period.80 The Advisory Commission’s report 
also notes that because insurance companies are able to predict their payout 
schedule with greater accuracy for life insurance policies than for other 
types of insurance, such as property-casualty insurance, life insurance 
companies are able to make more long term and speculative investments.81  
Given the findings in the Dingell Report, the findings of the 
Advisory Commission, and the recent financial scandals at prominent 
companies such as Enron, WorldCom and AIG, it would be unwise to trust 
that the financial strength of an insurance company will insure Retained 
Asset Accounts against loss. Because of the criticisms discussed above, 
significant changes to policy disclosures should be made so that 
policyholders and beneficiaries are more aware of the pros and cons of 
holding funds in a Retained Asset Account. 
 
III. DISCLOSURE 
 
The issue with RAAs is not necessarily whether the “accounts” are 
actually insured by the FDIC but the perception that life insurance 
companies have not adequately disclosed the fact that these so called 
accounts are not insured by the FDIC.  While State Sponsored Guaranty 
                                                                                                                                      
77 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 74, at Opening remarks of Chairman Rep. 
John D. Dingell (D. MI.). 
78 Id.; David W. Evans & Paul S. Cohen, Professional Liability Targets in 
Cases of Insolvency: Directors and Officers, and Accountants, 580 PLI/Comm 
157, 161-65 (1991). 
79 John L. Ingersoll et al., Federal Regulation of Insurance: The Industry’s 
Response to H.R. 4900 and H.R. 1290, 23 SPG Brief 10, 11-12 (1994). 
80 ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS: STATE 
SOLVENCY REGULATION OF PROPERTY-CASUALTY AND LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANIES 53 (Dec. 1992). 
81 Id. 
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Associations often provide coverage of $300,000 per life,82 if an insurance 
company fails, there is both a question of whether the SSGA provides 
coverage for RAAs and the fact that some individuals are entitled to more 
than the amount provided by SSGAs and they will be forced to either take 
the loss or file suit against the failing insurance company in the hope that 
there will be enough money left over from liquidation to allow them to 
recover.83  
The potential for beneficiaries such as the surviving spouse of a 
member of the Armed Forces to incur unanticipated losses or file suit 
against failed insurance companies are not ideal options for the beneficiary 
or the insurance industry. This is why adequate disclosure is necessary. 
With adequate disclosure beneficiaries are better able to appropriately 
assess the risks and rewards of the Retained Asset Account versus taking 
payment from the insurer and placing their money in a different and 
perhaps more secure investment such as a savings account, money market 
account or United States Treasury Bonds. Without appropriate disclosure 
individuals will not have sufficient information to make intelligent 
investment decisions. 
Journalistic efforts suggest that insurance companies have 
presented Retained Asset Accounts to policy holders and beneficiaries as 
though they are Money Market Accounts or in the alternative as though 
they are accounts similar to bank accounts in that each beneficiary has their 
own account with their name on it where their money is deposited.84 In 
Clark v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., the issue of how Retained Asset 
Accounts are presented as though they are Money Market savings accounts 
was mentioned, but not thoroughly discussed.85  
In their disclosure statements, Met Life’s RAA is presented as the 
“Total Control Account Money Market Option.”86 In a recent suit over 
RAAs against Met Life, the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada 
                                                                                                                                      
82 Facts & Figures, supra note 44. 
83 Policy Holder Information, supra note 46. 
84 See Clark v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. 3:08-cv-00158-LRH-VPC, 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 95097, at *2-14 (D. Nev. Sept. 10, 2010) (Met Life Retained Asset 
Accounts are formed when policy disbursements exceed $5,000. The funds are 
placed in an account named the “Total Control Account Money Market Option” 
(TCA for short). The account name was found to be “inherently deceptive” due to 
its implication that the funds were in a Money Market Account or its equivalent 
and that they were FDIC insured.).  
85 Id. at *12-13. 
86 Id. 
550 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL Vol. 18.2 
found Met Life’s use of the term Money Market “inherently deceptive.”87 
The Court noted that using the term “Money Market” in their RAA 
description created the impression that the beneficiary would receive their 
own Money Market Account and that that account would be insured by the 
FDIC.88 Although the court noted that the disclosure statement was 
“inherently deceptive,” the court granted Met Life’s motion for summary 
judgment because the beneficiary was unable to demonstrate suffering any 
harm from Met Life’s breach.89 The court limited its finding to the fact that 
because Met Life has not failed (been deemed insolvent by the SSGA), and 
thus the beneficiary had not lost any money, there was no recovery to be 
had.90 While it did not decide the issue of RAA disclosure, it did lay the 
foundation for how courts will discuss Retained Asset Accounts in 
subsequent cases. If Met Life and other insurance companies continue to 
characterize RAAs as “money market” accounts, that name will likely be 
considered “inherently deceptive” by courts and in the event of a failure 
will likely result in a damage award. To avoid such a situation, it is in the 
best interest of insurance companies to correct the flaws in their disclosure 
statements that lead to criticisms of the true nature of their Retained Asset 
Accounts. 
Clark appears to have been a wakeup call for Met Life. Starting in 
July 2010, twenty-five years after Met Life began using Retained Asset 
Accounts, the customer agreement signed by the policy holder disclosed 
that Retained Asset Accounts will, at least initially, hold funds for their 
beneficiaries and that Retained Asset Accounts are not the same as the 
money market accounts one might hold at a local bank. The section goes on 
to inform the policy holder that the Retained Asset Account that will be 
designated for the payout of their benefits will not be insured by the FDIC 
in any capacity.91  
While MetLife’s actions are certainly a step in the right direction, 
they are not the only life insurance company using these accounts. Every 
company in the industry can be tainted by the behavior of a few. As such, 
more needs to be done in regulating proper disclosure this area of the 
insurance industry in order to make sure there are proper safeguards against 
collapse and to educate “account” holders on what they are really getting 
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90 Clark, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95097, at *12-13. 
91 Evans, supra note 3. 
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when and insurance company informs them that the proceeds from their 
policy will be paid through a Retained Asset Account.  
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
Retained Asset Accounts have been subject to significant criticism 
by the mainstream media, however their criticisms do not tell the whole 
story. While insurance companies have failed to make adequate disclosure 
regarding the nature of Retained Asset Accounts, the accounts do provide 
several benefits to both beneficiaries and the insurance company. It has 
been noted that Retained Asset Accounts are not traditional savings 
accounts, checking accounts, CDs, or money market accounts, but they are 
similar financial vehicles. The mainstream media has criticized RAAs 
because of the misperception that the insurance company is making this 
money off of benefits that were supposed to have been paid out to 
beneficiaries. While it is true that the benefits were supposed to be 
distributed to beneficiaries, RAAs pay competitive interest rates and 
provide beneficiaries with time to decide what to do with the funds 
distributed to the by the insurance company.  
Instead of paying out benefits in the lump sum, life insurance 
companies have been sending draft books that allow beneficiaries to draw 
against the balance of the Retained Asset Account. While this does not 
immediately raise any concerns, the way insurance companies have 
disclosed the nature of RAAs is a serious issue. The RAA disclosure 
statements have not clearly identified what a Retained Asset Account is, 
how it is insured, the interest rate paid and how it differs from a 
conventional checking, savings or money market account. While to date the 
only harm that has come from these accounts is psychological and 
emotional, in the event of another financial downturn or simply the failure 
of a large insurance company, the threat of harm is great. Because of this, it 
would be wise for insurance companies to adequately disclose the various 
benefit payment options and to adequately describe these options, 
specifically Retained Asset Accounts, so that purchasers and beneficiaries 
understand what type of security they hold.  
Although NOLHGA and the insurance industry discuss State 
Sponsored Guaranty Associations as an equal to FDIC insurance, this is not 
an accurate representation of the SSGA system. SSGAs do not provide the 
same type of coverage as the FDIC, nor do they have the same amount of 
money available to them at a moment’s notice. SSGAs rely on 
contributions from non-failing insurance companies at the time of failure to 
support an insurance company’s obligations while the FDIC relies on a 
552 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL Vol. 18.2 
“war chest” made up of annual payments from banks into a central account 
to support its activities.92  
Although the public statements of executives at insurance 
companies like Met Life indicate that SSGAs are a secondary insurance 
policy behind the financial might of the insurance company. The leaders of 
similarly situated companies such as Enron, Tyco, AIG, Lehman Brothers, 
and WorldCom, among others made the same statements regarding the 
investment quality of their securities. Each of these companies failed to live 
up to the promises made by their CEO. In the current economic climate, 
statements by the CEO regarding the financial strength of a company are 
taken with a grain of salt. 
Insurance providers should be required to disclose exactly how 
they are planning to pay benefits in the event that they receive a valid claim 
on a policy. If they agree to pay a lump sum, they should describe how the 
lump sum will be paid, whether it is in a single check or through the use of 
a Retained Asset Account. This means that insurance companies must 
inform both the policy purchaser and eventually the beneficiary how their 
funds will be distributed at the outset of the insurer/insured relationship, 
rather than waiting until after a claim is made and benefits are paid out. 
Describing the payment options in detail will help policy holders 
understand what they are purchasing as well as improve the image of the 
insurance company as there will be no surprises when a beneficiary 
receives pseudo-checks when they were expecting a single lump-sum 
payment.  
Only through adequate disclosure can potential harms resulting 
from insolvency in the insurance industry be avoided. Proper disclosure 
should accompany every life insurance contract so that policyholders and 
beneficiaries understand what they are entitled to should a claim be filed. 
By providing adequate disclosure, beneficiaries will be able to evaluate 
whether they want to keep a Retained Asset Account or transfer the funds 
to a safer investment vehicle. In addition, adequate disclosure will lessen 
bad press against insurance companies because they will have explained 
exactly what is being distributed to beneficiaries from the outset. Because 
of this, insurance companies should strive to provide adequate disclosure 
regarding Retained Asset Accounts. 
                                                                                                                                      
92 Gallanis, supra note 35, at 9. 
2012 RETAINED ASSET ACCOUNTS 553 
 
 
APPENDIX 
 
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION 
 
 The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) is an 
independent corporation that insures deposits in banks and thrift institutions 
against failure.93 The FDIC was created as part of the Glass-Steagall Act of 
1933 in response to the over nine thousand bank failures during the great 
depression.94 The FDIC has successfully carried out its business without 
losing a single dollar of insured funds for over 75 years.95  
 The FDIC insures deposit accounts for up to two hundred fifty 
thousand dollars ($250,000) per individual, per bank.96 The FDIC does 
more than insure a single individual for $250,000 worth of deposits. It 
insures a single individual for $250,000 in each FDIC insured bank that 
they maintain an account at. That means that an individual could put $1 
million in a single FDIC insured bank and be covered for only $250,000 of 
that sum or that same individual could spread that $1 million into 4 or more 
FDIC insured banks and be insured for the entire $1 million sum. The 
FDIC does have ways to receive more than $250,000 worth of coverage at 
one bank provided certain criteria are met, such as having accounts in 
different asset categories.97  
 There are four main categories of assets, a single account, joint 
account, IRA and retirement accounts and revocable trusts. The FDIC 
explains the process by which their coverage works for each of these assets 
as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                      
93 Who is the FDIC?, supra note 28. 
94 Stammers, supra note 29. 
95 Who is the FDIC?, supra note 28; Stammers, supra note 29. 
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Example 1: Single Account (owned by one person): $250,000 per owner.98 
 
Example of Insurance Coverage for Single Accounts
Depositor Type of Deposit Amount Deposited
Jane Smith Savings account $25,000 
Jane Smith Certificate of Deposit $250,000 
Jane Smith NOW account $50,000 
Jane Smith's sole 
proprietorship 
Checking 
account $50,000 
Total Deposited $375,000 
Insurance Available $250,000 
Uninsured Amount $125,000 
 
Example 2: Joint Accounts (two or more persons): $250,000 per co-
owner. “[Assume] John and Mary have three joint accounts totaling 
$600,000 at an insured bank. Under FDIC rules, each co-owner’s share of 
each joint account is considered equal unless otherwise stated in the bank’s 
records. John and Mary each own $300,000 in the joint account category, 
putting a total of $100,000 ($50,000 for each) over the insurance limit.”99 
 
Joint Account Example
Account Title Type of Deposit Account Balance 
Mary and John Smith Checking $50,000 
John or Mary Smith Savings $150,000 
Mary Smith or John 
Smith CD $400,000 
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Total Deposits $600,000 
Insurance coverage for each owner is calculated as follows: 
Account 
Holders 
Ownership 
Share 
Amount 
Insured 
Amount 
Uninsured 
John $300,000 $250,000 $50,000 
Mary $300,000 $250,000 $50,000 
Total $600,000 $500,000 $100,000 
 
In this example, both John and Mary have ownership shares in the 
accounts of $300,000 [in other words, each one of them has ownership of 
one half of the checking account ($25,000), one half of the savings account 
($75,000), and one half of the CD ($200,000), for a total of $300,000]. As 
discussed above, because each individual is insured for up to $250,000 per 
bank, Mary’s coverage in the joint ownership category is limited to 
$250,000, and $50,000 is uninsured. The same is true for John, giving him 
$250,000 worth of coverage and leaving $50,000 uninsured.  
 
Example 3: IRAs and other certain retirement accounts: $250,000 per 
owner.100 
 
Example of Insurance Coverage for Self-Directed Retirement 
Accounts 
Account Title Account Balance
Bob Johnson's Roth IRA $110,000 
Bob Johnson's IRA $75,000 
Total $185,000
Amount Insured $185,000
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Example 4: Revocable trust accounts: “Each owner is insured up to 
$250,000 for the interests of each beneficiary, subject to specific 
limitations and requirements.”101 
 
Example — POD Accounts with Multiple Owners and 
Beneficiaries 
Account Title Account Balance 
Amount 
Insured 
Amount 
Uninsured 
Husband and 
Wife POD 3 
children 
$1,500,000 $1,500,000 $0 
Husband POD 
wife $250,000 $250,000 $0 
Wife POD 
husband $250,000 $250,000 $0 
Husband POD 
niece and 
nephew 
$500,000 $500,000 $0 
Husband and 
wife POD 
grandchild 
$600,000 $500,000 $100,000 
Total $3,100,000 $3,000,000 $100,000 
102  
 
The FDIC is funded through premiums paid by the banks and thrifts and 
from earnings on U.S. Treasury Securities.103 These premiums are paid 
regularly and go into what is described by some as a “war chest.”104 “To 
provide an effective banking safety net, it is necessary for the FDIC to 
replace cash (of the failed bank) with cash from the FDIC at the moment 
the bank fails.”105 The FDIC insures traditional bank accounts, savings, 
checking, trust, certificates of deposit (“CDs”), money market savings 
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accounts and IRA accounts.106 The FDIC does not, however, insure mutual 
funds, safe deposit boxes, annuities, stocks or bonds.107 Since its creation in 
1934, no depositor insured by the FDIC has lost even a single penny of 
insured funds as a result of a bank failure.108 To give an idea of how 
incredible this accomplishment is, the FDIC reports that since the year 
2000, 457 banks have failed.109 It is because of this success that the FDIC 
has gained such prominence and respect from individuals and businesses 
alike. 
 In addition to its role insuring deposits after a bank failure, the 
FDIC acts preemptively by “examining and supervising financial 
institutions for safety and soundness and consumer protection.”110 “The 
FDIC is a recognized leader in promoting sound public policies, addressing 
risks in the nation's financial system, and carrying out its insurance, 
supervisory, consumer protection, and receivership management 
responsibilities.”111 In carrying out its duties, the FDIC produces Annual 
Reports to the President of the United States and Congress, a Privacy 
Program, Strategic Plans about the FDIC’s short and long-term strategic 
goals and Financial Reports on its internal business.112 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 In her complaint, a plaintiff alleges that her insurer failed to settle 
her claim in a timely fashion when her house burned down. In order to 
prevail on her claim, she must allege that other people insured by the same 
company experienced the same misconduct. It seems likely that she is not 
the only one who has experienced a delay in settling a claim with this 
insurer, so in her complaint, she claims that, “upon information and belief”, 
other insureds have suffered the same misconduct. If her complaint is 
deemed factually insufficient upon a motion to strike, she has no 
opportunity to conduct discovery to prove that she is not the only one who 
suffered, and no opportunity to pursue her claim. If her complaint is found 

* J.D. Candidate, University of Connecticut School of Law, 2012; B.S., 
University of Connecticut, 2009.  I would like to thank Attorney Crystal Fraser, 
Attorney Mark Seiger, and Professor Alexandra Lahav for their invaluable 
assistance in writing this note, as well as my family and friends for their constant 
support and encouragement.  
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to be sufficient, however, the insurer will be subjected to a time-
consuming, expensive, and exhaustive discovery procedure, based on the 
plaintiff’s unsubstantiated allegations that other insureds suffered similar 
misconduct.  
 Pleading standards serve a critical function in our judicial system 
in that they set a threshold by which frivolous claims are stricken or 
dismissed, leaving room for meritorious claims to be tried in court.1 
Compliance with pleading standards is essential to prevail on a claim; 
without adequate pleadings, a claim essentially fails before the case ever 
begins. Inadequate pleadings are targets waiting to be stricken, and result in 
loss of opportunity to conduct discovery, the inability to present a case, and 
ultimately, no possibility of obtaining relief.2   
 The standards for pleading a claim in federal and Connecticut state 
courts are set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure3 and in 
Connecticut’s Trial Rules.4  In Connecticut, the courts require the plaintiff 
to set forth a concise statement of material facts in support of their 
allegations.5 However, the standards for pleading a claim of unfair 
settlement practices against an insurer have recently become a subject for 
debate, causing a split amongst Connecticut trial courts. Some courts 
believe that pleadings should be construed liberally, giving the plaintiff the 
benefit of doubt over the insurer.6 Others adhere to strict construction of 
pleading standards, suggesting that there should not be an exception to the 
state’s fact pleading rule for insurance claims.7 This note analyzes the 
standards for pleading a claim under the Connecticut Unfair Insurance 

1 Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 48-49 (2010) (discussing the 
district court judge’s role in filtering cases based on pleadings and motions to 
dismiss and the uncertainty of separating frivolous and meritorious claims).   
2 Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1294-95 
(2010). 
3 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a).   
4 CONN. PRAC. BOOK § 10-1. 
5 Id.  
6 See, e.g., Blakeslee Arpaia Chapman, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., No. 
520348, 1994 WL 76383, at *10 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 4, 1994) (interpreting a 
CUIPA claim liberally under CUTPA because the statutes are remedial in nature).   
7 See, e.g., Tomonto v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., No. CV044001543, 2006 WL 
2053723, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 7, 2006) (“This is a fact pleading 
jurisdiction. Practice Book § 10-1 states, in part: ‘Each pleading shall contain a 
plain and concise statement of the material facts on which the pleader relies . . . .’”) 
(citing CONN. PRAC. BOOK § 10-1). 
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Practices Act, and will suggest that there is no adequate reason to suspend 
Connecticut’s fact pleading standard for this singular area of law.  
 
II. PLEADING STANDARDS IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS
  
Until recently, claims for relief in federal court were governed by 
the notice pleading approach, wherein the claimant is only required to 
provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader 
is entitled to relief.”8 The goal of notice pleading is to “give the defendant 
fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it 
rests.”9 Under a notice pleading standard, if a claim for relief is sufficient to 
put the defendant on notice of the claim against him, it will survive a 
motion to strike, with factual discovery occurring later in the pretrial 
process.10  
Notice pleading was adopted because, in many cases, the defendant 
is in control of information that is relevant to the plaintiff’s claim, as they 
have the knowledge and evidence the plaintiff is seeking to prove their 
case.11 Notice pleading balances out this advantage by giving the plaintiff 
the benefit of the doubt that they have a legitimate claim, and by not 
requiring the plaintiff to cite facts that they cannot be expected to know at 
an early stage of litigation.12 However, the lower the pleading standard, the 
higher the economic cost, as vague and unsubstantiated pleadings may 
permit plaintiffs to conduct extensive and costly discovery inquiries into 
the defendant’s affairs.13
In 2007, the United States Supreme Court reconsidered the federal 
notice pleading standard in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, a consumer 
antitrust action against telephone and telecommunications providers 
alleging a conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act.14 The Twombly 

8 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). The United States Supreme Court adopted the notice 
pleading standard in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). 
9 Conley, 355 U.S. at 47. 
10 Miller, supra note 1, at 4. 
11 Paul Stancil, Balancing the Pleading Equation, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 90, 114-
15 (2009).   
12 Id.  
13 Id. at 116 (“In particular, the lower the pleading standard, the greater the 
potential disparity between defendant's and plaintiff's costs for several claim types . 
. . because the range of permissible inquiry into defendant's affairs increases as 
pleading specificity requirements decrease, especially for claims in which the 
plaintiff's own conduct is of little moment.”).   
14 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 550, 553 (2007).   
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Court adopted a slightly higher standard than notice pleading, holding that 
enough facts must be stated to make a claim for relief “plausible” on its 
face.15 In 2009, the Supreme Court again leaned away from the notice 
pleading standard in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, which relied on and enforced the 
plausibility pleading requirement set forth in Twombly.16 The Iqbal Court 
dismissed a civil rights complaint filed by a Pakistani man who was 
detained after the September 11 attacks.17 Mirroring the language in 
Twombly, the Iqbal Court stated that discriminatory animus on the part of 
the federal officials was “not a plausible conclusion” based on the facts 
pled.18 This newly-formed federal pleading standard has become known as 
“plausibility pleading”; a standard that imposes a higher burden on 
plaintiffs, requiring just slightly more facts be pled in comparison to the 
notice pleading standard.19 The holdings in Twombly and Iqbal regarding 
pleading standards are significant in that they indicate a moving away from 
the explicit focus on giving notice.20 However, this movement is modest, as 
the Court has stated that “plausibility” should not be interpreted as a 
demanding standard.21
In contrast to the standards for pleading a claim in federal court, 
Connecticut takes a fact pleading approach, requiring that “[e]ach pleading 
shall contain a plain and concise statement of the material facts on which 
the pleader relies, but not of the evidence by which they are to be proved . . 
. .”22 By focusing on a plain statement of specific facts, courts avoid 
subjecting defendants to frivolous litigation and the overall cost of 
operating the judicial system is reduced, as fewer claims survive this strict 
pleading standard.23 However, some claims that appear frivolous due to 
lack of factual pleading might be dismissed, despite the potentially valid 
claims they assert.24   

15 Id. at 570.   
16 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1952 (2009).  
17 Id. at 1950-51. 
18 Id. at 1952. 
19 Steinman, supra note 2, at 1310. 
20 Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court 
Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 883 (2009); Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.  
21 Bone, supra note 20, at 883-84 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544, 570 (2007)).  
22 CONN. PRAC. BOOK § 10-1.   
23 Stancil, supra note 11, at 148-49. 
24 Id. at 149.  
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The main purpose of more lenient pleading standards is simply to 
make a party aware of the claims against them.25 The requirements set forth 
by notice and plausibility pleading standards are easy enough to satisfy, 
which helps to ensure that a litigant gets his or her day in court.26 Despite 
the long-standing history of lenient pleading standards in federal courts, 
many state courts find it preferable to take a fact pleading approach, 
including Connecticut.27 Attorneys handling full workloads of civil 
litigation cases find that fact pleading standards make their cases “more 
focused, and ultimately less expensive and less time-consuming” than if a 
more lenient pleading approach was followed.28 The adoption and practice 
of fact pleading in Connecticut is therefore not arbitrary or accidental, but 
serves to benefit the judicial system by conserving resources and 
expediting meritorious cases.  
 
III. PLEADING A CUIPA CLAIM 
  
The Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices Act (CUIPA) was 
derived from the National Association of Insurance Commissioner's Model 
Act, which has been adopted by most states.29 CUIPA was adopted to 
prohibit persons from engaging in unfair or deceptive behavior in the 
practice of insurance within the state of Connecticut.30 The statute 
specifically lists sixteen prohibited practices, including misrepresenting the 
benefits of a policy, disseminating false information to the public, and 
engaging in unfair claim settlement practices,31 the last of which is the 

25 Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 
987, 990 (2003).   
26 Id.   
27 U. OF DENV. INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE LEGAL SYS., Fact-Based 
Pleading: A Solution Hidden in Plain Sight, 1 (May 2010), 
http://iaals.du.edu/news-room/fact-based-pleading-a-solution-hidden-in-plain-sight 
(follow “Read More” link) (“While fact-based pleading has not been a part of the 
federal civil process since the 1930s, it remains alive and well in many of the 
country’s biggest and busiest state courts, including California, New York, 
Pennsylvania, Florida, Texas, Missouri, Virginia, Illinois, New Jersey, Connecticut 
and Louisiana. These are courts that collectively handle millions of civil cases 
every year.”). 
28 Id.   
29 Chapell v. LaRosa, No. CV990552801, 2001 WL 58057, at *5 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Jan. 5, 2001).  
30 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-815 (2012).  
31 Id. § 38a-816.  
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violation this paper will focus on. The list of prohibited acts is followed by 
a blanket prohibition on any unlisted, unfair insurance practices.32   
CUIPA claims are handled by the Connecticut Insurance 
Department, and the Act gives the Commissioner of Insurance broad 
discretion to investigate potential unfair practices and enforce its 
provisions.33 Once a CUIPA claim is properly pled, therefore, it is at the 
discretion of the Commissioner to determine whether the alleged practice 
should be investigated, and to request and view any pertinent information. 
The Act also established an administrative procedure through which the 
Commissioner of Insurance can take action and impose sanctions against 
an insurer found to be in violation of its provisions.34
If a plaintiff has experienced unfair insurance claim settlement 
practices, bringing a claim under CUIPA is not the only opportunity for 
redress. Every contract is accompanied by an implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing.35 When an insurer withholds payment of a valid 
insurance claim in bad faith, in violation of an insurance contract, they 
subject themselves to liability in tort.36 A plaintiff can bring a claim of 
common law bad faith sounding in tort, and will succeed if they can prove 
that the insurer committed an unfair practice with a dishonest purpose or ill 
will.37 The payoff to the plaintiff who succeeds in their common law bad 
faith claim will not be substantial, however, as punitive damages under 

32 Id. § 38a-818 (permitting charges “[w]henever the commissioner has reason 
to believe that any person engaged in the business of insurance is engaging in this 
state in any method of competition or in any act or practice in the conduct of such 
business which is not defined in section 38a-816 . . . .”). 
33 Martin v. Am. Equity Ins. Co., 185 F. Supp. 2d 162, 166 (D. Conn. 2002).  
34 Elizabeth J. Stewart, Environmental Insurance Coverage Disputes in 
Connecticut, 70 CONN. B.J. 280, 306 (1996).  
35 Hoskins v. Titan Value Equities Grp. Inc., 749 A.2d 1144, 1146-47 (Conn. 
2000). 
36 Wiacek v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., Inc., No. 329601, 1998 WL 161378, at 
*2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 31, 1998). 
37 Buckman v. People Exp., Inc., 530 A.2d 596, 599 (Conn. 1987); see also 
Chapman v. Norfolk & Dedham Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 665 A.2d 112, 120 (Conn. 
1995) (“[I]n order to receive punitive damages under CUTPA, the plaintiffs were 
required to produce evidence that the defendants' actions had a reckless 
indifference to the rights of others or that the defendants had engaged in an 
intentional and wanton violation of those rights.”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).   
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Connecticut common law are limited to the amount of attorney’s fees.38 
Bringing an action under CUIPA is therefore significantly more attractive 
to those who have been subjected to unfair settlement practices than a 
claim sounding in tort, as a successful CUIPA claim could potentially 
award the plaintiff actual damages, attorney’s fees, and punitive damages.39 

A. DOES CUIPA PROVIDE A PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION? 
 
Since its inception, individuals have turned to CUIPA to seek 
redress from insurers for treating claimants unfairly during the claim 
settlement process.  However, individuals cannot succeed on such claims, 
as the Second Circuit has held that there is no such private cause of action 
under CUIPA.40 The Connecticut Supreme Court has not addressed this 
issue, and the lower courts are split as to whether CUIPA provides a private 
cause of action.41 A minority of courts rule that a private right of action 
does exist,42 but the majority opinion is that there is no private right of 
action under CUIPA.43 For the purposes of this paper, the majority position 
will be adopted, and it will be assumed that there is no private right of 
action under CUIPA.   

38 Charles T. Lee, Insurance Coverage Litigation in Connecticut: Is There a 
Level Playing Field in the “Insurance State”?, 74 CONN. B.J. 362, 379 (2000). 
39 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-110g (2012). “[U]nder a combination of the 
Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices Act . . . and the Connecticut Unfair Trade 
Practices Act, . . . insureds may recover substantial punitive damages, if they can 
show a defendant engaged in a general business practice of unfair or deceptive 
settlement conduct.” Lee, supra note 38, at 379.  
40 Lander v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 251 F.3d 101, 118 (2d Cir. 
2001). 
41 W. World Ins. Co. v. Architectural Builders of Westport, LLC, 520 F. Supp. 
2d 408, 411 (D. Conn. 2007).  
42 See, e.g., George's Auto Parts, Inc. v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., No. 
CV000439407, 2001 WL 206081 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 8, 2001); Edelman v. Pac. 
Emp’r Ins. Co., No. CV 93 0533463, 1994 WL 590632 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 20, 
1994). 
43 See, e.g., Am. Progressive Life & Health Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Better Benefits, 
LLC, 7591S, 2001 WL 1178596, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 30, 2001); Chieffo 
v. Yannielli, No. CV000159940, 2001 WL 950286, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 
10, 2001); Joseph v. Hannan Agency Inc., No. 323310, 1997 WL 15424, at *1 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 9, 1997); Stabile v. S. Conn. Hosp. Sys., Inc., No. 326120, 
1996 WL 651633, at *3 n.6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 31, 1996). 
566 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL Vol. 18.2 

Although the Connecticut Supreme Court has expressly declined to 
rule on this issue,44 the lack of definite authority doesn’t serve to restrict 
private claims. Even if no private right of action exists under CUIPA, the 
plaintiff is not left without redress; a claim for relief can be made under the 
Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) alleging a breach of 
CUIPA.45 The CUTPA, which prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce, does create a private 
right of action.46 For the purposes of this paper, pleadings alleging unfair 
settlement practices will be referred to as claims under CUIPA, regardless 
of whether they are being brought in conjunction with a CUTPA claim.   
Although a plaintiff is entitled to bring a claim under CUTPA 
alleging a violation of CUIPA, the claim is not proper unless the alleged 
unfair practice actually violates CUIPA.47 As a Connecticut statute, CUIPA 
is subject to governance by Connecticut’s Trial Rules. Such a claim 
therefore must contain a statement of the material facts forming the basis of 
the allegation, and meet the criteria set forth in both CUTPA and CUIPA.   
 
B. REQUIREMENTS FOR PLEADING A CUIPA CLAIM 
 
Of the sixteen causes of action contained in CUIPA, the unfair 
settlement practices cause of action is unique in that it requires a showing 
of multiple instances of misconduct by the same insurer.48 When asserting a 
claim of unfair settlement practices under CUIPA, the claimant must plead 
that the insurer performed certain actions constituting misconduct in 
conjunction with the settlement of their insurance claim.49 Such misconduct 
encompasses misrepresenting the insurance policy provisions at issue, 
attempting to settle a claim for less than a reasonable person would have 
expected, or refusing to pay claims without reasonable investigation.50 
These actions must not have been committed only as to the plaintiff; they 

44 Lees v. Middlesex Ins. Co., 643 A.2d 1282, 1285 n.4 (Conn. 1994) (“With 
respect to the CUIPA count, the defendant contends that CUIPA does not create a 
private cause of action. We decline to consider that claim because it is unnecessary 
for us to do so.”). 
45 Mead v. Burns, 509 A.2d 11, 18 (Conn. 1986).   
46 16 Conn. Prac. Series, Elements of an Action § 11:2 (“A statutory cause of 
action is created by C.G.S.A. § 42-110g for any person who suffers a loss of 
money or property as the result of an unfair trade practice.”). 
47 Martin v. Am. Equity Ins. Co., 185 F. Supp. 2d 162, 168 (D. Conn. 2002).  
48 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-815 (2012).   
49 Id. § 38a-816(6).   
50 Id.  
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must have been committed “with such frequency as to indicate a general 
business practice.”51 This clause has led Connecticut courts to conclude 
that pleading a claim of unfair settlement practices under CUIPA requires 
the claimant to show more than one instance of misconduct on the part of 
the insurer.52   
The language in the unfair settlement practices cause of action 
therefore requires a showing of multiple prohibited acts, whereas the other 
causes of action under CUIPA require that only one prohibited act be 
asserted.53 By including this language in the statute, the legislature clearly 
intended that insurers only be punished for unfair settlement practices 
occurring with some frequency, rather than for isolated incidences of 
misconduct.54 This indicates that isolated incidences of misconduct, 
although unfortunate, are not so seriously in violation of state public policy 
as to mandate statutory intervention.55  
Furthermore, CUIPA’s protection is not meant to extend to a 
plaintiff who claims that multiple unfair settlement practices occurred in 
relation to just one insurance claim.56 This point was emphasized in Lees v. 
Middlesex Insurance Company, where the plaintiff alleged that the insurer 
failed to acknowledge inquiries regarding her claim, failed to affirm or 
deny coverage, failed to make a good faith effort to settle the claim 
promptly, and failed to properly explain her insurance policy.57 The court 
in Lees held that multiple instances of alleged misconduct in relation to one 
insurance claim does not rise to the level of a general business practice.58 


51 Id.  
52 Mead v. Burns, 509 A.2d 11, 19 (Conn. 1986) (recognizing “the legislative 
determination that isolated instances of unfair insurance settlement practices are 
not so violative of the public policy of this state as to warrant statutory 
intervention”).   
53 Ferreira v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., No. 323152, 1996 WL 411999, at *1 
(Conn. Super. Ct. July 5, 1996); see also Lees v. Middlesex Ins. Co., 229 Conn. 
842, 848 n.5 (1994) (“We note that of the sixteen categories of unfair insurance 
practices proscribed by General Statutes § 38a-816, only subsection (6) expressly 
requires proof that the unfair claim settlement practices enumerated therein were 
committed or performed ‘with such frequency as to indicate a general business 
practice.’”). 
54 Lees, 229 Conn. at 849. 
55 Martin v. Am. Equity Ins. Co., 185 F. Supp. 2d 162, 166 (D. Conn. 2002). 
56 Lees, 229 Conn. at 848. 
57 Id. at 848 n.7.  
58 Id. at 849.   
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Ǥ DEFENDING AGAINST CUIPA CLAIMS

The main strategy for defending against CUIPA claims in state 
court is by filing a motion to strike.59 A motion to strike is used to contest 
the legal sufficiency of the allegations of a complaint.60 In evaluating a 
motion to strike, the court considers the facts set forth in the complaint and 
construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, admitting all 
well-pleaded facts.61 Only the facts alleged in the complaint can be 
considered; legal conclusions or opinions will not be admitted.62 If the facts 
set forth would support the cause of action asserted, the motion to strike 
will be denied.63 A motion to strike a claim of unfair settlement practices 
under CUIPA is often based on the grounds that the pleading violates 
Connecticut Trial Rules by stating insufficient specific facts.
CUIPA claims can also be litigated in federal court if there is 
diversity jurisdiction.64 In federal court, the proper motion to defend against 
a pleading that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is a 
motion to dismiss.65 A motion to dismiss is evaluated in largely the same 
way as a motion to strike; the court accepts as true all the factual 
allegations in the complaint, and draws inferences in the light most 
favorable to the movant.66 The action will be dismissed only if it is clear 
that no relief can be granted based on the facts and allegations contained in 
the complaint.67 It is important to note that, because the standard for 

59 Robert B. Yules & Cynthia W. S. Rowen, Insurance Bad Faith Litigation, A 
Primer, 67 CONN. B.J. 380, 393 (1993).  
60 Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 815 A.2d 1188, 1200-01 (Conn. 
2003).  
61 Colon v. Geico Cas. Co., No. CV 980419197, 1999 WL 596245, at *1-
2 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 28, 1999) (quoting Waters v. Autuori, 676 A.2d 357, 359-
60 (Conn. 1996)). 
62 Wiacek v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., Inc., No. 329601, 1998 WL 161378, at 
*1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 31, 1998).   
63 Id.  
64 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006).  The District Court has jurisdiction over civil 
actions where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 and is between citizens 
of different states. When considering diversity of incorporated insurers, a 
corporation is deemed to be a citizen of both the state it is incorporated in and the 
state where it has its principal place of business.  
65 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).   
66 W. World Ins. Co. v. Architectural Builders of Westport, LLC, 520 F. Supp. 
2d 408, 410 (D. Conn. 2007).   
67 Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984).  
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pleading in federal courts is plausibility pleading, the complaint does not 
have to contain specific facts; the plaintiff must simply plead sufficient 
facts to “nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to 
plausible.”68   
A strong motion to dismiss or strike comes with the potential 
benefit to insurers that the complaint will be immediately disposed of, and 
will not survive to be litigated in court.69 Alternatively, upon realizing the 
strong legal arguments contained in the motion, the plaintiff might be more 
willing to engage in settlement discussions, or settle at a lower price.70 On 
the other hand, if the motion is granted, the plaintiff might come back with 
stronger legal arguments that are more difficult to defeat at trial.71 Because 
of this delicate balancing act, it is critical for an insurer to evaluate the pros 
and cons of moving to strike or dismiss a CUIPA action before any such 
motion is filed.    
 
V. LEVEL OF SPECIFIC FACTUAL DETAIL REQUIRED  
 
At the trial level, Connecticut courts are split as to the minimum 
facts that must be pled to support a claim under CUTPA and CUIPA.72 
“The point of contention among these decisions centers on the requirement 
that ‘a CUPTA claim based on an alleged unfair claim settlement practice . 
. . require[s] proof, as under CUIPA, that the unfair claim settlement 
practice had been committed or performed by the defendant with such 
frequency as to indicate a general business practice.’”73 The problem 
therefore often lies in the ability of an individual plaintiff to state sufficient 
facts indicating that not only did the insurer perpetrate misconduct against 

68 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007).  
69 Mark Thomas Smith, Strategic Motions to Dismiss (Or Lack Thereof), 
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, http://www.abanet.org/litigation/litigationnews/trial 
_skills/pretrial-motion-dismiss.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2012).   
70 Id.  
71 Id. “Practice Book § 10-44 permits a party to file a new pleading within 
fifteen days after a motion to strike has been granted . . . .” Crespan v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. LLICV054002121S, 2006 WL 280009, at *2 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Jan. 13, 2006) (quoting Johnson v. Mazza, 834 A.2d 725, 729 (Conn. 
2003)). 
72 Mark B. Seiger & Elizabeth F. Ahlstrand, When Pleadings Lack Specific 
Facts, CONN. L. TRIB., Feb. 8, 2010, at 14-15 (quoting Lees v. Middlesex Ins. Co., 
643 A.2d 1282, 1286 (Conn. 1994)).   
73 Id.  
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the plaintiff, but also that this misconduct is repeated with frequency 
sufficient to render it a general business practice.   
Pleadings alleging a violation of CUIPA often state facts asserting 
that the claimant experienced unfair settlement practices, and that “upon 
information and belief” the defendant has regularly engaged in such 
practices with other insureds.74 Some courts have taken a lenient approach 
when factually sparse pleadings are set forth, and have permitted pleadings 
that contain either a factual allegation of a specific violation combined with 
an assertion that this is a regular business practice, or pleadings containing 
several claims based on the same incident.75 However, the majority of 
courts have held that general allegations of unfair business practices are 
insufficient, without giving any indication as to the precise level of fact 
required to state a sufficient claim.76  
The subsections of CUIPA describing the acts prohibited in settling 
insurance claims are both broad and vague, and the pleadings filed by 
plaintiffs vary widely depending on the nature of each insurance claim.77 
The issue of how much factual detail is required is significant, because the 
facts set forth in the pleadings often control the scope of discovery.78 If a 
complaint that alleges unfair settlement practices “on information and 
belief” survives an insurer’s motion to strike, the claimant may then have 
the opportunity to conduct prolonged, intrusive, and expensive discovery, 
inconveniencing both the claimant and the insurer.79  
To date, the Connecticut Supreme Court has not had the 
opportunity to consider the level of factual detail required to adequately 
plead a CUIPA claim. The defensive motion to strike removes some 
CUIPA claims from court before a decision is reached. Insurers often settle 
CUIPA claims that survive a motion to strike; they would rather pay the 
plaintiff a settlement than subject themselves to the broad discovery 

74 Id.  
75 Lee, supra note 38, at 380; Lees v. Middlesex Ins. Co., 643 A.2d 1282 
(Conn. 1994); Quimby v. Kimberly Clark Corp., 613 A.2d 838 (Conn. App. 1992). 
76 Lee, supra note 38, at 380.  
77 Chapell v. Larosa, No. CV990552801, 2001 WL 58057, at *8 (Conn. Super. 
Ct. Jan. 5, 2001) (questioning how inappropriate behavior by insurers can be 
ascertained, given the vague and broad language of the CUIPA statute).  
78 Seiger & Ahlstrand, supra note 72, at 14-15 (quoting Lees v. Middlesex Ins. 
Co., 643 A.2d 1282, 1286 (Conn. 1994)). 
79 Id.  
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discretion of the Commissioner of Insurance permitted under CUIPA.80 
Particularly for a large insurer, the costs associated with such discovery, 
such as time spent sorting documents, copying and shipping fees, and 
storage fees, serve as an incentive to settle the case rather than try it in 
court.81  
In the trial courts, there are two conflicting lines of cases outlining 
the level of fact necessary to state a claim that meets the general business 
practice requirement of CUIPA. These cases differ not only in the facts set 
forth in the various pleadings, but also in the legal analyses the courts 
apply. The first line of cases requires that the plaintiff state facts 
demonstrating a general business practice that go beyond the unfairness 
immediately suffered by the plaintiff personally.82 The second line of cases 
takes precisely the opposite position, holding that as long as the plaintiff 
alleges that other insureds have been subjected to the same unfair 
settlement practices, specific factual descriptions of these alleged instances 
are not required.83  

A. LINE 1: SPECIFIC FACTS REQUIRED TO ILLUSTRATE GENERAL 
BUSINESS PRACTICE 
The first line of cases reviewing the standards for pleading a 
CUIPA claim concludes that pleadings must conform to Connecticut’s 
Trial Rules, and as such, must contain a plain and concise statement of the 
material facts. Such cases state that, despite the rule that pleadings must be 
read in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, “an allegation based upon 
‘reasonable information and belief’ is properly viewed as a legal 
conclusion, particularly when the plaintiff has made no attempt to plead 
facts establishing any other instance or instances to demonstrate the 

80 See, e.g., Stancil, supra note 11, at 116 (“Fishing expeditions are sometimes 
so expensive that the defendant will pay the plaintiff to leave even a lake the 
defendant knows to be empty.”).   
81 See, e.g., Scott A. Moss, Litigation Discovery Cannot Be Optimal but Could 
Be Better: The Economics of Improving Discovery Timing in A Digital Age, 58 
Duke L.J. 889, 945 (2009) (stating that increased discovery costs have the effect of 
“increasing parties' incentives to settle early, before much discovery . . . but also 
increasing the incentive to file frivolous lawsuits that defendants would settle to 
avoid discovery costs.”).  
82 Wirth v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., No. CV095012844S, 2010 WL 654392, 
at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 14, 2010).  
83 Id. at *3. 
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frequency of the alleged CUIPA violation.”84 This line of cases suggests 
that, in order to properly plead unfair settlement practices as a general 
business practice, the plaintiff must allege specific facts indicating that the 
insurer’s misconduct has occurred with such frequency as to go beyond the 
immediate claims of the plaintiff.85  
One such case is Quimby v. Kimberly Clark Corporation, where 
the plaintiff sought damages and injunctive relief from her employer, based 
on alleged wrongful conduct in the treatment of the plaintiff’s workers’ 
compensation claims.86 All eight counts of the complaint were stricken by 
the trial court, among which two were stricken because the plaintiff failed 
to allege sufficient facts indicating that the defendant’s misconduct 
constituted a general business practice in violation of CUIPA.87 In Quimby, 
not only did the plaintiff fail to state sufficient facts indicating a general 
business practice, she did not even allege that other claimants had been 
treated in a similar manner.88 Without such an allegation, the facts stated 
did not meet the well-settled requirement that a single act of misconduct is 
insufficient to plead a claim under CUIPA.89 Therefore, the court affirmed 
the trial court’s decision to strike the plaintiff’s complaint.90 The Quimby 
case is one of few cases concerning the standards of pleading a CUIPA 
claim to have been considered on the appellate level, and as the complaint 
in question did not suggest that the unfair settlement practices occurred 
with frequency, the precise amount of fact required to plead a CUIPA claim 
was not addressed.  
In some cases, the plaintiff will allege, without factual 
substantiation, that other insureds have experienced the same unfair 
settlement practices, in an attempt to fulfill the general business practice 
element of CUIPA. This was the case in Ciarleglio v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. 
Co., where the plaintiff was denied workers’ compensation benefits after 
suffering job-related injuries.91 In considering the insurer’s motion to strike 
plaintiff’s CUIPA claim, the court noted that, “[i]n what may be an attempt 

84 Wiacek v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., Inc., No. 329601, 1998 WL 161378, at 
*3 (Conn. Super. Ct. March 31, 1998).  
85 Wirth, 2010 WL 654392 at *3. 
86 Quimby v. Kimberly Clark Corp., 613 A.2d 838, 840-41 (Conn. App. 1992). 
87 Id.  
88 Id. at 845.  
89 Id.  
90 Id.  
91 Ciarleglio v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., No. CV90 0276028 S, 1993 WL 
541609, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 16, 1993). 
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to avoid prompt demise of the fourth count, the plaintiff has inserted the 
magic words of other acts of insurance misconduct by the defendant, 
although not stating the factual basis for that claim.”92   
The Ciarleglio court viewed this strategy as problematic, in that the 
language in the pleadings constituted a legal conclusion due to the fact that 
the plaintiff did not name any other claimants whose workers’ 
compensation claims were handled inappropriately, and legal conclusions 
are not properly admitted on a motion to strike.93 Furthermore, the court 
acknowledged that the plaintiff had filed discovery to find other claimants 
in a similar position in order to bolster his CUIPA claim, but held that 
merely filing such a discovery request to give the appearance of fulfilling 
the requirements of a CUIPA claim is insufficient.94 Because the complaint 
failed to allege sufficient facts to support a claim of unfair settlement as a 
general business practice, the court granted the insurer’s motion to strike.95 
The plaintiff’s complaint in Hellberg v. Travelers Home & Marine 
Insurance Co. exhibited elements of the complaints in both Quimby and 
Ciarleglio. There, the plaintiff asserted seven violations of CUTPA/CUIPA 
with respect to one insurance claim that the insurer allegedly refused to 
pay.96 The plaintiff further stated that “these violations are part of a ‘pattern 
or frequency of similar unfair trade practices engaged in by the 
defendant.’”97 In determining whether the complaint would survive the 
insurer’s motion to strike, the court cited the holdings in Lees and Mead, 
noting that more than one instance of misconduct must be demonstrated.98 
The court not only relied on these key cases, but also quoted a similar 
Connecticut Superior Court case, Finocchio v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance 
Co., in granting the insurer’s motion to strike: 
 
A recent Superior Court decision examined the level of 
detail required in § 38a-816(6) claims holding that: “[a] 
close examination of the plaintiff's allegations . . . reveals 
that there are no specific factual references to the 
defendant's action towards other insureds . . . . As all of the 

92 Id. at *3.   
93 Id. 
94 Id.  
95 Id.  
96 Hellberg v. Travelers Home & Marine Ins. Co., No. HHDCV095030438S, 
2010 WL 3584551, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 13, 2010). 
97 Id.   
98 Id. at *3.   
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factual allegations in [the count at issue] involve only the 
settlement negotiations between the plaintiff and the 
defendant and fail to reference other insureds, the plaintiff 
has not alleged a general business practice.” In that case, 
the court held that allegations that the defendant “has in the 
past engaged, and continues to engage in unfair and 
deceptive acts and/or practices” were insufficient for the 
purpose of § 38a-816(6).99  
 
In some cases, the court explicitly analyzes how the Connecticut 
fact pleading standard should be applied to CUIPA claims. One such case 
is Currie v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., where there was disagreement 
amongst the parties as to the limits of the plaintiffs’ insurance policy when 
the plaintiffs’ store and warehouse burned down.100 Aetna moved to strike 
the plaintiffs’ CUIPA claims, as the plaintiffs had made the broad 
allegation that they and “other insureds and policy holders of the 
defendants” had suffered misconduct.101 In granting defendant’s motion to 
strike, the court held that:  
 
[s]uch bald allegations are properly seen as legal 
conclusions, particularly since the plaintiffs make no 
attempt to plead any facts identifying these “other 
occasions.” It is recognized that while Connecticut is a fact 
pleading jurisdiction, requiring that “[e]ach pleading shall 
contain a plain and concise statement of the material facts 
on which the pleader relies,” the pleader, nevertheless, is 
not required to plead “the evidence by which [material 
facts] are to be proved.” But here, no facts are alleged 
essential to establishing an unfair pattern of general 
business practice by Aetna, as required by Section 38a-
816(6). As Aetna contends, the plaintiffs “have inserted the 
magic words of other acts of insurance misconduct by the 
defendant, although not stating the factual basis for that 
claim.”102 

99 Id. (quoting Finocchio v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., No. FSTCV095009607S, 2009 
WL 1335073, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 22, 2009)). 
100 Currie v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., No. CV 960558900, 1999 WL 682041, at 
*1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 12, 1999). 
101 Id. at *4.   
102 Id. (internal citations omitted).   
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This line of cases clearly indicates that a plaintiff cannot merely 
insert key phrases and plural terms into their complaint to make it appear as 
though other claimants have suffered the same unfair settlement practices. 
For a complaint to be factually sufficient to survive a motion to strike under 
Connecticut’s fact pleading standard, the plaintiff must provide information 
as to the identities of other insureds that have suffered misconduct, and 
must demonstrate that they have suffered the same type of misconduct 
alleged in their complaint.   
For example, in National Publishing Co., Inc. v. Hartford Fire 
Insurance Co., Inc., the plaintiff sought insurance coverage following a 
series of thefts, but had difficulty collecting covered costs from the 
insurer.103 The plaintiff attempted to illustrate the frequency of misconduct 
by listing eight other parties who had allegedly filed complaints against the 
insurer with the Connecticut Insurance Department.104 In granting the 
insurer’s motion to strike, the court recognized that “the plaintiff fails to 
establish what facts, if any, support those entities’ complaints. The only 
misconduct pleaded, therefore, is the ‘isolated instance’ of wrongdoing that 
occurred against the plaintiff.”105 Because the complaint failed to establish 
these facts, the court held that the plaintiff’s CUIPA claim was not 
sufficiently pled, and granted the insurer’s motion to strike.106   
This first line of cases sheds light on the level of fact required to 
state a CUIPA claim in accordance with Connecticut fact pleading 
standards. From these cases, we can derive a general rule that plaintiffs 
must do more than allege that the insurer’s misconduct has occurred with 
frequency;107 they must plead sufficient supporting facts, rather than merely 
using plural terms alleging that “others” have suffered the same 
misconduct.108 The judges considering these cases have analyzed not only 
the purpose of the CUIPA statute itself, but have taken it into consideration 
in conjunction with the legislative intent of the statute and the Connecticut 

103 Nat. Publ’g Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., No. CV 970156478S, 1998 WL 
166169, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 25, 1998). 
104 Id. at *2.  
105 Id.   
106 Id.  
107 Quimby v. Kimberly Clark Corp., 613 A.2d 838, 845 (Conn. App. Ct. 
1992). 
108 Ciarleglio v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., No. CV90 0276028 S, 1993 WL 
541609, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 16, 1993); Currie v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 
No. CV 960558900, 1999 WL 682041, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 12, 1999); 
National Pub. Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., No. CV 970156478S, 1998 WL 
166169, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 25, 1998). 
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standards for pleading a claim. The strength of this line of cases, therefore, 
is that it takes into consideration Connecticut law as a whole, and does not 
merely pick and choose certain rules to follow in certain circumstances.  
 
B. LINE 2: LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE PLEADINGS 

The second line of cases reviewing the standards for pleading a 
CUIPA claim concludes that claims alleging limited material facts may 
survive a motion to strike. The rationale for these holdings is that CUTPA 
and CUIPA are remedial in nature, and as such, should be construed 
liberally to benefit claimants.109 Given that there is no appellate authority 
governing how much factual detail is required to allege a general business 
practice, and the district courts are split on this issue, courts that follow this 
second line of reasoning apply liberal construction in holding that such 
pleadings are sufficient to survive a motion to strike.110
The clear deficiency with these cases is that they fail to apply the 
Connecticut standard of fact pleading in evaluating the motion to strike. In 
Wirth v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Company, for example, the 
plaintiff brought a claim of unfair settlement practices under 
CUTPA/CUIPA against her insurer, in addition to claims of breach of 
contract and bad faith.111 The insurer moved to strike the count under 
CUTPA/CUIPA, arguing that the complaint was factually insufficient and 
failed to set forth facts indicating unfair claim settlement as a general 
business practice.112 In denying the insurer’s motion to strike, the court 
noted that Connecticut courts are split as to the specificity of pleadings 
required, but gave deference to the fact that other trial courts had held that 
pleading specific instances of misconduct involving other insureds is not 

109 Nation v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. CV040093456S, 2005 WL 2364932, at 
*2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 7, 2005) (“The court is aware that there is no appellate 
authority as to whether a plaintiff must plead other specific instances of unfair 
settlement practices on the part of an insurer in order to satisfy the allegation of a 
general business practice and that superior court decisions are split on this issue. 
Given the remedial nature of CUIPA and given that it is to be liberally construed to 
give effect to the legislature's intent, the court holds that the allegation of a general 
business practice in the plaintiff's complaint is sufficient to withstand a motion to 
strike.”).  
110 Id. 
111 Wirth v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., No. CV095012844S, 2010 WL 654392, 
at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 14, 2010). 
112 Id.  
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required.113 There was no reasoning or discussion as to why these cases 
should be followed over those requiring specific instances of misconduct, 
and no rationale was given as to why notice-style pleadings are sufficient.  
The court in Wirth further stated that “[t]he plaintiff's allegations of insurer 
misconduct reach beyond the plaintiff's individual claim, as evidenced by 
her use of the plural ‘claims’ and ‘insureds.’ The plaintiff's choice of words 
demonstrates that the acts are not confined to the plaintiff herself.”114 
However, the court never questioned how the plaintiff knew that other 
“insureds” had been similarly affected, or what the factual basis for these 
claims was. Because the court in Wirth did not evaluate or discuss the 
merits of the pleadings under Connecticut’s fact pleading rule, it is difficult 
to say whether merely pluralizing words in a complaint causes the pleading 
to contain facts sufficient to allege a general business practice.   
The court in Pettibone Tavern, LLC v. OneBeacon Midwest Ins. 
Co. provided a more thorough analysis of its reasoning in denying an 
insurer’s motion to strike, but still neglected to apply Connecticut’s fact 
pleading standard in considering the merits of the complaint.115 The insurer 
moved to strike the insured’s complaint alleging CUIPA violations, 
asserting that “[t]he better approach . . . is to require the plaintiff to do 
more than merely parrot the language contained within the CUIPA count 
and allege facts that demonstrate that the defendant engaged in a pattern of 
misconduct.”116 The insured’s response was that “the more persuasive line 
of cases does not require that it allege specific instances of insurer 
misconduct.”117   
In its reasoning, the Pettibone Tavern court considered the 
language of CUIPA, as well as the holding in Lees that the plaintiff must 
provide proof that the misconduct occurred with such frequency as to 
indicate a general business practice.118 However, the court concluded that 
because the plaintiff included language that the misconduct occurred in 
“other claims”, the complaint survived the insurer’s motion to strike.119 The 
court did not provide any reasoning as to why including this phrase in the 

113 Id. at *2-3. 
114 Id. at *4. 
115 Pettibone Tavern, LLC v. OneBeacon Midwest Ins. Co., No. 
CV106006711S, 2010 WL 4723384 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 28, 2010).   
116 Id. at *4.  
117 Id.   
118 Id. at *5 (citing Lees v. Middlesex Ins. Co., 643 A.2d 1282, 1283 (Conn. 
1994)).  
119 Id. at *6. 
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complaint made it sufficient, nor did it mention how its conclusion fit in 
with the requirement of proving frequency as stated in Lees. 
Some opinions stemming from cases in this line not only fail to 
consider the applicable state law, they provide no analysis whatsoever as to 
the level of fact must be pled in order to constitute a general business 
practice. In Bates v. Utica Mutual Insurance Co., the plaintiff brought a 
CUIPA claim against her insurer, alleging that her workers’ compensation 
claims were handled inappropriately during settlement.120 In her complaint, 
she set forth six instances of alleged misconduct pertaining to her single 
workers’ compensation claim.121 Although the court acknowledged that a 
CUIPA claim must include a showing of more than a single act of 
misconduct under Mead and Quimby, the insurer’s motion to strike was 
denied.122 The court reasoned that “[t]he plaintiff has also alleged that the 
defendant has committed the same acts ‘with such frequency as to indicate 
a general business practice.’ . . . The allegation of a general business 
practice in the plaintiff's complaint is sufficient to withstand a motion to 
strike.”123 In doing so, the court in Bates not only failed to discuss the 
Connecticut fact pleading standard, they also ignored the reasoning in cases 
requiring more factual support to allege a general business practice. They 
provided no explanation as to why the plaintiff’s allegations were 
sufficient. Finally, the court in Bates did not offer any discussion as to why 
an allegation of a general business practice is an appropriate factual 
component of a pleading, rather than a legal conclusion.    
What is missing in these cases is an analysis of Connecticut law as 
a whole. Cases in this line do not take into consideration the level of facts 
required in a complaint under Connecticut fact pleading standards. While 
most of the cases in this line of reasoning acknowledge widely-followed 
cases such as Mead, Quimby and Lees, which require proof of frequent 
insurer misconduct, they merely cite these cases as a rule and then form 
their own, unrelated conclusions.124 Many such cases hold that it is 
factually sufficient to assert that several other persons have suffered similar 
insurer misconduct, without naming those persons or stating any facts to 
demonstrate how the instances of misconduct were similar. Furthermore, it 
is difficult to tell how the courts reason through their decisions in this line 

120 Bates v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., No. CV020088925S, 2003 WL 21327656, at 
*1 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 29, 2003).  
121 Id. at *2.   
122 Id. at *3.  
123 Id.   
124 See, e.g., id. at *3. 
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of cases, as there is rarely a thorough discussion or analysis of the relevant 
law. These courts often rely on other trial-level decisions stating that no 
facts concerning other instances of misconduct are required, without 
explaining their reliance or analyzing the justification for these holdings.  
This line of cases is more favorable to insureds, who may have 
meritorious claims but lack the factual detail to properly articulate these 
claims at the pleading stage. However, denying a motion to strike does 
provide a plaintiff their day in court, but it does so at an enormous potential 
discovery cost to the insurer. Courts analyzing a complaint without the full 
force of Connecticut law in mind are exposing insurers to needless 
litigation that was not intended by the legislature in crafting the CUIPA 
statute.  
 
C. PLEADING STANDARDS APPLIED TO CUIPA CLAIMS IN FEDERAL 
COURTS 

CUIPA claims heard in federal court by diversity jurisdiction are 
subject to federal pleading standards.125 Because the federal plausibility 
pleading standard is less stringent than Connecticut’s fact pleading 
standard, one might assume that more CUIPA claims survive dismissal in 
federal court. However, this is not the case; the Connecticut District Court 
has held that unsubstantiated allegations of unfair settlement as a general 
business practice are not compliant with the plausibility pleading standard.  
In 2010, the Connecticut District Court applied the Twombly and 
Iqbal plausibility pleading standard to a CUIPA claim in Ensign Yachts, 
Inc. v. Arrigoni.126 In Ensign Yachts, a yacht insured by Lloyd’s of London 
was damaged during transportation for sale.127 In its complaint, Ensign 
Yachts alleged that the insurer violated CUIPA’s prohibition against unfair 
settlement practices by refusing to cooperate in the claims process and 
ultimately denying the claim without justification.128 However, the 
complaint asserted facts describing the unfair settlement practices suffered 
by Ensign Yachts and alleged that this was a general business practice of 
Lloyd’s, but did not identify any other specific instances of similar unfair 
claim settlement practices.129   

125 See discussion of federal pleading standards supra Part II.  
126 Ensign Yachts, Inc. v. Arrigoni, No. 3:09-cv-209, 2010 WL 918107, at * 3 
(D. Conn. Mar. 11, 2010). 
127 Id. at *1-2. 
128 Id. at *17.  
129 Id.  
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In its decision, the Ensign Yachts court commented on the split 
amongst Connecticut trial courts as to whether unsubstantiated allegations 
of unfair claims settlement as a “general business practice” are sufficient to 
plead a CUIPA claim. The court stated:  
 
Given the remedial nature of CUTPA and CUIPA, the 
Court would be inclined to agree with those courts which 
have held that the allegation of a general business practice, 
unsupported by specific instances of insurer misconduct in 
other cases, is sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. 
However, the applicable pleading standard for this forum 
requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, 
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible 
on its face.’” “A pleading that offers labels and conclusions 
or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 
action will not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it 
tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual 
enhancement.’“ Thus, under the Iqbal pleading standard, a 
mere assertion of a general business practice without 
anything more is insufficient to sustain Ensign’s “CUIPA 
through CUTPA” claims against Lloyds . . . for violation 
of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 38a-816(6). Accordingly, the Court 
dismisses these claims.130  
 
The Connecticut District Court has reached similar conclusions in 
other cases applying the Twombly and Iqbal plausibility standard. One such 
case is O'Neill v. Riversource Life Ins. Co., where the plaintiff asserted that 
“upon information and belief” the defendant had evaded disability income 
claims “as a general business practice.”131 The court in O’Neill dismissed 
the plaintiff’s CUIPA claim, stating that “[w]hile pleading ‘upon 
information and belief’ is permitted, O'Neill is obligated to do more than 
recite the elements of the cause of action.”132 
The District Court’s application of the plausibility standard is 
notable for two reasons. First, cases such as Ensign Yachts and O’Neill 
illustrate that pleadings asserting unfair claims settlement as a general 
business practice “upon information and belief” do not pass the threshold 

130 Id. (citations omitted). 
131 O’Neill v. Riversource Life Ins. Co., No. 3:10-CV-898 JCH, 2010 WL 
3925988, at *3 (D. Conn. Sept. 29, 2010). 
132 Id. (citation omitted).  
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of the plausibility pleading standard. As such, similar unsubstantiated 
pleadings would not comply with Connecticut’s more stringent fact 
pleading standard. Also, the fact that the federal courts apply federal 
pleading standards to CUIPA claims raises a potential Erie issue. The Erie 
doctrine discourages forum shopping between state and federal 
jurisdictions by binding the federal court to apply local substantive law and 
federal procedural law to matters sitting in diversity.133 If the standards for 
pleading a CUIPA claim were found to be substantive law for Erie 
purposes,134 the federal courts might be required to apply Connecticut 
pleading standards.135 Although not the focus of this note, the treatment of 
CUIPA claims in federal courts would be a factor worth considering if this 
issue reaches the Connecticut Supreme Court.  
 
VI. ANALYSIS FOR FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS  
 
Although a split opinion amongst courts as to the factual standards 
for pleading a CUIPA claim might be confusing, it is not unusual. Cases 
and motions are decided based on a judge’s objective opinion, and each 
judge emphasizes different facts and arguments within a case.136 As a 
result, the body of case law is not always perfectly consistent, but varies 
based on which judge was hearing a particular case and what facts and 
precedent they chose to emphasize. Our legal system is based on precedent, 
and in deciding which decisions to rely on, the judge must objectively 
analyze the facts at hand and identify similarities with past cases.137 When 
opinions on a point of law appear to be split amongst the courts, as in this 

133 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). “Except in matters governed 
by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any 
case is the law of the state.” Id. at 78.  
134 One might assume that pleading standards are procedural law; however, 
other seemingly procedural laws have been found substantive for purposes of Erie 
analysis. See, e.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. Deloitte & Touche, 818 F. Supp. 
1406, 1407-08 (D. Colo. 1993) (finding state statute concerning notice of 
settlement to nonparty persons to be substantive law). 
135 But see Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 n.7 (1996) 
(noting that where the matter in question is governed by the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, “the Federal Rule applies regardless of contrary state law”).  
136 David Lyons, Formal Justice and Judicial Precedent, 38 VAND. L. REV. 
495, 499 (1985).  
137 Id. at 501.   
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case, the judge must analyze how another court justified its decision in 
determining whether it is appropriate to join it.138 
For some legal issues, splits amongst trial courts persist until 
legislation is drafted in an attempt to clarify the law and assist the courts in 
rendering consistent decisions amongst cases with similar facts and claims. 
Despite the conflicting trial court decisions stemming from the general 
business practice requirement to plead an unfair settlement practice under 
CUIPA, the legislature has yet to enact any law to correct this issue. In 
2009, a bill was proposed in the Connecticut General Assembly that would 
eliminate the portion of CUIPA requiring that unfair settlement practices 
occur “with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice.”139 
The stated purpose of the bill was “[t]o allow a private cause of action for 
unfair claim settlement practices without the necessity of showing a general 
business practice on the part of an insurer.”140 However, this bill was not 
enacted.  
The fact that new legislation has not been enacted speaks to the 
importance of the legislature’s intent in adopting the language of the 
statute. The role of the courts is to construe and apply the plain language of 
the statute, and the legislature is free to step in and provide instructions if 
the court misconstrues its intentions.141 Inaction by the legislature is 
characterized as acquiescence in the court’s construction of a statute.142 The 
fact that the legislature has not acted to remove the “general business 
practice” language of CUIPA therefore indicates its acquiescence with this 
language, and with the courts’ requirement of a showing of multiple unfair 
practices by an insurer to satisfy a CUIPA claim.   
The treatment of CUIPA claims in federal court is also indicative 
of how the Connecticut Supreme Court might rule on this issue. As seen in 
cases such as Ensign Yachts and O’Neill, the Connecticut District Court has 
held that allegations of unfair claim settlement as a “general business 
practice” are insufficient to plead a CUIPA claim when applying a 
plausibility pleading standard.143 The plausibility pleading standard is not 
as demanding as fact pleading, requiring just slightly more factual 
allegations than notice pleading.144 If unsubstantiated allegations are 

138 Id. at 502.   
139 S.B. 763, Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Ct. 2009).  
140 Id.   
141 Hall v. Gilbert & Bennett Mfg. Co., 695 A.2d 1051, 1060 (Conn. 1997). 
142 Id. 
143 See supra Part V.C.  
144 Steinman, supra note 2, at 1298. 
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insufficient to comply with plausibility pleading standards, it is likely that 
the Connecticut Supreme Court would find them similarly insufficient to 
meet the state’s more stringent fact pleading standard.  
Public policy rationale may also play a significant role in the future 
analysis of the standards for pleading a CUIPA claim. If pleading standards 
are too stringent, plaintiffs may be deterred from bringing valid CUIPA 
claims simply because they do not have specific facts illustrating the 
insurer’s general business practice, and no access to discovery to ascertain 
such facts. Insurers should not be permitted to repeatedly commit unfair 
insurance practices purely because plaintiffs cannot meet Connecticut’s 
stringent fact pleading standard.   
If the Connecticut Supreme Court were to place high value on 
these public policy considerations, there may be ways to accommodate 
plaintiffs without circumventing the fact pleading standard. For example, 
plaintiffs could be granted a limited opportunity for discovery before a 
complaint is dismissed for lack of specific facts. Alternatively, the 
Connecticut Insurance Department or other regulatory entities could assist 
plaintiffs by keeping records of unfair settlement claims, which plaintiffs 
could use to identify other insureds who suffered similar wrongdoing.  
However, although these proposed solutions might address public policy 
concerns, they also have the potential to place undue strain on insurers; 
more insureds may take advantage of the limited opportunity for discovery, 
thus subjecting insurers to more frequent, costly and time-consuming 
discovery expeditions. Because public policy considerations have serious 
implications for both insureds and insurers, any proposed solutions should 
be considered carefully, noting that well-reasoned trial court cases, the lack 
of corrective legislation, and the treatment of CUIPA claims in federal 
courts all indicate that specific facts must be pled alleging a general 
business practice.  
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
  
Based on the plain language of the statute, CUIPA was intended 
for use against insurers that commit more than a single and isolated act of 
misconduct.145 However, trial court judges apply different standards in 
analyzing the level of facts necessary to plead a general business practice. 
As long as the general business practice requirement exists, and until the 
issue is decided at the appellate level, there will continue to be debate 
amongst judges over the level of fact required to plead a CUIPA claim.  

145 Lees v. Middlesex Ins. Co., 643 A.2d 1282, 1285 (Conn. 1994). 
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When thoughtfully considered, it is clear that there is no 
compelling reason to excuse CUIPA claims from following Connecticut’s 
fact pleading standard. It is true that it is difficult for individual plaintiffs to 
find factual evidence to support their allegations of general business 
practice without the benefit of full trial discovery, but it is by no means 
impossible. Therefore, plaintiffs should not be permitted to plead claims 
“based on information and belief,” or with unsubstantiated conclusions that 
others have experienced the same misconduct, as such pleadings do not 
meet the Connecticut fact pleading standard.     
  
SUBPRIME AND CREDIT CRISIS  
INVESTIGATIONS: WHAT CONSTITUTES A  
CLAIM FOR THE PURPOSES OF PROFESSIONAL  
LIABILITY INSURANCE?  
 
CAITLIN P. HOLT* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
  
 The subprime mortgage and credit crisis has generated an 
unprecedented wave of lawsuits and government investigations of lenders 
and financial institutions. The lending companies and financial institutions 
have turned to their Directors and Officers (D&O) and Errors and 
Omissions (E&O) liability insurance policies to cover the substantial costs 
of defending against the regulatory investigations and lawsuits.1 The scope 
of coverage under D&O and E&O policies varies significantly, with a 
number of exclusions and policy limitations excusing insurance companies 
from their duty to defend or reimburse the insureds under certain 
circumstances. The financial crisis has given rise to controversy over what 
legal and investigative proceedings constitute a “claim” for the purposes of 
triggering coverage under D&O and E&O policies. With substantial legal 
fees and considerable government fines at stake, the definition of a “claim” 
is of increasing importance to insurance companies and the financial 
institutions they insure.  
Although a number of jurisdictions have addressed the meaning of 
a “claim” in the context of a professional liability policy, the law regarding 
whether government and regulatory investigations trigger coverage under 
D&O and E&O policies continues to evolve. Two Court of Appeals 
decisions recently examined whether government and regulatory 
investigations fell within the policy definitions of a “securities claim” and 
reached divergent conclusions as a result of differing facts and policy 
language.2 These cases will have important ramifications for the treatment 
of government and regulatory investigations of corporate wrongdoing, as 
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* Juris Doctor Candidate 2012, The University of Connecticut School of Law. 
 
1 It is estimated that as many as 95% of Fortune 500 companies have D&O 
liability policies. David M. Gische, Directors and Officers Liability Insurance, 
FINDLAW (2000), http://library.findlaw.com /2000/Jan/1/241472.html.  
2 Office Depot, Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 453 F. 
App’x 871, 873-75 (11th Cir. 2011); MBIA Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 652 F.3d 152, 
155 (2d Cir. 2011). 
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well as the professional liability insurance industry as a whole. The purpose 
of this article is to examine the recent wave of government and regulatory 
investigations related to the subprime mortgage and credit crisis and its 
implications for D&O and E&O liability insurance. More specifically, this 
article will explore the kinds of legal proceedings that have been 
interpreted by courts to fall within policy definitions of a “claim,” so as to 
evaluate whether government and regulatory investigations into subprime 
lending practices will be covered by D&O or E&O policies.  
 
II. THE INVESTIGATIONS  
 
Given the catastrophic financial losses associated with the 2008 
subprime mortgage and credit crisis and the subsequent financial 
meltdown, it is not surprising that government and regulatory agencies 
have commenced investigations into corporate and lending behavior.3 The 
financial crisis provoked investigations into corporate wrongdoing by a 
number of state and federal watchdogs, among them the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC), and several State Attorneys General.4 The SEC began 
its investigation into subprime mortgage lending in 2007 when it formed a 
working group to investigate whether companies involved in subprime 
mortgage lending were liable under federal securities law for failure to 
disclose information to investors.5 In the five years since, the SEC has 
brought lawsuits against a range of financial institutions, including Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac.6 The FBI also launched investigations into subprime 
lending practices shortly after the crisis unfolded; in 2008, it announced it 
was investigating fourteen corporations that had been involved in subprime 
lending as part of its larger Subprime Mortgage Industry Fraud Initiative 

3 John F. McCarrick, Subprime Claims: D&O and E&O Liability and 
Coverage Implications, 775 PLI/Lit 299, 303-04 (April 2008).  
4 Kenneth M. Breen & Thomas R. Fallati, Subprime Lending Meltdown – Part 
Three: Federal and State Investigations, STAY CURRENT (Paul Hastings LLP, New 
York, N.Y.), July 2007, at 1-2, available at http://www.paulhastings.com/assets/ 
publications/742.pdf. 
5 Id. (citing Karey Wutkowski, SEC’s Cox Reveals CDO Probes, Fund 
Valuation Review, REUTERS (June 26, 2007, 8:49 PM), http://www.reuters 
.com/article/2007/06/27/sec-congress-idUSN2625573520070627). 
6 Press Release, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Former Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac Executives with Securities Fraud (Dec. 16, 2011).  
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launched the prior year.7 The FBI’s probe focused on firms suspected of 
engaging in accounting fraud, improperly securing loans, and insider 
trading.8  
In 2010, the FDIC, a federal agency responsible for investigating 
crime at financial institutions, announced that it was intensifying efforts to 
identify wrongdoing and punish recklessness, fraud, and other criminal 
behavior that contributed to the bank failures.9 The agency launched fifty 
criminal investigations of bank executives, directors, and employees of 
failed U.S. banks across the country.10 The Wall Street Journal reported 
that “[h]undreds of ‘demand’ letters [were] sent to former executives, 
directors and other employees, as well as their professional-liability 
insurers, putting them on notice of potential claim . . . .”11 Since then, the 
FDIC has filed over two dozen lawsuits against failed institutions and 
authorized many more.12 The FDIC investigations and lawsuits come 
several years after the initial wave of bank failures, but officials say it takes 
a minimum of 18 months to prepare for legal action after a bank fails.13 It is 
thus entirely possible the investigations will continue to multiply as the 
agency turns its attention to more recent bank failures.  
 States have also assumed an active role in the subprime 
investigations. The Attorneys General in New York, California, Illinois, 
Massachusetts, Ohio and Connecticut have all initiated investigations of 
financial institutions that were involved in the subprime crisis in their 

7 Subprime Loans and More: It’s a Bull Market for Financial Fraud, FBI (Jan. 
31, 2008), http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2008/january/fin_fradu013108. 
8 Kirke M. Hasson & Ernest T. Patrikis, Here Come the Regulators, 
PILLSBURY (June/July 2008), http://www.pillsburylaw.com/siteFiles/Publications/ 
5217C99E2A691AA548942891FDB7C691.pdf. 
9 Jean Eaglesham, U.S. Sets 50 Bank Probes, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 2010, at 
A1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487036282045756 
19000289073686.html. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 The FDIC website states: “As of March 20, 2012, the FDIC has authorized 
suits in connection with 54 failed institutions against 469 individuals for D&O 
liability with damage claims of at least $7.9 billion. This includes 27 filed D&O 
lawsuits (2 of which have been dismissed after settlement with the named directors 
and officers) naming 222 former directors and officers.” Professional Liability 
Lawsuits, FDIC, http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/pls/ (last visited Mar. 
21, 2012). 
13 Id. 
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states.14 The state investigations have focused on whether mortgage lenders 
are liable under federal and state laws and regulatory statutes for deceptive 
disclosure practices with borrowers.15 Depending on the state, consumer 
protection violations of this kind can result in both criminal and civil 
liability.16 In his 2012 State of the Union address, President Obama 
announced that Attorney General Eric Holder would launch “a special unit 
of federal prosecutors and leading state attorneys general to expand [the] 
investigations into the abusive lending and packaging of risky mortgages 
that led to the housing crisis.”17 
 In addition to government and regulatory investigations into 
subprime-related activity, financial institutions may commission internal or 
“special litigation committee” investigations of their own.18 If a corporation 
believes its officers or directors may be involved in wrongdoing, it may 
choose to perform its own internal investigation. Sometimes the internal 
investigation is prompted by an external investigation similar to the 
examples discussed above. At other times, internal investigations are 
brought about in response to a demand by a shareholder who is planning to 
bring a derivative lawsuit.19 Either way, corporations commonly form 
“special litigation committees” to conduct independent investigations of 
suspected misconduct.20  
 The costs of defending a policyholder against government or 
regulatory investigations of corporate wrongdoing are staggering. It is not 
uncommon for companies to spend millions of dollars responding to 
government and regulatory investigations and defending against follow-up 
litigation. For example, in a recent New York case a company sued its 
insurer to recover $29.5 million it spent responding to a SEC and state 

14 Breen & Fallati, supra note 4, at 1; Nat’l Ass’n of Attorneys Gen., The 
Housing Bust and Approaches to the Mortgage Foreclosure Crisis, NAAGazette 
(2007).  
15 Breen & Fallati, supra note 4, at 1-3. 
16 Id. at 2. 
17 President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 24, 2012). 
18 AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, RECOMMENDED PRACTICES FOR 
COMPANIES AND THEIR COUNSEL IN CONDUCTING INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS 1 
(2008).  
19 Id.  
20  Edwards Angell Palmer & Dodge LLP, Addressing Coverage for SLC-
Incurred Legal Costs, LAW360 (Jan. 28, 2010), http://www.law360.com/articles/ 
146250/addressing-coverage-for-slc-incurred-legal-costs. 
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investigation, only $6.4 million of which the insurer agreed to pay.21 The 
costs associated with corporate investigations are substantial for several 
reasons. First, the investigations typically involve a large number of 
individuals, thus requiring a lot of time, money, and legal assistance.22 
Secondly, the investigation periods may consume months, or in some cases, 
years.23 Moreover, indemnification obligations often require corporations 
to cover the legal expenses incurred by individuals employed by the 
corporation.24 In many cases, state corporate indemnification statutes 
require companies to indemnify their directors and officers in order to 
shield them from personal liability should they make an unwise business 
decision.25 If an investigation leads to a lawsuit, the insurer may find itself 
exposed to many more millions of dollars worth of claims. Indeed, a 
number of the biggest financial institutions have already reached $400 to 
$600 million-dollar settlements in subprime-related litigation.26 Subprime-
related investigations thus threaten to cost insurance companies vast sums 
under D&O and E&O policies, whether the investigations reach the courts 
or not. 
 
III. WILL D&O AND E&O INSURANCE COVER THE COSTS OF 
DEFENDING AGAINST SUBPRIME-RELATED 
INVESTIGATIONS? 
 
 With so many subprime-related investigations surfacing on the 
heels of the financial crisis, both insurers and policyholders should be 
concerned with whether D&O and E&O (together sometimes referred to as 
“professional liability”) policies will cover the costs of responding to 
investigative inquiries and paying for legal defense fees. D&O insurance, 

21 MBIA Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. 08 civ. 4313, 2009 WL 6635307, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2009), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 652 F.3d 152, 172 (2d Cir. 
2011). 
22 Patricia Bronte, D&O Coverage for Corporate Criminal Investigations, 7 
NO. 11 INS. COVERAGE L. BULL. 1, 2 (2008). 
23 Id.  
24 Id.  
25 Joseph P. Monteleone & Nicholas J. Conca, Directors and Officers 
Indemnification and Liability Insurance: An Overview of Legal and Practical 
Issues, 51 BUS. LAW. 573, 574 (1996). 
26 Kevin LaCroix, A Status Update on the Subprime and Credit Crisis-Related 
Litigation, THE D&O DIARY (Jan. 9, 2012), http://www.dandodiary.com/2012/ 
01/articles/subprime-litigation/a-status-update-on-the-subprime-and-credit-
crisisrelated-litigation. 
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which was developed after the 1929 stock market crash, is intended to 
cover the cost of indemnifying and defending a corporation’s directors and 
officers for wrongful acts committed while carrying out their corporate 
responsibilities.27 In contrast, E&O insurance provides more general 
coverage for defense costs arising from wrongful acts committed by the 
corporation and its employees.28 Generally, the insurance company’s duty 
to defend a policyholder is activated when a lawsuit is initiated.29 If the 
allegations in the complaint support a cause of action that falls within the 
scope of the policy, coverage is triggered.30  
 Whether the policy will cover the costs associated with responding 
to and defending against a government or regulatory investigation depends, 
of course, on the actual language of the policy.31 D&O and E&O insurers 
do not share a common form, so policies vary from carrier to carrier.32 
While most policies share similar conditions and exclusions, insurance 
companies have developed their own terms and wordings over the years.33 
What may seem like a trivial difference in the wording of a key term could 
make all the difference with regard to the policy’s coverage.34 Insurance 
policies feature a number of exclusions and limitations on coverage, and it 
is common for insurance companies to deny coverage as a result. Absent an 
applicable policy exclusion, insurers have relied on ambiguities in the 
policy terms to deny coverage. Recently, insurers have capitalized on 
ambiguity in the term “claim” to avoid covering fees and costs associated 
with investigations. 

27 JOSEPH P. MONTELEONE & CARRIE E. COPE, DIRECTORS’ AND OFFICERS’ 
(D&O) LIABILITY: EXPOSURES, RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE COVERAGE 1 
(2008). 
28 Charles Allen Yuen, Errors & Omissions Insurance Coverage: Common 
Claim Scenarios, 827 PLI/Lit 65, 67 (June 2010). 
29 1 ALLAN D. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DISPUTES: REPRESENTATION 
OF INSURANCE COMPANIES AND INSUREDS § 4:1 (5th ed. 2010). 
30 Id.   
31 Bronte, supra note 22, at 2. 
32 Randy Paar, Directors and Officers Insurance, in D&O LIABILITY & 
INSURANCE 2004: DIRECTORS & OFFICERS UNDER FIRE 9, 21 (2004). 
33 CATHERINE HANNA, SUBPRIME PRIMER: WHERE’S THE PRIMARY EXPOSURE? 
4 (2008), available at http://www.hannaplaut.com/publications/Subprime 
Primer.pdf. 
34 Robert D. Chesler & Cindy Tzvi Sonenblick, Does A Subpoena Constitute A 
‘Claim’ For Purposes Of D&O Insurance Coverage?, 14 MEALEY’S EMERGING 
INS. DISPUTES 1, 1 (2009). 
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Should a policyholder be denied coverage under its professional 
liability policy, it has a number of remedies. Most often, the insured brings 
a declaratory judgment action against the insurer seeking a declaration of 
coverage under the policy.35 Policyholders also have the option of suing for 
breach of contract damages36 or breach of good faith and fair dealing.37 
Insurers must therefore be cautious when denying coverage. In D&O and 
E&O coverage disputes, the policyholder has the burden of proving that the 
claim falls within the policy’s coverage.38 When a policy exclusion is at 
issue, however, the insurer has the burden of proving that the exclusion 
applies.39 
 
IV. WHAT CONSITUTES A “CLAIM” FOR THE PURPOSES OF D&O 
AND E&O INSURANCE? 
 
D&O and E&O policies are designed as “claims made” policies, 
meaning coverage can only be triggered when a “claim” is made against 
the insured.40 The scope of the term “claim” is unclear. As companies are 
increasingly confronted with subpoenas, document requests and similar 
inquiries in connection with government and regulatory investigations and 
lawsuits prompted by the financial crisis, the companies have submitted 
claims to their insurers seeking coverage under their D&O and E&O 
policies. In turn, a number of insurers have denied coverage on the premise 
that the subpoena, document request or inquiry does not constitute a 
“claim” under the policy. As a result, the meaning of a “claim” has recently 
become a hotly contested issue in determining whether coverage extends to 
government and regulatory investigations.41  
 
 

35 See, e.g., Diamond Glass Companies, Inc. v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., No. 
06-CV-13105(BSJ)(AJP), 2008 WL 4613170, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2008); St. 
Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Foster, 268 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1040 (C.D. Ill. 2003); 
Foster v. Summit Med. Sys., Inc., 610 N.W.2d 350, 353 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000). 
36 E.g., Diamond Glass Companies, 2008 WL 4613170, at *1. 
37 E.g., Ctr. for Blood Research, Inc. v. Coregis Ins. Co., 305 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 
2002). 
38 WINDT, supra note 29. 
39 Id.   
40 Monteleone & Conca, supra note 25, at 588. 
41 ORRICK, HERRIGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP, When Is a Claim Not a Claim? 
Insurance for Government and Regulatory Investigations, Insuance Recovery Case 
Law Update, ORRICK 1 (2009), www.orrick.com/fileupload/2055.pdf. 
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A. DEFINING A “CLAIM” 
 
 In determining whether or not coverage applies to an investigation 
or noncourt proceeding, the policyholder and insurer must ask themselves 
whether the action in question gives rise to a “claim,” and whether that 
claim was made during the policy period.42 It follows that the critical 
question is, “What is a claim?” In the 1980’s and 90’s very few 
professional liability policies defined the term.43 In one early case, the court 
quoted Justice Frankfurter as saying that “claim” is one of those “words of 
many-hued meanings [which] derive their scope from the use to which they 
are put.”44 When the meaning of the term was disputed in the earlier 
coverage cases, courts looked to the accepted meaning of the word within 
the context of the agreement, since “an insurance policy, like any contract, 
must be construed to effectuate the intent of the parties as derived from the 
plain meaning of the policy’s terms.”45 The courts have determined that the 
term has no special meaning in the insurance industry.46 The Merriam-
Webster Dictionary defines the word “claim” as “a demand for something 
due or believed to be due.”47 According to Black’s Law Dictionary, a 
“claim” is:  
 
(1) The aggregate of operative facts giving rise to a right 
enforceable by a court. (2) The assertion of an existing 

42 Peter S. Selvin, Parsing Policies, LA DAILY J., May 29, 2009, at 7.  
43 Bronte, supra 20, at 2. Examples of cases disputing the meaning of the term 
in the absence of a policy definition include Andy Warhol Found. for the Visual 
Arts, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 189 F.3d 208 (2nd Cir.1999); Winkler v. Nat’l Union 
Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 930 F.2d 1364 (9th Cir. 1991); Polychron v. Crum 
& Forster Ins. Cos., 916 F.2d 461 (8th Cir. 1990); MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Home 
State Savs. Ass’n, 797 F.2d 285 (6th Cir. 1986); In re Ambassador Group, Inc. 
Litig., 830 F. Supp. 147 (E.D.N.Y. 1993); Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. Federal Sav. & 
Loan Ins. Corp., 695 F. Supp. 469 (C.D. Cal. 1987)).  
44 MGIC, 797 F.2d at 288 (quoting Powell v. U.S. Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 
497, 529 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).  
45 Andy Warhol, 189 F.3d at 215 (citing In re Prudential Lines, Inc., 158 F.3d 
65, 77 (2d Cir. 1998)). See, e.g., Polychron, 916 F.2d at 463; Joseph P. Bornstein, 
Ltd. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 828 F.2d 242, 245 (4th Cir. 
1987); Richardson Elecs, Ltd. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 120 F. Supp. 2d 698, 700-01 (N.D. 
Ill. 2000); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Ayo, 1992 WL 245552, at *3 (E.D. La. Sept. 
9,1992), aff’d, 31 F.3d 285 (5th Cir. 1994). 
46 Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 642 N.E.2d 
723 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). 
47 MERRIAM-WEBSTER COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 227 (11th ed. 2011).  
2012 SUBPRIME AND CREDIT CRISIS 593 
right; any right to payment or to an equitable remedy, even 
if contingent or provisional. (3) A demand for money, 
property, or a legal remedy to which one asserts a right.48 
 
Many courts have relied on a definition of an insurance “claim” as the 
“assertion, demand or challenge of something as a right; the assertion of 
liability to the party making it to do some service or pay a sum of 
money.”49 
 Due to the frequency of corporate scandals over the last decade, 
insurers have become more careful about defining key terms in insurance 
policies. Today, most D&O and E&O policies expressly define the term 
“claim,” albeit with variation.50 The majority of D&O and E&O policies 
associate a “claim” with a civil lawsuit commenced by the service of a 
complaint.51 Apart from civil lawsuits, however, the scope of the definition 
varies from policy to policy.52 Some policies include criminal or 
administrative proceedings within the definition, and others define a 
“claim” more broadly to include arbitrations and mediations as well.53 The 
definition may explicitly include government or regulatory investigations.54 
A “claim” is also sometimes defined more generally as the start of a 
“judicial or administrative proceeding.”55  
 Since the definition varies from one policy to the next, the precise 
wording is critical to determining if coverage extends to certain actions.56 
Where the definition specifically includes a “government or regulatory 
investigation” or a “judicial or administrative proceeding,” it is likely a 
formal government investigation into a company’s alleged wrongdoing 
related to subprime lending practices would fall within the meaning of a 
“claim.” Likewise, definitions that encompass “investigations by any 

48 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 281-82 (9th ed. 2009).  
49 See, e.g., Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. Fed. Savs. & Loan Ins. Corp., 695 F. Supp. 
469, 479 (C.D. Cal. 1987).   
50 Bronte, supra note 22, at 3.  
51 When Is a Claim Not a Claim?, supra note 41. The service of a complaint is 
“relatively easily recognizable as a claim.” 
52 When Is a Claim Not a Claim?, supra note 41. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 David E. Borden & Ellen B. Van Vechten, Directors’ and Officers’ Liability 
Insurance, in 4 LAW AND PRACTICE OF INSURANCE COVERAGE LITIGATION 47-12, 
47-18 (David L. Leitner et al. eds., 2005). 
56 HANNA, supra note 33, at 4. 
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governmental entity into possible violation of law” will probably provide 
coverage for formal subprime investigations.57 
 The more challenging question is whether a preliminary 
investigation or proceeding – marked by a grand jury subpoena, document 
request, or informal inquiry or the like – falls within one of the policy 
definitions of a “claim.” Professional liability policies are frequently 
unclear as to whether coverage extends to preliminary investigations and 
noncourt proceedings commenced before the corporation or its directors 
and officers are formally threatened with a suit or charged with 
misconduct.58 The majority of D&O and E&O policies “intend to treat as 
covered only those SEC or government fees and expenses incurred after the 
date the SEC elevates an investigation to formal status or the government 
issues a ‘target’ letter to an insured party.”59 If the definition of a “claim” 
does not explicitly include the action in question (e.g. a subpoena, 
document request, target letter, etc.), the insurance company may have a 
basis for denying coverage for the costs associated with such an action.60  
 
B. SUBPOENAS AND INVESTIGATIVE DEMANDS  
 
 Generally, investigations into corporate wrongdoing – whether led 
by an attorney general, a regulatory agency or a grand jury – begin with the 
issuance of a subpoena.61 Most courts have held that a subpoena constitutes 
a “claim.”62 The decisions, however, have been highly fact sensitive.63 Any 
variation in policy wording or the facts of a case may affect the insurer’s 
duty to defend.  
 One of the first cases to address whether a subpoena or grand jury 
investigation falls within the meaning of a “claim” under a professional 
liability insurance policy was Polychron v. Crum & Forster Ins. Co.64 After 

57 R. Mark Keenan & Craig M. Hirsch, Subprime Lending Litigation and 
Investigations: Insuring Against the Costs, COMPLINET (May 2, 2007), 
http://www.andersonkill.com/webpdfext/Complinet-May2007-
KeenanAndHirsch.pdf. 
58 Jonathan C. Dickey & Amy L. Goodman, Practicing Law Institute, 
Indemnification, D&O Insurance, and Other Funding Mechanisms, in SECURITIES 
LITIGATION: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 14-1, 14-24 (Jonathan C. Dickey ed., 2008). 
59 McCarrick, supra note 3, at 312. 
60 When Is a Claim Not a Claim?, supra note 41. 
61 Chesler & Sonenblick, supra note 34, at 1. 
62 Id.  
63 Id.  
64 Polychron v. Crum & Forster Ins. Cos., 916 F.2d 461 (8th Cir. 1990). 
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a D&O insurer refused to reimburse a bank president for legal fees incurred 
during a grand jury investigation, the bank president (the policyholder) 
brought action to recover his losses.65 He argued that the grand jury 
investigation, which began with receipt of a subpoena for documents, 
constituted a “claim” against him under the policy.66 The insurance 
company, on the other hand, contended that a “claim” didn’t manifest until 
the grand jury indicted him – which occurred after the policy had expired.67 
Since the insurance policy did not define a “claim,” the court examined the 
ordinary meaning of the word and determined that the term was broad 
enough to encompass the grand jury investigation prior to the indictment: 
 
The function of a subpoena is to command a party to 
produce certain documents and therefore constitutes a 
“claim” against a party. The subpoena, it is true, was 
directed to the bank, but the documents demanded . . . 
related to the plaintiff’s conduct as a bank official. Further, 
the grand jury’s investigation and the questioning by the 
Assistant United States Attorney amounted, as a practical 
matter, to an allegation of wrongdoing against [the 
policyholder], for which he prudently hired an attorney. 
The defendant’s characterization of the grand jury 
investigation as mere requests for information and an 
explanation underestimates the seriousness of such a 
probe.68 
 
 Likewise, in Richardson Electronics, Ltd., v. Federal Insurance 
Co. the U.S. District Court held that subpoenas and other demands made in 
a government investigation constituted a claim for the purposes of a 
professional liability policy.69 After racking up more than $5 million in 
legal fees in connection with a criminal antitrust violation investigation by 
the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department, Richardson Electronics 
(hereafter “Richardson”) sought reimbursement under its D&O policy.70 As 
part of the investigation, the Justice Department served a Civil 

65 Id. at 462. 
66 Id.  
67 Id.  
68 Id. at 463. 
69 Richardson Elecs., Ltd. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 120 F. Supp. 2d 698, 701 (N.D. Ill. 
2000). 
70 Id. at 699. 
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Investigative Demand and subpoenaed documents and testimony by 
Richardson executives and employees.71 When Federal Insurance Co. 
(hereafter “Federal”) refused to pay, Richardson sued. Federal argued that 
the antitrust investigation did not constitute a “claim” under the policy, and 
as a result the costs associated with the investigation were not covered by 
insurance.72 Although the policy defined a number key terms, like 
“wrongful act” and “losses,”73 it did not supply a definition of the term 
“claim.”74 The court examined the dictionary definition of the term (“a 
demand for something due or believed to be due”75) and concluded that the 
Justice Department’s investigation sufficed because it “required Richardson 
and its officers and directors to comply with various demands for testimony 
and production of documents.”76 The court emphasized that a claim is a 
“demand for something due,” but not necessarily money.77  
 
1. A “Claim” is More than a Mere Threat or Document Request 
 
 The mere threat of litigation or legal action does not give rise to a 
“claim.”78 By its very nature, a “claims-made” policy provides coverage for 
“claims” made against the insured. The threat of legal action is merely a 
potential claim, since it has not met the condition that a claim actually have 
been made.79 The distinction between a potential claim and “claim” giving 
rise to coverage was described in Bensalem Township v. Western World 
Insurance Co., where the court held that “‘notice that it is [someone’s] 
intention to hold the insureds responsible for a Wrongful Act’ is an event 

71 Id. at 700.  
72 Id. The policy provided that Federal would pay “on behalf of each of the 
insured persons all loss for which [he] is not indemnified by the insured 
organization legally obligated to pay on account of any claim(s) made against him . 
. . for a wrongful act committed . . . before or during the policy period.” Id. at 699 
n.3. 
73 Id. at 699 n.3. 
74 Id. at 700-01. 
75 Richardson Elecs., Ltd., 120 F. Supp. 2d at 701 (quoting Cent. Ill. Pub. 
Serv. Co. v. Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 642 N.E.2d 723, 725 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1994)). 
76 Id.  
77 Id. 
78 Winkler v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 930 F.2d 1364, 1366 
(9th Cir. 1991). 
79 Id. See also MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Home State Savs. Ass’n, 797 F.2d 285, 
288 (6th Cir. 1986).  
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commonly antecedent to and different in kind from a ‘claim.’”80 Thus, 
letters or actions that “indicate the likelihood, if not inevitability, of some 
future claim . . . do not constitute a ‘claim made’ . . . .”81 It is also well 
settled that “requests for explanations, expressions of dissatisfaction or 
disappointment, mere complaining, or the lodging of grievance” do not 
constitute “claims.”82  
  Similarly, courts have differentiated between a mere request for 
information and a more serious government or regulatory investigation.83 In 
Trice v. Employers Reinsurance Corp. it was held that a request for 
information did not constitute a “demand for money or services” within the 
meaning of a claim, even though the request specifically alluded to the 
possibility of a lawsuit.84 The court said that “‘an actual claim is 
distinguished from an ‘event’ which could give rise to an actual claim in 
the future.’”85 In St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co. v. Foster the court held 
that a letter from an attorney requesting information about the company did 
not constitute a “claim.”86 The court distinguished between the letter at 
hand and the Justice Department’s demand for documents in Richardson.87 
“[T]he seriousness of [the Justice Department’s] investigation was clearly 
material to the district court’s determination [in Richards Electronics] . . . 
.”88 While “a formal lawsuit is not required to present ‘a demand for money 
or services,’ the inquiry must present more than a mere request for 
information.”89 The court explained that such a broad construction of a 
claim would be “bad public policy” because it would produce “a flood of 
notices of ‘claims’ based on requests for information or efforts at 

80 Bensalem Twp. v. W. World Ins. Co., 609 F. Supp. 1343, 1348 (E.D. 
Pa.1985) (quoting language from Article VI of the policy in question). 
81 In re Ambassador Group, Inc., Litig. 830 F. Supp. 147, 154 (E.D.N.Y. 
1993).  
82 Monteleone & Conca, supra note 25, at 589. 
83 See, e.g., Richardson Elecs., Ltd., v. Fed. Ins. Co., 120 F. Supp. 2d 698, 701 
(N.D. Ill. 2000). 
84 Trice v. Emp’rs Reinsurance Corp., No. 97-1271, 1997 WL 449736, at *3 
(7th Cir. 1997) (citing Nat’l Fire Ins. Co. v. Bartolazo, 27 F.3d 518, 519 (11th Cir. 
1994)). 
85 Id. (quoting Emp’rs Ins. of Wausaw v. Bodi-Wachs Aviation Ins. Agency, 
Inc., 39 F.3d 138, 143 (7th Cir. 1994)). 
86 St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Foster, 268 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1047 (C.D. Ill. 
2003). 
87 Id. 
88 Id.  
89 Id. (citing Trice, 1997 WL 449736 at *3). 
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intimidation by attorneys that may never materialize into demands against 
any insurance policies.”90  
 A survey of the case law shows that the determining factor as to 
whether a demand for information constitutes a claim is its seriousness. For 
example, the court in National Stock Exchange v. Federal Ins. Co. found 
that a request for an informal document regarding subprime activities did 
not constitute a “claim.”91 The distinction drawn between a demand and a 
request in cases like National Stock Exchange can spell trouble for 
policyholders who comply with an informal request in hopes of nipping the 
inquiry in the bud. If a “regulatory request and investigation is informal and 
a settlement is made in compromise to avoid a formal investigation, 
coverage may be precluded entirely.”92 
 In contrast, the court in Dan Nelson Automotive Group v. 
Universal Underwriting held that a civil investigative demand by various 
states attorneys general gave rise to a claim under an E&O policy.93 The 
court found that the demands, which requested that the plaintiff produce 
certain documents regarding its business practices, “functioned to 
command the Plaintiffs to produce documents and provide information 
relevant to the alleged violations of statutes, and therefore constitute a 
claim . . . within the meaning of the policy.”94  
In Ace American Insurance Company v. Ascend One Corporation, 
the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland weighed the seriousness 
of state subpoenas and investigative demands and whether they constituted 
a “claim.”95 In this case, Amerix, the policyholder, was served by the 
Office of the Attorney General of Maryland with an “administrative 
subpoena” pursuant to the Maryland Consumer Protection Act.96 Among 
other things, the subpoena sought documents relating to the company’s 
structure, governance, relationship and interactions with consumers. A year 
later, the Texas Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division served 
Amerix with a “civil investigative demand.”97 In response, Amerix hired 

90 Id.  
91 Nat’l Stock Exch. v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. 06 C 1603, 2007 WL 1030293, at *6 
(N.D. Ill. 2007). 
92 HANNA, supra note 16, at 5. 
93 Dan Nelson Auto. Grp. v. Universal Underwriting, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
4987 (D.S.D. Jan. 15, 2008). 
94 Id. at *16-17. 
95 Ace Am. Ins. Co. v. Ascend One Corp., 570 F. Supp. 2d 789, 796 (D. Md. 
2008). 
96 Id. at 791.  
97 Id. at 792.  
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attorneys, produced “tremendous quantities” of information and data for 
the state officials, and paid over $140,000 in fees and expenses.98  
Unsurprisingly, ACE denied the claim on the basis that neither the 
subpoena nor the demand contained a “claim for wrongful acts,” as 
required under the policy.99 The court determined otherwise. “Claim” was 
defined as “a civil, administrative or regulatory investigation against any 
Insured commenced by the filing of a notice of charges, investigative order 
or similar document.”100 The court evaluated the seriousness of the 
documents in order to determine whether or not they constituted an 
“investigation” under the definition, noting that both documents came from 
state attorneys general offices.101 It found that both the “caption on the 
subpoena (‘In re: Amerix’) and the specific inquiries into Amerix’s 
marketing and credit counseling activities” indicated that the policyholder 
was the target of an investigation and “not simply a source of 
information.”102 It concluded that:  
 
The extent and specificity of the Subpoena and Texas 
Demand indicate that the documents were issued to serve 
the function of an investigative order. This is further 
supported by the fact that the sole investigatory tool 
granted to the Maryland Attorney General’s office under 
the Consumer Protection Act is subpoena power. 
Therefore, the Subpoena . . . and related Texas Demand 
are, or at the very least are equivalent to, the filing of an 
investigative order or similar document.103 
 
 Some courts have drawn a distinction between a subpoena issued 
to a custodian of records for the purposes of producing records, and a 
subpoena seeking more than just information. In Center for Blood 
Research, Inc. v. Coregis Insurance Co. the First Circuit of the U.S. Court 
of Appeals addressed whether a subpoena served by an Attorney General 
constituted a “claim,” when there was no indication that the government 

98 Id.  
99 Id.  
100 Id. at 793.  
101 Ace Am. Ins. Co., 570 F. Supp. 2d at 796. 
102 Id. at 797.  
103 Id. at 798.  
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was seeking anything more than information from the organization.104 The 
policy definition of “claim” included “any judicial or administrative 
proceeding in which any insured(s) may be subjected to a binding 
adjudication of liability for damages or other relief.”105 The court reasoned 
that a subpoena for the production of records “could not possibly” subject 
the policyholder “to a binding adjudication of liability in the investigation 
before the assistant United States attorney.”106 Even if the investigation 
uncovered information leading to the commencement of civil or criminal 
proceedings, those proceedings would “have had to have been pursued in a 
different form.”107 The court chided the policyholder on not recognizing the 
“limitations of the investigation and of the scope of coverage under the 
insurance policy.”108 Notably, subpoenas or investigative demands from 
private counsel are not enough to establish the existence of an 
“investigation” for these purposes.109 
 
2. A “Claim” is a Demand for Damages or Relief 
 
 Most professional liability policies require a claim for damages.110 
Some define a “claim” as a “written demand for money”111 or a “written 
demand for monetary or non-monetary relief.”112 Others include within the 
definition of a “claim” a requirement that there be a “binding adjudication 
of liability for damages or relief.”113 The damages and relief requirements 
can prove problematic for policyholders who are under investigation and 
seeking insurance coverage. When D&O and E&O policies require a claim 
for “damages,” a policyholder may have difficulty convincing the court that 

104 Ctr. for Blood Research, Inc. v. Coregis Ins. Co., 305 F.3d 38, 42 (1st. Cir. 
2002). 
105 Id.  
106 Id.  
107 Id. at 42-43. 
108 Id. at 42. 
109 St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Foster, 268 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1048 (C.D. Ill. 
2003) (holding that a demand for documents from a private attorney was not a 
‘claim’). 
110 Selvin, supra note 42.  
111 Borden et al., supra note 55. 
112 When Is a Claim Not a Claim? Insurance for Government and Regulatory 
Investigations, supra note 39. 
113 Foster v. Summit Medical Systems, Inc., 610 N.W.2d 350, 354 (Minn. 
2000); Ctr. for Blood Research v. Coregis Ins. Co., 305 F.3d 38, 40 (1st Cir. 2002). 
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a regulatory action seeking restitution or civil penalties is covered.114 In 
such cases, claims seeking restitution, disgorgement, fines or civil penalties 
have been found to fall outside of the policy’s coverage. In Bank of the 
West v. Superior Court, for example, the court held that sums of money 
paid as disgorgement were not “damages” within the meaning of the 
insurance policy.115  
 The concept of “relief” as it relates to the definition of a “claim” 
has been a focus of much litigation. In Foster v. Summit Medical Systems, 
Inc. the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that a SEC investigation was not 
a covered claim because it did not subject the directors and officers or 
company to a binding adjudication for relief, as required by the D&O 
policy.116 The policy defined a “Securities Action Claim” as “any judicial 
or administrative proceeding initiated against any of the Directors and 
Officers or the Company based upon, arising out of, or in any way 
involving [securities laws and regulations] . . . in which they may be 
subjected to a binding adjudication of liability for damages or other relief . 
. . .”117 The court held that a SEC subpoena did not fit within either the 
ordinary or legal meaning of the term “relief.”118 
 In Minuteman International, Inc. v. Great American Insurance Co. 
the court advanced a much broader interpretation of “relief.”119 The facts of 
the case resemble most other claim disputes. The SEC issued an order 
directing a private investigation of Minuteman International Inc. (hereafter 
“Minuteman”) and sent it a subpoena and a notice of investigation.120 
Minuteman spent nearly $1 million complying with document production, 
retaining counsel, and complying with a subsequent SEC cease-and-desist 
order.121 The insurance carrier declined to reimburse Minuteman, claiming 
that the SEC investigation did not constitute a “claim” under the D&O 
policy because no relief was sought.122 The insurer tried to draw a 
distinction between “seeking relief in the form of monetary damages, 

114 Selvin, supra note 42 (“One of the most challenging issues from a 
policyholder’s perspective is establishing that the FTC or other regulatory action 
seeks damages, as distinct from restitution or penalties.”). 
115 Bank of the West v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 4th 1254 (1992). 
116 Foster, 610 N.W.2d at 351. 
117 Id. at 354.  
118 Id.  
119 Minuteman Int’l. Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., No. 3 C 6067, 2004 WL 
603482 (N.D. Ill Mar. 22, 2004). 
120 Id. at *2. 
121 Id.  
122 Id. at *3.  
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injunctive-type sanctions, or criminal charges and performing the 
investigation that leads up to a request for that type of relief.”123 The court 
disagreed, finding that the relief sought by the subpoena was the production  
of documents or testimony.124 “Consistent with Richardson and Polychron, 
the [SEC] Order and subsequent subpoenas served on plaintiff were 
demands for relief in that they were demands for something due. A demand 
for ‘relief’ is a broad enough term to include a demand for something due, 
including a demand to produce documents or appear to testify.”125 
 Not every court has agreed with Minuteman’s broad interpretation 
of the term “relief.” In Diamond Glass Companies, Inc. v. Twin City Fire 
Insurance Co., the court rejected Minuteman’s conclusion, choosing 
instead to rely on the ordinary and accepted meaning of the word.126 
Diamond Glass Co. (hereafter “Diamond”) was issued a subpoena by a 
federal grand jury seeking the production of documents and testimony as 
part of a government investigation into the company’s business practices.127 
When Diamond submitted the claim to its insurer, the insurer categorized 
the matter as a “notice of a potential claim.”128 The insurer asked Diamond 
to notify it when an actual claim was made against the company, and said 
any defense costs incurred prior to the matter rising to the level of an actual 
claim would not be covered.129 Litigation ensued over whether the grand 
jury investigation and subpoena constituted a “claim” for the purposes of 
the D&O policy.  
 Diamond made three unsuccessful arguments for why insurance 
coverage should have attached.130 First, it unsuccessfully argued that the 

123 Id. at *5. 
124 Id. at *7.  
125 Minuteman Int’l. Inc., 2004 WL 603482 at *7. 
126 Diamond Glass Cos. v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., No. 06-CV-
13105(BSJ)(AJP), 2008 WL 4613170 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2008). 
127 Id. at *1.  
128 Id. at *2.  
129 Id. 
130 Id. The policy definitions, in pertinent part, are as follows:  
 “Entity Claim” means any:  
(1) written demand for monetary damages or nonmonetary 
relief commenced by the receipt of such demand; [or] 
(2) civil proceeding commenced by the service of a 
complaint or similar pleading; or  
(3) criminal proceeding, or formal administrative or 
regulatory proceeding commenced by the return of an 
indictment, filing of a notice of charges, or similar document; 
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investigation was a criminal proceeding within the definition of an “Entity 
Claim.”131 The court rejected the argument on the grounds that the policy 
language expressly required “the return of an indictment, filing of a notice 
of charges or similar document.”132 In the absence of such proceedings, the 
investigation was not a criminal proceeding within the meaning of the 
policy. Next, Diamond made an argument that the grand jury subpoenas 
constituted “written demands for non-monetary relief” as described in the 
definition of an “Entity Claim.”133 The court rejected Minuteman’s broad 
description of the word “relief” and held that the ordinary meaning of the 
word and the term’s context in the policy make clear that investigative 
subpoenas and search warrants are not “demands for non-monetary 
relief.”134 Diamond’s last argument for why the investigation constituted a 
“claim” involved the “target” language under the definition of an Insured 
Person Claim.135 Diamond claimed that it became a “target” within the 
meaning of the policy when it was subpoenaed to testify before a grand 
jury and informed that it was a subject in the grand jury investigation.136 
The court held that coverage did not apply because Diamond never 
received “written notice” identifying it as a “target individual against 
whom formal charges may be commenced.”137 For the reasons stated 
above, the court determined that Diamond had failed to state a claim and 
was not entitled to coverage under the liability policy.138  

  against an Insured Entity.  
“Insured Person Claim” means any:  
(1) written demand for monetary damages or nonmonetary 
relief commenced by the receipt of such demand;  
  against an Insured Person 
“Insured Person Claim” also means a formal civil, criminal, 
administrative, or regulatory investigation commenced by the 
service upon or other receipt by an Insured Person of a written 
notice from an investigating authority specifically identifying 
such Insured Person as a target individual against whom formal 
charges maybe commenced. 
131 Id. at *3. 
132 Diamond Glass Cos., 2008 WL 4613170 at *3. 
133 Id. at *4. 
134 Id.  
135 Id. at *5.  
136 Id.  
137 Id.  
138 Diamond Glass Cos., 2008 WL 4613170 at *5. 
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 Furthermore, the court in Andy Warhol Foundation for Visual Arts, 
Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co. held that a letter that requested additional 
information and informed the insured of a willingness to take “all 
reasonable and necessary steps . . . to effect a recovery in this matter” did 
not state a “claim” because it made no demand for relief.139 In MGIC 
Indem. Corp v. Home State Sav. Ass’n, the court emphasized that the policy 
agreement is “speaking not of a claim that wrongdoing occurred, but a 
claim for some discrete amount of money owed to the claimant on account 
of the alleged wrongdoing.”140 The court said that claims “made in the 
newspapers that directors and officers . . . engaged in wrongful acts” would 
“obviously not be the kind of ‘claims’ that could make [an insurance 
company] liable under the insuring agreement.”141 Only claims that demand 
payment of “some amount of money” could trigger the insurer’s obligation 
to cover the expenses.142 
  
V. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: THE SECOND AND ELEVENTH 
CIRCUITS ADDRESS D&O COVERAGE FOR REGULATORY 
INVESTIGATIONS 
  
Last year proved to be an important one in solving the recurring 
question whether D&O coverage extends to expenses incurred in 
connection with informal government and regulatory investigations of the 
policyholder. In 2010 both the Second and Eleventh Circuits for the U.S. 
Court of Appeals reviewed appeals addressing the issue and came to 
different results, one finding coverage and the other not. The cases 
highlight just how fact sensitive the determination remains, since both 
opinions relied heavily on the specific circumstances and key policy 
definitions at issue.  
  
A. MBIA, INC. V. FEDERAL INSURANCE CO.  
 
In the widely publicized case MBIA, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., the 
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York was confronted 
with whether a company’s D&O policy covered defense costs incurred in 

139 Andy Warhol Found. for Visual Arts, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 189 F.3d 208, 
216 (2d Cir. 1999). 
140 MGIC Indem. Corp, v. Home State Sav. Ass’n., 797 F.2d 285, 288 (6th 
Cir. 1986). 
141 Id.  
142 Id.  
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connection with an SEC order of investigation and several subpoenas 
issued by the SEC and the New York Attorney General (NYAG).143 In 
2001, the SEC issued an Order Directing Private Investigation and began 
an inquiry into alleged accounting misstatements in the insurance 
industry.144 In 2004, it issued subpoenas compelling MBIA to produce 
various documents concerning transactions involving “non-traditional 
products.”145 That same year, the NYAG joined the investigation and 
served MBIA with similar subpoenas.146 When MBIA alerted its insurers 
and asked for their consent to retain counsel and respond to the agency’s 
inquiries, the insurers denied that the subpoenas triggered coverage under 
the D&O policies. Concerned with the investigation’s negative market 
impact, MBIA asked regulators to forgo the issuance of further subpoenas 
and volunteered to comply with additional informal requests for 
information.147 MBIA subsequently filed suit against its insurers for breach 
of contract and sought a declaratory judgment of coverage.148  
MBIA’s D&O policy provided coverage for defense costs for 
“Securities Claims,” defined as “a formal or informal administrative or 
regulatory proceeding or inquiry commenced by the filing of a notice of 
charges, formal or informal investigative order or similar document” that 
“in whole or in part, is based upon, arises from or is in consequence of the 
purchase or sale of, or over to purchase or sell any securities issued by 
[MBIA].”149 The district court found coverage under the definition for both 
the SEC and NYAG investigations. The NYAG subpoena was held to have 
triggered coverage because “an ordinary businessperson would view a 
subpoena as a ‘formal or informal investigative order’ based on the 
common understanding of these words.”150 Also of importance in the 

143 MBIA, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. 08 civ. 4313 (RMB), 2009 WL 6635307, 
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2009). MBIA held a $15 million primary D&O insurance 
policy with Federal Insurance Company (Federal) and a $15 million excess policy 
with ACE American Insurance Company (ACE) (collectively, the insurers). Id. at 
*2. The two policies were the same in all relevant respects, and are thus 
collectively referred to as the policy. Id. at *1.  
144 Id.  
145 Id.  
146 Id.   
147 Id. at *3.  
148 Id. at *1.  
149 MBIA, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 2009 WL 6635307 at *2. 
150 Id. at *6. The subpoena stated, “WE HEREBY COMMAND YOU . . . [to] 
deliver and turn over to the [NYAG] all documents and information requested . . . 
606 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL Vol. 18.2 
court’s decision was the inclusion of the term “similar document” in the 
definition of a “claim.” The court held that even if the subpoena were not 
an “order” within the policy definition of a “Securities Claim,” it is a 
“similar document” capable of commencing an investigation.151 The court 
also held that legal costs incurred by a special litigation committee (SLC) 
were covered under the company’s D&O policy.152 In the midst of the SEC 
and state investigations into MBIA’s investments, several shareholders 
filed derivative suits against the company.153 As is common, MBIA formed 
an SLC comprised of members of its Board of Directors to investigate the 
allegations made in the derivative actions.154 The insurer declined to 
reimburse MBIA for the costs associated with the internal SLC 
investigation (namely attorney fees) because the committee engaged in 
“independent decision-making” and consequently the attorney that was 
hired to assist it “could not have represented the company through its 
representation of the SLC.”155 The court disagreed, noting that the SLC 
“was vested with full and exclusive authority . . . to determine whether 
pursuit of the litigation was in the best interest of MBIA.”156 The court thus 
held that the internal investigation fell within the policy’s definition of a 
“Securities Claim.” 
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s holdings 
with regard to the SEC order, NYAG subpoena, and the SLC. The insurers’ 
argument that the NYAG subpoena was a “mere discovery device” and 
dissimilar to an investigative order fell flat.157 Referencing ACE Am. Ins. 
Co. v. Ascend One Corp., the court said a NYAG subpoena is “at the 
absolute minimum, a ‘similar document’ to those listed in the definition of 
a ‘Securities Claim’ because it is similar to other forms of investigative 
demands by regulators.”158 The Second Circuit also agreed with the district 
court’s assessment that a businessperson would view the NYAG subpoena 
as a “formal or investigative order” based on the common understanding of 
the words.159 With regards to the SLC matter, the Second Circuit broadened 

.” Id. The court noted that MBIA’s failure to comply with the order “may subject 
[it] to prosecution.” Id.  
151 Id. at *6. 
152 Id. at *9. 
153 Id. at *4. 
154 Id.at *4, *9.  
155 MBIA, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 2009 WL 6635307 at *9. 
156 Id.  
157 MBIA Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 652 F.3d 152, 160 (2d Cir. 2011). 
158 Id. at 159-60. 
159 Id. at 159. 
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the district court’s holding and ruled that the SLC expenses fell within the 
policy’s definition of “Defense Costs.”160 The court based its decision on 
the fact that MBIA directed and acted through the SLC when the SLC 
moved to dismiss the derivative suit, and thus constituted an “insured 
person” under the policy.161 
 
B. OFFICE DEPOT, INC. V. NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE CO. OF 
PITTSBURG, PA. 
 
In Office Depot, Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburg, Pa., 
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida held that costs 
incurred by Office Depot, Inc. in connection with an informal SEC 
investigation and an internal investigation and audit were not covered by 
the office supply company’s D&O insurance policy.162 Upon receipt of a 
letter informing it that the SEC was “conducting an inquiry” into the 
company to determine whether it had violated federal securities laws, 
Office Depot voluntarily produced various documents and made its 
employees and officers available for sworn testimony.163 Because the 
informal SEC investigation never culminated in the filing of any judicial or 
administrative complaints against the company or its directors or officers, 
coverage for the investigation was denied.164 Office Depot sued for over 
$23 million in reimbursement for legal fees and expenses incurred in 
connection with the informal SEC investigation, as well as an internal audit 
and investigation of the company’s accounting practices initiated in 
response to a whistleblower complaint.165 Applying Florida law, the district 
court granted the insurers’ motions for summary judgment, holding that the 
SEC investigation was not a “Securities Claim” within the policy’s 
definition.166   

160 Id. at 162.  
161 Id. at 163-64. 
162 Office Depot, Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburg, Pa., 734 F. 
Supp. 2d 1304 (S.D. Fla. 2010). 
163 Id. at 1310. 
164 Id. at 1308. 
165 Id. at 1312.  
166 Id. at 1309. The policy definition of “Securities Claim” was as follows:  
“(y) “Securities Claim” means a Claim, other than an administrative 
or regulatory proceeding against, or investigation of an Organization, 
made against any insured:  
(1) alleging a violation of any federal, state, local or foreign 
regulation, rule or statute regulating securities . . .; or  
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Thereafter, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
issued an unpublished per curiam opinion affirming the lower court’s 
holding and denying coverage for Office Depot’s defense costs.167 The 
Eleventh Circuit rejected Office Depot’s argument that “administrative or 
regulatory proceeding” was an undefined and ambiguous term and could 
thus reasonably include an investigation of the insured entity.168 The court 
determined that the expenses incurred after the SEC’s request for voluntary 
cooperation were “in furtherance of its pre-suit discovery” and “constituted 
an ‘investigation’ rather than an ‘administrative or regulatory 
proceeding.’”169 Since the policy’s definition of a “Securities Claim” 
expressly excepted both “an administrative or regulatory proceeding 
against” and “an investigation of” Office Depot,170 the court held that the 
costs were not covered.171 The Eleventh Circuit also affirmed the district 
court’s holding that the investigation did not fall within the definition of a 
“claim” under the insured party indemnification provision, since the letters 
sent by the SEC “only broadly request[ed] information to assist the SEC in 
determining whether Office Depot committed securities violations.”172 
Unlike a Wells Notice, which all parties agreed triggered a claim under the 

(2) brought derivatively on the behalf of an Organization by 
a security holder of such Organization.  
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the term “Securities Claim” shall 
include an administrative or regulatory proceeding against an 
Organization, but only if and only during the time such proceeding is also 
commenced and continuously maintained against an Insured Person.” 
(Emphasis added by court). 
167 Office Depot, Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., No. 11-
10814, 2011 WL 4840951, at *1 (11th Cir. Oct. 30, 2011). 
168 Id. at *3.  
169 Id.   
170 Id.  
171 Id. at *3.  
172 Id. at *4 (alteration in the original). The policy defined, in relevant part, a 
‘Claim’ as: (2) a civil, criminal, administrative, regulatory or arbitration 
proceeding for monetary, non-monetary or injunctive relief which is commenced 
by: (i) service of a complaint or similar pleading; (ii) return of an indictment, 
information or similar document (in the case of a criminal proceeding); or (iii) 
receipt or filing of a notice of charges; or (3) a civil, criminal, administrative or 
regulatory investigation of an Insured Person: (i) once such Insured Person is 
identified in writing by such investigating authority as a person against whom a 
proceeding described in Definition (b)(2) may be commenced; or (ii) in the case of 
an investigation by the SEC or a similar state or foreign government authority, 
after the service of a subpoena upon such Insured Person. Id. at *3. 
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definition, the SEC letters at issue did “not allege that violations have 
occurred or identify specific individuals that could be charged in future 
proceedings.” Since the correspondence did not fall within the policy’s 
definition of a “claim,” it did not trigger coverage.  
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
Although a number of jurisdictions have addressed the meaning of 
a “claim” in the context of a government or regulatory investigation, the 
coverage analysis remains incredibly fact sensitive. The outcomes of the 
cases have depended in large part on the factual circumstances, seriousness 
of the investigation, and specific language of the policy. Because the 
Second Circuit broadly interpreted “Securities Claim” to include informal 
regulatory and government investigations, policyholders will likely “cite 
MBIA for the proposition that a company does not forfeit its D&O 
coverage when it volunteers to cooperate with investigative agency 
requests.”173 When seeking reimbursement under D&O and E&O policies, 
policyholders will also look to the Second Circuit’s holding that coverage 
extends to expenses incurred by a special litigation committee. On the other 
hand, insurers will undoubtedly rely on Office Depot when denying 
coverage for costs associated with informal SEC investigations. Since both 
the Second and Eleventh Circuit opinions are heavily rooted in the policy 
language and specific circumstances presented, it may be easy for future 
litigants to distinguish MBIA and Office Depot from other cases. 
Nonetheless, both decisions are important examples of situations where a 
court found or denied coverage for costs associated with regulatory and 
government investigations into corporate wrongdoing.  
 A number of practical implications for insurers and policyholders 
flow from this discussion. The case law illustrates the importance of 
seeking the most favorable definition of the term “claim” or “Securities 
Claim” possible. Given the high cost of responding to subpoenas and 
investigations and defending against subsequent legal proceedings, 

173 Richard Bortnick & Micah J. M. Knapp, Guest Post: 2nd Circ. Holds D&O 
Policies Cover Voluntary Compliance Expenses and Special Litigation Committee 
Costs, THE D & O DIARY (July 29, 2011, 3:30 AM), http://www.dandodiary.com/ 
2011/07/articles/d-o-insurance/guest-post-2nd-circ-holds-do-policies-cover-
voluntary-compliance-expenses-and-special-litigation-committee-costs/. But see 
Id. Observers have noted that the MBIA analysis was “heavily influenced by the 
facts” and the “impact of the decision may be limited based on the particular policy 
language at issue and the facts of the case.” 
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insurance carriers should structure their policy agreements carefully. 
Likewise, it is of the utmost importance that companies and financial 
institutions carefully examine their current D&O and E&O liability policies 
to determine what types of noncourt proceedings and investigations 
constitute a “claim.”174 The uncertainty over government and regulatory 
investigations falling within the definition of a “claim” has provoked 
insurers and policyholders alike to take another look at their policies. As a 
result, the insurance industry continues to evolve. Insurance companies are 
now introducing professional liability policies that specifically agree to 
cover the costs of certain internal investigations, most often investigations 
commenced at the bequest of shareholders, and costs incurred in 
anticipation of a formal regulatory investigation.175As regulatory 
investigations become more frequent, at least one carrier has introduced a 
separate insurance product to provide coverage for informal SEC 
investigations.176 It will be interesting to watch as D&O and E&O policies 
continue to evolve in the coming years as the law on coverage for 
investigations develops. 
 
 
 
  

174 Michael R. Sarner, Coverage Under a D&O Policy for Costs Related to a 
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